Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

1956

An Economic Study of Agrarian Problems in Indochina.
Randall Stelly
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
Stelly, Randall, "An Economic Study of Agrarian Problems in Indochina." (1956). LSU Historical
Dissertations and Theses. 155.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/155

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF AGRARIAN PROBLEMS IN INDOCHINA

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Agricultural Economics

by
Randall Stelly
B. S., Southwestern Louisiana Institute, 1940
S., Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, 1947
May, 1956

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Acknowledgment is extended to Dr„ Martin D. Woodin who served
as major professor and advisor, for guidance and assistance during
this study.

Dr, Bueford M* Gile is also recognized for his help and

counsel.
Appreciation is extended to the personnel in the Food and Agri
culture Division of the United States International Cooperation
Administration, the Operations Missions to Indochina, and the Ministry
of Agriculture of Cambodia and Vietnam for providing much basic infor
mation and data without which this study would not have been possible.
To Miss Jo Ann Fedele and Miss Marie Pizzolato the author is
especially grateful for stenographic assistance.

TABLE CF CONTENTS
PAGE
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.................................................

ii

ABSTRACT.......................................................

xi

CHAPTER
I.

II.

III.

IV.

INTRODUCTION...........................................

1

The Purpose and Scope of the S t u d y .....................
Sources of Data and Methods of S t u d y ...................

5
6

GEOGRAPHIC POSITION, PHYSICAL FEATURES AND RESOURCES
OF INDOCHINA...........................................

9

Location and S i z e .....................................
Natural Regions and Topography .........................
Climate and Rainfall........ ...................... . .
River System and Waterways
.............
Agricultural Regions
.........................
Irrigation, Drainage and Flood Control .................
Soil Types and G r o u p s .................................
Fisheries and Marine Resources.........................
Forest Resources .
...................................
Mineral Resources and the Mining I n d u s t r y ..............

9
11
14
17
20
21
27
31
36
41

INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS .

45

Principal Industrial and Population Centers ............
Manufacturing and Extent of Economic Development........
Interlocking Directorship ...........................
.............................
Commercial Development .
Capital Accumulating and the Banking S y s t e m ............
Foreign Trade: Imports and Exports ...................
The labor Market: Employment and Working Conditions . . .
Transportation and Communication .......................
Inland W a t e r w a y s ...................................
Ocean and Coastwise Transportation.................
Air Transportation.................................
Tele-Communication Facilities
.....................

46
46
51
52
53
56
59
63
66
66
67
68

POPULATION AND U V I N G C O N D I T I O N .......................

69

Distribution Patterns and Population Density............
Population Movements: Internal Migration . . . . . . . .
Land-Man and Rural-Urban R a t i o s .......................
Education and Extent of Literacy.........

69
70
74
76

iii

PAGE

CHAPTER
V.

VI.

FARMING METHODS AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION............

SI

Crop Production and Agricultural P r a c t i c e s ............
Rice . . . . .
.....
Types of Rice Culture .
.......................
C o r n ...............................................
Other Food C r o p s .............
Sweet Potatoes
...........................
Beans
...............................
M a n i o c .........................................
V e g e t a b l e s .....................................
F r u i t s .........................................
Oil-Bearing Crops .................................
C o c o n u t s .................
P e a n u t s .........................................
Fiber C r o p s .......................................
C o f f e e .............................................
T o b a c c o ...........................................
Sugar C a n o .......................
Sugar Pain
.......................................
P e p p e r .............................................
T e a ...............................................
Plantation A g r i c u l t u r e ...............................
History and D e v e l o p m e n t ...........................
Rubber . . . . . . . . . . . . .....................
Marketing.......................................
l a b o r .........
livestock and Animal Husbandry
.....................
Machines Versus Hand T o o l s ...........................
Rice Threshing...................
Irrigation.........................................
Increasing Agricultural Production ...................
F e r tilization.....................................
Social Problems
...........................

S3
S5
S9
93
96
100
100
100
100
101
101
101
101
102
103
104
104
105
106
106
107
107
108
115
121
123
128
130
134
134
140
141

LAI© OWNERSHIP AND TENURE RELATIONS...................

143

Size of Farms and Extent of Farm Land Ownership........
Systems and Types of Tenure and Tenure Relationships . .
Farm land V a l u e s ...................................... *
Farm Incomes and Level of Living
................
Rice Consumption in Relation to P r o d u c t i o n ............
Tonkin and North A n n a m .............................
C o c h i n c h i n a .......................................
Cambodia .
.......................................
Land Taxation and Land Revenue Systems
...........
.
Viet Minh Land T a x .................................

143
151
156
158
160
l6l
163
163
165
169

iv

CHAPTER
VII.

PAGE
LAND AND AGRARIAN R E F O R M ...............................

174

175
Need for Agrarian R e f o r m ...............................
Past Efforts at R e f o r m .................................
175
Social and Economic Importance of Communal Lands . . .
179
Viet Minli and Communist Agrarian R e f o r m ................
183
Rent Reduction
...................................
183
Scope of the Program............................
184
185
The Brcader P r o g r a m .............................
Results . .....................
189
Appraisal
.............................
191Post-War Efforts at Land R e f o r m .......................
193
Recent Efforts at Agrarian R e f o r m .....................
198
Present Land Reform Program and L a w s ...................
202
Present Statutes
.............................
203
Adequacy
........................
206
Possibilities for Success and Recommendations . . . . .
. 209
For Relatively Immediate Implementation . * ..........
210
For Adoption Following Limited Preparation..........
210
For Adoption Following More Extensive Preparations .
. 212
Complimentary M e a s u r e s .............
213
The Refugee Farm F a m i l i e s .....................
213
Present United States Interest .........................
216
Extent of Implementation and Difficulties Encountered .
. 216
VIII.

AGRICULTURAL MARKETING AND P R O C E S S I N G .............

219

The Present Marketing S y s t e m ...........................
Paddy Assembly and Local Processing..................
Weights and Measures .
.........................
Transportation
.....................
Storage Facilities
.......................
Financial Arrangements and Prices at Various Points
in the Rice T r a d e .........
P r i c e s .............
Functions of Supplies and the Wholesale Price of Rice .
Taxes in Rice Marketing O p e rations.................
Milling and P r o c e s s i n g .............................
Grade and Quality
.................
Defects in the Marketing System.........
At the Farm Level
.................
Transportation Problems
................
Rice Kills .
..........................
Storage
...................
Pricing Mechanism on the Domestic Market..........
Too Many Middlemen
.................
Need for Improvements to Increase E f f i c i e n c y ........

220
220
225
22o
229

v

232
233
236
240
241
243
247
247
248
249
249
249
250
250

PAGE

CHAPTER
IX.

AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES.............................

252

History of Cooperatives................................
Cambodia...........................................
Reasons for F a i l u r e .................................... .
Extent and Adequacy Under the French
..........
Recent Activities and Government Interest ..............
The Hew P r o g r a m ................................... .
Present Cooperative Statutes
. . . . .
Admission.......................................
Capital Stock and S h a r e s .......................
A d m i n i s t ration.........
General Director and Board of Controllers . . . . .
General .Assembly and Voting
............
Division of S urplus .............................
A d e q u a c y ..................................... .
........ .................. .
Accomplishments
V i e t n a m ............................................
Current Program of Activities.......... .
Basic Roouirements for Success and Recommended Action . .

252
255
256
260
261
262
2o4
264
264
2o5
265
2o5
266
266
266
272
260
281

a 1G
RICULTURAL

284

C R E D I T ...................................

Traditional S o u r c e s ...................................
French Efforts .......................................
Mutual Loan Associations...........................
Credit Agricole Populaire ..........................
Credit Agricole I-Iutuel
.....................
Adequacy of the System: Reasons for F a i l u r e ..........
Inadequacy of the System
..........................
Flistory of the Organization and Activities of
Agricultural Credit Agencies ..........................
Agricultural Credit to Individuals inCochinchina . .
S I C A M ............................................
Provincial Mutual Agricultural Credit Banks
of Indochina . . . . . . . . .....................
Coordination Commission for Rice Production . . . .
Mutual Agricultural Credit in Cambodia, Annam
and T o n k i n .........
Popular Credit Office
......................
Provincial Mutual Credit Office for Annam
and Tonkin
.................................
Mutual Agricultural Credit inC a m b o d i a ...........
Post-War S i t u a t i o n ..................................
Recent Developments...................................
Cambodia
.......................................
V i e t n a m .........................................
The Present P r o g r a m ...................................
Conclusions and Recommendations for an Effective
Program
...............

vi

285
28?
288
239
292
293
296
299
300
300
303
305
306
306
308
309
314
314
315
319
328
335

CHAPTER
XI.

PAGE
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

...........

A Program of Reform
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

338
3I>7

.............

APPENDIX A .........

3^3
377

APPENDIX

...............................................

h09

APPENDIX

...............................................

1*13

APPENDIX D ...............................................

U30

VITA.................. ................... .

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE
1,

PAGE
Climatic Data for Selected Stations in Indochina; Average,
1928 - A 8 .................................................

16

2*

Salt Production and Export from Indochina, 1936-51 . . . .

34

3.

Forested Area, Forest Reserves, as of December 31* 1940,
and Output of Forest Products in Indochina during 1940 . .

3$

4.

Forest Production in Indochina, 1936-50 .................

40

5*

Value of Mine Production, Indochina, 1 9 1 3 - 4 $ ...........

42

6.

Coal Production and Export, from Indochina, 1936-50 . . . .

43

7.

Prices and Indices of Prices in Cochinchina for Selected
Years (1939 = 1 0 0 ) .......................

57

Area, Population and Population Density in Indochina by
State, 1946 .
.....................

71

Rice Acreage, Yield and Production, in Indochina, 1936-52 .

$7

10.

Rice Exports from Indochina, 1935-54

$$

11.

Rice Acreage, Yield, Prodiiction, and Production per Capita,
in Indochina, by State, 1942-43 .........................

90

Comparisons of Rice Acreage, Yields, Pi-oduction, and
Production per Capita of Indochina with Other Asiatic RiceProducing Countries, Average, 3.935-36 to 1939-40

90

Acreage, Yield, Production and Exports of Corn in Indochina,
for Selected Years, 1936-51 ...........

94

Acreage in Minor Crops, in Indochina, Annual 1936-3$, 1940,
1942-44 .................................................

97

Acreage in Minor Crops in Indochina, by State, Compared
vdth Area in Rice, Rubber and Corn, 1942 . . . . . . . . .

9$

Production of Minor Crops, in Indochina, Annual 1936-3$,
1940, 1942-44...........................................

99

8.
9.

12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Number of Domain Concessions in Indochina, by State,
December 31, 1942
.........

viii

109

TABLE
18.

PAGE
Area of Domain Concessions in Indochina, by State,
January 1, 1940
...........................

13.0

Area Planted to Rubber, Area Exploited and Total Pro
.............
duction of Rubber in Indochina, 1938-54 •

314

Rubber Exports from Indochina by Country of Destination
and by Quality, 1954

3J.S

21.

Monthly Exports of Rubber from Vietnam, 1954

3.19

22.

Land Owners in Indochina Classified According to the Size
of Their Holdings.......................................

145

Schedule of Taxes Imposed upon Farmers by Communist
Viet Minh Authorities...................................

171

Comparison of the Production of the Various Products OutTurned from Rough Rice between Rice Kills in the United
States and in Indochina
.....................

245

Lending Operations of the Mutual Agricultural Credit
Societies of Cochinchina from 1924-30 . ..................

302

Number and Amount of Loans made by the Provincial Mutual
Agricultural Credit Banks of Cochinchina, 1939-45 ........

304

Extent of Operations of the Agricultural Credit Offices
in Cambodia, Annam and Tonkin, 1928-40

311

Amount of Money Loaned by the Provincial Agricultural
Credit Offices to Cooperatives in Tonkin, Annam, and
Cambodia in 1938, 1939 and 1940......................

312

Balance of Accounts of Provincial AgriculturalCredit
Offices as of December 31* 1944....... ...................

313

Source and Disposition of Funds for Agricultural
Loans, January 1, 1955

327

19.

20.

23.
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.

29.
30.

andOther

LIST OF FIGURES
IGURE
I*
II.
III.
IV.

V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.

X.
XI.
XII.
XIII.
XIV.
XV.
XVI.
XVII.

PA <33
Geographic Location of Indochina ...............

....

10

Indochina Generalised Type of Farming A r e a s ...........

22

Location of Principal Rubber Plantations in Indochina

. .

112

Rubber Plantation Established on land that was Jungle Ten
Years Previously.......................................

113

Rubber Exports from Indochina, Average 1935-39, Yearly
1 9 5 0 - 5 4 ...............................................

116

Crude Agricultural Hand Tools used by Indochina Farmers

.

129

Land Preparation and Rice Transplanting in Indochina . . .

131

One Method of Rice Threshing and Cleaning Employed
Extensively in Some Sections of I n d o c h i n a ..............

133

Comparison of Threshing Rice by the Traditional Method and
with the use of a Portable Foot-Operated Threshing Machine

135

Methods of Lifting Irrigation Water Commonly Practices in
I n d o c h i n a ...................................

136

Effects of Commercial Fertilizer on Rice in Indochina

13$

. .

Physical Patterns of Rice Fields in South and North
V i e t n a m ...............................................

144

Allocating Parcels of Land to Farm Families Displaced by
the War in Indochina . . . . . . . . . . ................

200

Rural Rice Mills in V i e t n a m ...........................

223

Junes used in Transporting Rice and Other Commodities in
I n d o c h i n a .........

22S

Fanners Cooperative Rice Storage Facilities in Indochina .

270

Two Methods of Drying Leaf Tobacco in Cambodia..........

279

ABSTRACT

This study analyzes economic conditions of Indochina as related to
agrarian problems and indicates the nature of reforms necessary to im
prove the economic and social well-being of rural people*

The study is

based on available official and unofficial reports and on data developed
by the author during four years as an agricultural economist in Indochina*
Indochina comprises the states of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, which
in 1952, emerged as free nations after 75 years of French colonial
administration*

Indochina is largely agricultural and is faced with the

serious agrarian problems characteristic of the Far East*

About 90

percent of the 23 million inhabitants are engaged in farming, rice being
the major crop.

While agricultural products constitute nine tenths of

the country's total production, less than one tenth of the land area is
cultivated.

Most farming is carried on in the deltas of the Mekong and

Red rivers which support extremely large populations per square mile*
In general, farms are small, living standards near the subsistence level,
and most families heavily and continuously in debt*

Nearly all agriculture

is conducted by natives, although rubber, coffee, and some tea and rice
plantations are French owned*

Farming methods are primitive, yields

relatively poor, and production per worker low*

There is very little

mechanical equipment and the use of draft animals is restricted because
they compete with man for the limited food supply*

Problems of land

ownership and tenure relations include the large number of fanners on
the available land, the pa realization of land holdings in North and
Central Vietnam, and the share-cropper system, absentee landlords,

3d.

insecurity of tenure and low percentage of farraer-owners in the south*
The need for agrarian reforms arises from the very unequal distri
bution of landholdings with a large percentage of the farm land in
possession of a small percentage of the people, exorbitantly high land
rental rates, usurious interest rates charged by moneylenders and
merchants for loans, and the disorganized and unsystematic manner in
which agricultural commodities are marketed*

Ineffective government

action in relieving these conditions results in social and political
unrest*
Programs designed to improve the economic wall-being of Indochinese
peasants and, consequently, the national economy should emphasize in
creasing land productivity and farmer efficiency, and be accompanied by
measures to assure equitable distribution of production*

To fulfill

these aims a reform program should:
1.

Provide credit to farmers at reasonable interest rates to
decrease farmers reliance on merchants and moneylenders*

2*

Immediately effectuate reduction of land rent, establish
greater security of tenure and formalize rights of squatters
and displaced farmers on abandoned lands, and eventually
redistribute lands more equitably*

3*

Improve the agricultural marketing system by encouraging
village farmer credit, marketing, and purchase cooperatives,
reestablishing storage and basic processing facilities in rural
areas, providing adequate market information, and revising
taxation and credit policies.

xii

4*

Strengthen the government Agricultural Service to include a
farmer education, information or agricultural extension section
to acquaint fanners with possible benefits through improved
crop production and harvesting.

5*

Give greater emphasis to government rural education and health
improvement programs.

6.

Provide opportunities for more employment outside agriculture
and reduce excess farm population.

7.

Foster improvements in transportation, especially repairing war
damage to facilities and building more faxm-to-market roads.

8.

Place greater emphasis on improving irrigation methods and
water-control devices.

To implement such a program of agrarian reform will require the
active participation of governmental organizations at national, provincial,
and local levels.

Government action to be effective must provide a

greater opportunity for participation and self expression by the rural
people for whom the program is designed to benefit.

xiii

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

France established itself in Indochina during the second half of
the last century.

The first contacts with the natives were made by

French missionaries during the early part of the seventeenth century.
French traders became interested in the area during the middle of the
eighteenth century when the French East India Company sent specialists
to Indochina to survey the country’s resources and to draw up plans
for their development.

The first French territorial acquisition

occurred in 1787 when, by special treaty providing for French support
of the Etaiperor of Annam, France was permitted to acquire the city of
Tourane and the island of Paulo Condore, off the Cochinchina coast.'*'
Persecution of the French missionaries by the Annamites during
the early part of the nineteenth century opened the way for energetic
action by France.

After a series of military engagements a special

French military force captured the city of Saigon in 1859> and by
1867 the whole area known as Cochinchina became established under
French rule.

The Kingdom of Cambodia accepted French protection in

1863, and by 1884 the French became firmly entranched din the Mekong
River delta when by a special agreement the broad outlines of French
political and administrative controls were formulated.

Charles Robequain. Le Developpement F^onomiqna de L'Indochine
Francaise. (Translated by Isabel A. Ward under the title The Economic
Development of French Indochina, New York: Oxford University Press,
19447, p. 3.

France at first became interested in Tonkin primarily from a
desire to open a road into China*

Following a series of military

activities, beginning In 1873 and ending in the treaties of 1884 and
1885, a French Protectorate was definitely and firmly established
over Tonkin and Annam*
Lao3 was the last state to become part of French Indochina*
Through its influence exerted from Cambodia to the south and Annam
and Tonkin to the east, France made peaceful expansions into Laos.
The Franco-Siamese treaty of 1893 established a French Protectorate
over Laos whose king had turned voluntarily toward France for protec
tion against Siam and Vietnam*

French Indochina thus became five

states and three peoples plus several ethnic minority groups*
France immediately declared Indochina an "assimilated" colony.

2

While Cochinchina was governed directly as a colony, native rulers
remained in nominal control over most of the country.

However, French

colonial power was always dominant and indirect rule was used for
administrative expediency.^
The French administration lost little time in consolidating its
administrative powers for French economic gains.

Indochina soon

became a protected market for French industries and, in addition,
through special customs systems and tariff duties, contributed sub
stantially to furnishing France the raw materials for its growing

2
"Assimilated" is a term used by the French to define the re
lations between France and other members of the French Union.
o

York:

Erich H. Jacoby. Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia.
Columbia University Press, 1949)>P» 134.

(New

industries*

It was in fact advocated by high public officials in

France that "colonial production be limited to supplying the mother
country with raw materials or other non-competitive products".^

A

very healthy atmosphere was thus created for profits to French capital.
With time, however, the political and economic situation changed
to the detrement of the French.

Political leaders began agitating

for more freedom and greater independence.

After World War II France

was forced to give Cambodia and Laos and the newly-named state of
Vietnam greater autonomy.

The French Governor General was reduced to

the rank of High Commissioner, the Indochinese government officials
were given greater control over the internal and external affairs of
the area, a greater degree of independence was granted by France in
1950 and finally complete independence in 1952.
In Vietnam, especially, the fever of independence ran high.
Under the Communist leader Ho Chi Minh, dissident groups began battling
French forces openly soon after the war and, with Communist support,
succeeded in gaining control of that part of Vietnam north of the 17th
parallel.

Nationalists in the South, tuider the leadership of President

Ngo Diem, moved further away from French rule and influence by taking
control of a larger portion of the economic, political, financial and
social affairs of the country.
Thus, after seventy-five years of French rule the three states
of Indochina were granted independence within the French Union with
the freedom to choose their own form of government.

Cambodia and

^feline (Director of the French Industry and Agriculture
Association) as quoted by Robequain, op. cit., p. 129.

Laos are presently under a constitutional monarchy form of government
and South Vietnam, through popular referendum, recently chose a
democratic republic government and rejected the former French-imposed
Monarchy of Emperor Bao Dai.
Compared to other countries in Southeast Asia, Indochina has not
developed to any great extent economically and industrially under
French rule and administration.

As a result, the economy of the area

is still based almost entirely on agriculture which is conducted under
primitive methods of cultivation for the most part.

In the agricul

tural economy of Indochina rice production predominates to such a
degree that it can be referred to as an example of monoculture.

About

ninety percent of the inhabitants are engaged in agriculture, and
about ninety percent of the total production of the area comes from
agriculture and forestry.

Most peasant farms are small and the farmers

and their families have a very low standard of living and are usually
heavily in debt.
Nearly all fanning is carried on by native farmers, although
rubber and coffee plantations and a number of tea and a few rice
plantations are in French hands.

Except on the European rubber plan

tations, yields per acre are low due primarily to the primitive
production practices followed.
As in most Asiatic countries, the diet of the Indochinese con
sists mostly of plant foods, primarily rice.
important of the animal products.

Fish is by far the most

Since production statistics are

unreliable and many fairly important crops are excluded from official
production statistics, it is impossible to prepare a satisfactory food
balance for Indochina.

However, the per capita food consumption of the

average rural peasant is very low.
Besides the French, the Chinese and Indians play a leading role
in the internal economy of Indochina.

The Indians have become well

established in the retail trade while the Chinese can be said to
practically dominate the internal rice marketing and milling and the
forest industries, and also play a leading role in the fields of
agricultural credit and transportation.
The Purpose and Scope of Study
World War II brought to light a recognition and appreciation by
the Western world of the strategic and economic importance of that
geographic area of the world often referred to as Southeast Asia.
Japanese occupation and control of the area for a brief period during
the war gave that country control of over 95 percent (over one billion
bushels) of the world rice production and a six million ton annual rice
surplus.

In addition, the 150 million people living in that area

produce over 75 percent of the world’s natural rubber.
the area forms the "cross-roads'1 into Asia.

Geographically,

From a location stand

point the area is strategic because most communication between the
Orient and the western part of the world pass through Southeast Asia.
Indochina forms part of this general area; in fact, it is located
in the approximate center of Southeast Asia.
countries of the area.

As is the case of other

Indochina’s economy is basically agricultural,

and it is upon the prosperity and stability of the agriculture that
the economic well-being of all the people depends.

Agrarian unrest

has been rampant in all of Southeast Asia for the past ten years or
so, and especially so in Indochina.

Very little information has been published in the English language
about agricultural and agrarian conditions in Indochina.

The few

published works on the subject are in the French language for the most
part.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the economic conditions
of Indochina as related to agricultural and agrarian reform in order
that intelligent and positive lines of action may be recommended to
improve the social and economic position of the country*s agricultural
population and thereby insure future stability and prosperity in that
important area of the world.
three steps:

In general this analysis is divided into

(1) a general survey and summary of conditions as they

exist at the present time; (2) a critical appraisal and analysis of
the situation; and (3) recommendations and suggestions for practical
actions and policies deemed necessary to bring about desired improve
ments in the levels of living, productivity and stability of the rural
population.
The ideas contained and conclusions reached in this study are not
intended as final and only answers to the problems facing the rural
population of Indochina.

They should, however, serve as a basis or

"guide-lines” for action programs and policies designed to contribute
towards a political, economic and social atmosphere which will be in
the interest of individual freedom and happiness.
Sources of Data and Methods of Study
The data used in this study were obtained from official and non
official sources.

Official sources include Vietnamese and Cambodian

government reports and bulletins, census data, government agricultural

statistics, and official reports of various government agencies*

From

the United States, official sources include selected State Department
dispatches, reports to the United States Congress, and special Activity
Reports of the United States Operations Mission to Indochina*

Unoffi-

cal sources include published works of French economists on the agri
cultural economy of Indochina, theses, unpublished pamphlets and
articles, and trade and industry reports, magazines and bulletins*
The author has also drawn widely upon his experiences and observations
while serving in the capacity of Agricultural Economist with the United
States Operations Mission to Indochina*
Extensive vise was made of material published in French and contained
in the libraries of the Vietnamese and Cambodian Ministries of Agriculture,
and of the French High Commissioner for Indochina.

The Office of Foreign

Agricultural Relations of the United States Department of Agriculture,
the United States International Cooperation Administration, and the
library of the United States Embassy to Vietnam also provided valuable
material.
In this study, considerable use has been made of comparative,
deductive and inductive methods of reasoning.

The comparative method

of reasoning makes it possible to analyze programs and policies in
neighboring areas and offer suggestion for their application to the
country under study under similar conditions*

By considering the

applications to similar conditions it is possible to offer suggestions
and tentative theories leading toward remedial action, definite ends
and positive results.
The deductive method proves useful in formulating some basis for
policy programs through analysis of existing conditions in Indochina.

Unreliability and incompleteness of a large part of the data available
makes it necessary to resort to apriori reasoning, thereby making it
possible to put some reliance on logical reasoning.

However, failure

of the course of events or the actions of people to follow what logic
indicates should normally happen may put definite limits to the validity
of arriving at conclusions by apriori reasoning alone.

It is because

of this that deductions made at a particular time may later need to
be modified in the light of time and circumstances then prevailing.
The inductive method of reasoning may well be the most useful in
analyzing the actual conditions and also in making positive recommenda
tions.

The number of published books, pamphlets, theses and other works

of an economic nature dealing with the problems of agriculture in
Indochina serve to give a fairly accurate picture of the actual conditions
and to indicate past activities and occurrences.

These are very useful

in formulating ideas as to the cause of historical events and conditions,
and serve as a basis from which to arrive at conclusions and to offer
recommendations for improvements.

CHAPTER H

GEOGRAPHIC POSITION, PHYSICAL FEATURES AND
RESOURCES OF INDOCHINA

This study is concerned primarily with the econondc situation of
the Associated States of Indochina.

Particular emphasis is placed on

the agricultural economy as related to agrarian reform, agricultural
credit and farmers cooperative organizations.

It is proper, therefore,

that an analysis be made of the geographic position of the area.

The

physical features and the geographic location are related to the dis
tribution and occupation of the people, and the natural resources
indicate the state of the economy and possibilities for future economic
expansion and progress.
Location and Size
Indochina comprises the three States of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam
and forms the eastern portion of the Indochinese peninsula.

It lies

between 8° 3 0 * and 23° 25T north latitude and 100° and 109° 20* east
longitude, and stretches approximately 1,000 miles from north to south.
It is bounded on the north by China; on the east and southeast by the
Gulf of Tonkin and the China Sea; on the west by the Gulf of Thailand
and Thailand; and on the northwest by Burma.

Figure I shows the

geographic location of Indochina.
The total area of Indochina is approximately 285*000 square miles
or about 182 million acres.
largest of the three states.

Vietnam, with 126,000 square miles is the
About 44,000 square miles is included in

Tonkin, 57*000 square miles in Annam and 25*000 square miles in
Cochinchina.

The size of the area ceded to the Communists under the
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terms of the 1954 Geneva Convention is about 60,000 square miles and
includes all of Vietnam north of the seventeenth parallel.

Cambodia

comprises an area of about 70>000 square miles and Laos about 39,000
square miles.
Natural Regions and Topography
Indochina is made up of several very distinct regions.

By far

the most important of these from an economic standpoint are the Tonkin
Delta in the north and the Mekong Delta in the south (which form part
of Cochinchina, now known as South Vietnam, and Cambodia).

These two

delta areas lie at both ends of the Annamese chain of mountains and
for this reason the country is sometimes referred to as "two baskets
of rice balanced on both ends of a pole".

The northern and northwestern

parts of the country are occupied by the mountains of upper Tonkin, now
known as North Vietnam, and upper Laos.

Much of this part of the

country consists of sandstone hills and limestone plateaux.

Parallel

to the east coast from the Gulf of Tonkin to the North to the delta of
the Mekong River in the South runs the Annamese chain of mountains,
which at some point reaches the coast to form numerous enclosed bays.
This chain of mountains has steep slopes on the eastern side, but
descends in gentle steps on the western side to the plateaux of Loas
and to the Mekong River.

The Cardamon Mountains in Southeastern

Cambodia stretch along the Thailand frontier and the Elephant Chain,
also in southwestern Cambodia, reach the Gulf of Thailand not far from
the Mekong delta.

The mountain region of Cambodia is the rainest and

most unhealthful district in Indochina and is almost completely devoid
of human habitation.
lated.

Other mountain areas are only very thinly popu
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The plains of Indochina occupy almost one-half of the country1s
total area.

The plains along the east, although they are small in

area and fragmentary in distribution, contain a majority of the popu
lation.

Intensive cultivation and recent alluvial deposits of high

fertility permit the existance of a dense population.

In these small,

numerous plains and valleys along the east coast over ninety percent
of the land area is utilized by man for crop and livestock production;
no other area in the country approaches this figure.

The two broader

plains of Indochina are located on the Gulf of Tonkin and on the South
China Sea.

The northern plain, known as the Red River Delta, comprise

an area of 5,400 square miles.

In this area live more than seven

million inhabitants and is considered as one of the most densely
populated regions of the world.
The other great plain to the east is the Mekong Delta with an
area of 15,400 square miles.

This plain is usually referred to as the

breadbasket of Indochina because in normal years the bulk of the
country’s surplus rice is produced there.
Other important plains are the floodplains and tablelands of the
middle and upper Mekong River and the Toule Sap basin in central and
western Cambodia.

Unlike the plains of the east, the western lowlands

occupy a vast, contiguous area and are drained by a single great river,
the Mekong.

Unfortunately, however, not all of this extensive lowland

region is overlain with recent sedimentary deposits as is the case with
the Red and Mekong River delta plains.
The broad tableland of the upper Mekong basin extend from the
Western slopes of the Annam Mountains westward to the Mekong.

Undulating

gently this tableland attains moderately high altitudes in the east
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but along the Mekong River the upland surface is seldom above 500 feet.
Sandstone beds cover much of the area, with the exception of the
Vientiane plain where rather recent sediments of high fertility pre
dominate.

It is in this area

population is found in

where the greatest

all of Laos and the upper

concentrationof
Mekong river.

The Toule Sap, or Great Lake, in Cambodia is a shallow body of
water surrounded by alluvial material of rather high fertility.

The

flow of water into and

out of the lake is almost

entirely dependent

upon the rise and fall

of the water level in the

Mekong River.During

periods of low river level (December to June) the lake drains into the
lower Mekong.

During this period the lake is approximately 1,000

square ndles in area.

During the period of high water (June to November)

the Mekong River drains partly into the lake, reversing the flow of
the connecting water channel between the Mekong and the lake.

During

this period of the year water pours into the lake, enlarging its area
to over 3*800 square miles and enriching the periodically inundated
border land which is planted to rice when the water begins to recede.
Two other areas in Indochina deserve special mention because of
their importance from an agricultural standpoint.

One of these is the

Plateau des Bolevens in Southern Loas which comprises an area of about
1,500 square miles of tableland of high fertility.

This plateau has

received special attention by French agricultural interests who have
established coffee plantations in the area.

The other area of con

siderable importance is the tableland area of northeastern Cambodia and
northern Cochinchina.
alluvial materials.

This area is overlain with recent sediments and
Much of this deposit consists of basaltic material

carried down from erosion on mountain slopes to the North and East.
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This area is commonly referred to a3 the "red soils'1 and the "grey
soils", and, because of its relative fertility, constitutes the most
useful agricultural portion of all the Indochinese highlands*

In

this area are found the large rubber plantations and tea plantings
developed by the French.
Climate and Rainfall
Indochina is a warm country*

At sea level there is no cold month.

All of Indochina lies south of the Tropic of Cancer and the coldest
month - January - at Hanoi, in the north, has a mean temperature of

63 degrees.

Only a few tropical crops, such as rubber, cocoa and oil

palm are excluded from the extreme northern part of the country, but
in all the plains and lower valleys of Indochina harvests can ripen
during any month of the year.

The annual mean temperature is 74 degrees

at Hanoi in the north, 77 degrees at Hue in the center, and 80 degrees
in Saigon, all of which are close to sea level.
The longitudinal Annam chain of mountains as well as the mountains
of southwestern Cambodia constitute important barriers to winds, and
thus influence considerably the temperature and precipitation of a
large part of Indochina.

For example, west of the Annam chain the

temperattire variation between the hottest and the coldest months is
only five to six degrees Fahrenheit; while east of the mountains, in
Tonkin and northern Annam, the temperature differences between the
hottest and coldest months are more than twenty degrees.

In the winter

the temperature sometime falls to as low as 42 degrees Fahrenheit.
Along the east coast of Indochina there are variations of as much as

15
18 degrees in 24 hours, a3 well as large variations from year to year
in the northeasternmost part.
From an agricultural standpoint variation in temperature is less
significant than the distribution and amount of rainfall, which is
determined primarily by the monsoons.

The monsoons are of two types,

depending upon their direction and period of the year.

The southwest

monsoons blow from April to November and, since they travel over large
bodies of water, hit the south Indochina coast laden with moisture and
bring heavy radnfally and storms over much of the country.

The north

east monsoons blow from November to April and bring dry weather.

The

exception to this general rule is eastern Annam where the northeastern
winds, having crossed a large expanse of water before reaching the
coast and adjacent mountain slopes, contain large amounts of moisture
which is precipitated on the land.

For this reason central Annam

receives most of its rainfall during the winter months.
There is considerable variation in total annual rainfall from year
to year as well as from station to station within the country.

This

is readily seen in Table 1 which shows the temperature variations as
well as the precipitation at several locations in Indochina.

A study

of the distribution of precipitation indicates further that there are
four regions of relatively high rainfall (more than 120 inches) and
three relatively low (less than 60 inches).

The rainy areas are:

(l) the mountains of southwest Cambodia, (2) the Bolevens Plateau of
southern Loas, (3) the Djiring Plateau of south Annam, and (4) the
higher portions of the central and northern Annam chain of mountains.
The 1owen-than-average rainfall areas are:

(l) the plains of Cambodia
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Table 1.

Climatic Data for Selected Stations in Indochinaj Average,
1928-48
••

••

••

••

:Vien~ : Val d ‘
Pnom
: Dalat : Hanoi : Hue : Penh : Saigon rtiane : Emeraude
Temperature
(degrees Fahr.)
Mean of warmest
month

70

84

84

86

36

82

Mean of coldest
month

63

63

70

78

79

69

Annual average

66

74

77

81

82

77

Precipitation
(inches)
.4

.9

3.8

.3

.9

.2

February

1.1

1.4

2.5

.4

.1

.G

March

2.1

1.8

3.2

1.6

.3

1.4

5.6

April

7.0

3.5

1.8

3.0

1.7

3.9

8.1

May

8.0

8.4

3.8

5.2

8.3

10.5

20.5

June

6.3

9.9

3.2

6.0

12,6

11.8

28.4

July

9.9

13.1

3.7

6.7

11.1

10.4

40.9

August

8.4

13.2

4.1

6.2

11.0

11.4

40.1

12.2

10.8

16.8

r•
to

13.3

11.8

30.5

October

8.7

4.5

25.9

9.0

11.1

4.2

18.2

November

3.5

1.8

25.8

5.0

3.7

.6

9.2

December

.9

1.1

23.7

1.3

3.1

.1

2.6

68.5

70.4

118.3

53.9

77.2

66.9

207.2

January

September

Year

Sources:

*

1.5
1.6

Annuaire Statistique de 1 ’ Indochine, 1947-1948, pp. 5-13j
Pierre Gourou, L 1Utilization du Sol en Indochine Francaise:
Paris: Hartmann, 1940, pp. 66-67.
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and the Mekong delta, (2) the coastal lowland of south Annam, and
(3) the upper Mekong valley of western loas.
High rates of evaporation throughout the country have rendered
areas of only moderate rainfall unsuitable for cultivation and large
areas of southern Indochina average less than 55 inches a year*

Still

vaster areas have extremely dry winter and spring months which make
crop and livestock production difficult*

With the evaporation ratio

for the area varying between 12.5 inches and 27.5 inches, years of
below-average rainfall often leave parched fields behind them in the
drier areas.
River System and Waterways
The rivers of Indochina, along with the man-made waterways and
canals, play a dominant role in the economy of the country.

In fact,

it can be said that rivers and canals are the life-blood of the country
from the standpoint of both agricultural production (irrigation and
drainage) and transportation and communication.

In some areas of

Indochina, particularly in the Mekong and Red River deltas, river and
canal traffic account for probably more than eighty percent of the
total local traffic, with roads and highways and water-buffalo trails
carrying the remaining twenty percent.
There are two principal rivers in Indochina, each branching out
into several tributaries close to the sea.

The Mekong River is one of

the great rivers of the world from the standpoint of volume of water it
carries out to the sea, the size of the territory it drains, its length,
and the volume of water traffic.

It has its source in Tibet and

descends in steps for 1,900 miles toward its delta through the plateaux

and plains of southwestern China, western Loas, and Cambodia to
Cochinchina and the South China Sea.

Its principal tributaries are

the Cisbassac, the Transbassac and the Vaico rivers*

The Red River

descends from the mountains of Yunnan in China, cutting through deep
and inaccessable gorges before it reaches its delta in Tonkin.

Its

two chief tributaries are the Black River, which flows from the plateaux
on the northwest, and the Clear River whose tributaries flow from the
Ba-be Lakes in China.
Other important rivers are the Toule Sap in Cambodia which connects
the Great Lake to the Mekong River and the Saigon River which has its
source in the mountains to the northeast of Saigon, flows past the city
of Saigon and empties into the China Sea sixty miles south of the city
at Cap St. Jacques.

The Saigon River carries all the maritime traffic

of the port of Saigon which is one of the great ports of the Orient.
The general climatic, soil, and relief features of the regions
give to the rivers of Indochina certain common characteristics.

As a

result of the monsoons which bring heavy rains for six months of the
year, and a period of dry weather for the following six months, the
rivers are swollen to overflowing in the fall and early winter and
extremely low in the spring and early summer.

Many rapids and cascades

in the areas above the deltas prohibit through navigation on the rivers
beyond the plains.

In addition, there is an enormous amount of erosion

caused by the rivers in the mountains and highlands with the result
that when the rivers overflow in the deltas during the high waters fertile
alluvial material is deposited over much of the two main deltas.

It is

this periodic deposit of earth material that has made it possible to
produce a rice crop without much fertilization year after year for
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centuries in the Tonkin or Red River delta, and it is the deposits of the
Mekong River which is responsible for the forming of the Cochinchina
delta lands.
Numerous other smaller, less important rivers are found along the
entire length of the Annam, or central Vietnam, coast*

These all

originate 3hort distances inland in the Annam mountains and flow into
the China Sea.

These smaller rivers also overflow their banks during

the rainy season and are the cause of the many small deltas in that
area.

Throughout the length of the Annam coast population centers and

farming are found at the mouths and along most of those rivers for short
distances from the sea.
The Red and Mekong River deltas represent a very complicated
pattern of canals crossing and cris-crossing one another and the smaller
rivers at irregular intervals.

In the Tonkin delta irrigation and

control of the water in the Red River were the main reasons for building
canals.

The first projects were undertaken by the natives centuries

ago and under French Administration the canal and dike systems were
improved and enlarged.

However, the means of communication afforded

by the canals and dikes is today probably as Important as their function
of water control.

The dikes provide footpaths for man and water buffalo

while the canals and ditches alongside the dikes furnish a means of
transportation by canoes or sampans and small, sailboats.
It is estimated that approximately 2,000 kilometers (1,200 miles)
of man-made canals presently exist in the Mekong delta. ' Most of these

5

Robequain, ot>. cit.. p. 111.
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canals were dug under French administration.

The original purpose of

digging the main canals in Cochinchina was to afford a means of com
munication to the swampy rice lands of the interior.

Secondary cuts

branching off the main canals have made permanent rice cultivation
possible over almost the entire delta.

Settlement of the interior

followed the dredging of canals, with new colonists building their
huts on the earth piled up by the dredges— the plains away from the
canal banks being flooded with from two to four feet of water for a
period of five to six months each year.

For that reason a typical

Cochinchina rural conmunity represents a row of straw huts strung on
both sides of the canal banks.
With the exception of two primary roads and a few secondary ones,
the only means of surface transportation in the interior of Cochinchina
is by means of sampans on the canals, ditches and riverB.

It is estimated

that just prior to World War II the total tonnage traveling over the
most frequented Cochinchina waterways was in excess of eight million
tons annually. ^

More recently, during the period of military activity

those canals afforded about the only means of army transportation and
movement in the interior, and both the French and Nationalist forces
made extensive use of troop landing crafts and other shallow-draft boats
in their military operations.
Agricultural Regions
Broadly speaking, the cultivation of crops in Indochina is carried

^Robequain, op. cit., p. 112.
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on in seven principal agricultural regions or areas.

These are:

the Red

River delta in Tonkinj the numerous small valleys and deltas along the
Annam coast, the Mekong River delta, the Great Lake region in Cambodia,
the plateau des Bolevens in Southern Loas, the red and grey tablelands
north and northeast of Saigon, and the Dalat-Djiring-Ban MeThout
triangle.

Rice is by far the most important crop grown in both the Red

River and Mekong River deltas.

C o m , cotton, sweetpotatoes, and vegetables

are crops of lesser importance in the Red River or Tonkin delta.

Secondary

crops include sugar cane, peanuts, tropical fruits, coffee, manioc, and
tea.

The Dalat area is the source of most of the fresh vegetables consumed

in the Saigon-Cholon metropolitan area, while tea cultivation predominates
in the Djiring area.
of Indochina.

The plateau des Bolevens produces most the coffee

On the red and grey soils area of Cochinchina and north

eastern Cambodia are found most of the rubber plantations.

Figure II

indicates the major types of farming areas in Indochina,
Irrigation. Drainage and Flood Control
Chiefly because of the wide variation in rainfall from year to year
and the uncertain seasonal distribution, irrigation is necessary to insure
stable production of rice and other crops, in spite of the generally
heavy rainfall in Indochina.

However, in the past, protection of the

crops against the disastrous floods has taken precedence over irrigation
in Annam and the Tonkin deltas.

As noted previously, the construction of

canals for transportation of paddy to the Saigon-Cholon area, to encourage
settlement of the area and to drain large expanses of marshy land has
been given greatest emphasis in the Mekong delta, but these canals also
serve as a basis for an irrigation system.
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Figure II*

Indochina Generalized Type of Farming Areas.
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Only about nine percent of the total land area in Indochina is planted to crops.

In the Tonkin delta the work of protecting the rice fields against
the ravages of the floods has been going on for centuries.

With the

exception of the highest alluvial lands and the lowlands in the region
between Hanoi and Haiphong, where the floods are not to be feared and
irrigation functions automatically by the action of the tides, cultiva
tion of rice in the delta is possible only through irrigation and control
of the water through a system of dikes.

Thus, construction of dikes and

efforts at water control in most of the delta have been going on as long
as agriculture has been practiced.

However, with the use of only simple

hand tools the natives in this area never were able to build dikes of
sufficient strength to sustain the high waters, with the result that
breakages occurred frequently flooding large areas.
In 1926 the French began an extensive program of dike improvement
throughout the delta.

The outlines of the old dikes were straightened,

the earthen embankments were made wider, higher and more solid by means
of an admisture of rocks and by reenforcing the foundation with tempered
clay.

The big dikes, which also serve as roads, and behind which huddle

the villages, are an inseparable part of the landscape of much of the
delta.^
At the turn of the century the French became interested in building
a modern irrigation system in the Tonkin delta.

But this could be done

only within the framework of the existing flood control dikes.

Between

1905 and 193S several canal systems were built, each of which consisted
of a witholding dam, a primary canal, and secondary and tertiary canals,

^The Agriculture of Indochina. (Washington: U.S.D.A., Office
of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Economic Cooperation Administration,
August, 1950), p. 19.
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all of -which brought water to the rice fields by gravity alone.

In 192#

a mechanized pumping station was constructed on the Red River above Hanoi
which, when completed, raised the irrigation water a total of sixteen
feet and distributed it by canals to some 25,000 acres of rice land*
Beginning in 1931 work was begun on a network of canals to carry
off excess water from the Red River and to bring in water for irrigation.
At the same time improvements were made in the pattern of dikes parallel
ing the river.

Irrigation systems have been completed in the delta covering

an area of over 600,000 acres, and plans for similar projects were made
before the war which would cover an area of about 1.3 million acres.

In

Annam, irrigation projects already completed cover an area of about
275,000 acres and similar systems are now under construction or planned
which would ultimately irrigate an addition 440,000 acres.
In Cochinchina it is estimated that over five million acres of farm
land have been created by means of drainage.

Acreage under rice cultivation

increased four times from 1880 to the beginning of the war, and rice exports
from Saigon were five times as great before the war as in 1880.

Irrigation

has taken a less important place in Cochinchina than in Tonkin or Annam
because the pressure of population on the land is not as great and farm
families have not been forced to cultivate the lower grade lands.
There are over 800 miles of main canals with an upper width of 70
feet and a depth of more than 6 feet below the level of the lowest dryseason tides in Cochinchina— the remaining mileage of canals is composed
of secondary and tertiary canals serving as branches and connection links
between the main canals.

However, the building of these secondary connect

ing canals has lagged behind the building of the main canals and with
relatively little effort native farmers could extend the beneficial effects
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of the changes in water levels resulting from the tides flowing up and
down the main canals into their own rice plots*

These changes in the

water level due to changing tides act as a natural regulator and make
it possible, merely by operating floodgates, either to remove excess
water during low tides or apply irrigation water during high tides*

Up

to the present time, however, only a small number of rice fields benefit
fully from the changing tide levels.
It is estimated that there are about two million acres of swamp
land in Cochinchina which is unfit for crop production.

Of this, about

1.6 million could be improved sufficiently for rice cultivation through
proper drainage.

The French administration developed engineering plans

to drain these lands and actual work was begun, but with the outbreak
of World War II all activity ceased.
French modernization plans before the war also called for the con
struction of several irrigation systems in Cambodia which would benefit
about 320,OCX) acres.

Very little effort has been made in water con

trol and irrigation in Laos.
With the exception of the irrigation plant on the Red River
mentioned above, a smaller plant in Annam capable of irrigation about

1,200 acres of rice land and thirteen small motorized pumps suitable for
irrigation about 75 to 100 acres each, all lifting of irrigating water
in Indochina is performed by primitive hand methods.

The equipment newly

installed in the large plant on the Red River and the plants and pumps
mentioned above were all furnished under American aid programs.

The two

most conmon methods of lifting irrigation water by hand consist of one
person balancing a bamboo bucket on a tri-pod and dipping the bucket in
the water at the lower level and dumping it into the field being irrigated
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or two persons balancing a bamboo bucket between two ropes and dipping
the bucket into a low level field or ditch, then dumping the water into
the field being irrigated.

These primitive methods of lifting irrigation

water place great restriction on both the surface area one is able to
irrigate and the height (3 to k feet) to which the water can be lifted.
In some areas in Tonkin and Annam water must be elevated three times
before the level of the field being irrigated is reached.
In irrigating upland crops, such as peanuts and tobacco, during
the dry season in areas removed from a stream, farmers make use of the
practice of digging holes in the ground by hand to the level of the water
at depths of from 20 to 30 feet.
six feet in diameter.

These holes are usually from four to

The water is lifted from the hole into the fields

in bamboo buckets attached to the end of a long bamboo pole.
The economic possibilities of greatly expanding the cropland through
these primitive irrigation methods are very limited.

The solution rather

appears to be in making greater use of small and medium mechanical waterlifting pumps on a cooperative basis.
this direction has been made.

Through American aid a start in

But the surface so far has only been

scratched, and it is probable that an additional four to five million
acres of cropland could be made suitable for double cropping by increasing
and improving the water-lifting devices and wells.

This appears especially

feasible when it is considered that the temperature in Indochina is ideal
for growing most tropical and semi-tropical crops twelve months of the
year.
Some progress is being made with the help of American aid to con
struct water-retention works in Cambodia and South and Central Vietnam
that will inpound rain water in the higher elevated areas during the
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rainy season for distribution into rice fields below during the diy season.
Such water control works would make it possible to grow a crop of rice
during the dry season as well as during the rainy season.

It is estimated

that it is feasible, within economic limits, to dam up water sufficient
for irrigating from 2.0 to 2.5 million acres.
The emphasis by the United States Government in helping Indochina to
improve and expand its irrigation facilities and water-control works is
reflected in the fact that for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1956,
American aid funds earmarked for irrigation amounted to $1,525,000 for
South Vietnam alone.

Of this amount, $125,000 is destined to procure

earth-moving equipment and water pumps from the United States, and
$1 ,400,000 constitute local counterpart currency to pay the internal
costs of operating this equipment and of constructing dams and distributing
canals.
Soil Types and Groups
There are no sufficiently complete soils studies to enable a detailed
description of the various soil types.

But the few general surveys that

have been made indicate that in general the soils of Indochina are relatively poor from an agricultural point of view.
The soils of Indochina are acid for the most part, poor in assimilable
phosphorus, lime, potassium, magnesium, and in humus.
true of most tropical soils.

This is generally

Climate is the principal factor influencing

g
Pierre Gourou, L'Utilization djj Sol en Indochine Francaise:
(Paris: Hartmann, 1940). Translation by Isabel A. Ward, (New York:
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945), PP* 77-&B.
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soil formation over the greater part of the country.

Abundant precipita

tion, almost everywhere exceeding the rate of evaporation, hastens the
process of leaching out the soluble substances from the soil surface.
Laterization^ is rapid in most areas.

But the process of laterization

is definitely retarded by forest cover, and when forest land is cleared
for farming minerals are soon leached out of the soil.
these soils become relatively infertile.

In a year or two

Under these circumstances, a

system of shifting or "ray” cultivation is practiced over a large part
of the mountain and hilly regions of Indochina.^

The ill effects of

shifting cultivation is not limited to laterization, but soil erosion
becomes a serious problem when the forest cover is constantly being
destroyed.

Upland soils are exposed to the violent actions of the rains

and denudation advances at a very rapid pace causing the waters of the
swollen rivers to contain large amounts of silt and sediment.

Robequain

estimates that one cubic meter of Red River water contains 500 grams
of silt during the dry season and as much as three and one-half kilograms
during the floods.^
Generally speaking, only the recent soils of the low alluvial plains
of Indochina are able to support a crop year after year in the form of

Laterization is the process of forming iron oxides in insoluble
rock form by water and rain dissolving the silica in soils containing
little humus more rapidly than the alumina.
^ " R a y ” cultivation is a primitive method of shifting cultivation
in which the forest cover in mountainous and hilly areas is burned to
clear the land for raising crops for a year or two, the soil being ferti
lized by the ashes, then allowed to return to its natural state over a
period of 13 to 20 years of idleness after which the cover is again burned
to clear the land for cultivation.
in> J2R« d t .. p. 107.

wet-field rice.

The grey soils of old allumiura and the residual soils

resulting from the decomposition of rocks in mountain regions do not
lend themselves to the cultivation of dry-field annual food crops on
a large scale.

Once deprived of tree cover, they are threatened with

rapid exhaustion, laterization and erosion.

Irrigated rice fields can

sometimes be established there, but the physical conditions allow this
only for small areas.

Even poorer soils are found in the alluminized

zone of the centrally located Plaine des Joncques to the west of Saigon
and adjacent areas to the north and west.

These '‘grey’1 soils are

products of the alluvial residue of a former delta and are elevated
several feet above the level plain below.

Dry native crops and, more

recently, rubber plantings have made use of these older alluvial soils,
but future exploitation, it appears, will have to be confined to a few
tree and bush crops.
The soils of the Tonkin delta are composed of fine particles, or
silts, which when dried are so hard it is difficult to break them up
with a plow.

These delta soils as a whole are of only medium fertility

except along the river banks.

The upper delta soils deteriorate through

leaching and decomposition; therefore, the oldest soils are usually the
least fertile.

Despite the fact that the soils of the Tonkin delta are

relatively poor, they have the great virtue of lending themselves to
the cultivation of wet-field rice because of their slight depth and
impervious sub-soil.

The differences in the fertility of the soils

are reflected in the density of the population, which usually reaches
its naxiraum on the richest soils and not necessarily on the longestsettled regions.

Notwithstanding the fact that the grey soils of old alluvium and
the residual upland soils are unable to sustain continuous paddy cul
tivation, and that rapid erosion, leaching and laterization preclude
their utilization for upland crops except under favorable local
conditions, there are some soils in the hilly areas which have a special
fertility*

These are the ’’Terre rouges” or red soils formed from the

decomposition of basalt*

The vast extent of these soils, coupled with

their relative fertility make them of prime interest to those seeking
efficient utilization of Indochina’s soil resources.

Altogether they

cover an area about 13,500 square miles (S.6 million acres) of which

70 percent may be classified as agriculturally usable, equivalent to
roughly half of the existing rice area of Indochina.

Despite their

well-known aversion to hilly lands, the Annamese have long cultivated
many of the fertile red soils of Annam and northern Cochinchina*

In

recent years the

crescent of the

basaltic soils

southern edge of

the Annam chain

has been the site of important plantings

of Hevea rubber trees.

extending fromthe

Cleared of their dense vegetation, these lands

are supplying the major part of the rubber production of Indochina.
Coffee and tea plantations are also found on these lands.

Diversified

dry crops are grown on some basaltic patches of ground; in some such
areas gardens of palms, bananas, pineapples, tea bushes, etc., are
grown.

Large areas of this land are still unpopulated and uncultivated.

Lack of means of communication to the interior appears to be the main
drawback to colonization and fuller exploitation of this vast land
resource.

These

red soils could

carry fruitful

and sub-tropical crops and represent one of the
tially rich agricultural areas of Indochina.

plantations oftropical
most importantpoten
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The general poverty of most of Indochina’s upland and mountain
soils needs to be reemphasized.

The relatively fertile red lands

represent only six percent of the total hill and mountain area; the
remainder is composed of relatively infertile grey soils, all lateritic
in character*

Except for a few areas in the redlands, there is little

or no permanent crop cultivation.

Recent alluvium and, to a lesser

extent, the grey soils of older alluvium appear destined to continue
to support the vast majority of the Indochinese population.
Fisheries and Marine Resources
The fishing industry holds a leading place in the economy of
Indochina, since fish with its various by-products forms an indispensable
item in the diet of the people.

There are no accurate statistics

available on the production of fi3h for the country as a whole.

Trade

statistics serve only limited usefulness in indicating the volume of
the total catch, because such a large proportion of the catch is consumed
locally and never enters the market channels.

However, all authorities

agree that fisheries are second only to rice in importance to the native
economy.

Fishing is a part-time occupation for almost the entire rural

population and is carried on in the spare time between rice planting
and harvesting when all the fresh waterways, lakes and rice fields are
fished energetically.

Although there are no available statistics to

verify this conclusion, it appears that fresh-water fishing is by far
more important than salt-water fishing because stocks of fish in the
surrounding seas are meager and Indochinese do not have a sea-faring
tradition.
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Before the war estimates of Indochinese fish catches varied between

300,000 and 410,000 metric tons annually and exports of fish and fish
products averaged about 35,000 metric tons.

This would represent an

annual per capita consumption of over 16 kilograms, although it is
difficult to determine accurately the utilization of the catch.

Some

is consumed in the fresh state, a part of the catch is dried and a
large proportion is consumed in the form of nuoc mam, a fish paste or
sauce used to give added flavor to the daily rice diet.

The following

represents the most reliable estimates as to utilization:
Metric ton3
Nuoc mam
Salted, dried and smoked fish
Fish oil and meal
Fresh fish

50,000
125,000
20,000
150,000

Fishery products take an important place in Indochinese exports.
In 1937, fish ranked fifth in the value of the principal goods exported
from the country.

The main part of these exports consists of salted

and smoked fish caught mainly in the Tonle Sap area of Cambodia.
Singapore usually provides the principal market for these export ship
ments.

Dried shrimp, fish and shrimp paste and fish oil make up most

of the remainder of these exports.

As a result of the war the exports

of fish and fish products dwindled almost to the vanishing point.

Very

little export activity has been forthcoming in the last few years.

In

1951, less than 3,000 metric tons of fish and fish products were exported,
about twenty-five percent of it in the form of salted, dried or smoked
12
fish, and the remainder in the form of fish oil and grease.

Economiaue du Vietnam No. 10. (Saigon:

1952), p. 521.

October,
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The most intensive commercial fishing in Indochina is carried on
in the Great Lake of Cambodia where some 30,000 persons are engaged in
conmercial fishing a body of water only 3>&00 square miles during highwater stage and only 1,000 square miles during the low-water stage.
Production is estimated at about 120,000 metric tons in a normal year,
with a large percentage of this being caught by the trawling method.
Of this production less than one-half enters the market in the fresh
state, the remainder is either dried or smoked before it is marketed.
About 1,500 metric tons of fish oil is prepared annually from fish
wastes.

Fish and its various by-products constitute one of Cambodia*s

most important sources of income,
A large program is presently underway in South Vietnam to expand
the raising of fish in the flooded rice fields.

Special efforts are

being made by the Vietnamese government to expand the breeding of the
*thelipia ’ fish (a rapid-breeding and rapid-growing type of fish which
thrives exceedingly well in shallow water and flooded rice fields).
On its most ambitious side this program envisions having every rice
farm family dig a home fish-pond of sufficient size to supply its own
fish needs.

The United States Economic Mission to Indochina has been

most interested in this program for increasing the production of this
all-important food item,

A total of $355,000 has been set aside by

American officials for the purpose of helping local farmers defray the
expenses of constructing home fish ponds, and for the importation of
additional breeding stock from Thailand and other Asian countries.
Besides fish and fish by-products another important marine industry
in Indochina is salt.

Before World War II Indochina was one of the

major producers of salt in East Asia.

Slightly less than 200,000

34
metric tons of salt was produced annually on about 4>100 hectares
(9,000 acres) of marine salt beds.

Table 2 indicates the annual pro

duction of salt by regions and annual exports.
Table 2.

Salt Production and Export, 1936-51 (in thousands of metric
tons)

•
Total
:
:
Annam
: Cochin-^ :
: Tonkin : Monopoly : Private : chinai/ : production : Exports
m

Tear
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940 .
19412/
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951

Sources:

^

29.1
27.9
35.6
25.3
28.0

65.1
66.4
67.1
86.1
83.8

43.3
55.5
40.4
44.2
83.5

51.2
43.8
35.9
57.8
54.0

39.0
29.7
39.0

67.5
50.1
14.4

51.2
17.7
18.0

.2
1.2

10.2
40.5

47.5
60.6
29.7
14.7
17.9
4.1

—-

Annuaire
Bulletin
Bull.etin
Bulletin

—

13.5
19.5

188.7
193.6
180.0
223.5
189.4
316.6
275.9
205.1
158.1
101.0
—

41.3
65.4
113.6
81.5
103.8

93.0
93.3
68.5
44.2
20.0
28.0
7.0
—

.3
—
—

20.0
23.1
40.3
—

Statistiaue de l ’Indochine 1943-46, 1947-48;
Mensuel de Statistique d'Outre-Mer 1951,
Statistiaue Mensuel 1950-51J
Econonique du Vietnam. No. 10, October 1952.

Monopoly salt only.

2/
-/ Production data by state are unavailable for 1941 and 1942 and for
the years since 1948.
The greater part of this salt was produced by Indochinese using
a variety of relatively inefficient methods.

The remainder was produced

by one large French salt-producing corporation or ’monopoly* producing
primarily for export.

Success of the operation of this large corporation

with salt beds in southern Annam offers an example of modern technology
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successfully applied to a native industry resulting in more efficient
production and better quality of the product.
Salt production from sea water is carried on in three areas.

One

of these areas is in North Annam, but because of the excessive humidity
and precipitation and the pollution effect of numerous streams and
rivers the operations are confined to small plots and the production
is all consumed locally.

In Cochinchina there are two 3alt fields

which produce over one-half all the salt in Indochina.

However, In

this area humidity, precipitation, and pollution of the coastal water
also hamper efficient operations.

The most productive operations are

carried in in the southern coast of Annam.

It is In this area that

the large French corporation mentioned above is located on a 360hectare tract (300 acres) and produces the highest quality salt in
Indochina by employing the pure "solar" process.

With the exception

of the salt produced by this French corporation, all salt in Indochina
is subject to government monopoly in its sales.
There i 3 no salt refining industry in Indochina.
raw salt for human consumption and in salting fish.

The natives use
The small amount

of refined salt used in the country is all imported from France.

As

Table 2 indicates, a large percentage of the raw salt produced in
Indochina is exported, with almost the entire exports going to Japan
before World War II.

Due to insecurity and abandonment of many salt

beds during the recent internal hostilities production has decreased
considerably.

With the reestablishment of peaceful conditions pro

duction will probably return to pre-war level in the near future.

Foreat Resources
Of the total land area In Indochina, about 74 percent is classi
fied as forest land.

However, only about half of this may be

considered true forest; the remainder is largely savanna and brushland.
Rich forests (those supporting a volume of timber of more than 300
cubic meters per hectare,^ one-third of which is composed of highestgrade timber) cover only about 17 percent of the true forest lands;
another 20 percent may be termed definitely inferior (supporting a
volume of only 100 to 150 cubic meters per hectare, a very small pro
portion of which is high-grade timber).

The bulk of the forests are

intermediate in character from the standpoint of volume of timber and
grade.
Although the trees of the savanna forest lands are generally
small, a high proportion are suitable for certain industrial and
manufacturing needs.

These rich savannas support a volume density of

100 to 150 cubic meters per hectare.

Inferior types contain less than

100 cubic meters of firewood per hectare.
lands contain only brush and bamboo.

Other forests and savanna

Differences in the definition

of the term ’forest* probably account for differences in the estimates
of the total forested area of the country, which vary from 74 million
acres (about 40 percent of the total area of the country), to over 104
million acres (about 57 percent).

In general, however, It can be said

that the rich and average forests plus the better savannas comprise
about 57 percent of the total land area while the poor forests and
savannas account for about 17 percent.

13One cubic meter of timber contains 424 board feet.
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Table 3 indicates the forested area by state in 1940 (no later
figures are available), as well as the amount included in the forest
reserves, and the output of the principal forest products*

It will

be noted that almost half of the forested area is in Loas, the least
populated state, but that the total amount of forest that has been
placed in reserves is negligible*

Only a small part of the forests

of Indochina, chiefly the inaccessable areas, is genuine virgin forest.
A government forestry service was established in 1901 for the
purpose of supervising timber cutting and preventing the further deple
tion of the forests through wasteful cutting methods.

In 1942, the

conservation and improvement of Indochina's forest resources was placed
under the supervision and responsibility of the Director General of
the Forests and Waters Service within the Ministry of Agriculture.
Apparently this agency has not been too successful in its task.

It

has been criticized as being little more than another fiscal agent
concerned primarily with taxing the lumber coming into the consumption
centers from the interior.
The most pressing problem facing forestry officials has been the
constant depletion and deterioration of the many useful forests and
wood species.

Uncontrolled timber cutting has denuded large stands in

the upland border’s of the delta plains.

In addition, the destructive

method of shifting cultivation, or "ray", also has devastated large
portions of fine tropical forests, giving rise to dense woodlands over
large areas but all without any valuable species remaining.

Today,

many of Indochina's forests are virtually exhausted and soil erosion
has become a serious matter in some areas.

It is in an effort to

control the wasteful exploitation methods that the Forest Service has

Table 3.

Forested Area, Forest Reserves, as of December 31, 1940, and Output of Forest Products in Indochina,
during 1940

Catesorv

•
:

Unit

•
: Tonkin

•
•
: Annam

•
• Cochin- :
: china : Cambodia

•
•
: Laos

•
• Total French
: Indochina

Total area
Forested area (rough estimate)
Forested area

1.000 acres
1.000 acres
% of total

28,589
17,050
60

36,472
16,061
44

15,987
1,977
12

44,725
19,274
43

57,179
50,408
88

182,952
104,770
57

Forest reserves. Dec. 31. 1940
Number
Area
Area supervised

Number
1.000 acres
1.000 acres

122
1,023
158

154
2,276
235

177
1,843
788

145
6,222
203

4
10
10

602
11,374
1,394

Output of forest products
in 1940
Construction wood from
forest reserves
from other forests
Total
Firewood
from forest reserves
from other forests
Total
Charcoal

1 million bd. ft.
1 million bd. ft.
1 million bd. ft.

1.000 steresr/
1.000 steresi^
1.000 steresi/
1,000 m.t.^/

106.4
M
109.8

100
28
128
2.7

^

65.7

-2*1
71.6

201
-26
237
n.a.^/

1 stere » 35.31658 cu. ft.
■=/ 1 metric ton * 2.2046 pounds.
<2/ The total production of Annam and Laos was 2,000 metric tons.
Source:

Annuaire Statistique de P Indochine. 1939-40, p. 87.

66.6
28.8
95.4

349
820
1,169

92.0

33.9
47.?
81.4

137
252
389
5.5

8.4
8.4

23
0
23
n.a.2/

281.0
85.6
366.6

810
1 ,1?6
1,946

102.2
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recently established large, protected forest reserves throughout the
country.

However, wasteful cutting practices continue and shifting

cultivation in the mountain areas has not diminished to any great
extent.
All of the 13.5 million hectares of forest in Vietnam are owned
by the government and administered by the Forest Service.

Two con

cessions of about 30,000 hectares each were granted about 30 years
ago.

These two concessions furnish the logs for the largest sawmill

in Indochina.

Of the 14.6 million hectares of forests on Laos, 14

million hectares are owned by the government and 600,000 hectares
constitute the Royal Domain.

The concession to exploit the Royal

Domain has been granted to a French firm which has the exclusive right
to cut timber in that area.
As a consumption item, bamboo is utilized to a much greater extent
than dimensional lumber by the Indochinese.

The reason for this is

that bamboo poles suffice for the construction of straw huts, are more
easily transported and cut to desired lengths, and cost less than
lumber.

It has been estimated that the per capita consumption of

lumber in France is 19 times more than in Indochina."^

The high cost

of lumber compared with bamboo in the population centers of Indochina
is due primarily to the fact that facilities for transporting timber
from the forest areas to the milling and consuming centers are for the
most part undeveloped.

Another factor is that only a very small portion

of the sawmilling industry is mechanized.

It has been estimated by

"^Unpublished report on the Forest Industry of Indochina by
G. N. Brown, Forestry Expert, United States Operations Mission to
Indochina.
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Brown that close to 80 percent of the logs cut into dimensional lumber
in Indochina is sawed by hand.

This results in a low capacity of the

sawndlling industry and in high-cost lumber even in localities on the
edge of large forest areas.

This is the reason why the output of wood

for commercial and constructional purposes has always lagged behind
that of firewood, as is indicated by Table 4.
Table 4.

With the exception of

Forest Production in Indochina, 1936-52
Constructional
timber

Firewood

Total

(1.000 cubic meters)— ^
1936
193#
1940
1941
1943
1944
1946
1947
1943
1949
1950
1952

661
872
865
1076
1214
1013
229
203
276
253
265
685

1538
1834
1946
1520
3276
3143
1023
951
1047
917
1008
416

2199
2756
2811
2596
4490
4156
1252
1154
1323
1170
1272
1101

1 cubic meter = 35«34 cubic feet or 424 board feet of lumber.
Sources:

Annuaire Stati3tiaue de l tIndochine 1943-46, 1947-48J
Bulletin Mensuel Statistiaue 1950-51J George N. Brown,
op. cit.

one rather large sawmill located near the city of Saigon and the teak
wood exploitation in Laos (both operated by French), most mechanical
sawmills in Indochina are owned and operated by Chinese.

For the most

part, sawmills owned and operated by Indochinese are not mechanized,
and generally consist simply of a few blocks and lift jacks (either
under a grass shed or in the open) and several workers with hand saws
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working on the same log.
ditions is extremely low.

Output per man under these primitive con
Actually these native wood sawing operations

are not sawmills in the true concept of the term but are given the
classification of "saw-pits" in lumbering terminology.
Mineral Resources and the Mining Industry
Indochina has a great variety of mineral resources, among which
coal, tin, zinc, tungsten, gold, and precious stones are the most
important.

Most of these minerals were prospected by the Annamese and

Chinese before French occupation, but production has been of a con
siderable amount only during the past half-century.

Except the coal

deposits, most of these minerals are located in the mountainous areas,
and the impenetrable nature of the interior, unhealthy climatic con
ditions, and poor communication facilities have hampered extensive
development of these resources.
For a number of years prior to World War II exploitation of mineral
resources, except for coal, was largely confined to small-scale operations
carried on for the benefit of France rather than as an adjunct to the
Indochinese economy.

Until 1940, mining concessions were entirely in

French hands, foreigners being prohibited from owning or controlling
any mining enterprise.
Total production from mines in 1940 was valued at about 30 million
piasters ($8,000,000 at 1940 exchange rates).

Tonkin accounted for

about five-sixths of that amount; most of the remainder was produced
in Cambodia and Laos.

Coal is by far the most important mineral pro

duced in Indochina and prior to World War II accounted for about 60
percent of the total value of all minerals mined in the country.

Table 5 indicates the value of mine production in Indochina, and Table

6 shows the coal production and exports*

Pre-war production of coal

amounted to about 2.4 million metric tons annually, of which 98 percent

Table 5.

Value of Mine Production, Indochina, 1913-48
Year

Value
(millions of piasters)

1913
1923
1930
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948

4.0
9.6
16.8
11.2
13.0
19.3
26.3
29*5
30.2
30.0
23.0
20.0
15.6
6.0
18.0
15.5
80.7*

The very large Increase in piaster value of output during 1948 is
due more to devaluation of the currency than to increased output of
mineral products.
Source:

Annuaire Statistique de ltIndochine 1943-46, 1947-48, p. 111.

was anthracite.

Practically all the coal deposits of the country are

located in the Hon Gay area north of the city of Haiphong in eastern
Tonkin.

A large portion of these are open-pit deposits and coal reserves

are estimated at over one billion tons.

At the time this area was

turned over to the communists in 1954 the French had just completed
installing large quantities of mechanical mining equipment to facilitate

Table 6. Coal Production and Export, from Indochina, 1936-50

Tear

:
Quang Ten

1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950

2264
2280
2524

Production
(1,000 metric tons)
Anthracite
: Bituminous and
: Other
: Total
:
lignite

—
-10

2186
2308
2276
2534
Pi,14
ppy*
1163
954
499
218
262
249
359
330

43
60
80
86
79
80
66
38
13
—

11
—

:
:

Total
coal
2186
2308
2335
2615
2500
2327
1243
1020
537
231
262
260 /
359I/
376
495

:
Exports
:(1.000 metric tons)
To
Total
: Japan
913
808
672
673
479
515
249
. 152
—

1725
1550
1581
1791
1566
1338
337
180
1

—
—

—

25
64
41

24
69
73
59

In 1948 local consumption amounted to 262,700 tons divided as follows: water and electric! ty42#, manufacturing industries-30#, Marine navigation-13#, railroads-6#.
Sources:

Bulletin Mensuel de Statistique D 1outre-Mer 1951: Bulletin Statistique Mensuel 1950-51:
Annuaire Statistique de 1* Indo-China 1943-4*3. 1947-48, p. 112.
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their mining operations*

Since most of Indochina's thermal energy is

derived from coal, the generating of electricity has always been
dependent upon production from the coal mines*

With the coal mines

in Communist hands the rest of Indochina is now dependent upon
foreign sources for its coal supplies.

CHAPTER III
INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT
AND COMMUNICATIONS
The economy of Indochina is largely agrarian and industrial
development is consequently in a relatively infant stage.

Next to

open-strip coal mining in Tonkin mentioned in the previous Chapter,
cement manufacturing is the most important single industry in the
country.

Production of cement in 1948 amounted to 97,300 metric tons

as against 266,400 metric tons in 1938, but rose successively to
202,200 tons in 1951, 235,200 tons in 1952 and over 300,000 tons in
1954,

Other industries include two medium-size cotton mills in

Tonkin, small industrial plants in North and South Vietnam, such as
ship yards for small crafts, rubber processing and rubber products
manufacturing (except tires), tire recapping, paint manufacturing,
shoe making, match manufact tiring, and food processing.

In addition

to the above-mentioned industrial enterprises, cigarette, smoking
tobacco and cigar manufacturing is a relatively important industry in
the city of Saigon,
Also relatively important enterprises include a number of small
breweries making beer and alcohol, sugar refining, native basket work,
soap making, salt mining, and oxygen and acetylene works.

Outside of

the few industrial enterprises, almost all locally-produced supplies
and equipment are manufactured in cottage-type industries employing
less than 10 persons, or in centers where artisans of various trades
gather to produce their goods and market their products.

An important

industry is represented hy local rice mills, which, before the war,
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were scattered throughout the rice-producing areas of the Tonkin and
Mekong deltas*

Most of the small country rice mills have been

destroyed by war activities and at present the rice milling enterprises
are practically all centralized in the cities of Saigon and Pnom Penh.
A more detailed analysis of the rice milling industry is made in
Chapter VIII.
Principal Industrial and Population Centers
The largest population center of Indochina is Saigon-Cholon with
an estimated two million persons.
about 300,000 persons*

Hanoi is second in population with

Haiphong, the main seaport in Tonkin, and

located 50 miles from Hanoi, has a population estimated at 200,000
persons, while Pnon Penh, the capital city of Cambodia, numbers about
150,000.

Other relatively important centers of population include

Nam Dinh and Haidoung in Tonkin, Hue, Tourane and Nhatrang in Annam,
and Mytho, Cantho and Longxuyen in Cochinchina.

In Cambodia, Kompong

Cham and Battambang are also relatively important centers of population.
The most important centers of population in Laos are Vientiane, the
capital city, Savannakhet and Luang-Prabang.
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Manufacturing and Extent of Economic Development
Although the profit motive and French economic gain were probably
behind most French efforts at industrialization and development of
Indochina, the fact remains that fifty years ago there were a very

^Annuaire Statistique de l tIndochine. Summary, 1952, pp. 20—31.

small number of industries in the real sense of the word*

Most of

the non-agricultural production was carried on by artisanal workers
under small sheds using rudimentary production methods and primitive
hand tools.

It has been estimated that the seasonal and permanent

labor force engaged outside agriculture in all Indochina amounted
to about one million during that period.

A large number of workers

included in this figure consisted of farm people who worked at different
trades during the slack period of labor requirement in the rice fields.
It has already been noted that the mining industry was developed under
French control and supervision at the turn of the century.

The rubber

production and processing industry was also developed by the French
during the past 30 years.

The French are also responsible for

establishing the first mechanical sawmill in Indochina, as well as the
first mechanical rice mill.

The textile mills in Tonkin, as well as

the bottling works and breweries and alcohol plants in Saigon, Hanoi,
Haiphong, Tourane, Pnom Penh and other cities, were all established
by the French.
Among the rural industries, those connected with the preparation
of food, such as rice husking, the manufacture of rice paste and cakes,
starch, oils and molasses, the distillation of alcohol, etc., undoubtedly
employ the greatest number of workers, but it is difficult to distinguish
between moral industries working solely for home consumption and those
producing for sale.

^First Report of the French Modemization Commission. Saigon
November, 1943, p. 23.

The textile industries probably come next in the number of people
employed, although there are no reliable statistics available to veriiy
this statement.

Throughout the country there are many primitive looms

on which women and children weave cloth, which, though coarse, is
strong and valued highly by Indochinese peasants.
of silk is still woven by hand on primitive looms.

A considerable amount
With the textile

industry may be included embroidery, lace making, the manufacture of
fishing nets, hammocks, and rope and twine from jute or ramie.

Basket

weaving is likewise a widespread home industry.
Masons, stone cutters, and brick makers are all members of the
building industry.

There are a few village blacksmiths and artisans

who make copper and brass articles, and cart wheels and plow shares,
but the average Indochinese peasant uses little metal.
also a special craft in a few localities.

Pottery is

These are the traditional

industries and are found mainly in the Tonkin delta area.

In many

localities these rural and family industries are primarily handicraft
industries that supplement agriculture and make use of that portion of
the peasant’s time left after his primary occupation in the fields.
The extractive and mining industries were considered in the
previous chapter under "Natural Resources".

The importance and position

of coal mining cannot be too greatly emphasized.

Aside from furnishing

Indochina with almost all its thermal energy and accounting for a large
percentage of all industries, it also accounted for the employment of
close t o '50,000 natives and about 300 Frenchmen at the outbreak of
World War II.

17

After the war the number of workers in the coal mines

17
Annuaire Bleu. (Institut de la Statistique due Vietnam,
Saigon: 1950), p. 21.
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decreased due to decreased volume of production and the fact that the
mines were more fully mechanized with American mining equipment
furnished by American Aid.

IS

Next in importance as a French production and industrial venture
in Indochina is the rubber industry.

The economic situation of the

rubber industry is treated under a separate heading in Chapter V.
Using primarily labor imported from the Tonkin delta the French are
responsible for having established this industry second in importance
only to rice as a source of foreign revenue.

The first extensive

rubber plantings were established during the late 1920*s and early
1930’s, and immediately prior to World War II the plantations of
Indochina were employing a total of 70,000 Indochinese.

In 1945 the

number of natives on rubber plantations stood at 60,000 but b y 1953
had decreased to 35,000.

The primary reasons for this decrease are:

(1) the production rate decreased during that period and many
laborers left the plantations to join the rebel array; (2) new plant
ings were not being undertaken by plantation owners; and (3) many
other plantations greatly mechanized their operations, thus reducing
the amount of hand labor required for sustained production.
Undoubtedly, regulations imposed by France and tariff legislation
favoring special French interests have contributed many of the features
of Indochina’s present economy, and particularly explain the slow
development of industries as compared with agriculture.

In the ■words

ISSee United States Special Technical and Economic Mission,
Activity Report through June, 1953, in which it is stated that almost
two million dollars of U. S. equipment were made available to one
large coal mining company during the first two years of American Aid
to Indochina.
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of one Frenchman of authority ’’the free development of industry has
never been allowed........... even the possibility of such development
was long considered paradoxical, almost inconceivable".

19

It is quite

evident that if foreign capital and ingenuity had been allowed to
freely seek employment in the country, the resources of Indochina would
have by now attained a greater degree of development and industrilization
would have at least kept pace with other segments of the economy.
Cotton spinning is another rather important industry carried on
a reasonably large scale by the French in Indochina.

The two spinning

mills, both located in the Tonkin delta, employed a total of more than
10,OCX) native men and women and produced an annual output of about
15*000 tons of cotton cloth and y a m until it was taken over by
Communist forces during the early part of 1954.
Cigarette and cigar manufacturing is completely in French hands.
All four cigarette manufacturing plants are located in the city of
Saigon-Cholon and process an average of 7,000 tons of leaf tobacco
into cigarettes and cigars annually and employ approximately 1,800
men and women.
The French have also secured a monopoly in sugar refining.

The

four plants in South Vietnam, all French-owned, process all the refined
sugar produced in Indochina.

There are numerous small, open-kettle

syrup and sugar mills scattered through the southern part of Indochina,
however.

All of these are owned either by Indochinese (Vietnamese or

Cambodians) and Chinese.

These small sugar mills are of course unable

to produce refined sugar but are limited to the production of syrup

19Robequain, op. cit., p. 269.
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and very coarse brown sugar most of which is consumed in that state
by natives, but part of their production is sold to the French
refineries.
Rice milling is about the only large-scale mechanical industry
in Indochina not dominated by or under the exclusive control of French
nationals.

In the field of rice marketing and processing Frenchmen

prefer to concentrate on the wholesale and export phase (since they
have a virtual monopoly on shipping) and appear to have left the field
open for dominance by Chinese.

For example, out of 191 rice mills in

operation in the interior provinces of South Vietnam in the fall of
1952, only two were French-owned, the remainder were in the hands of
Vietnamese and Chinese.

In the city of Saigon-Cholon during this same

period there were a total of 41 rice mills in operation.

Of this

number 31 were Chinese—owned, seven were owned by Vietnamese and only
three were in French hands.

20

In Cambodia, another center of rice

milling, during the spring of 1953 there was a total of 108 rice
mills in operation.

However, most of these were small, huller-type

rice mills with a capacity of less than 1,000 pounds of paddy per
hour.

Of the six rice mills with a capacity of 20 tons per hour or

more, four were owned by one French firm and the other two by Chinese.
Interlocking Directorship. A very particular feature of French
firms engaged in business and commercial and industrial activities in
Indochina is that of interlocking directorships*

It is very seldom

that one large commercial establishment is engaged only in one or two

20
Bulletin Economique du Vietnam No. 10. Saigon:
1952, p. 511-514.

October,
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fields of activities, or that one fairly large industrial and/or manu
facturing plant is owned by one single firm.

Though it is not generally

known by the public, the management of one of the largest conmercial
establishments in Indochina once admitted to the writer that his firm
was holding both financial and management interests in rice mills,
sugar mills, vegetable oil refining, bottling works and a glass factory,
ice plants and breweries, in addition to being one of the largest import
and export establishments in the French Empire, and also the owner of
a large part of the shipping sailing under the French flag*

Another

example could be cited of a group of large rubber plantations having
as members of the board of directors the managers of an import-export
firm, a cigarette manufacturing plant, a salt mine, a rice milling com
pany, and a petroleum company*

Probably the only exception to this

sort of arrangement among the larger French enterprises in Indochina
is the cotton spinning and weaving industry, which, as far as can be
ascertained, is under independent ownership and directorship.
Commercial Development
The basic unit of currency of Indochina is the piaster of 100
centimes.

The parity of the piaster is tied to the French Franc.

Since 1953 the parity between the two currencies has been fixed by
mutual agreement by the governments of France and the Indochinese at
the ratio of 10 French francs to one Indochinese piaster.

Exchange

rates between the piaster and other currencies are based on the Paris
official market franc rate, presently fixed at 348 francs to the United
States dollar.

Calculated at this rate one United States dollar equals

34*8 piasters*

However, like most currencies in the world, there is
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usually a large difference between this official rate and the free, or
open—market rate of exchange for the United States dollar; recent free,
or open-market rates for the Indochinese piaster have varied between
70 and 80 for one United States dollar.

Foreign trade of Indochina

is conducted at the official rate instead of the averages between the
official and the free rates.

Exchange transactions are closely con

trolled and U, S, dollar exchange is granted only for the purchase of
items deemed essential by the Indochinese government for the economic
requirements and rehabilitation of the country.
Capital Accumulation and the Banking System
French expansion in Indochina was made possible only by the
entrance and circulation of capital.

According to Robequain, the

major portion of these funds was raised within the country in the form
of taxes and duties, or as loans almost entirely subscribed in France.
All the budgets, both national and local, are financed this way.

21

Private

business, on the other hand, had to find new capital, occasionally
within the count ty but more generally in France.

It appears that

foreign capital (non-French), with the exception of Chinese capital,
has formed a very small percentage of the capital investment in Indochina.
The period immediately following World War I is the one in which
French investments in Indochina were at their highest level.

In the

seven years, from 1924 to 1930 French companies operating in Indochina
floated loans totaling slightly more than 3.3 billion francs.

This is

the period during which French business men became actively engaged in
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carving our rubber plantations out of the jungle, and the tempo of
activities is reflected in the fact that about one-third of the loans
made during that period were in the field of agriculture.

This was

also a period of great development of the Hongay coal mines and of
the building and allied industries.

22

In 193^ an equivalent of 464 million dollars were invested in
Indochina, of which 382 millions were in business enterprises.

Western

capital (95 percent French) amounted to 302 million dollars, and
Chinese capital 80 millions.

More than one-third of the French capital

was invested in agriculture, the remainder in processing industries,
mining, trade and banking.

Most of French agricultural investment

represents investments in rubber plantation which, before the war was
estimated at 45 million dollars.

23

.rivate capital, therefore, whether obtained through loans, or
capital subscription by private investors, can be said to have played
a leading role in the commercial and economic development of Indochina
to its present level.

Both the size and the form which investment will

take in the future will probably be closely linked up with monetary,
economic and political problems which cannot be solved by private
initiative alone.

Having passed through periods characterized first

by agricultural endeavors and then by the capitalists, Indochina*s
development in the future may well be marked by ever-increasing govern
ment intervention, especially in the field of credit, monetary controls

York:

^Helmut G. Callis, Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia. (New
Institute of Public Relations), pp. 80-85.
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and trade restrictions.
There are eight banking corporations operating in Indochina,
with offices in the principal cities.

French, Chinese, Indian, and

British interests predominate in the banking business of the country.
The central bank for all the three states is the Institute d ,Emmission.
which, as the name indicates, is the Bank of Issue for all of Indochina.
This bank of issue was created in 1952 for the purpose of taking over
the functions of (l) issuing bank and Treasury notes, (2) supervise
foreign exchange control, (3) acting as a depository for the National
Treasury and the various public and governmental offices, and (4)
making loans and advances to the National Treasury against its short
term bond issues which are guaranteed by the Institute and sold to
the banks locally.
The amount.of money in circulation in Indochina has increased
at a tremendous rate since 1940 when 280 million piasters were in
circulation.

(During that year the official rate of exchange was 3.5

piasters to one U. S. dollar).

In 1948 the amount of money in circula

tion amounted to 3.2 billion piasters, and by the spring of 1954 this
had increased to 8.5 billion piasters.

25

It appears that the general level of prices kept pace with the
presses printing the currency.

The government Bureau of Statistics

publishes monthly and annual indices of wholesale and retail prices of
both industrial and consumption goods, as well as price indices of

^*The role of credit and the credit system as related to agri
cultural enterprises is treated more extensively in Chapter X.
25

Annuaire Bleu, op. cit.. p. 3«

imported and local goods.

The Bureau also publishes monthly and annual

indices on the cost-of-living for both Europeans and natives.

Based

upon prices in 1939 as 100, the index of wholesale prices in 1951 was
2,450; the index of food items consumed by natives was 4,280, and
the index of food items consumed by Europeans was 4,350.

26 It appears

that the level of prices in metropolitan France just about kept pace
with inflation in Indochina.

The same source indicates the general

level of wholesale prices in France stood at 2,525 at the end of 1951.
Table 7 shows the general movement of prices in Indochina for selected
years since 1939.
Foreign Trade: Imports and Exports

27

Indochina is primarily an exporter of raw materials and an importer
of manufacturer goods.

The foreign trade of the country has been

characterized by a substantial excess of imports over exports, by an
increasing tendency for imports to rise appreciably and for exports to
remain stable or fall slightly in recent years.
The value of Indochina's exports in 1952 amounted to over 4 billion
piasters (117 mi]lion dollars).

Three agricultural commodities accounted

for 71 percent of the total, distributed as follows:
rice, 33 percent; and com, 2 percent.

rubber, 36 percent;

Other exports in order of

26
Tableau de l 1Evolution des Prix en Indochine. Bureau de la
Statistique, 1952.
27
Data used in this section were obtained mostly from the
following documents: (l) Etudes et Documents. Institut d'Emission,
No. 4, December, 1953, (2) Summary of Basic Economic Information.
American Embassy, Saigon, July, 1953.

57
Table 7.

Prices and Indices of Prices in Cochinchina for Selected
Years. (1939 - 100)
:
1929 :
1939
«
•

i
■

1950
1949 !
•

I
•

1951

Wholesale Prices in Saigon
General index
Local products
Imported products

94
74
116

100
100
100

2,100
2,100
2,090

2,070
1,960
2,100

2,450
2,390
2,480

104
87

100
100

2,880
3,910

3 ,n o
3,780

3,590
4,350

103
103

100
100

4,130
4,130

4,230
3,940

4,770
4,280

7.1

5.6

168

144

155

11.6

9.3

262

220

232

11.1
6.9

8.6
7.8

237

217

203
126

220
147

89

100
100
100

1,826
1,702
1,922

2,063
1,823
2,265

2,525
2,037
3,050

Family Consumption Items
European
General index
Index of food items
Vietnamese (working class)
General index
Index of food items
Prices of Selected Products in
Saigon (Piasters pr 100 kg)
Paddy
Milled rice (No. 1, 25%
broken)
Milled rice (No. 2, k0%
broken)
Com
Index of Wholesale Prices
in France
General index
Food products
Industrial products

Source:

SB
89

Tableau de l'Evolution des Prix en Cochlnchine. Bureau de la
Statistique, 1952.

58
importance were feathers, coal, hides, and skins, pepper, kapok, and
dried vegetables.

Metric tonnage of some of the leading conmodities

exported in 1952 are as follows; with annual pre-war averages shown
in parentheses:

rice, 245,000 (1.5 million; rubber, 63,000 (60,000);

c o m , 28,000 (500,000); pepper, 550 (5,000); coal, 213,000 (1.6 million).
The chief countries of destination with percentages of the total value
of exports taken by each, in 1952, were as follows:

France, 30.3J

Hong Kong, 12.75 United States, 10.6; Singapore, 9*4; and Indonesia,
8.5.
Total imports during 1952 were valued at 15.7 billion piasters
(449 million dollars) resulting in an unfavorable balance of trade
amounting to 11.6 billion piasters (333 million dollars), or a little
less than twice the deficit of 1951 of 170 million dollars, compared
with 40 million dollars in 1937.
in order of importance, were:

The chief items imported in 1952,

cotton and other textiles, metal goods,

machinery, iron and steel, automobiles and motor accessories,
pharmaceuticals, wines and liquors, sugar, silk products, electrical
equipment and appliances, and paper and rubber products.

France is by

far the leading supplier of goods imported in Indochina, with 78 percent
of total imports during 1952 origination in that country; the United
States supplied only 5 percent of Indochina’s imports that year.
In 1939 and 1940, an export excess of 100 and 190 million piasters
(28 and 54 million dollars) respectively, was achieved, while the average
during the 1930’s was only about 60 million piasters (17 million dollars).
Even this considerable export excess, however, was normally not sufficient
to cover the annual transfers of commercial profits into French francs
(averaging about 700 million francs, or 70 million piasters).

For
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several years this resulted in a deficit in the balance of payments

and not until an excess of exports of about one billion francs was
reached in 1937 did & surplus in the balance of payments appear for

the first time.

Payments were balanced by new capital imports, since

the heavy transfers of profit prohibited the accumulation of capital
in Indochina.

Callis concludes that the development of Indochina has

been characterized by increasing indebtedness, with little organic
growth of capital equipment.
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The Labor Market: Employment and Working Conditions
In a country such as Indochina, the position of the laboring
class is conditioned mainly by the general low level of living of that
part of the population engaged in agriculture.

Improvements through

labor legislation can be obtained only when social conditions in general
are improved at the same time.

In Indochina, the problem of labor is

not alone the uneven distribution of the population; the demand for
labor on the rubber plantations in the South create yet another special
problem.
In the previous chapter mention was made of the approximate number
of workers employed in the various industries of Indochina.

With the

exception of workers on the rubber plantations, the Indochinese laborers
live in the cities and towns where their employment is located.

They

work regular hours and receive a definite rate of pay for their work.
In most industries the usual number of hours of work is 10 hours per

2^Callis, op. cit., p. 84.
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day, six days per week*

Although there is a minimum wage law and standard

work week, social legislation is not enforced*

The general level of

wages for both unskilled and skilled laborers is low compared with western
standards*

During 1948, the last year for which reliable statistics

are available, the average rate of pay for unskilled men workers was
16 piasters per day, and for women, 11 piasters.

The average rate of

pay for skilled laborers was 18*4 piasters per day during the same
year*

29

The official exchange rate of the Indochinese piaster during

1948 was 17 piasters for one United States dollar, which would indicate
that unskilled men workers received about ninety cents per 10-hour
day, women 68 cents, and skilled workers about $1.09*

However, it

must be remembered that the free rate of the piaster vis-a-vis the
U. S* dollar during that year was about 40 piasters to the dollar, which
means that the purchasing power of the piasters received for ten hours
of work amounted to about 40 cents for unskilled men workers, 30 cents
for women workers, and 46 cents for skilled workers.
There is in Indochina a Labor Inspection Service whose main function
is to arbitrate in labor disputes, but siding more often with the
employer than with the employee.

During 1948 there were a total of

696 individual work stoppages, of which 573 cases were settled by the
Labor Inspection Service and 123 settled by a special Conciliation
Commission.

During the same year there were also a total of 57 work

stoppages by groups of workers.

Forty-two of these were settled by

the Labor Inspection Service and the remaining 15 were settled by the

29

Annuaire Statistique de L ’Indochine, 1947-48, pp. 253-259.
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Conciliation Commission.

The unionization of labor has not made much

progress in Indochina.
The use of 'contract labor' is still the rule on most large rubber
plantations.

Most of the workers hired on contracts on the plantations

were recruited in the Tonkin delta where an excess supply of labor has
existed for centuries.

At first the government administration did not

enter into the labor recruiting business, with the result that planta
tion owners used special hiring agents who were paid so much per laborer
recruited.

Thompson reports that the majority of these hiring agents

were unscrupulous, made gross misrepresentation of the hiring contracts
and, in many cases, used drugs in getting the coolies to submit to
conditions which were virtually three years of forced slavery.

30

Special legislation passed in the late 1930's resulted in improvements
in the methods used in hiring and also in the conditions under which
plantation laborers worked and lived.

Supervision of hirings was

placed in the hands of civil administrative authorities, and contracts
had to guarantee a minimum of well-being to the laborer! such as three
years employment, ten hours daily work, rest periods, stipulated wage
rates, provisions for dependents, suitable housing, food rations, and
a compulsory deferred pay system (5 percent wage deduction) designed
to encourage savings.
Camus estimates that at the peak of activities, in 1939 > rubber
plantations afforded the livlihood for a total of 140,000 men, women
and children, and that the value of salaries paid and food furnished

30
Virginia Thompson, labor Conditions in Indochina, (New York:
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945)} p. 153•

represented probably 25 percent of the total wages paid labor in
Indochina. ^

Working and living conditions have materially improved

during the past decade.

Sanitary conditions have been imp roved, free

medical care and hospitalization is provided on most plantations,
adequate housing for the laborer and his family is furnished and the
free food ration now include meat and fish, fresh vegetables, salt,
tea, and ’nuoc mam* (fish paste).

Free schooling for dependents and

churches or pagodas are also provided on most plantations.

In addi

tion, recreation facilities and village markets with controlled retail
prices are also provided.

Contracts also stipulate that free trans

portation for the worker and dependents to their original village will
be provided at termination of the contract.

As result of these improve

ments turnover of contract labor on rubber plantations has greatly
decreased during the past few years.

Notwithstanding the number of

laborers who left the plantations to join the guerillas during the
early part of rebel activities, it is estimated that about 70 percent
of the workers renewed their contracts at the end of the first three
years period, and some workers have remained voluntairly on the same
plantation for twenty or more years.

OO

More recently, It appears that

one of the greatest drawback to keeping contract laborers (most of
which are Tonkinese) on the plantations for a long period of time is
the changed environments in which the laborer finds himself on the
plantations.

Robequain concludes that miserable as his life in the
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J. J. Camus, L 10euvre Humaine et So d a l e dans les Plantations
de Caoutchouc d 1Indochina. (Saigon: 19497, p. 1.
^^Camus, op. cit., p. 6.

north was, the Tonkinese on the rubber plantation is still home-sick
for his native village.
him.

The dicipline of the plantation depresses

He cannot get used to the forests and hills which hem him in

from all sides.
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In many cases the Tonkinese laborer seems to be

the victim of his own shiftlessness.
Transportation and Communication
Probably the greatest mark that will be left by the French in
the development of Indochina will be the progress made in the field
of transportation and comnunication during the past few decades.

As

noted in Chapter II, through French initiative and under French super
vision great progress has been made in digging canals to drain rice
lands and irrigate other areas, with the result that the present rather
extensive system of canals in the delta areas of Indochina affords a
means of communication and transportation in the interior provinces which
was not available before the canals were dug.
However, results of French efforts go far beyond the existing
canals.

On the eve of World War II there was a total of over 33,000

kilometers of hard-surfaced (asphalt) roads; although there is not a
single mile of concrete road in all of Indochina.

Close to 15,000

kilometers consisted of gravel roads, and the remainder, or approximately
13,000 kilometers, were dirt roads.

It should be kept in mind that at

the turn of the century Indochina was without any improved roads in the
true sense of the word.

Although the road surfaces and the road beds

are not up to United States standards, carving out the right-of-ways

Robequain, op. cit., p. 218.
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and the road beds out of jungle forests, mountainous areas and low,
swampy land usually called for a large amount of effort*
Ten years of war resulted in the destruction of a large percentage
of the road mileage in Indochina.

Lack of security prevented proper

maintenance and repairs in many areas, especially in North and Central
Vietnam and in Laos.

In addition, demolition of bridges by the Communist

rebels was so extensive that very few of the numerous bridges remained
intact.

It has been estimated that a total of 13,000 of the 33*000

kilometers of roads in existence at the beginning of the war were unfit
for automobile travel in 1950.

A great road rebuilding and bridge

repair program is now underway in Indochina, with most of the asphalt,
steel and concrete being furnished by the United States under the
foreign aid program.
Under the French control and administration a total of over 3*000
kilometers (1,800 miles) of railroad was built in Indochina; about
400 kilometers of which consists of a rail line from the city of Pnom
Penh to the border of Thailand to the west.

In Vietnam the French

extended a railroad from the banks of the Mekong river in the south to
the border of China in the north, thus linking the two most important
deltas and regions of Indochina.

It has been stated that "there was a

wholly understandable ambition on the part of the French to use rail
transportation to attract as much as possible of the trade of South
China.^

There is little doubt that the interest of France and of

French enterprises were given first consideration in the construction
of the single railroad the whole length of the eastern seaboard.

However, the fact remains that the railroad was constructed through
exceedingly rough terrain, necessitating many excavations, tunnels,
and numerous bridges.

The first railroad was constructed in 1890 and

the linking of the southern line and the one from the north was not
accomplished until 1936, or 40 years later.

Most of the work of building

the railroad, as is still the case in building roads and highways, was
done by hand.

Robequain cites a case of 60,000 laborers working at

one time on a single section of the rail line in the north close to
35
the Chinese border. ^
The operation of the railroads in Indochina is under government
control and direction.

Guerrilla activities during the past few years

resulted in the destruction of about one-third of the total railroad
mileage.

At the end of 194& only 1,300 kilometers of railroad remained

in operation.

Throughout the period of 1950 to 1954 railroad traffic

was possible only with armored cars, and every train was preceded by a
pilot locomotive to test the bridges ahead for mines.

Throughout the

area controlled by the guerrillas in the north and central part of
Vietnam most of the rails were removed and the metal used by them for
ammunition.

The same use was made of the steel ties in those areas

(the French have an aversion to utilizing wood ties on railroad beds).
This gives some indication of the tremendous rebuilding job to be done
in Indochina to bring the roads and railroads to the same condition
that existed before the war.

35Robequain, op. cit.. p. 91.
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Inland Waterways

With the numerous rivers and smaller streams in the country, and
the network of canals dug throughout both the Mekong and Red River
deltas, Indochina had a very efficient system of inland waterways in
prewar days*

Mention has already been made of the importance of this

inland waterway system in the development of the interior section of
Cochinchina*

During the war activities, however, the rebels, in their

effort to block military and civilian traffic on the canals and smaller
streams, erected numerous barriers across those waterways*

In addition,

the fast military craft operating up and down the canals caused a
large percentage of the canal banks to wash away*

This, and the fact

that the barriers built by the rebels prevented the usual flow of
current in many canals, resulted in heavy silting*

Thus, many of the

inland waterways are badly in need of dredging and repair before the
larger sampans and river boats can safely navigate them.
Ocean and Coastwise Transportation
There are no free zones or ports in Indochina.

The two principal

ports are Saigon in the south and Haiphong in the north.

Other important

coastal ports in Vietnam are Hongay, Bangoi, Tourane and Nhatrang.

In

Cambodia the most important port is Pnom Penh on the Mekong River.
Another port in Cambodia, but of secondary importance, is Kampot which
is located on the Gulf of Thailand in the southern part of Cambodia.
Saigon is by far the most important port, handling 1,116 steamship
cargoes in 1952 totaling approximately 1.5 million tons.
year Haiphong handled 500,000 metric tons.

In the same

Whereas the Chinese
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predominate the inland or river shipping, the coastal shipping is
almost exclusively a French monopoly.

Normally about one third of the

ocean-going ships calling at Indochinese ports are of French registry#
During 1950, for example, out of 731 ships entering the port of Saigon
a total of 474 were French.
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Air Transportation
Both external and internal aviation activities have increased
considerably during the past few years; the latter primarily because
of lack of security on highways, railways and internal waterways.

As

a result, regular air service is provided between all of the principal
cities and population centers by one or more of the five air transport
companies operating in Indochina.

A large number of airports and

runways built by the French for Army Air Force use are also opened to
civilian air traffic.
The extent of internal air traffic is indicated by citing statistics
for the year 1950— considered an average year since 194®.

In that year

there were a total of 31*710 internal commercial civilian flights in
Vietnam alone.

These flights carried a total of 276,800 passengers and

30,140 metric tons of freight.
not available.

Total passenger or freight mileage is

During that same year there were a total of 1,623

international flights in and out of Vietnam, carrying 30,000 passengers
and 2,300 metric tons of freight.

37

Bulletin Economique du Vietnam. Etudes et Documents. No.
Saigon, December, 1953.

37Annuaire Bleu, op. cit., p. 10.
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Tele-Communlcat!on Facilities

While there are telephone exchanges and inter-urban conmunications
in the larger cities of Indochina and their immediate surroundings> all
inter-city and foreign communication is by radio.

A government organi

zation in each of the three states operates the telephonic, radio, and
telegraphic networks of Indochina.

Outside of the larger population

centers, tele-communication is not very extensively developed.

There

are about 8,500 telephone subscribers in Indochina today, compared with
5,000 in 19k& and 10,000 in 1939.

CHAPTER IV
POPULATION AND LIVING CONDITIONS

There has never been a really satisfactory census taken of the
population in Indochina.

Best estimates place the present total

population at about 28 million people with 22.6 million people in
Vietnam, 1.6 million in Laos and 3.5 million in Cambodia.

There are

approximately 9.8 million people in North Vietnam (commonly referred
to as Tonkin), 7.2 million in Central Vietnam (the former Annamite
Empire) and approximately 5.6 million in South Vietnam (formerly known
as Cochinchina).
Distribution Patterns and Population Density
It is estimated that over 80 percent of the population live on
slightly less than 13 percent of the total land area.

Population data

available are sufficient to show the extremely uneven distribution of
the population.

The most heavily populated areas are the alluvial

plains close to the sea.
(l)

These areas are:

The Red River delta, 5>790 square miles, with 7.5

million people or 1,295 per square milej (2) the coastal plains of
Central Vietnam, 5,790 square miles, with 4.6 million people or 795
per square mile; (3) Central Cochinchina, 6,180 square miles, with
3*2 million people or 520 per square mile; (4) Western Cochinchina,
7,720 square miles, with one million people or 130 per square mile;
(5) Southern Cambodia, 12,350 square miles, 2.4 million people or 195
per square mile.

The towns and cities are included in these figures.
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As is indicated by Table 8 the rest of the country also shows
significant differences in population densities.

Large areas of Laos,

Northern Cambodia, and the hilly and mountainous areas of Central
Vietnam are virtually unpopulated.

On the other hand, parts of the

Red River delta are among the most densely populated agricultural
areas of the world, having a population density of over 3*000 people
per square mile.
Population Movements t Internal Migration
The growing population of Indochina includes a great number of
ethnic groups which are also very unevenly distributed.

Of the total

population, the Annamites are by far the largest number, representing
about 72 percent of the population.
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About one-half of the Annamites

live in the Tonkin delta, the rest of them in Annam and Cochinchina
and a few in Cambodia and Laos.

In Vietnam they amount to about 88

percent of the population, whereas in Cambodia and Laos they represent
only six and three percent of the population respectively.

The

Cambodians are the second most numerous ethnic group in Indochina,
representing 12 percent of the total population.
Of the remaining 14 percent of the population, about 2 percent
are foreigners and 12 percent other natives of a great many ethnic
groups.

Most numerous among them are the Thai who represent about 6

percent of the population and are divided about equally between Laos

^T)ata on population movement and migration are obtained for
the most part from the Annuaire Statistiaue de l fIndochine. 1947-1948,
pp. 19-30, and from Pierre Gourou, Land Utilization in Indochina, pp.
47-73.
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Table 3.

Area, population and population density in Indochina by state,
1946

State

•
J
: Area
:

•
*
Population density
tAverage oftMost densely:Least densely
:Population : entire : populated . : populated
s state
: province^/ :
source

1,000
sq. mi.

Thousands - ---- People per square m i l e - -- —

Tonkin (North
Vietnam)1/

44.7

9,851

220

3,193

3

Annam (Central
Vietnam)1/

57.3

7,134

124

2,973

10

Cochinchina (South
Vietnam)

24.7

5,579

226

1,116

13

127.2

22,614

178

3,193

3

Total Vietnam
Cambodia

53.7^

3,227

60

350

3

Laos

91.4^

1,139^/

13

23

5

99

3,193

3

Total Indochina 2 72 . 3 ^ 27,030^

^

1943 figures for Tonkin and Annam.
Does not include cities.

3/

^

Not including the territory ceded to Siam in 1943 and returned after
the war.

^

Not including the population of the territory ceded to Siam in 1943
and returned after the war.

Source:

Annuaire Statistiaue de l tIndochine< 1943-46, pp. 27-23.
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This ethnic group make up about 56 percent of the total

and Tonkin.

population of Laos.

Another important ethnic group is

the Moi who

live mostly in the plateau areas of South Annam and Laos; they represent
about 4.5 percent of the population.
The largest group among the foreigners is the Chinese who number
about 610,000.

The majority of these reside in the city of Saigon-

Cholon which has about 320,000.
numbers about 144*000.

The Chinese population in Cambodia

The importance of the Chinese in the economy

of Indochina far exceeds their numerical strength.

In fact they have

a firm hold on a large segment of the country’s econony, and form somewhat
of a link between the native population and the French.

The typical

Chinese in Indochina is the merchant, primarily rice merchant, although
upon first entering the country he may engage as a laborer or enter in
some special type of agricultural enterprise, such as peppery-growing
in Cambodia.

In his profession as a rice merchant he is able to exploit

the native’s perennial need for credit and lack of capital.
Through his connections as a merchant, the typical Chinese in
Indochina probably makes as much or greater profits through lending
money at usurious rates of interest as he does in his rice merchandising
business.

Although hi3 tactics are resented by most natives, the

Chinese is rather admired by them for his success; furthermore, he is
usually able and willing to grant a loan to a peasant when no one else
will.
Another important group of foreigners in Indochina is
or British Indiana, as they are sometimes referred to.

the Hindu,

They number

about 6,000, of which about 300 are in Cambodia, 200 in Tonkin and the
remainder, or 2,500, reside in South Vietnam.

A large percentage of
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them are engaged in the retail trade, usually specializing in dry
goods retailing.

However, they also engage in short-term money lending,

and in certain areas give the Chinese stiff competition in this field.
These Indian money lenders are called ’Chettyar’ by the natives.

The

majority of them concentrate their money-lending activities in the rural
areas and they usually lend money on harsher terms than the Chinese,
For this reason they are probably disliked more by the farming population
than are the Chinese,
Migration of Asians into Indochina is still quite heavy.
year 1943 a total of 45,000 Chinese entered the country.
Indians coming in that same year was slightly over 400,

In the

The number of
Migration into

South Vietnam has been heavier than into other parts of Indochina in
recent years.

However, there has no doubt been quite heavy migration

of Chinese into the Tonkin area during the past few months since the
Communists took control of that part of Vietnam,
At the beginning of 1949 there was a total of 71,000 French nationals
in Indochina, of which about 6,000 were ’assimilees* or Eurasians who
enjoyed full French citizenship privileges.

About 22,000 resided in

the immediate vicinity of Saigon, 10,000 were in Tonkin, and about 5,000
in Cambodia,

These figures do not include members of the armed forces.

French nationals have been leaving Indochina for metropolitan France
in great numbers during the past year or two, and, although no reliable
statistics are available for verification, the present number is probably
only 60 percent of what it was in 1949.

Very few Frenchmen remained in

North Vietnam following the partioning of the country in 1954.
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Land-Man and Rural-Urban Ratios
The people of Indochina, the vast majority of whom are peasants,
maintain a high population density in some rural areas only by intensive
use of the land*

Therefore, climate, soil, and agricultural practices

play a great part in the pattern of distribution of the population.

It

is conmonly agreed that a further important factor determining population
distribution is the prevalence of malaria in most of the hilly and
mountainous regions.
For the country as a whole, population density, being slightly
under 100 per square mile, does not appear to be a problem of great
significance until one makes an analysis of the pattern of distribution.
The fact that 30 percent of the total population lives on less than
13 percent of the total land

area, and that between 80 and90 percent

of the people are farmers greatly intensifies the pressure of the
population upon the land in varying degrees in certain areas.
In the Tonkin delta the population problem is very serious.

In

the rural areas, population densities of more than 1,900 persons per
square mile are not uncommon, and even higher densities than that are
encountered in some provinces, such as Hadong with 2,900, Yenbay with
3,000, and in Quang Yen with
mile.

a total of 6,000 inhabitants per

These figures take on a more meaningful aspect when

square

it is con

sidered that in the rural provinces of Tonkin about 95 percent of the
people are engaged in direct agricultural pursuits.

Pierre Gourou

hesitates to apply the term ’excess population' to the rural areas in
Tonkin but states instead that the agricultural techniques applied on
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the land in Tonkin require a large farming population.

39 However, the

fact remains that the normal rice ration in Tonkin is only about 136
kilograms per capita per year compared with an average of about 250
kilograms in the rest of Indochina*

Problems arising from an excess

of people on the land also are common in other parts of Indochina,
especially in the coastal farming areas of central and northern Annam,
where land holdings are small and the population density is very high*
The pressure of population on the available land is much less in South
Vietnam, and decreases yet more in Cambodia and Laos*

Indochina can

be cited as a good example of maldistribution of population*

While the

Tonkin delta region passed the saturation point many decades ago, other
agricultural regions present quite different circumstances*
According to careful abstracts of vital statistics, the annual
birth rate in the principal cities in Indochina is about AO per thousand,
while the death rate averages approximately 30 per thousand, indicating
a rate of population increase of one percent per year.^

No statistical

information is available which would give an indication of the average
population increase in the interior, rural areas of the country, but in
South Vietnam and Cambodia the birth rate is probably higher than in the
cities and the death rate not higher resulting in a rate of population
increase probably higher than one percent in those areas*

Infant

mortality is still high but the great number of children spilling out
of every rural village is an amazement to most foreigners

39

Gourou, Land Ut.-i

Contrary,

nr> in Indochina. p* 276.

^Rapports au Consiel des Interets Economiques et Financieres
Hanoi, 1938, p* 288.
^ S e e Robequain, op. cit.. p. 47* in which he states that half
the deaths are of children under 15 and that the mortality rate for in
fants in their first year averages 20 to 30 percent of the number of births.

the rate of population increase is probably less than average in the
Tonkin delta area*

The birth rate in that region is probably as high

or higher than in other areas of the country but conditions of famine
and disease are definite and almost constant checks to further increases
in population,
Malthus, from his two basic concepts —

"food is necessary for

the existence of man" and "the power and inclination of man to reproduce
his kind greatly exceeds his power to produce food" deduced that the
interaction of the two would create disturbing population pressure.

His

gloomy preductions have found criticisms in the western world where
man’s capacity to produce food has often more than kept pace with
population increases*

However, in certain parts of Asia Malthus*

postulates can be said to be very much in existence*

Probably in no

other place on the globe is the pressure of population upon the land
supply greater than in the Tonkin delta*

The recent evacuation of

about one million people from Communist North Vietnam to the south has
no doubt eased the problem somewhat but it would be exaggerating to
think that this has resulted in materially solving it.
Education and Extent of Literacy
Until 1945, formal classroom education in Indochina was restricted
to the larger towns and major cities, and to the children of the privi
leged,

It is only during the past few years that government-operated

schools have been established in the smaller, rural villages and
communities; even these were established only in "secure" areas of the
controlled zones.

There are no official statistics indicating the

degree of literacy in all Indochina*

However, the percentage of
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illiteracy among the rural population is without doubt extremely large,
running probably as high as 75 percent of the adult population.
Although formal education, even at the lower levels, is confined
to the larger cities primarily, the extent of schooling in both public
and private schools is indicated in analyzing the percent of the total
population attending school.

According to official statistics only 28

persons per 1,000 inhabitants attending school at the outbreak of
World War II; in 1947 the figure dropped in 8.6 per 1,000 persons; and
in 194S a total of 10*3 persons per 1,000 inhabitants were attended
s'

school.

These official statistics indicate that as recently as 1948

only about one percent of the total population received formal schooling
of any kLnd*^
In Indochina the rate of death at birth and early childhood is
very high while the longevity of life is short.

The result is that

the children of school age (between the 6 and 18 age group) are esti
mated to represent approximately 40 percent of the total population of
28 million.

These statistics indicate that only one out of 40 children

of school age attended school in 1943.

The other 39 either worked in

the rice paddies, roamed the streets and countryside, begged for food,
helped the guerillas in sabotage activities, or went fishing.
The University of Hanoi is the only institution in Indochina
offering courses at the college level.

However, compared to western

size and standards its activities are limited.

In 1943 there were

only 32 professors on the faculty with 769 students in attendance.

^Annuaire Statistiaue de lfIndochine. 1947-48, pp. 55-73.
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A large number of the sons and daughters of the wealthy and Influential
Indochinese attend universities and high schools in France,

Also, in

1947 a total of 71 scholarships were granted by the French Government
for higher education in France,
Private and religious (Catholic) schools play a prominent role
in education at the lower and intermediate levels.

In 1943, the extent

of private schooling, most of which was located in cities, was as
follows:
French;

Number of schools

Number of students

High schools

11

3>293

Grade schools

13

2,872

22

4>093

209

14>054

Vietnamese;
High schools
Private schools

In addition, 42,000 Chinese children received schooling in 309
private Chinese schools.
In the public school system in 1947-43 there were 17 high schools
and 900 grade schools employing 292 French teachers and 4,133 Vietnamese
teachers (of which 2,400 were serving in the capacity of "auxiliary
instructors”)•

At that time there was a total of 5,159 high school

students enrolled in public high schools— but only 2,350 were Indo
chinese, the others were either French, Chinese, Indian, or other
nationalities.

There were some 174,000 students enrolled in public

grade schools and 79,000 in kindergarten.
With the exception of the larger grade and high schools in the
larger cities, public schools as a rule are very poorly equipped from
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the standpoint of both supplies and material facilities and instructors*
In the rural areas a grass shack without walls nor floor, one small
board for the instructor, bamboo benches and half-naked students is the
rule*

Books and other supplies are very scarce or non-existant*
Some improvements have been made in recent years in the field of

education.

More schools have been built especially in the rural areas,

more and better teaching equipment and supplies has been furnished,
and there has been special efforts made on the part of the governments
to encourage more young people to qualify themselves and enter the
teaching profession*

However, greater progress has been witnessed in

the field of adult or '’mass" education.

Under a program sponsored by

American aid it is estimated that approximately 2 million adult Indo
chinese have been made "literate"; i.e., taught to read and write
during the course of the past four years.

This program of activity

is still going on.
In the field of agricultural education there was a total of 59
students enrolled in agriculture, veterinary science, and forestry in
1941-42.

In addition, an average of 10 students received scholarships

each year from the government for study in agriculture and related
fields in French universities*

Courses offered at the University of

Hanoi were primarily in the basic sciences, such as, agronomy, plant
pathology, etc. and very little, if any, courses were offered in such
fields as Agricultural Education, Agricultural Economics, etc.

In

evitably only a very small percentage of the agriculture graduates
remained actively engaged in their profession, either in government,
teaching or private enterprise after completing the college courses.
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The University of Hanoi is now closed to all Indochinese students
except those residing in Communist North Vietnam*
way to establish a general university in Saigon.

Plans are now under
In addition, American

aid is being furnished to establish an agricultural college in South
Vietnam wherein it is anticipated that agricultural education and
extension will comprise the larger portion of the curriculum*

At the

same time efforts are being made to establish an agricultural extension
system modeled after the U* S* system.

The extent of American aid in

this field of agricultural education and extension is expressed in the
amount of $228,000 for supplies and equipment (primarily vehicles for
the extension service personnel) and one million dollars of local
counterpart currency with which to erect the buildings, furnish local
supplies, pay the personnel, etc.

It is anticipated that the new

extension service will supplement the old French system of having a
provincial nursery in every province supervised by a government agri
cultural agent operated on government funds, but serving the sole
purpose of furnishing fresh fruit and vegetables, and flowers for the
Chief of Province and other high government officials.

CHAPTER V
FARMING METHCDS AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Best estimates place the total amount of land under permanent
cultivation in Indochina at between 15 and 16 million acres.^
comprises only about nine percent of the total land area.

This

Dense forest

land comprises about 115 million acres, or 60 percent of the total
area*

Approximately 53 million acres, or about 30 percent of the land,

constitute what is commonly referred to as "open land”, that is, land
on which there is very thin forest vegetation, and/or open grass land.
The remaining two million acres comprise swamp land which is unfit for
crop production at the present time.
It is estimated by Gourou that 20 million acres of the land
classified as "open land” could be brought into cultivation without
unduly large land clearing efforts.

Most of this land is of a

slightly rolling topography, has a high natural fertility and would
be very well suited to the growing of cotton, corn, and other "high
land11 crops.^

In addition, approximately BO percent of the two

million acres, or 1.6 million acres, of the presently uncultivated
swanp land could be drained sufficiently for rice cultivation.

^ N o complete and reliable estimate of land use was ever made
for Indochina. The best studies available in this field are those
of Pierre Gourou entitled Lar^d Ut.-t1-iza.tlon in Indochina. Institute
of Pacific Relations, New York, 1945j and Yves Henry, Economic
Agricole de I ^ndochine, Ideo Presse, Hanoi, 1932. Land use data are
obtained from these two studies for the most part.
^According to Indochinese and French terminology, high-land
crops, or "cultures de haute terre", designate those crops grown
without irrigation water which in Indochina means practically all
crops except rice.
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A major part of the cultivated land, about 11 million acres, is
in Vietnam.

In Laos only about 1.5 million acres are under cultivation;

in Cambodia about 3.3 million acres.

In addition, roughly 4 million

acres in the hilly and mountainous region of Vietnam are used for
shifting (ray) cultivation.

The amount of grass land used for pastures

is very small.
Rice is by far the most important crop grown in Indochina and
takes first place in economic importance.

Irrigated rice fields cover

approximately 12.5 million acres of a total cultivated area of about
15*5 million acres.

A*)

Only about 1.0 of the 15.5 million acres under

permanent cultivation are in the hilly and mountainous regions.

Roughly,

only about 2 million acres of the valleys and coastal plains are planted
to crops besides rice, namely co m, cotton, peanuts, sugar cane, and
.vegetables.
Agricultural production is largely confined to the broad level
volleys of the Mekong River in Cambodia and South Vietnam and the Red
River in North Vietnam, the Western province of Battambang and the area
surrounding the great lake of Tonle Sap in Cambodia, and the small,
isolated river valleys along the east coast of Vietnam.
Approximately 8 million acres, or roughly 53 percent of the total
cultivated area of Indochina, is located in the Mekong River delta.

AC

About 1.9 million acres of rice land in Indochina bear two
crops of rice per year. Available water during the dry seasons being
the limiting factor such two crop lands are located along low river
banks and are flooded during the dry season by the rise of the water
level in the rivers caused by rising tides. Therefore, while the
total area under permanent cultivation is in the neighborhood of 15 to
16 million acres, the total crop area is probably between 17 and 18
million acres.
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About 3.5 million acres are cultivated in the Red River delta.

The

Tonle Sap and Battambang region of Cambodia comprises about 1.0 million
acres, and approximately 2.3 million acres of cultivated land is located
along the east coast of Vietnam.
Crop Production and Agricultural Practices
For the most part crop production in Indochina is conducted under
very primitive farming practices.

The most intensive use of human

labor is still the predominant way of land cultivation; therefore, labor
requirements in crop production are extremely large.

Mechanical agri

cultural equipment is relatively unknown and the use of draft animals
is very limited in certain densely populated areas, especially in the
Tonkin delta and the Annam Coastal areas, because they compete with
man for the meager food supply.

In the Tonkin delta it is reported
|z

that an hourfs work by a water buffalo is worth two hours of man labor.
The intensive use of labor in agriculture has somewhat of a concealing
effect of excess population and partly explains why in certain rural
areas with high population densities there may actually be a shortage
of labor during periods of peak labor requirements, such as rice
transplanting and harvesting.
Crop cultivation is typically small-scale with the farm family
furnishing most of the labor required.

This is the case even on large

estates (except rubber), because most large landowners still prefer to
make use of primitive methods of cultivation and divide their holdings

^See Gourou, op. cit.. p. 241.
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into small plots for hand cultivation by the large supply of farm
laborers available.
Although the average Indochinese farmer can be classified as
a skillful cultivator by Asiatic standards, his productivity is very
lew.

Furthermore, he has from experience become resigned to the

relative uselessness of his labor and makes very little attempt to
increase labor productivity.

This rather fatalistic attitude on the

part of fanners in general is not conducive to improvements in agri
culture, and serves to demonstrate that improvements are difficult to
achieve in an agricultural economy based on a depressed farming
population.
Due primarily to lack of improved seed stock, hand cultivation
and the absence of proper equipment, and very restricted use of ferti
lizer, the average crop yield in Indochina is low by any standard of
comparison.

Lack of standardization and, in general, low quality of

produce are reflected in the relatively low prices usually paid for
IM

Indochina farm products (particularly idee) in foreign markets.
There have been very few efforts made in the past by the govern
ment to bring about improvements in crop production methods.

Under

French administration experimental stations or gardens were established
in almost every province but these served primarily the purpose of
furnishing fruit, vegetables and flowers for the chiefs of provinces*
A number of seed zdce improvement stations also were established in
various parts of Indochina,

However, not much progress was made in

^ T h i s subject is dealt with more extensively in Chapter VIII
Agricultural Marketing and Processing.
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improving rice varieties*

The small amounts of proven varieties that

were brought out were either sold to the large plantation owners or
bottled up on laboratory shelves.

The average Vietnam peasant rice

farmer has seldom had the opportunity to plant selected rice seed
because improved seed was not distributed to farmers by the "Office
Indochinoise de Riz".
However, improvements through technical advice on proper production
methods, practical education, seed selection, and other procedures can
meet with only limited success even if well carried out so long as
agricultural education work is not conducted in coordination with
positive measures for the solution of other urgent agricultural
problems - mainly agricultural credit.^

Robequain points out for

example that it is useless to explain proper fertilization practices
to fanners so long as the price of fertilizer is beyond the economic
capacity of the peasant and so long as credit with which to purchase
fertilizer is unobtainable at reasonable rates*

L9

Rices
Rice is by far the most important product of Indochina*

The

inhabitants of the area give first place in their thoughts and actions
to the cultivation of rice and rice fields cover over 80 percent of the
cultivated area of the country*

Rice takes first place as food and also

is the most important export item*

Almost all agricultural enterprises

undertaken in the country are adjusted according to the requirements

^Agricultural credit problems are treated in some detail in
Chapter X, Agricultural Credit.

U9Robequain, op. cit*. p, 228,
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of rice culture, and all other crop cultivation is subordinate to it*
Aside from its importance as a food item in the diet of the people the
main reasons for the predominance of rice cultivation are:

(l) there

is no other crop produced in the area that can give as large per acre
yields under the same conditions of climate, soil fertility, and
cultivation; (2) on a large percentage of the area now under cultivation
rice is about the only crop that can be grown at all; (3) flooded rice
is the only food plant in Indochina the cultivation of which can be
continuously pursued year after year without the yields decreasing to
unprofitable levels*

Rice, therefore, is the single great factor

in Indochinese civilization and rice cultivation has made possible the
high population densities existing in the Tonkin delta and certain
parts of Annam.
These advantages and the importance of the rice crop have led
the peasants of Indochina to adapt themselves to natural conditions
as regards its cultivation.

Bach agricultural region in the country,

with its individual soil characteristics and peculiar irrigation
situation, grows special varieties of rice and at the most opportune
period of the year*

As a result of this multiplicity of adaptations

there is no month of the year during which some rice is not being
harvested in some rice-growing district*

Figure U

indicates the

more important rice-producing regions of Indochina, and Table 9 gives
estimates of the acreage, yield and production of rice from 1936-37
to 1954*

50

These estimates serve the purpose of giving some indication

^®It must be kept in mind that the statistics available on rice
and all other agricultural production in Indochina are grossly inadequate
and have several shortcomings, and that whatever the source of those
given, one must remember that they represent rough estimates based on
insufficient information in many cases.
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Table 9*

Rice Acreage, Yield and Production, in Indochina, 1936-52

Year

Acreage^

Yield per acre

ProductionS/

(1,000 acres)

(pounds)

(1,000 metric tons)

Averages
1936-1940
1941-1945

14,306
13,000

1,006
987

6,530
5,817

Annual
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952

8,970
9,890
12,900
13,500
12,000
9,680
10,500

1,060
970
1,012
950
1,012
1,000
970

4,286
4,797
5,919
5,817
5,511
4,441
4,600

1/ In Tonkin and Annam where two crops of rice are grown annually on

~

the same land such acreage is counted twice.
—/

In terms of rough rice.

Sources:

U.S.D.A., Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Foreign
Crops and Markets, Washingtons Miay 29, 1950j
Annuaire Statistiaue de l*Indochine. 1948-49, Saigon, 1950;
Biillft-Hn Econondoue du Vietnam. No. 10. Saigon, October, 1952$
Rice Office of Indochina, Yearly Rice Acreage and Production
Statistics.

of production trends, the relative importance of the various products,
and their importance from the standpoint of the national econony as a
whole.
The acreage in rice declined considerably during the war period,
and decreased yet further during the post-war years of internal rebel
activities.

Although production was still sufficient to meet domestic

requirements, post-war exports have been small compared with the pre-war

88
period (Table 10).

Thig decline in production and exports was the

result of many rural regions being under the control of rebel forces
which prevented free movement of paddy from the interior to the SaigonCholon rice mills.

In addition, many farmers fled their local villages

for the safety of the larger cities resulting in a large acreage being
left uncultivated, and, many other farm families restricted rice pro
duction to the amount needed for home consumption and local demand.
Now that internal security has been established it can be expected
Table 10.

Year

Rice Exports from Indochina, 1935-54

Paddv

Milled rice and
rice products

Total

1,000 metric tons
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
Sources:

318
224
140
38
322
60
—
—

6
—

1
1
—
—
—
—
—
—

1,430
1,539
1,389
1,016
1,350
1,526
944
974
1,017
498
44
109
90
233
140
125
361
240
207
387

Syndicat des Exportateurs Francais d tIndochine, Annual
Reports: Customs Statistics for Indochina.

1,748
1,763
1,529
1,054
1,672
1,586
944
974
1,023
498
45
109
91
233
140
125
361
240
207
387
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that rice production will soon return to pre-war levels*

However,

unless there are significant increases in per acre yields over pre-war
averages it is doubtful that pre-war volume of rice exports from Indochina
will be forthcoming.

It must be kept in mind that with an average

annual increase in population of one percent domestic requirements have
increased about 15 percent since the pre-war period, and assuming no
change in the pre-war per capita rate of consumption, over one million
metric tonB more would be required for domestic consumption than before
the war.
Go chinchina is by far the most important rice-producing area in
Indochina.

This region has the largest acreage in rice fields, the

highest yield per acre, the highest total production, and the highest
production per capita than any other area.

Cochinchina and Cambodia

are the only regions of Indochina which normally produce an exportable
supply of rice*

Table 11 shows the distribution of rice production

among the various regions or states*
Relative low soil fertility, lack of proper fertilization,
primitive production methods, inefficient water control, and high
losses before harvesting all combine to give Indochina very low peracre yields of rice and one of the lowest per-capita productions of
those engaged in its culture of all rice-producing countries (Table 12).
In the pre-war period yields in Japan were almost three and a half times
as high as those in Indochina.
51
Types of Rice Culture;
By far the greater part of the rice grown

51Most of the factm l information contained in this section was
obtained from material prepared for the Economic Cooperation Administra
tion by the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations of the United
States Department of Agriculture and reported in The Agriculture of
French Indochina.
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Table 11.

Rice Acreage, Yield, Production, and Production per Capita,
in Indochina, by State, 1942-43
•
:

State

Acreage

1,000 acres

Pounds

1,000 rn.t#

Pounds

3,674
2,337
5,690
2,439
1,102

1,129
923
1,232
757
774

1,882
934
3,179
838
337

413
354
1,298
606
853

15,244

1,051

7,270

628

Tonkin
Annam
Cochinchina
Cambodia^/
LaoslS/

Total French
Indochina-!/
—^
o/
—'

•
•
• Production
•
•
*
: Yield per acre: Production :per capital/

In terms of rough rice.
Not including the area ceded to Siam in 1941, and returned to Indo
china after the war*

Source:

Table 12.

Annuaire Statistiaue de 1*Indochina. 1941-42. Saigon:
pp. 87-83.

1943.

Comparisons of Rice Acreage, Yields, Production, and Pro
duction per Capita of Indochina with Other Asiatic RiceProducing Countries, Average 1935-36 to 1939-40

Country

:

Acreage

•
«
•
• Production
•
«
: Yield per acre : Production: per capital/

1,000 acres

Pounds

1,000 nut.

Pounds

14,306
12,671
4#,353
7,362
3,333
13,706
7,033

1,006
1,233
2,259
3,408
2,295
1,301
1,353

6,530
7,114
50,064
12,153
3,996
11,040
4,349

620
1,006
270
334
376
360
662

French Indochina
Burma
Chinais/
Japan
Korea
Pakistani/
Siam

-J

Computed by use of population statistics for 1937* as published in
FAO, Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics. Rome, 1948.

^

Average 1931-37*

If Average 1936-37 to 1939-40*
Source:

Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Foreign Crops and
Markets, Washingtons May 29, 1950, except for last column
which was computed as indicated in \/.
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in Indochina is wet-rice. although in the mountain regions dry or
upland rice is grown, chiefly under the ray system of cultivation.
The cultivation of wet-rice presents each geographical region with
its own particular 3et of problems.

The major difference between the

problems of rice cultivation in the Tonkin and Mekong Deltas is the fact
that the Red River rises rapidly and endangers the rice fields by wide
spread and destructive floods, whereas the annual floods of the Mekong
River come very slowly and are never as high as those of the Red River.
Furthermore, the Mekong River rises only once each year, after which
the water recedes, whereas the Red River may have three or four high
floods during the course of the rainy season.

Thus, in the Tonkin

delta the chief water problem is protection of the land against floods,
whereas in the Mekong Delta the chief problem is drainage.
In Tonkin and Annam there are two distinct rice crops grown, one
known as the fifth-month crop (grown in the dry season and harvested in
June, the fifth month of the Annamese calendar) and the other the
tenth-month crop (grown in the wet season and harvested in November).
Low-lying land usually bear only the first crop; rice land with medium
elevation usually bear both crops; and the uplands of the northern and
central parts of the delta usually bear only the wet-season crop.

It

is estimated that about 45 percent of the rice land in Tonkin bear both
the fifth-month crop and the tenth-month crops of rice, and in Annam
about one-third of the rice land area is double cropped.
Through generations of practice the farmers of Tonkin and Annam
have developed a great facility for selecting varieties of rice best
adapted to particular conditions of soil and water, and for extracting
every possible advantage from transplanting rice seedlings*

As in most
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of Asia, the rice seed is first planted in seed-beds which are very
carefully cultivated*

In some of the higher areas transplanting is

absolutely essential to the cultivation of wet-rice because the fields
cannot be kept flooded for the entire period of growth from 3eed to seed*
In Cochinchina three types of rice cultivation is carried on:

Rice

that is transplanted only once, rice that requires two transplantings,
and rice that is seeded directly into the field*

These three types of

adaptations to environmental conditions differ in labor requirements,
length of growing season and yield.

Almost 75 percent of the total

rice area in Cochinchina is planted to rice which i3 transplanted
only once.

There are considerable variations in types, their harvests

varying from late October to early January, but the largest part consists
of the so-called "half-season” rice, which is seeded in June, transplanted
in August, and harvested in December.
Rice fields with two transplantings are found close to the rivers
and are subject to floods.

They are not provided with dikes so that

the flood waters can flow evenly over the area*

The depth of the water

(reaching up to 18 inches in October) require the transplanting of
strong rice seedlings.

Two transplantings are necessary to provide

strong plants of the necessary height to stand above the water level
and to withstand being smothered by the weeds*

Twice-transplanted rice

has a longer growing season; it is seeded in June and harvested in
February*
Floating rice is found along the banks of the Bassac River in
Cochinchina and around the Great Lake in Cambodia and the borders of
the Mekong River.

Rice follows corn in the rotation which is sown to

reach maturity just before the flood, and the rice is planted between
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the rows.

The only requirement is that the rise in water level be

sufficiently gradual so that the rice will not be submerged.

The

stems, which attain lengths of 12 feet or more, settle on the mud when
the water recedes, and new roots start at the upper nodes.
thus can produce a number of heads.

One seedling

The crop is harvested during

December-January.
The larger part of the rice fields in Cambodia are rainy season
fields, flooded solely by rain water held in by small dikes.

Character

istic of the Cambodian landscape are these rice fields which become very
dry during the winter and which are dominated at intervals by clusters
of sugar palms.
In addition to this rainy-season rice and floating rice, the
Cambodians also cultivate a dry-season rice sometimes called "fallingwater" rice by the natives.

When the river floods recede from the land,

the farmer plants rice which he is often obliged to irrigate by primitive
hand methods.

In some areas the rice is planted out in stages with the

first planted plots being the first harvested.
The Tribal population of Laos, Tonkin, and Annam, practice ray
cultivation of dry or upland rice.

After the forest has been burned

and cleared rice and corn are planted by merely dropping the seeds into
holes made with a stick.

There is no land tilling, no cultivation,

no fertilization, and no farm implement of any kind is used.

In this

type of culture the most important task between seed planting and
harvesting consists of guarding the fields against wild animals.
Com:
Indochina*s only other cereal of importance is corn.

While it

had been cultivated by the natives for many years it was a secondary
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food crop fifty years ago and was a negligible item in Indochina’s
foreign trade.

Plantings were encouraged by the French to provide

animal feed for export mainly to France, and by the 1930’s it had
become one of Indochina’s most important exports*
, from 1932 to 1936
it was the second most important export product in terms of value,
although far behind rice.

This was largely due to the French policy

of protecting colonial products by increased tariffs on foreign grain.
C o m has not, however, become an important product for domestic con
sumption, as the natives prefer rice, and during the period preceding
World War II about 85 percent of the c o m produced was exported.
Table 13 shows the official figures for area yield, production and
exports of com.

For the most part the data are inconplete, especially

for the period since 1944 when they appear to cover only Cambodia.
Table 13.

As

Acreage, Yield, Production and Exports of Corn in Indochina,
for Selected Years, 1936-51

Year * Acreage

* Yield per acre :
* Production

|
«

Exports

1,000 acres

Pounds

1,000 metric tons

1,000 metric tons

1,235
1,235
1,235
1,036
741
694
613
300
45S
461
452

1,071
1,071
1,160
767
812
689
741
810
850
845
900

600
600
650
370
273
217
206
110
177
175
185

467
563
548
276
125
99
18
47
29
40
64

1936
1937
1933
1940
1942
1943
1944
194S
1949
1950
1951
Sourcest

Annuaire Statistique de l ’Indochine. Vols. VT to XI, 1934-36
to 1943-467 Vol. XII, 1946-48.
Direction de 1 ’Agricueture du Vietnam, (Special Report).
Saigont January 15, 1954.
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the data indicate, corn has become a much less important product for
Indochina than it was before the war.

In Cambodia, for example, which

was relatively free from internal rebel activities, it is obvious that
the decline in production is due to other causes.

In 1949 the low

world price for corn in relation to high production costs in Indochina
was undoubtedly an important factor contributing to reduced acreage.
It is reported that in 1949 France paid approximately 20 francs per
kilogram more than the then current world price for corn imported from
Indochina.

As is indicated by Table 13, corn exports from Indochina

since the war have been small compared with pre-war exports.

France

and the French Union continue to be the most important market for
Indochina's c o m exports.

In general, c o m for export is not given

the proper care that it should receive.

Very often it is not carefully

sorted and graded, and is packed and shipped before being dried to the
moisture content necessary for safe storage, with the result that there
frequently is excessive molding and weevil damage.
In Cambodia corn Is grown along the river banks and in the flood
beds of the Mekong.

The seed sown at the beginning of the rainy season

in May or June is harvested just before the high floods.

In some areas

c o m is grown as a dry-season crop also, and it is possible to grow
two crops of corn a year, but this practice is not very widespread.
Unlike rice and pepper, the Chinese merchant is almost completely
absent from the corn marketing picture*— leaving this activity to the
French, and now more recently, the Cambodians themselves.

It has been

stated that the increase in corn production in Cambodia which occurred
during the late thirties was partly attributable to the interest taken

l
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by the Cambodian farmers in a crop whose sale was not as thoroughly
controlled by the Chinese middlemen as certain other crops* such as
rice and pepper*
Other Food Crons:
Among the more important food crops, in addition to rice and corn,
are sweet potatoes, sugar cane, manioc, taro and various other root
crops, beans, and a rather large variety of fruits and vegetables.

52

Reliable statistics relating to the acreage and production of these
minor crops are more difficult to obtain than those for rice and corn
because they are grown on even more scattered plots and are often interplanted with one another.

Furthermore, the acreage planted from year to

year varies greatly depending upon the supply of water and climatic
conditions.

Since these crops are essentially dry-season crops the

availability of water is the critical factor.

In most areas dry-season

crops are planted immediately after the rice harvest on rice land, and
since irrigation is usually necessary toward the maturity stage the
amount of land a farm family can cultivate is very small because practically
all water lifting is done by primitive hand methods.

However, improvements

52The most reliable statistics available concerning the production,
acreage, and exports of the minor crops are contained in the following
tables (1) Table 14 Area in Minor Crops; (2) Table 15 Area in Minor Crops,
by State, Compared with the Area in Rice, Rubber, and Corn; (3) Table lo
Production of Minor Crops,
No data with any degree of reliability are available for ndnor
crops for the years of intensive rebel activities (since the end of World
War II), Only gross estimates by people not too well informed have been
made of acreage and production of those crops for those years. The fact
that such a large proportion of the producing areas was located in those
parts of the country occupied by Communist rebels probably resulted in
large reductions in both acreage and production since large numbers of
fanners left the countryside for the safety of the cities and thus quit
farming.
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Table 14*

Acreage in Minor Crops, in Indochina, Annual 1936-38, 1940,
1942-44

Crop

!
1936
•

; 1937

!
1938
*

:
# 1940

1942
;
•

!
1943
•

!
1944
*

. ---- 1 ,000 acres - - ■
37
0.3
n.a.

37
0.5
n*&*

37
0.5
n.a.

37
2
n.a.

47
9
3

83
38
2

123
43
3

Peanuts
Castor seed
Sesame

37
10
10

37
10
10

57
10
10

57
15
10

123
24
12

119
49
15

116
74
17

Coconut
Tung
Sugar cane

62
n.a.
99

74
n.a.
99

74
n.a.
99

74
n.a.
99

62
9
87

72
9
36

69
9
89

Tobacco
Coffee
Tea

49
25
49

54
25
49

49
25
49

37
30
62

38
26
43

54
30
43

a
n.a.
n.a.

Pepper
Kapok
Mulberry
Lac

4
9
n.a.
17

4
10
7
17

4
10
7
17

7
10
12
15

9
14
17
15

5
14
27
15

n.a.
13
35
15

403

434

449

467

538

661

652

Cotton
Jute
Ramie

Total area
in minor crops
Source:

Annual re Statistiaue de l ^ndo chine. Vols. VI to XI, 1934-36
to 1943-461

Table 15.

Acreage in Minor Crops, in Indochina, by State, Compared
with Area in Rice, Rubber and Corn, 1942
•
: Tonkin
•
«
•

Crop

♦
•
•
•
•
Annam : Cochin- : Cambodia : laos
»
*
•
• china *
•
•

:
Total
:
French
: Indochina

-----1, 000 acres -

Cotton
Jute
Ramie
Peanuts
Castor seed
Sesame
Coconut
Tung
Sugar cane
Tobacco
Coffee
Tea
Pepper
Kapok
Mulberry
lac
Total minor
crops
Ricei/
Com
Rubber

2
7
1
12
21
3
0
2
15
7
5
27
0
0
7
15

11
1
2
59
2
7
10
5
35
15
16
14
1
1
8
0

3
1
negl.
37
negl.
1
52
0
37
8
3
2
1
3
1
0

30
0
0
15
1
1
0
0
0
7
0
0
7
10
1
0

1
0
negl.
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
2
0
0
0
0
0

47
9
3
123
24
12
62
9
87
38
26
43
9
14
17
15

124

187

149

72

6

538

3,674P
Z13
0

2,338^
64
4

5,690
44
255

2,439
371
71

1,102
49
negl.

15,243^
7a
330

2,593^

6,138

2,953

1,157

16,852

Total crop
acreage reported 4,011

1/ Crop year 1942-43*
2/ In Tonkin and Annam, where two crops are obtained from much of the
area, such acreage is counted twice.

1/

In addition to these crops, a number of others are cultivated in
small plots for home use in most sections of Indochina. Before
World War II the area planted to those other crops amounted to
about 485,000 acres of which 250,000 acres were devoted to sweet
potatoes, 170,000 acres to beans and 65,000 acres were planted
to manioc.

Source:

Annuaire Statietiaue de l ^ndochine. 1941-42.

Table 16.

Production of Minor Crops, in Indochina, Annual 1936-38,
1940, 1943-44

Product

I 1936 I 1937 I 1938

*. 1940

I

1942 ; 1943 I 1944

1,000 metric tons
Cotton
Jute
Ramie
Peanuts
Castor seed
Sesame
Copra
Soybeans
Sugar cane
Tobacco
Coffee
Tea
Pepper
Kapok
Silk, raw

If
2/

!.lH./ 1 .2^
0 .01^/ 0 .12/
n.a.
n.a.
125?
12S/
5
5
3.5
3.5
30
25
n.a.
n.a.
602/
602/
15
14
2.5
2.5
15
15
3 *5!/
2.51/
0,2

a ?

0.2

0 .252/
0.4
205/
5
3.5
30
15 /
752/
15
3.5
15
3.5 ,
3.51/
0.2

1.3|/
o.s2/

4.2
3.5
30
802/
14
3.5
17
31/
0.2

5.62/
2.7y

2.9
1.6
29
n.a.
922/
13.2
4
10.5
9.42/
0.1

6 .57/
7.5^?

6 .2?/
5.64/

2?^
4.7
1.7
30
n.a.
7232/
17.6
4.3
10.4

2 ^
12.8
1.5
29
n.a.
8222/
14.3
n.a.
n.a.
n.a. ,
2*5o/
10.02/
7 .72/
0.2
0.2

Ginned
Unginned

1/

Combed

y

Fibre

y

Shelled

y

Unahelled

1/

Brown and white sugar combined. Does not include amount consumed
as cane, which is form in which sugar is consumed in Tonkin.

Source:

Annuaire Statlsticme de l 1Indochina. 1934-36 to 1943-46,
Report No. 60. American Consulate, Saigon, February 14, 1950.
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in methods of irrigation which could make it possible to extend the area
under cultivation of high-land or dry-season crops would probably result
in greater plantings of rice, since, the Indochinese farmer normally
prefers rice cultivation to any other crop whenever there is water
available.
Sweet Potatoes : This crop is produced in most sections of Indochina
but it is only in the Tonkin delta that it is considered an important
crop.

In this region, where the winter precipitation is reasonably

dependable, sweet potatoes are extensively grown as the second crop
following the rice crop.

Before the war the area devoted to the

cultivation of sweet potatoes amounted to about 250,000 acres annually.
Beans: This crop is grown everywhere in the country.

Annual

acreage normally amounts to about 170,000 acres and production is
usually sufficient to meet domestic demands, with slight exportable
surpluses during good years.
2,000 metric tons per year.

Pre-war exports averaged approximately
In 194&, an exceptionally heavy crop

year, exports of dry edible beans amounted to more than 6,000 metric
tons.
Manioc t

This root crop forms a relatively important item in the

diet of part of the population, especially the Tonkinese in the north.
Normally about 65,000 acres are planted to this crop annually.
Vegetables: With the exception of beans, manioc and potatoes,
vegetables do not play a very important part in the diet of the natives
of Indochina.

However, the production of vegetables is carried on in

almost all the villages.

Production of vegetables by native farm

families is almost exclusively for sale in the nearby towns and cities
where the output is consumed by the European and Chinese population.
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The only concentrated area of production is located at Dalat, located
in the hilly region about 100 miles east of Saigon, where both European
and Chinese varieties of cabbages, cucumbers, tomatoes, lettuce, shallots,
onions, garlic, etc*, are grown for the Saigon-Cholon metropolitan
market.

Soy beans are also an important crop grown in this area.

Fruits: Fruits are grown on a small scale throughout the country
wherever soil and climatic conditions permit, but only a few small
areas can be classified as centers of fruit production.
grown rather extensively in the Hue area in Annam.

Bananas are

Other areas along

the Annam coast are also noted for the production of oranges, tangerines,
grapefruit, pineapples, and other tropical fruits.

Statistics on the

acreage and production of fruits and vegetables are veiy meager and
those available are grossly unreliable for the most part.
Oil-Bearing Crons:
Of the oil-bearing crops, coconuts and peanuts, are by far the
most important and are about the only two grown on a commercial scale
in Indochina.
Coconuts: According to official statistics, the total acreage in
coconut trees before the war amounted to 74>000 acres and the total
annual production averaged 30,000 metric tons of copra.

During that

period about 8,000 metric tons of copra and 500 metric tons of coconut
oil were exported annually.

Cochinchina has by far the largest acreage

in coconut trees, most of which is located in the provinces of Bentre and
ffytho along the Mekong River.

Coconut trees are also grown in Annam

along the coast and in Cambodia where some 7,000 acres are found.
Peanuts: Peanuts are probably the second most important oilseed
crop grown in Indochina.

Total acreage in peanuts before the war was
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estimated at 75*000 acres and the total production of shelled peanuts
amounted to about 22,000 metric tons annually, of which an average of

2,700 metric tons was exported.
Peanuts are grown in every section of Indochina except Laos, with
the most important producing areas in Cochinchina and Annam.

Peanuts

are consumed locally by the natives either roasted or in the form of
oil.

Most of the peanut oil is pressed by the farmers themselves, but

there are a few scattered small commercial peanut oil presses in most
of the larger producing areas.
Fiber Crons:
The fiber crops produced in Indochina are cotton, jute, ramie and
kapok.

Of the four, cotton is the most important.

The chief cotton

producing area is Cambodia which has approximately 60 percent of the
total acreage.
size plots.

It is grown mostly by native farmers in small garden-

Most families who grow a few cotton plants spin and weave

cotton for their own family use.
According to official statistics, the acreage in cotton in Indochina
before the war was about 37,000 acres, with an annual production of
approximately 1,200 metric tons of lint.

Under Japanese occupation

acreage increased to 123,000 acres and production to 6,200 metric tons
in 1944 (Tables 14 and 16).

This average yield of about 100 pounds

per acre is much lower than that of other commercial cotton-producing
countries of the world.

For this reason French efforts to fill part

of their domestic needs for cotton in Indochina was a complete failure,
with production costs per pound of lint cotton produced being much too
high to bring any financial returns to growers.

The basic causes of

low yields are (l) cotton can be grown only during the dry season and
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then the plants suffer from lack of moisture, and (2) when cotton
reaches maturity during the beginning of the rainy season the boles
and fiber are frequently damaged by the daily rain3.

Also, the fact

that the sale of lint cotton is done almost exclusively through Chinese
middlemen who take a large share of the profits is another important
factor deterring the natives from cultivating cotton on a commercial
scale.

This also partly explains the fact that Indochina normally

imports approximately 20,000 bales of lint cotton each year to be spun
by French-owned textile nails located in the northern part of the
country.
Of the other fiber crops grown in Indochina, jute is cultivated
principally in Tonkin; kapok in Cambodia; and ramie in Annam.

Most

reliable statistics indicate pre-war production of 800 metric tons of
jute, 3,000 tons of kapok, and about 500 metric tons of ramie (Table 16),
Coffeet
Coffee plantations have been established on the red lands of
South Annam, on the Plateau des Bolevens in Laos, and in a few small,
areas in Northern Cochinchina.

Although the natives cultivated coffee

plants before the advent of the French in the country, most plantations
have been developed by the French and the coffee produced at the present
time comes almost exclusively from these plantations.

According to

official statistics, the total pre-war acreage in coffee trees amounted
to approximately 25,000 acres with annual production between 2,500 and
3,500 metric tons.

Annual pre-war exports, almost all to France,

averaged about 700 metric tons.

Most of the crop is sold for domestic

consumption, although some part of the Loatian production is exported
across the Mekong River into Thailand.
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Tobacco:
Tobacco is cultivated to some extent in almost all sections of
Indochina, but production is not sufficient to meet domestic needs,
resulting in net imports into the country of about 2,300 metric tons of
leaf tobacco and tobacco products annually.

Tobacco growing is almost

exclusively a native enterprise, and about 90 percent of the production
consists of strong varieties used for domestic consumption by Indochinese.
The remaining 10 percent is light tobacco produced for consumption by
Europeans.

Most of the tobacco grown is planted in small plots right

after the rice harvest.

The plants are very carefully tended as a rule

and irrigation is mostly by the ‘bucket-method*.
The total area in tobacco during the period 1936-40 averaged
37,000 acres annually and total annual production approximately 14,000
metric tons.

The French have made recent efforts at establishing

tobacco plantations in the Vientienne area in Laos, but results have
not been very satisfactory from the standpoint of yield and quality.
Sugar Cane?
Over 80 percent of the sugar cane produced in Indochina is grown
by native farmers under primitive, inefficient hand methods on scattered
small plots of ground.

The remaining 20 percent of production is pro

vided by rather large French-owned plantations.
yields of sugar cane are exceptionally low.

As a result, per acre

For example, the average

yields in Java are approximately three times those of Indochina.

Sugar

cane is planted in all of the major agricultural regions of Indochina,
but Cochinchina and southern Annam account for most of the output of
sugar.

The per capita consumption of sugar in Indochina is low, and

most of it is in the form of molasses or syrup.

Therefore, while
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producing almost solely for the domestic native market very little
effort is made by native growers to improve the quality.

With the

exception of two rather large French-owned sugar refineries, most of
the sugar and syrup produced in the country is grinded and processed
by small country syrup mills located in the centers of sugar cane
producing areas and utilizing antequated production methods.
The total area in sugar cane before the war averaged about 100,000
acres and production averaged almost 70,000 tons of brown and white
sugar, and syrup and molasses converted in terms of brown sugar.

This

does not include the amount consumed as cane, in which form most of
the sugar produced in the Tonkin delta is consumed locally.
As a result of French efforts in producing and processing white,
granulated sugar, Indochina was a net exporter of sugar for a short
period before the war.

However, in recent years Indochina has depended

upon imports for a very large percentage of its sugar requirements
because domestic consumption has increased and domestic production has
declined.

Present import needs of the country is estimated by the

director of the largest French sugar refinery in Indochina at about
45,000 metric tons per year.

In contrast, imports of sugar amounted

to 10,000 tons in 1947, 11,000 tons in 194S, and 19,000 tons in 1949.
Sugar Palm:
In Cambodia, the sugar palm is grown rather than 3ugar cane.

In

addition to its fruit, its sap is collected in bamboo pots to be consumed
either in the fresh state, fermented (as wine), distilled, or, more
often, it is boiled down for the production of palm sugar.

This sugar

has a strong molasses flavor, and, although considered inferior to cane
sugar, is cheaper and is consumed in large quantities by the Cambodians.
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Before the war there were probably about 500,000 sugar palm trees In
Cambodia producing close to 6,000 metric tons of sugar annually.

It

does not appear that this quantity has diminished during the recent
year3 of rebel activities.
Pepper:
Unlike the various crops discussed above, pepper is not a product
of native Indochinese agriculture; its cultivation, carried on in the
southern part of Cambodia, is almost exclusively in the hands of Chinese.
Although it constitutes only a small portion of the total value of all
agricultural commodities produced, it is considered an important crop
because it ranks high on the list of foreign exchange earners for
the country.

Indochina ranks high in the world as a pepper producer,

and almost the entire output is exported to France.

Approximately

7,000 acres were devoted to the production of pepper before the war,
and production averaged approximately 4,000 metric tons per year.

The

chief problem of pepper growers has been that of producing more than
the available market required.

Protective tariffs have been established

within the French Union to alleviate the hardships, but on occasions
production quotas have had to be enforced.

Year-to-year variations

in market conditions have made for unstability in prices, with the
result that production is decreasing.
Tea:
Although there are a few large European tea plantations in Indochina,
native tea production is still much more important than that of the
plantations.

According to official statistics, approximately 62,000

acres were planted to tea before the war; European plantations accounted
to about 7,500 acres of this area.

Production was approximately 17,000
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metric tons*

The largest acreage is located in Tonkin, but the Mol

Plateau in southern Annam is also an important area of production.
The French have made efforts to establish tea plantations in
the hilly areas of the red soils of southern Annam.

However, these

ventures proved a failure as cost of production on those plantations
turned out to be much higher than in the lowland areas where the natives
are engaged in tea cultivation.
Plantation Agriculture
History and Development: As has been the case in other tropical
countries, an important feature of Indochina’s colonization by Europeans
has been the establishment of agricultural enterprises financed mostly
by foreign capital and employing native labor*

At first, French agri

cultural endeavors were primarily concerned with rice in Cochinchina,
and coffee and tea in Annam and Tonkin.

During the early years of

colonization efforts it was the opinion of most French agriculturalists
that rice production would be the most profitable venture.

It is primarily

for this reason that the French undertook large drainage works in the
Mekong delta of Cochinchina.

Miany French concessionaires moved into

Cochinchina and established rice plantations*

At the turn of the

century almost 250,000 hectares (600,000 acres) of rice land in
Cochinchina was under French control.
rice concessions in that state.

This was about 33 percent of all

However, a large percentage of that

land was never put into cultivation by the concessionaires, since much
of it was never drained sufficiently.
Strictly speaking, in the real concept of the word, rice concessions
never were, and are not now, true plantations, since they are almost
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all cultivated by native share-croppers.

Whatever the nationality of

the landlord, it has very little bearing on the method of cultivation
and the equipment employed by the peasants cultivating rice land in
Cochinchina.

There are still some landlords who own rice concessions

and pay their labor daily wages and employ many overseers in the fields,
but this system of operation is very seldom found.
Coffee was among the earliest of the plantation crops to be grovm
in Indochina, with plantings having started in Tonkin before 1900.
Coffee cultivation has since spread south and at the present time the
center of production is in the red lands of southern Annam and northern
Cochinchina where plantings are of rather medium size— the majority
of plantations being under 250 acres.
Only during the past thirty years have large tea plantations
been established under French management.

These are also located on

the red soils of southern Annam, but production on French-owned
plantations represent only a small portion of the total tea output
of the country.
Rubber:
It is in the field of rubber production that French colonization
has made its greatest imprint*

There is little doubt that rubber is

the most successful plantation crop in Indochina.

Table 17 indicates

the number of concessions existing in Indochina at the beginning of
World War II, and Table 18 shows the area in each state included in
those concessions.

The majority of the concessions are located in

Cochinchina where the largest increases in cultivated acreage have
occurred during the French administration.

This is because large

areas were made tillable through the clearing of forest land and the

Table 17. Number of Domain Concessions in Indochina, by State, December 31* 1942

State

Tonkin
Annam
Cochinchina
Combodia^'
Laos

Total French Indochina

Indochinese
s
Europeans and companies
Established
:
: Provisional . :
Total
: Provisional : Established:
Total
: concessions!/ : concessions!/ : concessions: concessions. : concessions ; concessions

56
191
753
73
52

248
337
2,411
46
23

304
573
3,164
119
80

8,050
715
8,304
148
23

3,952
1,978
140,201
211
26

12,002
2,693
148,505
359
49

1,125

3,120

4,245

17,240

146,368

163,608

land concessions were originally granted on a provisional basis for a period of 10 years. Conditions
provided that land not brought under cultivation at the end of 10 years would revert to the public domain.
However, there has been no enforcement of this provision because, to date, no such land has reverted to
public domain.

^

Concessions less than 5*000 acres.

Source:

Annuaire Statistioue de l^Indochine. 1941-42, p. 92.

Table 10. Area of Domain Concessions in Indochina, by State, January 1, 1940
*
•

•
Euroneans and comnanies
Indochinese
Total
:Cultivated : Provisional: Established:
Total
: Cultivated
: Provisional : Established:
area
: concessions: concessions : concessions :
: concessions : concessions: concessions : area

State

---- 1,000 acres - - - Tonkin
Annam
Cochinchina
Combodia
Laos

Total French
Indochina

Source:

30
185
335
163
7

251
200
1,003
77
2

281
385
1,332
240
9

111
96
1,112
78
3

107
48
326
12
2

108
93
2,713
29
10

3,039
41
12

55
64
2,718
30
7

714

1,533

2,247

1,400

495

2,958

3,453

2,874

215

2U6

Annuaire Statistioue de ltIndochine. 1941-42, p. 92.
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drainage of swamps.

It is primarily as a result of these efforts that

the area of tillable rice land increased by over 4 million acres from
1880 to 1940.

The 175,000 acres presently in producing rubber trees

is also a result of French effort in clearing forest land for cultivation.
Almost all of the rubber plantings in Indochina are restricted to
an area consisting of grey and red soils in the provinces of Baria,
Bien Hoa, Thu Dau Mot, and Tayninh in South Vietnam, and in the provinces
of Kompong Thom, Kompong Cham and Kratie in Cambodia.

Exceptions to

this general area of production are about 2,500 acres in the Ban Me
Thout area and three small plantations occupying about 1,500 acres in
the vicinity of Nhatrang along the southeast coast (Figure III).

No

rubber trees are found further north of latitude 12°45' nor at altitudes
higher than 1,600 feet.

The hevea rubber tree (the variety in commercial

production in Indochina) grows best on well-drained soils and no pro
ducing rubber trees are found on lands suitable for rice.
The rubber industry of Indochina is of recent origin.

Most lands

now in production were cleared and planted to rubber trees between
1920 and 1939*

Almost without exception the large plantations were

established on government concessions, or on land grants to private
individuals who undertook the task of clearing the area of jungle
growth and planting young hevea saplings (Figure IV).

Most of the

work of jungle clearing and planting was done by hand with the use of
coolie laborers imported from North Vietnam vender three-year contracts.
Once started, rubber plantings increased rapidly to about 281,500
acres by 1938 and to 342,800 acres by 1945*

However, with the Japanese

occupation in March, 1945, followed by years of Vietmin activities,
the area in rubber trees decreased by about one-third and in 1952 only
about 247,000 acres remained planted.
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Figure III.

Location of Principal Rubber Plantations in Indochina.
Almost all of the rubber plantings in Indochina are restricted to the
areas of gray and red soils, one area located north of Saigon on the
Cambodia-Cochinchina border and the other east of Saigon.
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Figure IV*

Rubber Plantation (lower picture) Established on Land That
Was Jungle (upper picture) Ten Years Previously*
The establishment of rubber plantations is probably the
greatest contribution of the French to the agricultural
economy of Indochina*
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Table 19 shows the area planted to rubber, the area exploited or
tapped and in actual production, and the total yearly production*

The

differences between the area planted and the area exploitable reflect
primarily the area planted to young trees not yet of producing age*
The differences between the exploitable and the exploited area gives
an indication of the acreage planted to trees of producing age but
which was not in actual production in each respective year because of
security conditions*
Table 19.

Area Planted to Rubber, Area Exploited and Total Production
of Rubber in Indochina, 193£-54

••

Year

Area - (hectares )i/
: Planted : Exploitable : Exploited

1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945 ,
19462/
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
3-952,
19532/
1954

iProduction (’metric tons')
: Smoked sheets : Total

114,500

118,000

139,000
140,000

105,200
106,000

102,253
102,253
102,452
101,719
101,000
100,000
72,000
75,000

£6,536
88,901
91,227
96,900
93,626
87,157
65,000
68,000

105,200

54,140
59,025
62,959
61,899
60,890
48,853
... .

58,614
46,317
47,338
51,136
50,500
53,200
73,380
60,000
64,000

16,055
29,061
28,000
28,456
31,008
35,280
33,935
42,000
42,500

72,000
66,557
72,245
76,069
75,178
74,734
61,362
12,000
20,296
38,560
43,700
43,026
48,984
52,956
62,000
74,000
73,000

One hectare « 2*47 acres.

2/

^/

From 1945, statistics include only those plantations 500 ha., which
plantations before the war produced about 85% of the total, and
presently produce about 98% of the total rubber.
Acreage data for 1953 and 1954 includes Vietnam only.

Sources

Syndicat of Rubber Planters of Indochina, Yearly Reports on
Rubber Situation. Saigon.
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Total production of rubber in any one year is closely related to
the acreage exploited, and years during "which a larger area was exploited
resulted in increased total production.

Since most of the acreage

left unexploited for security reasons during war activities consisted
of trees of producing age, these were put back into production in a
very short time following improvements in security.

This has resulted

in a rapid increase in total production from 1953 to the end of 1954
when production reached the 1940-44 average of slightly over 70,000
metric tons*
Most of the present producing plantations are owned by French
and other foreign interests.

A large percentage of the trees now

producing were planted between 1930 and 1939.

Therefore, many trees

are now nearing the end of their period of maximum production.

In

order to assure future and continued production at the present rate
those trees should be replaced with young saplings.
done on a few larger and older plantations.

This is being

However, analyzing the

available statistics on area planted, area exploitable, and area
actually exploited gives an indication that plantings of young trees
have not kept pace with the destruction of old trees.

Such a situation,

if continued, will without doubt result in a reduced area exploitable
as well as exploited in a few years.
Marketing: Approximately 98 percent of the rubber produced in
Indochina is exported; only two percent is processed locally into
consumer items by one small rubber manufacturing plant in Saigon
(Figure V).
Until 1950 France was the primary market for Indochina rubber,
with the United States a close second.

However, the United States
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-

80

72,606
- 70

53,575
„ 50

48,500

- 30

_

20

1935-39
Figure V.

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

Rubber Exports from Indochina, Average 1935-39, Yearly 1950-54.
Almost all rubber produced in Indochina is exported. Shipments are
made soon after the rubber is processed on the plantations*
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has recently become the major market.

During 1954 exports to the

United States were three times the exports to France and accounted
for approximately 70 percent of total exports from Vietnam (Table 20).
Smoked sheets and crepe make up most of the production and exports.
Rubber is the best (and about the only) source of dollar earnings
for Indochina.

During 1950 the total tonnage of all exports to the

United States from Indochina amounted to 24,200 tonsj rubber alone
accounted for 23,900 tons, or about 99 percent of the total.

In that

year, the best post-World War II year up to that time, dollar earnings
through rubber exports to the United States were more than $16*5 million.
It Is estimated that for the 12 months of 1954 rubber exports from
Vietnam alone to the United States amounted to slightly over $21.5
million.
One interesting

aspect of the dollars earned throughrubber exports

'tothe United States is that the exporters are allowed to

retain 15

percent of those dollars for their own account in the United States
with the remaining 85 percent being reserved by the governments of
Vietnam and Cambodia
No large stocks

for governmental balance of payment purposes.
of smoked sheets or crepe rubber arestored and

accumulated within Indochina at any one time.

Shipments out of Saigon

normally follow processing at the plantations, after about a 60-day
period.

Monthly exports from Indochina are usually heaviest from

July to January followed by a lower level of movements during the spring
and summer months (Table 21).

Exports from Indochina into the world

market comprise such a small percentage of the total rubber trade
that it has very little or no effect on world prices of raw rubber.

us
Table 20.

Rubber Exports from Indochina by Country of Destination and
by Quality, 1954i/

Country

: Smoked
: sheets

*
«

•
•

: Crepe

: Sernamby

Latex
: (drv wt.)
•
•

•
•

:

Total

(metric tons) France
U. S. A.
England
Singapore
Low Countries
Belgium
Italy
India
Madagascar
Mexico
Algeria
Canada
Venezuela
Egypt

Total

4,30S
29,192
2,056
300
195
302
1,112
132
60S

6,609
6,808
10
367

1,539
122

22
1

1,204

14
28
5
65

6

15
2
3S,220

13,968

2,865

12,498
36,123
2,066
1,891
195
302
1,112
132
14
642
5
85
15
2
55,082

29

For Vietnam only. Total exports of rubber from a U Indochina in
1954 amounted to 72,600 metric tons.
Sources:

Rubber Statistical BuUetin, Saigon: 1954; Trade data supplied
by the syndicat of Rubber Planters of Indochina.

Furthermore, v/it-h. the exception of the production from the Michelan
Rubber Company^ plantations, Indochina rubber apparently enjoys very
little favoratism in the French trade.

Thus, Indochinese rubber must

sell on a strictly competitive basis, pricewise, with other natural
rubber export countries.
A disturbing element amongst rubber interests of Indochina during
recent years has been the instability of prices received for rubber.
During 1952, for example, prices dropped from about 15 piasters per
kilogram during February to 10.50 piasters during October.

Prices

119
Table 21*

Month

Monthly Exports of Rubber from Vietnam, 1954~'^
•
*
•
•
: Smoked **
Creoe
:
Latex
t sheet : Sale : Ordinary : Sernamby : (dry wt.) : Total

c tons) - January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Total

**

5,269
2,405
1,404
1,923
2,564
2,335
4,007
3,043
3,630
3,651
2,735
5,252

362
182
94
171
251
394
368
322
329
405
295
442

722
749
924
797
770
593
1,132
754
1,029
801
761
1,270

162
65
67
180
271
193
280
319
166
419
138
603

.4
7.3

6,515
3,401
2,489
3,091
3,858
3,519
5,788
4,442
5,216
5,277
3,930
7,575

38,219

3,667

10,301

2,865

29.5

55,082

.4

2.3
4*9
4.3
9.7

Data obtained from Indochina Rubber Planters Syndicat.

went up to 15 piasters again during late January 1953 but dropped to
11*50 piasters during the summer of that year.

With high original

development and installation costs, increased production costs (security,
mobile guards, inflation, etc.) rubber producers complain about this
price fluctuation and instability*

In view of increased production

of synthetic rubber and the internal political situation, there is very
little incentive to expand output or to plant new seedlings.

Further

more, plantation owners are hesitant to embark upon a program of largescale replacement of old trees with young seedlings (a very costly
transformation) in view of the present political situation in South
Vietnam.

Native Vietnamese activities in rubber tree plantings have

never played a very important part from the standpoint of total pro
duction.

A few small and scattered plantations were established by
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Vietnamese interests before World War H , but production from these
never exceeded five percent of the Total.

For the most part small

owners were unable financially to afford armed guards to the extent
that the larger plantation owners did during Vietminh activities with
the result that most of the smaller plantations remain in complete
ruin today.

In fact, since 1945 production statistics include the

production of only those plantations above 1,300 acres in size, it
being estimated that the output of all plantations below 1,300 acres
does not exceed two percent of the total.

This serves to point up

the size of individual holdings by foreigners— with one syndicated
group owning over 54,000 acres.
Thus, contrary to Malaya and other Southeast Asia rubber areas,
large-scale plantations, developed by foreigners, with large capital
investment in equipment, processing plants, buildings, transportation
equipment, etc., is the rule.

It is without doubt that such large-

scale operations contribute to both efficiency in production and control
of quality of the product.

It has been suggested by responsible Indo

chinese authorities that the large rubber estates be broken up into
small plots and allocated to the laborers presently working on those
plantations.

However desirable such a move might appear to be from a

sociological and political viewpoint, it would be a tragic and costly
mistake financially for several reasons.

In the first place, the

large plantations practice what is termed "controlled bleeding" of the
trees, thus effectuate both uniformity and controlled quality of the
latex and preservation of the trees for a longer period of profitable
production.

Secondly, only by having full control of the liquid latex
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at its source can the larger processing plants be operated efficiently
and profitably with the resulting uniformity of the finished smoked
sheet rubber*

In the third instance, plantation owners have invested

heavily in land clearing and cultivation equipment since the war in an
effort to overcome the labor shortage caused by the war; it is doubtftil
if this equipment could be profitably operated on small, sub-divided,
individual holdings*

Finally, removal of foreign owners can be expected

to result in a managerial vacuum in most instances which would be most
detrimental to continued production and marketing efficiency and would
result in high production costs and poor quality rubber.
Labor: As previously noted, contract coolie labor (mostly Tonkinese)
played a very important role in the early days of rubber development
in Indochina.

Though animal power (mostly elephants) and fire were used

in the original land clearing, human labor was used almost exclusively
in planting and cultivating the trees.

Before World War II "immigrant"

laborers on rubber plantations amounted to about 70,000, but this number
was considered by rubber plantation managers insufficient to fully
exploit the acreage then exploitable and rubber plantations have always
had a demand for laborers larger than the supply available.

During 1945,

the number of laborers on rubber plantation stood at 60,000, but following
eruption of the Vietminh rebel activities this labor force decreased
rapidly and by November, 1952 only 35,000 remained.

Undoubtedly, many

plantation laborers joined the rebel ranks.
Several reports have been written about plantation laborers— some
by plantation owners themselves and others by disinterested parties—
all endeavoring to point up the position of the laborers, their standard
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of living, health and housing conditions, etc.
always been a big problem facing plantations.

labor recruiting has
Since no recruiting is

permissable without governmental authorization, the government of
Vietnam has always been in a position to greatly influence the labor
force on the plantations.

The most recent authorization to recruit

labor was granted by the government on June 1, 1951*

However, because

of war conditions this authorization did not result in any large-scale
recruiting.

With government authorization, the greatest handicaps to

labor recruiting have been the hesitancy to move, or the immobility of
the Tonkinese, and the difference in wages and cost of living between
north and south Vietnam.

A laborer woxild not move from the north

unless he was guaranteed as high or higher wages as he received when
working in Tonkin, notwithstanding the many benefits he received when
working on the plantations and the lower cost of living.
Present conditions may not always have existed, but the extra
benefits (in addition to wages) furnished laborers and their families
by the larger plantations in Indochina could well serve as a standard
for Southeast Asia.

A visit to the area should convince even the most

skeptical that the housing, school, medical care, recreational oppor
tunities, basic food items, and other benefits furnished by plantation
owners, either free or at a nominal charge, affords plantation workers
with a living standard far superior to that of the average Vietnamese
family.
Though the labor force has decreased greatly during recent years
and plantation owners complain of a perpetual shortage of labor, it is
obvious that the actual need for laborers on plantations has decreased.
This is because the former method of hand clearing of land and the
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hand method of cultivation and care have to a large extent been
replaced by mechanical equipment in which most plantation have invested
heavily.

On many plantations about the only operation still done

wholly by hand is "bleeding" the rubber trees.

In addition, moderni

zation of the processing plants on the plantations also has contributed
to reducing the number of laborers required and increasing the efficiency
of production.
There have been serious discussions in various circles about
moving a substantial number of Tonkinese war refugees onto rubber
plantations and thus help relieve the refugee resettlement problem.
However, it is doubtful if, under the circumstances noted above, any
large number of refugee families could be profitably and effectively
employed on the rubber plantations.
Livestock and Animal Husbandry

The scarcity of draft animals is one of the main problems that
fanners in Indochina are faced with today.
in Vietnam.

This is especially the case

Cambodian farmers are established husbandrymen for the

most part, and under normal conditions Cambodia is a source of both
meat and draft animals for Vietnam.

At the end of World War II

Cambodia had approximately 600,000 head of water buffaloes and 1.2
53
million cattle. ^

The movement of draft animals from Cambodia into

Vietnam in 1949 amounted to 37*000 cattle and about 10,000 water buffa
loes.

It is estimated that the animal population in Cambodia has remained

^ Annuaire Statistique de l fIndochine. 1947-4#* p. 102.
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about the same since 1947.

54 All official statistics concerning animals

in Indochina are rough estimates at best and they are so labeled in the
official publications in which they are published.
In all of Vietnam the total number of both cattle and water
buffaloes was about 2.4 millions in 1947j out of that number, 1.4
millions consisted of water buffaloes.

Thus, in 1947 there was one

head of cattle or water buffalo for every two farm families.

It is

estimated that 75 percent of those an.imal3 were actually draft animals.
However, guerilla warfare in most of the country resulted in a large
decrease in the animal population and in 1951 it was estimated that
not over 373,000 cattle and water buffaloes remained in Vietnam.

Of

this number about 91*000 were in the Tonkin delta, 103,000 in Aimam,
and about 179,000 in Cochinchina.^

This would indicate a ratio of

one head of cattle or water buffalo for every 12 farm families for all
of Vietnam, and a ratio of one for every 15 farm families in the Tonkin
delta.

If 75 percent of the animals were being used for draft purposes,

this would indicate a ratio of one draft animal for every 15 farm
families in Vietnam and one for every 20 farm families in Tonkin.

Elevate en Indochine. Supplement au Bulletin de Reseignement
Economioue. Saigon: April, 1947«
55
^Annuaire
Bleu, op. cjt., p. 102.
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Government authorities estimate five persons as being the
average number of people per rural household. This is the estimate
most frequently given for all of Indochina and no distinction is made
between various regions— north, central, or south. However, from
numerous personal observations of the large number of children spilling
out of almost every straw hut (pailotte) in all rural areas of Indochina,
this figure appears to be a gross under*-estimate.
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The need for draft animals is so acute and the part that they
could play in the rehabilitation of abandoned rice lands is so great,
especially in Cochinchina, that a total of $350,000 of American aid
funds were allocated to Vietnam for the purchase of draft animals
in Thailand for importation into the country during the fiscal year
1955-56.

In addition, a total of $225,000 of American aid funds is

earmarked for the importation of breeding animal stock.

In addition,

about $500,000 of local counterpart currency is being provided to
expand the Vietnamese animal breeding program during that same period.
This amounts to about $1.1 million of American aid funds destined
to contribute to an increased livestock population.
Producing a crop of rice ■without the use of either animal or
mechanical power is not a new or recent experience to Tonkinese fanners.
Even during the pre-war years when the animal population was at its
highest level there was only one draft animal for every three farm
families in that region.

The traditional method of plowing and land

cultivation there has always been and still remains, human power on the
end of a hoe handle.
determine.

The reason for this situation is quite simple to

Rural population density in that area is so great, the

average size of land holding is so small and fields are so subdivided
that there is literally no place for cattle or water buffaloes.
is no grass or pasturage available for animals.

There

A small amount of

grass may occasionally grow on the snail dikes and levees bordering
the fields but these dikes are so narrow and so trespassed upon by man
(in many areas they are the only dry paths available for communication)
that grass growth is greatly restricted.
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The situation with respect to pasturage for draft animals improves
somewhat in Annam and Cochinchina where sufficient grass is usually
available during the rainy season to keep draft animals alive.

But

during the long dry season, finding forage for animals becomes quite
an important problem even for farmers with relatively large holdings,
because during this period of drought very little green grass is to
be found anywhere in Indochina.
There is an animal husbandry service (Servd.ce d ’Elevage)
established under French Administration in each of the three states
within the Department of Agriculture, and under the supervision of
a Chief of Service, who is a veterinarian.

The organization also

cemprises chiefs of districts and a provincial agent in each province.
This service agency has accomplished very little toward improving
the livestock situation in Indochina.

Its functions call for little

more than enumeration and vaccination, but it has done very little
of either of these functions except livestock vaccination during
epedimics.
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This agency has under its control and supervision one

livestock "experimental" station and two poultry stations.

Pure breeds

of animal and poultry were imported from Australia, Thailand and other
neighboring countries for the expressed purpose of breeding and dis
tribution of offspring to farms.

However, up to the present very

little breeding or distribution has been forthcoming.

These stations

are little more than show places designed to impress dignitaries who

■^See the 1952 report by J. VI. Patton, Veterinary Officer with
the United States Special Technical and Economic Mission to Indochina,
on the Functions and Accompli shments of the Veterinary Service in
Indochina.
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are brought periodically to visit and "inspect”•

The poultiy stations1

main contribution has probably been furnishing fresh eggs for chiefs
of provinces and other high governmental officials —

with very little

distribution of hatching eggs or baby chicks to farmers except on rare
occasions of visits by government officials to those stations.
Although the extent of range land in the plateaux and hilly areas
comprise a very large portion of the total land area of Indochina,
it is unlikely that animal production on a large commercial scale will
ever be established.

The main reason for this is that for an average

period of about five months every year drouth conditions prevent grass
growth over most of the country and, except for rice, very little feed
grain is grown.

Even with increased production of corn in Cambodia

sufficient for livestock feeding, the cost of transporting it to the
upper plateaux and hilly range areas would make it uneconomical and
prohibitive for use as livestock feed*

There have been some attempts

by French interests to establish commercial livestock production in
these hilly areas but most of these have met with financial failure.
During 1955 the owner of the only remaining French livestock ranch
in Indochina offered all of his meat and draft cattle for sale to the
American Aid fiLssion because expenses of keeping cattle during the dry
period were too high to make commercial cattle raising a profitable
venture in that area*
The diet of the average Indochinese family contains very little
animal products.

The per capita meat consumption is estimated at H

kilograms (24.2 pounds) per year of which duck and pork make up
probably 75 percent.

The duck population in the rice areas outnumbers

chickens by as much as ten to one*

There are no official or unofficial

12 a

estimates of the swine population, however, it probably ranks second to
the number of ducks*
pig*

Usually every rural household has at least one

The best available indication of the relative importance of hogs

and cattle is the official statistics concerning controlled slaughtering
of animals in government-supervised slaughter houses.

Latest official

data available are for the year 1943 when 117,000 cattle and water
buffaloes were slaughtered compared with 553,000 hogs.
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However,

while these figures are probably fairly accurate for cattle and water
buffaloes, since very few of those are slaughtered without government
control, they probably grossly understate the total number of hogs
slaughtered in the countiy.

A large number of hogs are slaughtered

on the farms by fanners themselves without government control or
supervision and are not represented in government statistics.
Machines Versus Hand Tools
The Indochinese peasant has no machinery and very little metal
at his disposal.

Simple and rudimentary agricultural hand tools are

relatively inexpensive, and the peasant farmer often makes most of
them himself.

Over much of the older, over-populated regions of the

country, the only pieces of metal to be found are crude plow shares,
spades and hoes, and small scythes used for cutting the rice heads at
harvest time (Figure VI).
Me chanination:
Mechanization is unknown except on the large rice and rubber

^Annuaire Statistjque de 1 'Indochina« 1947-43, p. 103.
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Figure VI.

Crude Agricultural Hand TooIb Used by Indochina Farmers.
A large proportion of the land cultivation work in Indochina
is performed by hand, utilizing primitive tools.
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plantations.

A large portion of the land in the newly—settled flooded

plains of the Mekong River delta in Cochinchina is never plowed.

Prep

aration of the land for rice consists simply of cutting the grass just
below the water level with a long knife, winnowing the grass in the
center of the field and transplanting rice seedlings directly into the
mud among the stubble (Figure VII).

Over much of the remaining rice

land the hoe and spade are the only implements utilized in land prep
aration.

Lack of proper land preparation and cultivation accounts

partly for the relatively low rice yields obtained in Indochina.

The

fact that proper land preparation through the use of more and better
equipment and machinery would result in increased rice yields is obvious.
In Cochinchina, there is the possibility for utilizing mechanical
equipment on a cooperative ownership and use, or on a rental basis.
In that section of the countiy some of the larger farms and plantations
are already relativelj7- highly mechanized.

However, because of the

extremely high degree of land parcelization in many areas of Tonkin and
Annam, it is doubtful if mechanical cultivation of the land will ever
be feasible.

In those areas, hand cultivation and/or plowing in very

close quarters with one water buffalo and a small plow appear to be
there to stay.
Over 95 percent of the rice produced in Indochina is cut by hand,
threshed by hand, spread out on mats to dry and cleaned on the farms
by hand.

Also, about the same amount is transported to the "delivery

point", usually by the side of a local road or barge landing along a
canal or stream, on human backs.
Rice Threshing:

There are three methods most commonly employed

in threshing rice by hand in Indochina.

One of these consists of simply
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Figure VII.

Land Preparation and Rice Transplanting in Indochina.
In some areas rice land is never plowed prior to planting
the crop. Land preparation consists of cutting the previous
year's rice stubbles and weeds just below the water level.
Rice seedlings are then transplanted directly into the mud.
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beating the heads of rice against a piece of wood or stone and letting
the heads of rice fall either on the ground or on mats spread out for
that purpose.

Another method consists of beating the heads against

wooden slats at the bottom of a large bamboo basket and letting the
grain fall into the basket.

The third method is practiced widely by

farmers who have draft animals available and consists of piling the
heads of rice in a circular row and walking the animals over the grain
until they separate from the straw.
winnowing.

Cleaning of rice is all done by

Figure VIII shows one of the various methods used by

Indochinese rice farmers for rice threshing and cleaning.

No estimates

have been made of the percentage of losses occurring in these primitive
threshing and cleaning methods but undoubtedly losses are quite high.
Minimizing these losses occasioned by the hand methods of threshing
rice would contribute materially to the net yields and total quantity of
rice produced.

There is very little place in Indochina for large rice

combines, (except on a few large plantations where they are already
introduced) because: (l) a large portion of the total rice land is cut
up into very small fields bordered by narrow, hand-made dikes, which
would make it very uneconomical to utilize combines, and (2) over a
large portion of the area where large plots of rice land are found,
water normally stands two to three feet in depth on rice land at harvest
time, and about the only method feasible for cutting the rice is the one
presently used— i.e., standing in water up to the waist and cutting the
rice with a tend scythe.
However, there is a place in Indochina for snail, hand-operated or
motor-driven mechanized rice threshers of the types manufactured in
Japan.

This type of equipment is being introduced and used in some
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Figure VIII,

One Method of Rice Threshing and Cleaning Employed
Extensively In Some Sections of Indochina*
Methods employed in rice harvesting and threshing are
primitive. In addition to the practice of letting oxen
pull bamboo rollers over the rice as shown here, other
methods of separating the paddy from the straw consist
of beating the grain against slats in a large bamboo
basket or against rocks or other objects, Paddy cleaning
on the farm is done by the winnowing method and most onthe-farm storage consists of bamboo bins pictured above.
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areas.

It has so far proven to be an economic asset especially when

utilized on a cooperative basis by several neighboring farmers (Figure
IX).

Both private individuals and government agencies plan the

importation from Japan of this equipment in greater quantities but the
main drawback to quantity imports lies in the absence of foreign currency
exchange.
Irrigation:

Improvements and progress that can be and are being

made in the irrigation system and water-lifting devices have been
mentioned previously.
(Figure X).

Need for such improvements is real and urgent

However, lacking private capital and initiative, the

governments of Indochina must of necessity step in and help in this
needed function.

Present plans call for government ownership, control,

supervision and maintenance of the water reservoir and distributing
systems and the larger pumping stations being established.

Under this

plan, benefitting farmers will pay to the government one-fifth of the
rice crop for the use of water from these government irrigation systems.
It is anticipated that &' number of smaller water pumps will be furnished
at cost by the government to small groups of fanners who will utilize
those pumps on a cooperative basis.

Reimbursement to the government

of the price of the pumps will be made over a period of years out of a
water-use tax; assessed against the benefitting farmers on a per-acre
basis.
Increasing Agricultural Production
A very comprehensive study of the possibilities for increasing per
acre yields as well, as total agricultural production in Indochina was
made for the French High Commissioner General by a group of agricultural
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Figure IX*

Threshing Rice by the Traditional Method and with the Use of
a Portable, Foot-operated Threshing Machine,
Small, portable rice threshing machines manufactured in Japan
are a great improvement over the method of beating the grains
against slats in a bamboo basket now prevalent in Indochina.
More Japanese-type thresters are needed and their use by farmers
on a cooperative basis should be encouraged*
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Figure X,

Methods of Lifting Irrigation Water Commonly Practiced in
Indochina*
Human power is utilized almost exclusively in lifting irriga
tion water in Indochina* Primitive methods are inefficient,
time-consuming and a great waste of human energy* Improving
the methods of irrigation and water-lifting would contribute
materially to increased total rice output*

137
5Q
technicians during 1947 and 194#.''

This group of technicians made

its evaluations of crop production and agricultural expansion possibil
ities on the basis of two consecutive five-year programs beginning in
194# and ending in 195#.

In regard to rice production, emphasis was

placed on further development of irrigation and water control facilities
including the completion of the system of larger canals begun by the
French in both the Mekong and Red River deltas and in Cambodia with
government funds and resources.

The program also would get property

ovmers to complete the system of secondary canals on their land at their
own expense and with their own means.

According to this plan the area

of tillable rice land in Indochina would be increased from 5.7 to 6.0
million hectares (l6 million acres) by the end of the second five-year
period in 195#.
As an additional means of increasing the total production of rice
the greater use of commercial fertilisers, rat control and wider use
of improved seed rice is recommended.

As a result of these measures

an increase in total rice production from 6.5 million tons before the
war to 7.9 million tons at the end of the 10-year period (195#) is
considered by the study to be feasible (Figure XI).

Howpver, the report

points out that it is very unlikely that total rice exports will exceed
pre-war levels because of greater domestic consumption as a result of
increased population and greater purchasing power of the laboring class,
particularly if some further industrilization occurs.

^Premier Rapport de la Sous-Commission de Modernization de
l !Indochinet Presidence du Consiel, Saigon; November, 194#.
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Figure XI*

Effects of Commercial Fertilizer on Rice Growth in Indochina*
Most of the cultivated soils in Indochina are deficient in the
basic plant nutrients, especially nitrogen* Relatively low
farm prices received for paddy makes it almost inpossible for
farmers to utilize commercial fertilizers profitably. Wider
use needs to be made of green manure crops, compost and rich
alluvial mud from the canals and shallow rivers*

The effects that improvements in irrigation and water control
facilities would have on rice acreage expansion and increased rice
production have been dealt with in the previous section.

Undoubtedly,

the one area in which the greatest, most rapid, and most profitable
improvements could be achieved in Indochina is that of increasing
output per acre of land now under cultivation.

Increases in the yield

per acre of rice land offer the greatest possibilities because about
85 percent of the total land area under permanent cultivation is used
for rice production, and rice yields in Indochina compare unfavorably
with the yields obtained in other rice producing countri.es in Southeast
Asia.

By comparison, in Japan rough rice yields average about 3j400

pounds per acre; in Thailand 1,400 pounds; whereas during the best
pre-war years the average in Indochina was only about 1,000 pounds.
Japanese rice yields are about three and one-half times as high as those
of Indochina.
Proper fertilization of rice lands, better farming practices
including proper land preparation, use of improved and higher-yielding
seed stock and an adequate supply of irrigation water would all con
tribute to increasing per acre yields of rice.

In addition, better

conservation and utilization of rice produced cotild be obtained through
better methods of harvesting, especially rice threshing, and proper
storage after harvest.

Each year large amounts of rice are lost from

rain and rodents damage of paddy stored in the primitive and very
inadequate bamboo bins.

Gourou estimated before World War II that as

much as 10 percent of the rice harvest was destroyed each year by rats
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in Indochina.

60

Since very little ef fort toward controlling rodents

has been made since the war and interior storage facilities have
deteriorated, it is probable that the losses have increased considerably*
Fertiliser:

It is estimated that about 50 percent of the cultivated

land in Indochina is deficient in both nitrogen and phosphorus, and
about 30 percent deficient in potassium for satisfactory crop production.
However, in normal years only about five percent of the cultivated land
receives any chemical fertilizers.

In the reports of Gourou and the

Subcommission on the Modernization of Indochina it is pointed out that
the high cost of fertilizers in relation to rice prices limits its
use.^

But the availability of chemical fertilizer at relatively low

cost xidll still not make it possible in most cases for peasant farmers
to utilize it to any great extent as long as fluids needed for its
purchase can be obtained only at usurous rates of interest.
During the years immediately preceding World War II an average of
11.000 metric tons of chemical fertilizers were imported into Indochina
each year, of which about 6,000 tons consisted of nitrogen fertilizer,
3.000 tons of phosphates, and about 2,000 metric tons of potash fer
tilizers.

Imports of fertilizer are almost exclusively under French

control, and most of the chemical fertilizers are utilized on the
larger plantations, especially those owned by Frenchmen.
The average peasant farmer usually makes an effort to obtain all
of the fertilizer he can without any cash outlay.

Wide uses are made

of human excrements and animal manure, ashes from the rice straw burned

^Gourou, op. cit. . p. 390.
^^Premier Rapport de la Sons-Commission de Modernization de
_!* Indo chine, op. cit., p. 130.
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for fuel, and mud froa ponds and ditches.

Other forms of fertilizers

produced locally are oilcake and fish paste.
Thex'e ax's rather important deposits of phosphate rock in North
Vietnam but very little effort has been made to fully exploit these
resources and manufacture ground phosphate fertilizer.

Realizing the

importance of the part chemical fertilizers could play in contributing
to increased rice yields in Indochina, the French Modernization Commission
included a few projects for the production of nitrogenous and phosphatic
fertilizers within the country.

However, it appears that the most

feasible way in which the fertility of the land owned and cultivated by
Indochinese peasants could be increased is not through the wider use of
chemical fertilizers but through increased cultivation of green manure
cropsf making more extensive use of compost, greater utilization of mud
from the canals and ponds, using rice straw for the production of compost
rather than burning it as fuel, and providing ground limestone obtained
from the hilly areas at a low price to the peasant farmers.
Social Problems: Improving yields and increasing the productivity
of the average farm family will not in itself offer the full remedy for
miserable farm life in Indochina.

Even during good crop years the

average farm family usually is unable to retain a sufficient part of
what it produces to avoid some degree of malnutrition.
A way must be found, through improvements in the credit, land
tenure, landlord-tenant relationships, and marketing systems, to make
it possible for the average farm family to be able to retain a larger
portion of the harvest for its own consumption and benefit.

The pro

blem of equitable distribution of the produce of the land is as grave

142
as is the problem of low productivity.

To be sure, improving productivity

per farm worker through more efficient production methods and greater
yields will lessen the acuteness of the problem but this alone will
never solve the agrarian problems of Indochina.

CHAPTER VI
LAND OWNERSHIP AND TENURE RELATIONS

The intensity of the problems of land ownership and tenure relations
varies in the different regions and states of Indochina.

In the Tonkin

delta farming area the problem relates primarily to the large number of
farm families upon the available land supply, the intensive subdivision
and parcelization of land holdings and the extremely small amount of
land available to the average farm family.
only slightly in Central Vietnam.

This situation improves

The problem of absentee ownership

is not as acute in the north and central parts of Vietnam and Cambodia
as it is in South Vietnam.

In South Vietnam the problem revolves around

the share-cropper system of crop production, absentee landlords, insecurity
of tenure, and the fact that only a relatively small percentage of the
farmers own the land they cultivate.
Size of Farms and Extent of Farm Land Ownership
The degree of subdivision of agricultural land and the pressure
of population in the various parts of the country are best illustrated
by Table 22 which classifies the landowners of North, Central, and
South Vietnam and Cambodia according to the size of their holdings.

In the deltas of North and Central Vietnam, the Annamese custom
of dividing property equally among all of the children has resulted in
very small-sized land holdings, which in the majority of instances,
are divided up into many tiny parcels (Figure XII).

In North Vietnam

62 percent of land-owning farm families have less than 0.9 acre of land
from which they attempt to make their living, and an additional 30
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3ill*.

Figure XII.

Physical Patterns of Rice Fields in South and North Vietnam.
The practice of subdividing the land equally among each
member of the family has resulted in very small landholdings
and excessive parcelization of the land in North Vietnam. In
South Vietnam large landholdings usually are divided into small
plots and rented out to sharecroppers*
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Table 22.

Land Owners in Indochina Classified According to Size of
Their Holdings!/

Size of
holding

:
:

lJumber of
land
owners

Percent of
total

North Vietnam
2/
Under 1 acrer1-5 acres
5-10 acres
10-50 acres
50-100 acres
Over 100 acres
Total

Total

Percent of
total

Central Vietnam

594,000
283,000
60,000
21,000
800
200

61.6
29.9
6.2
2.2
0.1
negl.

450,000
165,000
31,000
3,500
300
50

63.7
25.2
4.7
1.3
0.1
negl.

964,000

100.0

654,350

100.0

South Vietnam
Under 2.5 acres
2.5-12.5 acres
12.5-25 acres
25-125 acres
125-250 acres
250-1250 acres
Over 1250 acres

lJumber of
land
owners

Cambodia^

66,000
97,000
33,000
23,000
3,600
2,400
200

33.7
33.0
14.9
11.0
1.4
0.9
0.1

25,000
72,000
13,000
4,400
100
40
10

20.9
60.2
15.0
3.7
0.1
negl.
negl.

255,200

100.0

119,550

100.0

This classification is obtained from Henry Ives’ study of 1932
■which is still considered by the governments of Indochina as the
official one.
—

1/

The original size class was in tenns of mau which in North Vietnam
equals 0.39 acre and in Central Vietnam equals 1.24 acre. In this
table mau have been converted to acres on a one-to-one basis.
Includes only the three rice provinces of Battambang, Preiveng, and
Soairieng.

Sources:

Henry Yves, Economie Agricole de 1»Indochine- Hanoij 1932,
pp. 66-94;
Governmental Decree of May 30. 1954 concerning landlord-tenant
relations in Vietnam. Preface to Presentation. Saigon; 1954.
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percent have less than 4.0 acres.

In Central Vietnam the situation is

almost as badj 69 percent of the peasant farm families own less than
1.2 acres and an additional 25 percent have from 1.2 to 6.2 acres.
Naturally, all of these small parcels of land are cultivated by members
of the farm family and no outside help is needed.

On such small acreage

it is impossible to keep and feed work animals and virtually all land
preparation is performed by hand with the use of a simple hand tool
commonly called a hoe-spade.

In some cases, work animals are hired

from the larger landowners for plowing rice land.

The most common

rate of repayment for the use of work animals is two man days of work
at either rice transplanting or harvesting time for each day a work
animal is hired during plowing time.

This reflects very vividly the

fact that, from the standpoint of economic valuation, the four legs of
a water buffalo are worth four strong arms and two human backs in the
over-populated Red River delta of Indochina.
An example of the extent of the subdivision of land in the Tonkin
delta is cited by Yves who relates that the Forestry Service, wishing
to lease two and a half hectares of high rice land (5 3/4 acres) for
use as plant nurseries, had to deal with 76 owners who shared this land
and to sign 76 separate rental contracts.
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Yves is of the opinion that

the decrease in the size of holdings in the Tonkin delta has not affected
all land owners evenly, and is somewhat critical of the French adminis
tration for having made it possible for some owners to increase the size
of their holdings while the size of the holdings of the vast majority
of farmers was decreasing.

The new trade potentials opened up by

^ Henry Yves, Economic Agricole de l ’Indochine, Hanoi, 1932,

p. 111.
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improvements in transportation and the abundance of credit to those who
could furnish necessary credentials have encouraged the creating of
rather large estates amidst a sea of garden-sized holdings.

The revenue

from these estates made it possible for ambitious and clever growers
to supply demands for credit, food and other items needed in production
what were practically unknown in the old system of closed economy, but
which had developed with the economic evolution brought about through
the activities and under the leadership of the Europeans.

As a result

of this many large estates have come into existance since French
occupation of the area and many farmers who formerly were owners of
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small plots have now become tenant farmers. ^
In previous studies of land ownership and tenancy in the Tonkin
delta the proportion of farm families who owned no land at all or of
those veiy small landowners who had to rent part of the land which they
cultivated was not determined.

According to Gourou, in one province

about one-half of the rural people registered on the tax rolls owned
no land.
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He estimates that in certain areas the number of taxpayers

either without any land at all or with less than .18 hectares (.41
acres) is about 63 percent of the total rural population.
The larger estates have been accumulated usually through the
purchase of land which had been forfeited or on which loans at
exhorbitant rates of interest had been made.

For the most part, the

cultivation of those lands remained in the hands of small cultivators

^ H e n r y Yves, Economic Agricole de l ^ndochine, Hanoi, 1932,
p. 108.
^Pierre Gourou, L*Uti ~1-ization du Sol en Indochine Francaise.
New York, 1945, p. 360.
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(farmers or sharecroppers) whose burden and low standard of living was
usually increased by their debts.

Robequain remarks on this subject

that speculation in land, inadvertently encouraged by the French
administration, on occasion has also involved communal lands, through
the complicity of the mandarins and village head-men.

65

In some parts of Indochina, the village community owns part of the
land comprising its territory.

The largest part of this consists of

land originally granted by the state to the village with the right of
usufruct.

Historically, people deprived of rice fields could turn to

the communal lands for support.

The cultivation of communal land was

shared periodically by the landless peasants of the village.

It is

estimated that prior to World War II such communal lands represented
approximately 20 percent of the total cultivated land area in North
Vietnam, 25 percent in Central Vietnam, but only about 3 percent in
South Vietnam the most recently populated region of Vietnam.

In the

past, these communal lands played an important role in counterbalancing
the inequalities in private land ownership.

However, under French

administration such importance has diminished.

Community-owned lands

have diminished in area, and speculations in renting communal lands
by village authorities have caused discontent on the part of the
peasants.

Communal lands are still being purchased by larger land

owners in the Tonkin delta.

Therefore, it is to the interest of the

peasant landless class to maintain, and if possible, to increase the
area of .communal lands.

65
•^Robequain, op. cit. . p. 83.
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In Cambodia most of the peasant farmers cultivate less than 11.0
acres if the land is river bottom land, or from 11.0 to 30.0 acres if
they own land at a distance from a river, or hilly land.

Large private

estates and absentee ownership of land is not a problem in Cambodia.
Most of the land holdings are owner-cultivated and all of the land
not cultivated for a period of five years reverts to the Cambodian
government.
In South Vietnam, or Cochinchina, 72 percent of the rice land
holdings are less than 12.5 acres in size; 15 percent are from 12.5 to

25 acres; 11 percent from 25 to 125 acres; and less than 3 percent of
rice land oxvners have more than 125 acres.

(Rubber land holdings are

purposefully excluded from these figures.)
In Worth Vietnam only 17 percent of the total cultivated area is
owned by persons holding more than 8.9 acres, which there is considered
to represent the lower limit of a large holding.

By contrast, in South

Vietnam holdings larger than 125 acres (considered to be the lower
limit of a large holding in that region) take up 45 percent of the
total cultivated land area.

If the medium-sized holdings from 12.5

to 125 acres are added to the large holdings, one finds that 87 percent
of the cultivated area in South Vietnam is owned by persons holding
more than 12.9 acres compared with only 17 percent of land owners
holdings more than 8.9 acres in North Vietnam.
There is a very much variation in the size of land holdings among
the various regions of South Vietnam.

Robequain is somewhat critical

of the French policies in the settlement of the new lands in the Mekong
delta, which, to him, are responsible for the very uneven distribution
of land holdings in that area.
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In essence, the following is his explanation for the present landownership situation in the Mekong delta:
"The economic evolution set in motion by the French
occupation has operated here for a longer time, but the main
factor has been the rapid expansion of rice growing in the
vast regions which had previously been waste lands and had
been made immediately cultivable by canal construction.
Western techniques naturally produced quicker and more imrpressive results from virgin soil than on land that had
already been cultivated by the Indochinese. This explains
why in the ’old provinces’ of eastern and central Cochinchina, the estates are still relatively small in size,
although they are larger than those in the northern deltas.
As a rule the owner himself cultivates at least some of
his fields and supervises the work on the remainder— which
is entrusted to tenant farmers who are easily recruited in
the vicinity, as in Tonkin, from among those having no
property at all or veiy little.
"In the western provinces, on the other hand, new lands
were not brought into production by small-scale native
colonists. To be sure this is regrettable, but the French
administration has some justification; the construction of
canals was very expensive and it seemed logical to sell the
land cheaply to the buyer best able to develop it quickly.
Only rich natives and those able to borrow applied. (Mostly
Frenchmen.) This was the origin of large estates held by a
single proprietor. While the percentage of landowners with
from one to five hectares is 80.2 percent in the central
province of Mytho and 71.7 percent in Cochinchina as a whole,
it is much lower in the Transbassac provinces; 49.9 percent
in Rachgia and 33.3 percent in Baclieu. (In these provinces
it is not unusual for one owner to have 500 or even 1000
hectares.)^6 Cultivation by the direct family method is no
longer possible; on this land recently almost uninhabited,
it is done by tenant farmers, or ta dien. who pay a specified
amount of paddy as rent each year. Often unstable and rest
less, these farmers, lacking funds, borrow both money and
rice from the landlord
Usually the landlords do not
live on their land but in the main town of the province and
sometimes even outside the province; often their contacts
with the sharecroppers are made only through their managers;
landowner ship here is mainly speculative.

According to Henry Yves, in Baclieu province farms up to 10
hectares comprise a total land area of 87,642 hectares; those from 10
to 50* 93, 547 hectares; and those over 50, 144, 364 hectares. Henry
Yves, Economic Agricole de l rIndochine, p. 152.
What Gourou, Robequain, or Yves did not mention is that in
South Vietnam the five largest landowners hold a total of 250,000 acres
of rice land-—and all five are French citizens.

151
".......
Unwittingly and contrary to its own interest,
French colonization has led to the increase of a so-called
•proletariat’ class in Indochina (although it should be
pointed out that it is impossible to compare this proletariat
with the class designated by the term in the Western World).
In this essentially rural society, it might be defined as
including all those people who either own no land or have too
little for their livelihood. And to this criterion of insuf
ficient real property should be added that of uprootedness
or 'detribalization•, as it might be termed the Annamites have
not long since outgrown the tid.be.'*67

Systems and Types of Tenure and Tenure Relationships

In general it may be said that South Vietnam is a region of large
land holdings, absentee landlords, sharecroppers and landless agricul
tural workers, whereas North and Central Vietnam and Cambodia are
regions of small peasant farmers who cultivate their own lands.
According to most reliable estimates, 98.7 percent of the agricultural
holdings in North Vietnam, 90 percent of those in Central Vietnam, and
95.4 percent in Cambodia, but only 64 percent of the holdings in South
Vietnam are operated by their owners.

68

It is estimated that in Vietnam there are approximately 4.5 million
farm families —

but only 2.0 million farm landowners.

Thus, close

to 56 percent of all farm families in Vietnam do not own all the land
they cultivate.

The concluding statement frequently encountered that

"North and Central Vietnam are areas of exceedingly small individual

67
Robequain, op. cit., pp. 84-85.

68Note that this is a classification according to property
owners, not farming units. Thus, a single large property owner may
rent out his land to many tenants or sharecroppers who farm them as
separate units, is still considered in these data as a single holding
operated by tenants. The figures for the number of farms worked by
their owners are therefore deceptively large.
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land owners and South Vietnam one of large land estates" is verified
by the following:

In Worth Vietnam, 62 percent of the holdings are less

than one acre in size and 92 percent are less than 5 acres, compared
to Central Vietnam where 69 percent are less than 1.2 acres and 94
percent are under 6 acres in size, while in South Vietnam holdings
above 125 acres in size comprise about 50 percent of the total
cultivated area.

(Rubber plantings located mostly in South Vietnam

are excluded from these statistics.

Since they are all over 125 acres

in size, including them would materially increase the 50 percent figure.)
Legal ownership of land is frequently one of name only.

The

owner is often practically a tenant, being obliged to make annual
payments to the money-lender who has allowed him to remain on the
land holdings.

In addition, a large proportion of the larger land

owners are frequently anxious to conceal the actual size of their
holdings or actual property relations for purposes of tax evasion,
concealment of actual wealth, etc.

In some areas, inaccuracy in land

registration and concealed transfer of ownership by special agreement
often make it impossible to establish the actual dimensions of the
large estates.

An official inquiry into the very thickly populated

province of Thai Binh in North Vietnam disclosed that 122,000 small
owners with less than 0.9 acres shared 54,000 acres, whereas 253 large
owners held 25,000 acres directly and, in addition, controlled 38,000
acres; the legal, registered owners were in fact sharecroppers of the
big estate owners.

The situation in Central Vietnam is similar to that

in North Vietnam.
In Cambodia tenancy is not frequent, although there also tenancy
figures reflect legal more than economic relationship due to the strong
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influence of moneylenders.

From the standpoint of legal definition of

ownership of cultivated land, the Cambodian enjoys a certain prestige
over his Vietnamese counterpart.

In Cambodia all land not cultivated

for five consecutive years reverts to the kingdom; whereas the govern
ment grants legal title to a person who cultivates government-owned
land for five successive years.

However, such ownership by virtue of

direct cultivation over a period of time is limited to five acres to
any one farm family.
In South Vietnam, holdings above 25 acres are usually divided into
parcels of from 2.5 to 25 acres and worked by tenants known as "ta dien"
(Figure XII).

The "ta dien" who rents less than 5 acres usually not

only cultivates with members of his family this land but also works
as a farm hand for other farmers in the area.

Approximately 70 percent

of the total cultivated area in South Vietnam is said to be cultivated
by tenants.

Under the most common landlord-tenant arrangement the

"ta dien" has to clear the land of tall grass and brush growth and
level the land; dig any drainage or irrigation ditches; cultivate the
land; plant, irrigate, harvest, dry and transport the rice to the
landlord’s farmstead.

Rent to the land owner is usually paid in kind,

ranging from 40 to 50 percent of the harvest.

With very few exceptions,

tenants have to borrow crop production capital from the landlord.
Interest on this type of loan averages about 10 percent per month.
Loans are usually repaid at rice harvest time, and lenders invariably
request repayment of the principal and interest in paddy.

Therefore,

in most instances, between 60 and 70 percent of the crop remains in the
hands of the landowner.

Furthermore, it is not uncommon for the landlord
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to impose upon the tenant the condition that he must obtain the land
lord's permission to dispose of his ovm remaining portion of the crop
to a third party.
The fact that the landowner is usually also a moneylender to
the tenant has had a very bad influence on general agricultural
development in Indochina.

6b
According to one source 7 the landlords

in many cases depend more on the interest they get from the loans
they make to their tenants than on the production from their rice
fields.

That explains why many large landowners prefer to divide

their holdings into small, plots and rent them to tenants for primitive,
traditional hand cultivation.
A system of land utilization based on money interest and not on
agricultural production must finally reduce the productivity of the entire
economy.

This would appear to be especially the case in a country

basically agricultural, where 90 percent of the population is directly
engaged in agricultural pursuits.

According to other sources, French

colonists also shared in the money-lending practices of the native
landlords.
Uncertainly of ovmership characterizes the land property system
of Worth and Central Vietnam.

Historically, the land ownership system

in that part of Indochina derives from the fact that the Emperor owned
all the land in the Tonkinese and Annamese empires and distributed it
to those who cultivated it and paid the land tax, and also distributed
that portion of the crop assessed to the Emperor for his "ever-normal

697Erich Jacoby, Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia, Mew York:
Columbia University Press, 1949, p. 14&.
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granary".

Thus, the right to use and own land has been based on entries

made in the local village register used for land tax and rice collection
purposes.

However, the negligence of the local authorities (mandarins)

in keeping accurate registers, the absence of accurate land surveys,
and also the fact that boundary lines, consisting most frequently of
smqll levees, were often washed away by floods and changing water
courses have all contributed to disputes over ownership.

In Vietnam,

ownership by virtue of possession over a long period of time is not
recognised.
In South Vietnam and in the more important provinces of Central
and North Vietnam, and Laos, a system of land register established by
the French in 1925 provides the basis for legal ownership.

In almost

all of Laos and in other mountainous areas, land falls into three general
categories in terms of ownership; namely areas where ownership is
confirmed by custom, those belonging to the community, and those used
temporarily in ray cultivation.
The lands granted by the French administration to both French
citizens and friendly Indochinese were obtained by virtue of an old
Annamese custom that land remaining uncultivated for a period of three
years or more reverted to the public domain.

Long periods of internal

wars resulted in a large portion of the land remaining in this category
when the French administration began in 1875*

ln addition to such

public domain property, those areas of land which had been used only
for ray cultivation were also alloted as land grants.
On the average, the land concessions granted to French colonists
and land development companies were larger than those granted to the
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Indochinese.

Nevertheless, the concessions granted to Indochinese were

sufficiently large to have the effect of creating a special class of
plutocracy among recipients, most of whom have become the •worst ex
ploiters of the poor peasant farmers not only through high land rental
rates but also through the exorbitant rates of interest they charged on
short-term loans.
Farm Land Values
There are wide variations in the value of cultivated land in
Indochina between different regions and within areas in any one region.
Such variations range from as low as $30 per acre in some areas in South
Vietnam to as high as $400 to $500 per acre in some areas in North
Vietnam.

Relative fertility or yield per acre is seldom considered

a criteria in price determination.

Land in some areas in North Vietnam

is often sold for 10 times the money value of land of comparable fertility
located in South Vietnam.

By order of inqportance, the following factors

appear to determine the money value of a plot of land in any area:

(l)

population density in the area and the extent of the owner*s family
ties to the land— particularly ancestors’ graves that may be situated
on the land; (2) location of the land, related primarily to transporta
tion avenues and facilities, either land or water, available; (3) in the
case of rice land, irrigation water supply; and (4) fertility or yield
(rendement).
The Indochinese farm family attaches the greatest importance to
the presence of ancestors * graves on a certain piece of land.

This

factor is often the reason that farm peasants refuse to move off the
land, even when in state of starvation and economic opportunities are
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far greater in another area.

The pressure of population on the land

in many areas of North and Central Vietnam, especially close to the
larger cities, also explains the great importance attached to land by
the peasants and is reflected in the value of land.
In areas where transportation facilities are not well developed
(which is the case in many agricultural regions of Indochina), the
principle that land better situated commands greater value becomes
apparent.

This is particularly true in those areas where there is

usually an excess of production over what is needed for family con
sumption resulting in a salable surplus.

This largely explains why

some rice land located in the interior areas far removed from a rice
storage and milling center, but along a canal or small stream will often
be priced three or four times more than land in the same neighborhood
and of comparable fertility and productivity but having the a11-inportant
disadvantage of being located three or four miles away from the water
course.
For rice production, the availability of irrigation water naturally
has an influential affect on land values, and in some cases this factor
may be responsible for a 200 percent increase in value.

70

70
Yves, Agricultural Economy of Indochina« pp. 27&-2S0, cites
the following examples of the effects of the various factors on the
price of land used for farming purposes in the Tonkin dalta: (l)
Flooding of rice fields by the Mekong River overflowing with rich
alluvial deposits resulted in increasing the value of the land affected
by 700 percent. (2) Completion of an irrigation canal resulted in rice
land price increases up to 200 percent.
(3) Land in the province of
Hadong located near a road or navigable stream is priced at from 3 to 5
times more than land of equal fertility located some distance away. (4)
Farm land in the very heavily populated area of Donglien is valued at 16
times more than farm land of comparable fertility in a neighboring area
10 miles away due to the intensive competition for the available land.
(3) As great a factor was water supply, location and relative population
density in determing land prices is, the existence or absence of ancestors1
graves on the land.
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Improvements in buildings, fences, etc., play a very small role
in land value determination primarily because such improvements normally
are meagre.

A permanent building or a fence on an Indochina farm is a

rare sight indeed.

The average value of such improvements is probably

not over $10 per farm and consists primarily of bamboo sticks and straw
thatching.

On the contrary, greater value is attached to any dikes,

levees or other watersretention earthen worksj all of which are built
by hand, and constitute by far the most important improvement on the
land.
For the above reasons, the relative fertility of the land plays
a minor role in determining its value.

The importance attached to the

fertility of land is certainly not as large in Indochina as it is in
Europe or in the United States.
Wherever irrigation water is available, rice takes precedence
over all other crops for land use.

However, everything else being

equal, there appears to be very little difference between the value
of rice and other agricultural land.

No money value is attached to

forest, swamp, and grass or range land since such land belongs to the
state and normally can be obtained without cost through concessions.
There is no recorded sale of such land in Indochina.
Farm Income and Level of Living
In general, the productivity, level of living, and farm income
of the average farm family in Indochina are very low regardless of the
yardstick used or the comparison made.

In the majority of cases, low

per capita productivity, low per acre yields, uneconomical subdivided
parcels of land available to cultivate, and sharing a large portion of
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the total output with the landlord and money-lender all combine to
result in the farm family being able to retain amounts of rice and
other farm products barely sufficient for human existence.
It is estimated roughly that about 25 million people in Indochina
are engaged in agriculture and of that number between 82 and 85 percent,
or approximately 22 million persons, produce rice as the only crop.
Total rice production of the area during good years amounts to only
slightly more than six million tons.

This amounts to about 500 pounds

per capita of the farm population and 600 pounds per person engaged
in the production of rice.
Since normally no rice is imported into Indochina, total yearly
production minus total yearly exports represent domestic disappearance.
Only an infinitestimal quantity of grain, including rice, is fed to
livestock and poultry.

Therefore, the quantity of rice that disappears

domestically is almost wholly for human consumption and amounts to
about 350 pounds per capita annually.
The average farm family probably consumes the same quantity of rice
as non-farm people which indicates that the yearly surplus, or quantity
of rice available for sale or exchange is about 250 pounds per person
engaged in agriculture.

This quantity of rice, if sold at the average

farm price equivalent for 1954 of four cents per pound would bring
a return of $10.

For a family of five persons, considered in official

statistics as the average size of rural families, this would amount to
$50 income per year above family rice needs for food.
are based on 1954 data for all Indochina.

The above figures

But if the heaviiy populated

deltas of North and Central Vietnam are considered as a separate case
the situation presented is quite different.

For example, it is estimated
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that the seven million rural people in the Tonkin delta produce normally
about 1.9 million tons of rice annually, or about 370 pounds per person.
It is estimated that the amount of rice left for sale or barter each
year after home food use amounts to only 20 pounds per person, or 100
pounds worth four dollars per average farm family of five persons.
From this quantity of rice must be deducted, the share of the crop going
to the landlord as rent which probably amounts to all of the surplus.
Thus, in the case of sharecroppers this indicates that no rice is left
for sale or barter after allowing for family consumption and probably
the only way to obtain cash is to hire members of the family as laborers
on neighboring farms.
Rice Consumption in Relation to Production
The above calculations are made with the use of data for the year
1952 and are based upon rice production and population figures with no
allowances made for the quantity of rice consumed internally by dis
tilleries, the amount lost through damage by weather and rodents, and
the quantity of paddy used for seed.
Yves conducted a very intensive study of the internal consumption
of rice in Indochina in 1932.

71

It is realized that results of this

study are outdatedj however, it is the only intensive study of this
problem ever made and is still quoted in official documents and pres
entations.

The economic conditions of the average Indochinese farm

family have not changed greatly since that time.

Production of lice

71
Henry Yves, Economie Agricole de l ’Indochine, Paris:
Presse, 1932, pp. 19&-20&.

Ideo
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and other crops is still done under primitive methods of cultivation
and harvesting.

Yields have not increased.

Total crop production has

increased but only in direct proportion with the increase in the number
of farm families engaged in agriculture.

The results are that the

average farmer is not more productive today than he was a quarter of a
century ago, his tenure conditions have not improved and he still has
to share as large a part of his harvest with his landlord and money
lenders as he did then.

The conclusion is that the conditions reported

by Yves are still applicable today.
For purposes of analysis, Yves divided Indochina into four regions;
namely, North Vietnam, Central Vietnam, Cochinchina, and Cambodia.
per capita production of paddy was as follows:

The

North Vietnam, 473

pounds; Central Vietnam, 513 pounds; Cambodia, 761 pounds; and
Cochinchina, 1,433 pounds.

(The above and following data are pre

war yearly averages.)
Tonkin and North Annam Combined:
Total production................. 1.36 million metric tons of paddy
Exports (to large population centers)

250,000

"

"

"

"

Consumed by distilleries . . . . . .

60,000

"

"

"

11

Seed (at rate of 40 kg. per Ha.) . .

60,000

"

11

"

11

”

"

M

"

11

"

11

M

Animal feed and l o s s ...............

60,000

Human c o n s u m p t i o n ................. 1.43 mil.

In addition, about 37*000 metric tons of rice flour from rice mills
are available for human consumption.

It is further estimated that the

1.43 million tons of paddy results in about 900,000 metric tons of
milled rice at a milling yield of 63 percent.

This indicates rice

availabilities for human consumption in the rural areas of those regions
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of about 209 pounds per person per year, or a little over one-half pound
per capita per day, plus a small amount of rice flour used mostly for
thickening vegetable soups.
The paddy movements to population centers and the quantity used
by the distilleries indicate that about 310,000 tons of paddy leave
the farms of that region in an average year.

This amounts to about

68 pounds per farm person per year that is available for either barter
or sale.

However, these 310,000 tons that move off the farms come from

the larger farms for the most part— the farmers with smaller holdings
seldom, if ever, have any paddy available after harvest for sale or
barter.

Yves reports that in Tonkin only the rich and the relatively

well-to-do people are able to afford consumption of good quality rice
throughout the year.

More generally, the small peasant farm families

can afford rice only during the 3 or 4 months immediately following
the rice harvest.

After this period they have normally consumed what

was left to them after dividing the yearrs harvest with other interested
parties in production and have to resort to mixtures of yams, other
root crops and c o m meal— rice by then being too expensive an item to
utilize in their diet.

Therefore, even amongst the rice-producing

peasants, rice is considered a luxury food item during part of the year.
The Annamese peasant produce and consume mostly a low-quality red
lice.

This type of rice is preferred by the peasants of that region

primarily because of the fact that it gains very much weight and volume
during cooking— thus affording a fuller rice bowl and human stomach from
a smaller quantity of milled rice.

Yves reports that they cannot afford

higher quality rice even during the best years.
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Cochinchina: The average yearly pre-war production of paddy in
Cochinchina is estimated at 2.7 million metric tons.

Estimated dis

tribution of this quantity is as follows:
E x p o r t s .................. 1.3^ (million metric tons of paddy)
Consumed by distilleries.

.06

"

"

" 11

”

S e e d ........................ 09

"

"

" "

"

Loss and animal feed

"

"

" ”

"

11

"

" ”

”

Human consumption

...

.05
1.12

To the above availabilities for human consumption should be added
about 80,000 metric tons of rice flour produced by local rice mills.
This indicates human consumption amounting to about 550 pounds of paddy,
or 308 pounds of clean rice plus a little rice flour per capita per
year.

The data indicate that the amount of paddy available for sale

or barter is about 3*000 pounds per farm family or 500 pounds per
person.

Yves considers the consumption figure of 300 pounds per person

per year "normal” for the rural population of Cochinchina and remarks
that rice prices are generally lower at the point of production in
Cochinchina than in North and Central Vietnam due to supply factors,
differences in transportation costs, and number and tactics of middle
men engaged in marketing.

It should also be pointed out that while

the average peasant in Cochinchina consumes about two and one-half
times the quantity of rice that the North and Central Vietnam peasant
consumes, the use of yams and other root crops and corn in the diet
is much less extensive in Cochinchina than in other regions of Indochina.
Cambodia:

Before World War II the 400,000 Cambodian farm families

produced an average of about 815,000 metric tons of paddy per year.
tribution of this production was estimated by Yves to be as follows:

Dis
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E x p o r t s ........................
Consumed by distilleries
Seed

....

..................

Animal feed and l o s s
Human consumption.......... . .

120,000 (metric tons of paddy)
30,000

"

11

"

11

35,000

"

»

"

»

30,000

"

"

"

"

600,000

"

n

"

”

These figures indicate a per capita consumption of 4S0 pounds of
paddy per year or 300 pounds of clean rice.

Pre-war per capita con

sumption of rice by Cambodians, therefore, was only slightly less than
the indicated consumption of peasants in Cochinchina.

However, the

average Cambodian peasant family is probably better fed than the
Cochinchina residence since corn, sweet potatoes and other root crops
supplement the Cambodian rice ration to a larger extent.

Average yearly

movements of paddy into the export and distilleries markets indicate
that the quantity available for sale or barter amounts to approximately
820 pounds per farm family or 160 pounds per person.

However, this

should not lend one to conclude that the average Cambodian farmer has
only one-third as much paddy available for sale as his counterpart
farmer in Cochinchina.

Rather, it must be remembered that since a

very large percentage of Cambodian farmers own the land they cultivate,
they do not have to share their output with landlords and probably are
able to retain a larger portion of their rice production.

To this

extent, the amount of surplus or salable paddy remaining in the hands
of the average Cambodian farmer after harvest is probably equal to the
amount left to the average farmer in Cochinchina after the latter has
divided his output with the landlord in payment for rent of the land.
It should also be remembered that the data used in the analysis
above relate to total production, disappearance, consumption and exports.
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No attempt is made to isolate the farmers* share of the total produce.
The portion of the rice crop remaining to the peasant for his own use
and benefit varies considerably between different regions according to
the different circumstances relative to individual tenure arrangements,
landlord relations, credit position and market situation.

However, in

all probability the average peasant rice farmer seldom is able to enjoy
full use and benefit from more than 50 percent of his rice production
in any one year.

The 50 percent figure is the one most commonly used

in official documents.
Land Taxation and Land Revenue Systems
Before 1953 land tax laws and the land taxation system of Indochina
consisted of a wide variety of governmental ordinances and decrees,
each one applicable to certain regions or areas, to certain categories
of property owners, and all varying in rates and tax schedules for land
in a certain productivity or use categories.

For example, in Vietnam

the govenors of each region (North, Central and South Vietnam) had the
authority to decree the tax laws applicable within their own territorial
jurisdiction with the result that different rates existed for the
different regions and there were often wide variations in tax schedules
even between provinces, depending upon the budgetaiyrequirements and
political expediency.

In many cases French property owners were com

pletely exempt from Vietnamese-decreed laws but were subject only to
tax laws instituted by the French Governor General.

The multiplicity

of land tax laws in existence in Vietnam in 1953 is evident from the
statement of the special commission appointed by the president of the
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country to study possible remedial action.

The commission reported

that it had examined a total of 157 different kinds of taxes before
making its recommendations for a new law applicable uniformly through
out the country.

The commission made special note of the fact that

many of the taxes in existence prior to 1953 fell heavily upon the
laboring classes and peasants least able to pay them.

In some cases

no distinction was made of the fertility or productivity of different
lands; instead, all land was subject to a f3.at and uniform tax rate.
In other cases tax rates were not based upon the size or area of holding
nor productivity, but upon the number of families cultivating a given
unit of land, thus the smaller the holding the higher the rate.
The new tax law enacted in 1953 divides agricultural land into
two general categories; rice lands, and high lands on which crops other
than rice are grown.

The amount of the yearly tax to be assessed against

the land depends upon the fertility, or category of productivity.

Rice

lands are divided into six categories and taxed as follows:
1.

High-class land which has an average yield of over 2,000
kilograms of paddy per hectare; 200 piasters.

2.

First-class land which has an average yield of from
1,200 to 2,000 kilograms of paddy per hectare; 160 piasters.

3.

Second-class land which has an average yield of from 700
to 1,200 kilograms of paddy per hectare; 130 piasters.

4. Third-class land which has an average yield of from 500
to 700 kilograms of paddy per hectare; 100 piasters.
5.

Fourth-class land which has an average yield of from 300
to 500 kilograms of paddy per hectare; 70 piasters.

6. Fifth-class land which has an average yield of less than
300 kilograms of paddy per hectare; 40 piasters.
The majority of rice lands in Vietnam would fall in categories of
first and second-class land.

During 1953 rough rice prices at the
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farm averaged about two piasters per kilogram which indicates that the
gross value of the output from one hectare of rice land of average
productivity amounted to between 2,400 and 3*000 piasters.

The land

tax rates under the new lav/ therefore amount to between six and seven
percent of the gross value of the produce.

The land tax is assessed

against the legal owners of the land as registered in the local village
land register.

In the case of landowners renting their rice land and

receiving 40 percent of the crop as rent, the tax schedule indicates
that about 17 percent of the landowners' share would be paid to the
government in the form of land taxes.
The law calls for the appointment of special land-classification
committees detailed to conduct land classification procedures during
the rice-growing period or at harvest time, and makes provision for
landowners to request and receive a hearing for a reclassification in
cases where they believe their lands have been put in a category above
their actual productivity.

Provisions are also made in the law for

reclassification downward during periods of severe floods, droughts,
or other catastrophes resulting in reduced yields in an area as well
as reclassification upwards when public improvements are made in water
control, irrigation, etc., resulting in increased rice yields.
A different tax rate schedule is established for land on which
other crops besides rice are grown.

Seven different categories of land

are established, depending upon the types of crops produced.

Tax rates

vary from 300 piasters per hectare for the highest category of land to
15 piasters for land in the lowest category.

With the exception of the

differences in the applicable rates, the same general provisions apply
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to both rice land and high land on which other crops besides rice are
grown.
Undoubtedly, revision of the land tax laws was an attempt on
the part of the government to pacify the smaller landowner-operators
in the face of increasing Communist activities in the field of land
taxation in those areas where they were in control.

As was the case

with a large number of governmental decrees during that period, the law
v;as met with very limited enthusiasm by most landowners.

Very few land

classification committees were appointed and a smaller number actually
engaged in land classification work, with the result that the law
remained on the statute books but very little actual implementation
and enforcement was forthcoming.
A tax on land based on the productivity of the land amounts in
fact to taxing the produce itself in the final instance.

There is

little doubt that such a tax system, if applied widely in Indochina,
would result in landowners shifting the burden of the tax back to the
renters of the land in the form of higher rents, or a larger portion
of the crop, with the final incidence falling upon the renters and
sharecroppers least able to bear the burden.

In theory, there can be

no shifting of a tax levied against land or other immovable property,
and, from a theoretical concept, the owner of the property carries the
burden of the tax in the form of reduced capitalized value of the property
because of lower net, or economic rent.

However, in a situation such

as exists in the overly-populated farming areas of Vietnam where the
supply of land available is. very limited and the demand for a parcel
of land on which to make a living far exceeds the supply, the competitive
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bidding by landless peasants for the available rice land gives the land
owner considerable advantage.

In most cases where verbal agreements

stipulate rent payments in the form of a certain portion of the produce,
land of higher fertility and productivity usually rents for a higher
percentage of the total output with the result that farmers cultivating
this type of land are not able to retain a much larger quantity of
produce than if they were cultivating inferior land.
However, there is still very intensive competition for the better
land and owners of this type of land are able to obtain a larger portion
of the crop in their rental agreements.

A tax on the landlord’s share

would immediately result in landowners requiring and being able to
obtain increases in their portion up to the point where the share
remaining to the cultivator is sufficient only to afford his family
the bare means of subsistence.

The final result will be greater equality

of sharecroppers cultivating lands of different fertility, but an
equality at the lower end of the subsistence level.

The conclusion is,

therefore, that such a system of land taxation, though imposed on the
landowners in the first instance, would result in shifting the burden
on the sharecroppers in the final instance.

The only possible remedy

to this situation is the enactment and rigid enforcement of a rental
ceiling law designed to protect sharecroppers against exhorbitant land
rental rates on the part of landowners.

The Vietnamese government failed

in this respect and the new land tax system likewise failed to accomplish
the desired ends.
Viet Minh Land Tax:

The Communist Viet Minh instituted a land

tax law of their own, and from all indications rigidly enforce it in
those rural areas that have come under their control.

The tax is
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imposed upon the tenant farmers, land ovmer-cultivators, and landowners
alike.

The yield of the land, or its productivity, and the size of the

family unit form the basic criterion in establishing the amount of tax
to be paid.

Therefore, yearly production per person in the family

actully determines the amount of tax a farm family pays, with different
rates applying for families classified as renters, owner-cultivators,
or landowners.
Taxes to the Viet Minh authorities are paid in paddy at harvest
time and range from 17 percent to a maximum of 75 percent of the pro
duction above a certain amount.

The tax schedule treats tenant farmers

more leniently than it does owner-cultivators and the large landowners.
As indicated by Table 23, the tax schedule is a rather ingenious device
for extracting heavier taxes on the landowner class.

The owner-cultivator

farm family was selected as the basic unit to which the schedule or
rate for the other two classes of farmers was related.

For ovmer-

cultivators the tax rate ranges from 17 percent of the produce at a
level of paddy production of up to 400 kilograms per person in the
family.

The rates for this class of farm family increases by six percent

for each 100 kilograms of paddy produced per person up to the 75 percent
level.

After this level of production is reached, the amount of the

tax increases by 75 kilograms for each increment of production of 100
kilograms per person in the family.
The tax rate assessed against tenant farmers amounts to 75 percent
of that assessed against the owner-cultivators up to the point where
the rate reaches 75 percent of the paddy produced after which tenant
farmers likewise pay 75 kilograms of paddy for each increment of pro
duction of 100 kilograms per each person in the family.
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Table 23.

Paddy
production
Kilograms
per person
Under 400

Schedule of Taxes Imposed Upon Farmers by Communist Viet
Minh Authorities
•
•

•
t

•
•

Landowners
: Tenant farmers
: Owner-Cultivator :
:
Tax rate for each additional 100 Kg . per person
: Percent : (Kg) : Percent : (Kg) : Percent : (Kg)
29.75

17

12.75

68

29.75

119

23

91

40.25

149

90

29

120

50.75

200

26.25

116

35

155

61.85

262

000

• 30.75

347

41

196

71.75

344

900

35.25

182

47

243

75.00

419

1000

39.75

222

53

296

75.00

494

1100

44.25

266

59

355

75.00

569

1200

48.75

315

65

420

75.00

644

1300

53.25

368

71

491

75.00

719

1400

57.75

426

75

566

75.00

794

1500

62.2 5

488

75

641

75.00

869

1600

66.75

555

75

716

75.00

944

1700-

71.25

626

75

791

75.00

1019

1300

75.00

701

75

866

75.00

1094

1900

75.00

776

75

941

75.00

1169

2000

75.00

851

75

1016

75.00

1244

400

12.75

51

500

17.25

68

600

21.75

700
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The rate assessed against the portion of the rice crop received
by landowner families as rent amounts to 75 percent more than the rate
assessed against owner-cultivator families up to the point where the
rate reaches 75 percent for each increment in amount of paddy received.
As the schedule of tax rates indicates, the amount of paddy turned
over to the Communists constitutes a rather large percentage of the
crop even at low levels of per capita output.

However, it is quite

evident that the intent was to tax much more heavily the portion received
by landlords as rent.

In very few cases do tenant families receive more

than 400 kilograms per person in the family as their share of the paddy.
Therefore, it is very seldom that rice farmers in this categoiy pay more
than about 13 percent of their share as taxes.

The same situation is

true with respect to farm families classified as owner-cultivators, and
probably only in very few and isolated cases do they pay more than about
17 percent of the paddy produced as taxes.

However, this is usually

not the situation in so far as the landowner class is concerned, and
especially so with the large landowners.

Very seldom do they receive

as little as 400 kilograms of paddy per person in the family.

As the

tax schedule indicates, tax imposed on the landowners class reaches the
75 percent of increment figure when about 360 kilograms of paddy is
obtained per capita.

Probably most landowner families receive rent

equivalent to more than this amount each year with the result that the
share of the rice crop received by landowners is taxed vary heavily.
Furthermore, there is very little likelihood that landowners are able
to improve their position very much by imposing higher rent payments
upon their tenants.

There are two reasons for this conclusion:

first,

most landowners would be obliged to deliver 75 percent of this increment
to the authorities in the form of increased taxes; second, the Viet Minh,
as early as 1949a passed a land rent reduction law stipulating that
rents, in money or in kind, would be reduced to the point where the
maximum rental paid by tenants would in no case exceed one-third of the
average yearly production. ^

Both Communist civil and military author

ities were very energetic in enforcing paddy collections to the full
amount of the tax and in implementing the rent reduction law in those
areas where they were in control.
This tax on the produce of the land referred to above is known
as the "general tax" and goes into the national budget of the Communist
authorities.

In addition there is a local tax, also collected in kind,

which goes to the local authorities to create revenue for local adminis
tration expenses.

This local tax is also levied on a graduated scale

against the three classes of families and amounts to an additional 15
percent of the "general tax".
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The Communist rent reduction program is treated an greater
detail in Chapter VII, Land and Agrarian Reform.

CHAPTER VII
LAND AND AGRARIAN REFORM

Land and agrarian reform has been foremost on the minds of peasant
farmers in most of the Asiatic countries for the past decade.

In no

other country of that part of the world has the need been greater, nor
the cry louder, than in Vietnam.

Agrarian reform programs undertaken

by a government may be of various types and degrees depending upon the
need, the willingness of the government to put forth the efforts required,
and the financial, personnel and other resources available to carry out
the program.

It may take the form of outright expropriation of large

landholdings, sub-division and sale of the land, consolidation of small
land holdings, and/or reduction of rent.

Land reform programs may be

accompanied by the provision of short- medium- and long-term agricultural
credit on favorable terms and public or cooperative ownership of primary
marketing facilities, such as storage, as was undertaken in Japan under
the recent military occupation authorities.

Reform programs may also

take the milder and simpler form of government purchase and redistri
bution of large land holdings, supplemented by a rent-reduction program,
as recently carried out on the Chinese island of Taiwan.

Whatever the

degree of reform anticipated, there must be careful study and detailed
planning as well as strong determination on the part of the governmental
authorities for any such program to be successful and accomplish the
desired results.
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Meed for Agrarian R e f o m
The urgent need for reforms in agriculture in Vietnam arises from
the following:

(l) the very unequal distribution of landholdings

resulting in a large percentage of the total cultivated area being
owned by a very small percentage of the people; (2) the relatively
large number of landless farm familiesj (3) the very extensive degree
of parcelization of land holdings in Central and North Vietnam; (4)
exhorbitantly high land rental rates prevailing in most areas; (5) the
usurous rates of interest charged by moneylenders and merchants on
short-term money and food loans to fanners; and (6) the disorganized
and unsystematic conditions under which agricultural commodities
(primarily rice) are marketed at the farm level.
These conditions of the rural economy all combine to lead to
gross inefficiency in agricultural production in general, grossly
unequal distribution in incomes, perpetual indebtedness and a miserable
standard of living for a large sector of the rural people at the bare
subsistence level.

The result is social and political unrest on the

part of the masses.
Conditions of luxurous living and absentee landlordism on. the
part of a few individuals, and wide stratification of economic and
social levels can have little effect in promoting stability and general
economic improvements when surrounded by a sea of misery and poverty.
These have been the conditions in Vietnam in the past, and it is toward
remedying them that efforts at agrarian reform should be directed.

Past Efforts at Reform
The first efforts made in the field of land reform in Vietnam
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were initiated in the 17th century by Emperors of Annam and Tonkin who
made use of the available communal, or public lands, to plan their
yearly distribution to landless farm families on an equitable basis.
They also confiscated all the private lands in certain heavily populated
provinces and transformed them into collective farms to be cultivated by
arny veterans and their families as a reward for military service.
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According to Vu-Van-Hien, communal or public lands were to be re
distributed every four years to avoid disparity among those already
allotted parcels of land and also to afford an opportunity to those
72
families without any land to farm communal land.
During the first
half of the 19th century the Emperors were instrumental in greatly
increasing the amount of cultivable land coming under public or communal
ownership.

In addition to outright confiscation of large land holdings,

special ordinances by the Emperors declared as communal property all
agricultural land in the following categories:

(l) New alluvial land

formed by the changing courses of the rivers and sea shore; (2) all
land that had been cleared and brought under cultivation through the
use of military labor (prisoners of war); (3) lands abandoned by their
owners during the war; and (4) lands that belonged to persons who died

rro

Vu-Van-Hien. Ia. Properiete Communale au Tonkin. (Law Thesis)
University of Paris, 1939. Most of the information concerning the
historical aspects of communal lands and early land reform was obtained
from Vu-Van-Hien1s study.
7Ll
According to Hien, public lands were distributed to heads of
farm families. The size of the allotted plot of land depended upon
the total amount of such land available and the number of landless farm
families in the village, and also the relative fertility of the land.
Use of public land can be withdrawn from a farm family for failure to
pay the taxes attached to the land, and for letting the land remain
uncultivated for one season.
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without leaving direct descendants.

The application and enforcement

of these ordinances resulted in 25 percent of all cultivated land in
Central Vietnam and 21 percent in North Vietnam being under public
ownership at the beginning of French administration in 1873.
It was state policy to allocate public lands to villages, but
the ownership of such lands remained to the state which made redistri
bution among the villages when deemed necessary.

The law prohibited

the creation of large estates and established protective measures in
favor of maintaining the extent of public lands by prescribing severe
sanctions against those who "usurp or sell properties belonging to the
state".
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However, with serious political troubles during the latter

part of the last century the central governments relinquished control
of the public lands to the local village authorities.

Greater autonomy

was ceded to the villages and state law gave way to local customs.
Increasing difficulties were, therefore, encountered in the realization
of a general policy for the whole country.

Taxes attached to the land

by local village notables were increased to such an extent that peasant
families were forced to abandon the land and become vagrants.

As a

result, a large portion of the public land was left uncultivated.

In

addition, local cliques of village notables tended to ignore all legal
prescriptions regarding the public land which were contrary to their
personal interests.

Reference already has been made of the fact that

in many cases the local village notables and their French Administration
counterparts made profitable personal gains through the sale and/or
rent of communal lands (see page 148).

75
Vu-Van-Hien, op. cit., p. 12.
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As a result of the war culminating in the French occupation of
Tonkin in 1884, large masses of population had been forced to migrate
and a large amount of land was left uncultivated.

Numerous French

colonists hurriedly asked for and obtained from the Colonial Administra
tion large land concessions in those areas where peasants, scattered
by the war, had not yet returned.

Vien makes reference to one such

concession amounting to 11,700 hectares of land made in 1896.
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Five

years later when the peasants returned to their lands, serious trouble
broke out and the Colonial Administration was compelled to recover the
concession by paying an indemnity to the French concessionee out of
the public funds.

Similar cases occurred in numerous areas and a

great number of peasants never recovered their lands.

Such was also

the fate of many villages which lost their public or communal lands.
The serious problem of overpopulation of the deltas in North
Vietnam was never solved by the French Colonial Administration.

In

1933, an official survey revealed the existence of 968,000 landless
peasant farm families, their living depending upon the periodic
allocation of communal lands.

This problem, together with the fact

that agricultural production techniques were no more improved under the
French than under previous local rulers, induced the Colonial Adminis
tration, after a period of uncertainty, to continue after 1929 the
traditional policies regarding the communal lands.

Since 1935 various

attempts have been made to subject the villages to the tighter and
tighter control of the Central Administration.

76Ibid, p. 21
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Social and Economic Importance of Communal lands: From a
theoretical point of view, the part played by the communal lands in
Vietnamese social and economic life would seem undeniable.

They form

a major obstacle to the concentration of land-ownership in the hands
of an economic oligarchy and to the formation of a rural proletariat.
In an essentially agrarian economy such as Vietnam, such an order would
lead to political despotism by the land-owning class, and would result
in fierce social conflicts.

Hien makes reference to an area comprising

a number of villages in North Vietnam where, except for about 700 acres
of communal land, the total amount of tillable land belong to a small
77
number of money-lenders.

The existence of communal land means that,

periodically, a certain portion of the available rice land can be
distributed among a large number of the population.
However, in practice the system of allocating communal lands
presents many drawbacksj the most important is that the average share
of communal land allocated to a farm family does not amount to more
than one-half an acre, whereas at least twice this surface area of rice
land would still be insufficient to feed an average peasant family or
to provide work for all members of the family.

It is true that a

certain number of families comprise two or three "inscribed members"
(father and sons) who can pool their shares of communal lands and thus
have a more economical and efficient operating unit.

But even under

such conditions, another set of requirements often make it impossible
for father and sons to take advantage of pooling their allotted shares

^Vu-Van-Hien, op. cit.. p. 35.
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of communal land.

The pool, or its leader, must have certain indispen

sable agricultural equipment, mainly a water buffalo, and a certain
amount of capital available to purchase seed and food rice, and to pay
taxes to the village during the pre-harvest period.

Therefore, what

usually happens in practice is that only those farm families who already
possess a certain amount of private land, or who own at, least part of
a water buffalo (i.e., own it in common with someone else) are able to
cultivate their shares of communal land with the maximum advantage to
the cultivator’s family.

The majority of peasant beneficiaries have

to "rent" their shares - usually at a very low price - to the large
landowners and money lenders who, in the last analysis, are the real
beneficiaries of the system.
Another drawback to the system is that redistributing the land
every four years prevents many beneficiaries from investing the
required amount of capital that they have available on long-time
improvements in the land, because they cannot be sure that at the
end of the four-year period they will be allotted the same parcel of
land.

This situation makes for inefficient utilization of available

resources for maximum net returns.
A pre-war study revealed that 12 percent of the communal lands
in Vietnam were not cultivated.
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In the delta areas of Worth and

Central Vietnam all the tillable land always has been cultivated during
periods of security.

Most of the uncultivated communal land reported

in the study was located in the hilly areas beyond the deltas, where

78
Henry Yves, op. cit., p. 67.
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the soil is less fertile and manpower not quite as abundant.

Part of

the communal lands remain fallow, although the local villages are
obliged to pay taxes assessed against those lands to the central govern
ment.

In some cases enterprising immigrants from the overcrowded^ deltas

rent these lands and, through hard work, succeed in increasing their
productivity.

However, the usual result is that local village notables

will reap the greatest benefits from such efforts by increasing the
rental rates to abnormal levels or through cancellation or refusal to
renew the peasant’s lease.
Vu-Van-Hien proposes two ways in which reforms can be made in the
79
use and allocation of communal lands:'7

First, the communal land may

serve as a basis for collective cultivation and the village become an
economic as well as a political and social unit.

All the village

inhabitants would cooperate in the cultivation of the land lumped
together and would receive equitable shares of the produce.

YJriting

in 1939 he said, "This collectivism presents undeniable economic and
social advantages, but its realization requires the presence of
political and psychological factors, as well as a revolutionary change
in the administrative structure and the mores of the peasants.

One

cannot think of the occurrence of such changes at the present time."
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One may wonder whether, with the recent changes in the political structure
of the country, such a proposal should not be given more serious con
sideration.
The second reform propsal by the same writer m s less radical,

79
Vu-Van-Hien, op. cit. . p. 184.
^Vu-Van-Hien, op. cit.. p. 186.
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namely, to divide the communal lands into equal lots of two acres each,
a plot considered of sufficient size to furnish food for an average
peasant family.

Because the area granted at each distribution to an

individual family would be increased four times, a much smaller number
of people would receive their shares of land at each distribution.
And, of course, if the land were relatively infertile, the individual
share would still be larger.

Moreover, the rule of four-year periodic

distribution is not favorable to the cultivation of certain crops and
does not encourage long-time improvements on the land.

The period during

which the beneficiaries would enjoy their shares of communal land must
be increased to ten or twelve years.

The result would be that each

individual would find himself less often on the partition roll, perhaps
not more than once or twice during his lifetime but, on the other hand,
each time he would have an area of adequate size to cultivate during
a longer period and thus have a better chance to save some capital with
which to start life as an independent farmer, instead of living miserably
on relatively frequent but entirely inadequate relief.

With the 700,000

acres of communal land in North Vietnam, 350,000 such parcels of land
can be provided for an equal number of peasant families during ten to
twelve years and, with an improved agricultural credit system, thus
give them a chance to become independent farmers.

However, at the

present time there are probably one million landless rural families in
North Vietnam, and the population is increasing at the rate of 100,000
per year.

The reforms along this line would provide help for one third

of them, but at the next distribution of communal land which would take
place ten or twelve years from now, only one fifth of the landless farm
population could have a share in the public land.
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Viet Minh and Communist Agrarian Reform

The Viet Minh agrarian policy in the years immediately following
their seizure of power in 1945 was often obscure, but generally speaking
land reform in the early years of the Viet Minh revolution was less a
clearly formulated program than a propaganda campaign designed to win
support of the peasants.

In some areas where Viet Minh control was

undisputed, there was a redistribution to poor peasants of land that
belonged to "traitors” and "colonialists" and for a time an intense
campaign to win "voluntary gifts" of land from property owners.

Early

in 1947 the Viet Minh authorities undertook a propaganda campaign for
the reduction of land rents and the suspension of usury.

The program

no doubt won the Viet Minh considerable popularity since high rents
and usury, together with inequitable land distribution, are among the
worst evils of the Vietnamese agrarian economy.

After 1947 the Viet

Minh undertook the provisional redistribution of abandoned lands to
former tenants.

This redistribution, much of which was said to be the

former property of "traitors" and "colonialists", was probably nothing
more than the legal recognition of the actual state of affairs in the
countryside, for the peasants had already occupied the best parts of
abandoned lands.
Rent Reduction:

In July, 1949 the Viet Minh government passed

the land rent reduction law.

Apparently this was the first time that

the requirement that land rents be reduced was put on a legal basis.

c*i

Most of the material on Viet Minh land reform was obtained
from United States Embassy Dispatch No. 133 dated October 2, 1954. The
writer participated in writing that dispatch.

The decree fixed a minimum 25 percent rent reduction, and in the case
of excessively high rents a 35 percent reduction.

The immediate goal

at this time was to fix a maximum rent that would not exceed one third
of the average crop.

In August, 1949 a Viet Minh decree gave priority

to veterans and their families in the redistribution of confiscated
property.

A decree in February, 1952 ordered classification of all

abandoned land in accordance with the owner’s political beliefs.
Lands belonging to those who had collaborated with the enemy were to
be seized.

The state reserved the right to decide later the disposition

of lands belonging to persons living in enemy zones who did not collabo
rate with the enemy.

In the case of owners whose political status was

unknown the land was to be returned in whole or in part after expenses
for management had been deducted.

This appears to have been the first

law that attempted to blackmail landowners living in the controlled
zone who refused to collaborate with the Central Government.

A decree

in May, 1950 attempted to resolve the agrarian credit program by can
celling all debts contracted before 1947> those for which unpaid interest
had already doubled the capital borrowed, those contracted with leaders
convicted of a crime against the independence movement, and those
contracted by debtors killed in the line of duty.

Another decree of the

same date declared that all lands that had been fallow for five con
secutive years or which were not cultivated by the end of 1950 would
be considered state lands.

They were to be distributed afterwards on

a provisional basis to poor peasants who would acquire the right to
cultivate them for ten years.
Scope of the Program: During the early years the objectives of the
program were limited in scope (the chief of which were the reduction of

land rent and the redistribution of abandoned or confiscated lands on a
provisional basis) and outwardly at least the program was relatively free
of communist doctrines.

To be sure there was some emphasis on increased

production programs and land gift programs, but before 1950> and in some
respects long afterwards, the Viet Minh land reform program was hardly
more radical than many such programs that have been carried out in
other countries under conservative governments.

Significantly, it was

a landownerfs political views and actions, not the extent of his wealth,
that determined Viet Minh policy with respect to his property.

Further

more, the Viet Minh were interested primarily in production and taxes
to support their war program, and agrarian policy was largely directed
towards putting abandoned land back into cultivation, encouraging
production, and the collecting of taxes under the agricultural tax law
of 1951 (a graduated tax that penalized unerned incomes from land as
explained in some detail in the previous chapter).

It is probable

that the Viet Minh land reform program brought little improvement in
the peasant’s economic status for any gains were probably offset by
increased taxes, forced labor and conscription.

There is abundant

evidence that rents, at least on good lands, were not greatly reduced,
that such ancient abuses as usury persisted in clandestine forms, that
evasion of the provisions of the land reform laws was relatively simple
and that the disappointing results of the program often expressed by
Viet Minh leaders did not give an entirely false picture of the situation.
The Broader Program:

The Secretary General of the Communist Party

in Vietnam outlined in detail an ambitious program of land reform in
1950 that went far beyond the cautious, empherical one that had prevailed
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until then.

It was a program that the Viet Minh applied with vigor,

and with an ever-increasing tempo, particularly since 1953, 'with only
minor revisions and deviations.

Basically, the program as set out was

to be accomplished in three stages:
1.

Confiscation of lands belonging to the French "colonialists"
and Vietnamese "traitors" for redistribution to needy peasants;
the reduction of land rents; the redistribution of communal
lands; the abolition of feudal exploitation; propaganda for
the cession of land to the state.

2.

Partial realization of the slogan, "Land to the Cultivator".

3.

Complete realization of the slogan and preparation for the
socialization of agriculture.

This program, which was to be led by the workers, would, according
to Viet Minh authorities, increase food production, strengthen the
resistence movement, and provide excellent propaganda.
reform had much more important objectives.

However, land

Not only would land reform

transform the traditional village social pattern and bring about a
redistribution of land, but in working towards its achievement the
peasants would receive training in mass action under proper direction.
And from land reform to utopian socialism there was only a short stop.
Thus, while an important goal in the land reform program in the fore
seeable future was to provide the peasants enough land through despolia
tion of the landlords to make them economically independent, a long-term
goal was the coliectivation of the land.

Through affiliation with

cooperatives the peasant farmers were expected to learn the advantages
of cooperation and eventually to abandon their individualistic ways
in order to participate in a collective farm.
The mobilization of the masses for the reduction of land rents
and the application of the agrarian reform program was launched early
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in 1953 and was perhaps the first concerted effort to change the rural
economy and bring about the long-term goals as expressed by the Viet
Minh authorities.

By comparison, earlier programs had a haphazard

character, although there had been ambitious attempts since 1951 to
organize the peasants for the collection of the agricultural land tax.
The objectives of the mobilization of the masses, as defined in official
statements, were the destruction of the reactionary forces, the weakening
of the feudal economic power, the weakening of the feudal political power
and the seizure of power by the proletariat.

These objectives were to

be achieved by enjorcing the reduction of land rents, by seizing all
land belonging to the French and Vietnamese traitors, by more rational
use of the land expropriated from those who had evaded their duties as
citizens by fleeing to the controlled zone, by abolishing forest and
land concessions, by making a new survey of tillable land and by making
a more equitable distribution of communal-lands.

With some allowances

for a confusion between means and ends and changing in wording and
stress, this represented substantially stage one of the program outlined
by the authorities three years earlier.
The Viet Minh authorities lent great stress to the mobilization
of the masses under government supervision.

This mobilization was

"class struggle at the hamlet level", and the authorities attached
great importance to class distinction.

According to Viet Minh leaders

there were eight classes in the Vietnamese rural community:
1.

The large landowners— they own much land, do not participate
in the work in the fields, and live principally from rents.
Managers of large estates are in the same class.

2.

Rich land owners— they do some work in the fields, but live
principally from the exploitation of labor. If they do not
own land themselves, they are sub-lessors.
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3.

The middle class property holders— this group may have enough
land and equipment to support itself, but just as often it
may be obliged to rent part of the land it cultivates. The
prosperous middle class property owners may sometimes exploit
others by hiring children to watch the cattle, by hiring day
laborers, or they may obtain additional income from renting
land or lending money. However, if income from exploitation
from land or labor exceeds 25 percent of their family’s income,
they are considered rich peasants.

4.

The small land holders— they have little land and in order to
make a living they must rent lands from others or engage
themselves as laborers. Peddlers and artisans belong to this
class, since their livelihood is dependent upon the poor
peasants.

5.

The small tradesmen and non-agricultural property owners—
they do not live from the fruit of the landj they specialize
in commerce or have some trade. They do the woric themselves
or may hire one or two apprentices.

6. Professional people— this group includes teachers, doctors,
and lawyers. They may be large land owners but they are not
considered members of the landholding class.
7. Clergymen-a separate class.
8.

Vagabonds— this class includes all who have no gainful occupa
tion— thieves, beggers, fortunetellers.

The Viet Minh document entitled "Classification of Peasant Social
Groups" gives no explanation for the omission of the landless peasant or
the agricultural worker.

This group, however, which represents a large

percentage of the total population, is probably the communists* most
reliable ally in the rural areas, since from an economic point of view
it has everything to gain by cooperating with the authorities in the
program.
The objectives of the mobilization of the masses were to be
achieved in four stages, the definitions of which were never clear from
the material available.

However, under the usual procedure government

officials encouraged the peasants, particularly the poorest people in
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the village, to join and assume leadership of the local agricultural
associations (apparently a peasant union under government direction),
to complain of past injustices they had suffered under the landlords,
and to demand a reduction in land rents and the return of all rent
payments in excess of the legal maximum.

The landlords who were accused

of violating the law were brought before the people's court for trial
and punishment.
Results;

The results of the movement for the rent reduction was

made public during August, 1954.

According to the Viet Minh statement,

the rent reduction movement, which in January, 1953 was applied to
only nine villages under their control, had by August, 1954 reached a
total of 826 villages in the Tonkin delta and the northern part of
Central Vietnam with a population of 3.5 million people.

In nine

provinces the peasants had confiscated 14,200 hectares of rice land and
2,650 water buffaloes from the reactionaires and notables and had
obliged landlords to repay 12,300 tons of paddy representing excess
rent to 137,000 peasant families.

In view of the large area involved,

these data do not indicate a great redistribution of wealth.

But there

are grimmer statistics; in 600 villages the villagers exposed the
"crimes" of 10,150 landlords who were brought before the people’s
courts.

Of this number about 135 were condemned to death and about

1,200 were imprisoned for re-education.

The Viet Minh went rapidly

to stage two of its reform program— "partial realization of land to the
cultivator", with the promulgation of a special lav/ in December, 1953*
Under the provisions of articles 2 and 3 of this lav/ the lands and
property of French "colonialists" and other imperialist agressors
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are to be confiscated.

There is to be total or partial confiscation,

according to the seriousness of the offense, of the lands, draft animals,
and agricultural implements that belong to the landlords.
confiscated will be requistioned.

VJhat is not

Article 4 states that the lands,

livestock, and agricultural equipment of landlords who are not reactionaires and who are members of the resistance will be expropriated.

They

will receive compensation in ten years in the form of bonds bearing one
and one-half percent annual interest.

The confiscated, requistioned,

and expropriated lands are to be distributed to:

(l)

Landless peasants,

impoverished peasants, peasants who do not have enough land to support
themselves, and needy middle class peasants; (2) other members of the
poor rural classes, such as artisans and small retailers; (3) families
of fallen soldiers and veterans; (4) workers in government factories
and officials.
conditions.

Other minor groups may also receive land under certain

The principal innovations in the new law are the provisions

for the expropriation of the lands of "loyal" landlords on terais very
unfavorable to the owner, and the grant of permanent title to the
beneficiaries of the land redistributed.

The measures pertaining to

the confiscation of lands belonging to French colonialists and Vietnamese
traitors had been in force for a few years and according to Viet Minh
reports at least 225,000 acres of land had already been confiscated
by the state and redistributed.

Moreover, redistribution in the past

had always been on a provisional basis.

Following the promulgation

of the new law there was a strong propaganda compaign around the slogan
"land to the tiller", and the small independent peasant became the Viet
Minh ideal.
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However, the law of December, 1953 has been applied only on an
experimental basis.

Early in 1954 it was applied in six villages, and

by May of that year in an additional 59 villages.

Evidently the Viet

Minh were very careful to apply the new law only in those selected
villages where there had been a successful movement for the reduction
of land rent.
In August, 1954 it was reported by Viet Minh authorities that in
the six experimental villages where the law was first applied, the
peasants had confiscated, requisitioned, or expropriated and redistrib
uted 26,000 hectares of land, 352 water buffaloes and 1,062 agricultural
implements.

Another report in September of that year related that

in the 47 villages where the program had been applied between the
months of May and September the peasants had confiscated about 9,000
hectares of land, 2,400 water buffaloes and a large number of farm
tools.

The seized property had been redistributed to some 13,000

families, representing a total of 50,000 people or 60 percent of the
total population.

There is a large discrepancy between the reports of

the total amount of land seized in the six villages (26,000 hectares)
and that of the 47 villages— in which the first six were included—
(9,000 hectares).

One explanation is irresponsible reporting and gross

carelesness with the data; but probably a better and more accurate
explanation is that the smaller figure represents rice land only while
the larger figure represents all land.
Appraisal: With the Viet Minh having undisputed control of all
of Vietnam north of. the 17th parallel they are probably giving yet
greater attention to agrarian reform.

Although no current reliable

information is available, the program of confiscation and redistribution
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of the land no doubt has been accelerated and applied over most of the
area under their control.

The reduction of land rent and the redistrib

ution of land will bring some temporary improvement in the poor peasants*
economic situation.

However, the gain will most certainly be short

lived, for undoubtedly the Viet Minh tax collectors will be just as
exacting as the former landlords.

In North Vietnam the land reform

program faces two serious problems— the shortage of agricultural land
available in one of the most thickly populated regions of the world,
and the state *s great need for capital which it will be able to obtain
only by exploiting the peasants who are far more numerous than all the
other classes combined.
According to official statistics landed property in both North and
Central Vietnam is divided into extremely small parcels.

For example,

in North Vietnam the average farm is less than one hectare (2.5 acres)
in size.

Farmers possessing more than 7 acres (3 hectares) are very

rare and holdings above 40 acres cover less than 2.5 pei-cent of the
cultivable area.

It is estimated that 93 percent of the small owner—

cultivators have no more than only one-half hectare of land, and that
over 300,000 farm families (24 percent of the rural population) own
no land at all.

A large percentage of the latter are only entitled to

cultivate one-tenth hectare of communal land.
much better in Central Vietnam.

The situation is not

The Viet Minh reports indicate that

where the land confiscation and expropriation law had been applied
only 9*000 hectares of tillable land had been confiscated in 47 villages
having a population of about 85,000.

The distribution of this amount of

land among 13,000 families can not result in each family becoming self-
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sufficient.

In Tonkin and the northern part of Central Vietnam now

tinder Viet Minh control there is simply not enough farm land for all
the farm families.
It is nothing new to Communist governments to extract heavy taxes
from the peasants to get capital necessary for industrialization and
war material.

But the peasant farmers of North and Central Vietnam

have been accustomed too long to the agricultural tax to have many
illusions about the taxes they will have to pay after they are allotted
an additional parcel of land.

The heavily taxed peasant inevitably

goes into debt to the usurer who, in the absence of a state or cooperative
creditor, is the only one prepared to lend him money.

The Viet Minh

have spoken loudly of village cooperative funds but it is doubtful if
their resources are sufficient to meet even the minimum credit needs.
However, Viet Minh theorists probably argue that it makes little difference
whether the peasants go into debt again after acquiring new land under the
redistribution program, since the goal is collectivism.

When that goal

is reached, all debts will probably be cancelled again.

Post-War Efforts at Land Reform
While the Viet Minh leaders were busy formulating their own policies
regarding land reform and affectuating limited application of those
policies in the areas under their control, the French and Vietnamese
governing authorities made only very feeble attempts during the early
period of internal hostilities.

In 1947 an attempt was made by the

president of Vietnam to draw up an ordinance designed to improve ownertentnt relations and reduce the overall rent paid for the use of farm

land.

Basically this ordinance called for written rental and lease

contracts in all cases, and proposed the organization of tenure com
mittees in each province to determine the maximum amount of rent that
should be paid for the use of land for each region, village and type
of soil.

The proposal stipulated that under no condition could the

rent paid in kind exceed 40 percent of the average annual yield of the
land as determined by the appointed committees.

Rental payments in

cash for any one crop year could not exceed the average farm price
during the preceding year of 40 percent of the yield.

In case of

overpayment of rent the courts were to order the land owner to return
such overpayment to the renter plus interest at 8 percent per year for
money accounts and one percent per month for paddy.

In case of crop

failure reducing the yield by as much as one-third of normal, the
committee was to order a reduction in rent payment to an "equitable"
amount below the 40 percent maximum.

The ordinance also provided for

maximum rates of interest to be paid by tenants who borrowed either
rice or money from their landlords during the course of the crop year
at 12 percent per year for money advances and two percent per month
for paddy advances.

It was also stipulated in the ordinance that

provincial committees would determine the maximum rental rates for
draft animals, agricultural equipment and other commodities.

Special

conciliation committees appointed by the Minister of Agriculture for
each province were to act as conciliary bodies except in cases involving
foreigners (Frenchmen) which were to be brought directly to the higher
civil courts.

Upon being signed by the French High Commissioner for

Indochina the ordinance became law, however its application and enforce
ment was never realized.

No provincial committee was ever organized,
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no productivity assessed to any farm land, nor rental contracts entered
into under the terms of the law.

The relationships between landowners

and tenants continued as previously with no material change or improve
ment resulting.
About the only serious study of the situation at that time was by
a Frenchman, H. A. C. Moreau, acting in the capacity of advisor to the
Minister of Agriculture.

82

Primary concern in this study was given to

redistribution of rice lands in South Vietnam leading toward more
efficient family-size units.

Moreau took into consideration the fact

that the distribution of rice land ownership in South Vietnam is such
that there is an average of 8.7 hectares for each land-owning family,
excluding communal lands.

About 6,300 owners with holdings of 50

hectares or more in 1947 had a total of slightly more than one million
hectares; 65,750 owners with 5 to 50 hectares had an aggregate of
850.000 hectares; and 183,000 owners with less than 5 hectares had
315.000 hectares.

His proposition was to establish 50 hectares as the

maximum limit of landownership.

Therefore, the 6,300 large landowners

would retain 50 hectares each or 315,000 hectares, leaving 720,000
hectares of their total holdings available for redistribution.

These

720.000 hectares would be distributed to landless farm families and
those having less than 5 hectares.

According to the recommendation,

480.000 hectares would be distributed to 96,000 landless farm families
on the basis of 5 hectares each (no distinction to be made to differences
in land fertility) and the remaining 240,000 hectares would be divided

S2H. A. C. Moreau, Reforme Agraire et 1 ’Evolution de la Propriete
Familiale au Sud Vietnam, unpublished memorandum based upon a study made
in 1947.
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among 80,000 of the 183,000 small farmer-owners having less than 5
hectares (land ownership in this category averaged 1.9 hectares and
3*1 hectares additional would be allotted).

How those fortunate 80,000

farmers were to be selected was not stated.

Thus, the redistribution

would allow 96,000 landless farmers to obtain land and an additional
80,000 small landowners to increase the size of their holdings to more
economical units.

After redistribution of the land on the above basis,

the comparative picture of landownership in South Vietnam would be as
follows:

Size of holding

Number of landowners
Before

Less than 5 ha.
5 to 49 ha.
50 ha. and more

After

Before

After

183,000

279,000

345,000

1,065,000

65,750

65,750

850,000

850,000

6,300

6,300

1 ,035,000

315,000

70,000

70,000

2 ,300,000

2,300,000

Communal land
Total

Area (hectares)

255,050

351,050

The plan proposed an average price of 4,500 piasters per hectare
for the land to be redistributed.
piaster in 1948

was

(The exchange value of the Indochinese

20 piasters to the United States dollar.)

New owners

would pay for the land over a ten-year period, using about 15 percent of
the rice crop for this purpose.

Owners whose lands were to be distributed

would be paid a cash indemnity equal to 20 percent of the declared value
of the land and would be issued state bonds maturing serially in ten
years and bearing interest at three percent annually.

It was proposed
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that the World Bank or some other international credit institution
be approached to grant the Vietnamese government the credits needed
to support this original 20 percent cash payment, since the Vietnamese
treasury was almost empty.

It was also suggested that some government

action (the specific nature of the action was not mentioned) be
initiated to encourage the former landowners to reinvest the yearly
proceeds received from the maturing land bonds into "fruitful purposes"
such as industrial plants.
Since the former large landowners would no longer play the role
of country banker, rice collector and trader, a vacuum would be created
which the proposal suggested be filled with farmers cooperatives organized
at the same time as the land redistribution took place.

The plan

envisioned government control and supervision of these organizations,
which would be primarily credit and marketing societies.

Short-term

crop production loans amounting to 20 percent of the crop and mediumterm equipment and draft animals loans amounting to about 15 percent of
the value of the yearly harvest would be made.

Short-term loans would

be for the duration of one year and medium-term loans would be repaid
in four yearly installments.

Loans to the cooperatives for rice storage

warehouses and small rice mills would be for a 10-year period.

This was

indeed a grandoise scheme calling for a cash outlay of capital amounting
to over 2.1 billion piasters, or more than 106 million dollars at the
official rate of 20 piasters to the dollar.

However, like most plans

drawn up by French technicians for Indochina, this plan was submitted
to the governmental authorities for consideration but no mention was
made of means of financing.

The proposal left a great many additional questions and problems
without answers, including:

(l) What method would be used to get

landowners to agree to the established price of 4,500 piasters per
hectare and to the rate of interest of three percent annually on the
bonds?

(2)

By what means would the government make it attractive

to those farmer landowners to reinvest their money into industry?
(3)

How would the loan from the World Bank be repaid and in what

manner would the benefitting farmers repay the original 20 percent to
the government?

(4)

From where would the money come to finance the

cooperatives and what were to be the procedures under which the
cooperatives would repay the loans?

As could have been expected, the

plan was submitted to the Minister of Agriculture but it was never
given serious consideration by either the French-sponsored Vietnamese
government nor by the French governmental authorities themselves.

The

many shortcomings and defects of the proposed program were probably
too obvious.
Recent Efforts at Agrarian Reform

In Vietnam the type of reform that the peasant farmers feel the
greatest need for, and personally attach the greatest importance to,
is rent reduction and land ownership and redistribution, especially in
the large land holdings sector of South Vietnam.

In 1952-53 a limited

attempt was made by the Vietnamese government then in power to utilize
American aid funds to finance the resettlement of farm families dis
placed by war activities on abandoned and idle rice lands in South
Vietnam.

The aim of that program was actually two or three fold:
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a.

b.

Political:

1.

To accelerate the pacification of the area.

2.

To afford an opportunity to the government to
help that part of the rural population which
had suffered under the Viet Minh and thus
shield them from further Communistic influence.

Social and
economic:
1.

To give work to refugee farmers.

2.

To improve their living condition by affording
them the basic materials needed for the con
struction of shelters and cultivation of crops.

3.

To bring back into cultivation those lands
abandoned and left idle since 1946, and thus
increase total rice production.

The program was administered by the South Vietnam Agricultural
Service and supervised by the regional agricultural agent and the
respective province chiefs.
for food and
cultivated.

seed at

Farm families were granted loans of rice

the

rate of from 300to 400

kilogramsper hectare

Out of 3,500 tons of rice so loaned during 1951-53, over

S3 percent was collected at the first harvest.

The rice recovered

was vised to extend the program to new locations and help new refugees.
During the first two years of the program a total of 5,600 families
were resettled on 10,050 hectares of rice land and during the 1953-54
crop year 3,100 additional families were resettled on 11,ISO hectares
of land (Figure XIII).
The program was carried out in four provinces in South Vietnam.
The abandoned rice land put back into cultivation belonged either to
absentee landowners or to the provincial administration (public lands).
The land m s divided into plots of from 2 to 5 hectares and allocated
to families on an equitable basis depending upon size of family.

Each

case took the form of a contract of three years duration between the
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Figure XIII*

Allocating Parcels of land to Farm Families Displaced by
the War in Indochina,
Farm families displaced by the war greatly aggregate the
agrarian reform problems in Indochina, In an attempt to
find a solution the government of Free Vietnam allocates
on a provisional basis abandoned lands in the Mekong River
delta to war refugee farm families.
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refugee farmer and the provincial administration who acted on behalf
of the absentee landowners.

Among other things the contracts stipulated

the size and location of the alloted plot of ground, the amount of paddyadvanced, the number of houses or the sum of money advanced for housing
material, etc.

Contracts also stipulated that rent for the use of this

land would be paid to the provincial administration according to the
following schedule:
(1)

At the end of the first year - 50 kilograms of paddy per
hectare

(2)

At the end of the second year - 100 kilograms of paddy per
hectare

(3)

At the end of the third and subsequent years - 200 kilograms
of paddy per hectare.

(The average annual yield of paddy on this type of land amounts to about
1,000 kilograms or one metric ton.

Therefore, the rent stipulated for

the third and subsequent years amounts to about 20 percent of the total
rice production.)
The rent received by the province was to be set aside as a special
assistance fund to be used to extend the program in subsequent years.
In the case of private land, if the owner returned to the area by
the time of the second harvest he could receive the quantity of paddy
collected from the farmer resettled on his land but he had to adhere to
the terms of the contract and also resume paying land taxes.

At the end

of three years occupancy and cultivation the resettled farmer is to have
priority of tenure on the acreage he has brought back into cultivation.
Any conflicts arising in rental rates are to be arbitrated by the
provincial administration.
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It is estimated that this program, carried on from 1951 to 1954*
cost about one million dollars of counterpart aid funds.

This amounts

to about $100 per farm family resettled and about $20 per acre of land
brought back into cultivation.
The French-sponsored government in power during 1953 drew up a
series of governmental decrees and ordinances designed to (l) set a
definite limit to rental payments of 15 percent of the harvest on rice
land in all Vietnam, (2) return all undeveloped agricultural concessions
to the public domain, (3) provide for the sale to the government all
privately-owned land holdings above a certain acreage (size limits
varying between North Central and South Vietnam) and (4) government
confiscation of all abandoned lands not put back into cultivation by
a certain date.

According to the provisions of those decrees, lands

so acquired by the government would be allocated to landless farmers
who would pay the government for the land over a period of years.
However, not a single phase of this program ever got started.

No actual

planning was ever done to implement the program, no personnel were
recruited nor agency created to carry it out, and no enforcement pro
visions were ever established.

Therefore, those decrees became laws

in writing only and general knowledge of them never went very far beyond
Saigon.

Furthermore, the interior of the country was insecure for

travel because of increased rebel activities and the program had no
chance of becoming operative.
Present Land Reform Program and Laws
When the present U. S. backed government of Ngo Dinh Diem came
into power in 1954* it proclaimed itself highly in favor of a broad
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program of land and agrarian reform.

At first a few revisions were

made to the former land reform statutes, among the more important of
these were:

(l) stipulation of a sliding scale of rent (from 15 to

25 percent of the crop on rice land, depending upon the fertility of
the land); (2 ) leasing by the government of all uncultivated agricultural
land to landless peasants for a period of four years; (3) written landlord-tenant contracts; (4) a comprehensive census of land holdings,
abandoned lands, absentee ownership, etc.

A new Ministry of Agrarian

Reform was created in the Presidential Cabinet to administer and
implement the program.
A four-year government lease or tenancy contract at reduced rental
rates falls far short of solving the problems of landless peasants and
destitute displaced or refugee farm families unless some means are pro
vided them to obtain the needed basic essentials of food and shelter
until the first harvest, and the basic items (hand tools, seed, etc.)
required to become productive.

To meet this need, a total of 6.4

million dollars of American aid counterpart funds was set aside for
the purpose of granting short and medium-term loans to these farmers.
Therefore, the providing of government credit to resettled farmers is
tied to the government’s land reform program.
Present Statutes:
The body of lav/s presently in existence relative to land reform
is contained in a set of four statutes which individually are designed
to:

(l) establish the procedures for returning to the public domain

and the redistribution of all uncultivated portions of agricultural
concessions; (2) establish the regulations governing the relationships
between landowners and tenants; (3) stipulate and set the limitations
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to the extent of maximum rice-field and agricultural-land holdings;
and (4) establish the procedures for the enjoyment of the usufruct of
rice-fields and other agricultural land.

The essential characteristics

of these statutes are summarized briefly below.
The first ordinance provides for the return to governmental control
of agricultural lands previously granted as concessions which have,
without good reason, been uncultivated for at least the past two years,
and their subsequent reallocation to selected applicants from specified
priority categories or classes.

The ordinance further provides that a

land occupant, who is not the bona fide owner, and who has been culti
vating the land for the past three years, may be officially confirmed
as the legal occupier with use privileges the same as a successful
non-resident applicant.

Various articles specify the amount of land

that may be allocated to an applicant and/or stipulate the conditions
of occupancy, including the provision that cultivation must be commenced
immediately.
The second statute defines tenants and sharecroppers and differen
tiates their relationship to owner-proprietors; provides that tenure
relations will be governed by a written and recorded lease and stipulates
the conditions and terms of such lease; establishes the basic duration
of the lease at five years; fixes the rental rates at a maximum of 25
percent of the main annual crop, while allowing for negotiation on
improvements, fixtures, production items, etc.; provides for improvement
compensation and deterioration indemnities; establishes appointive
membership review-conciliation-enforcement committees with representatives
of the interests of tenants, landlords and the government at the pro
vincial and village levels and stipulates their operation, functions,
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and authority, and specifies uniform measurement units applicable to the
statute.

Appended to the basic statute is a specimen of the prescribed

Farm Lease Contract.
The third statute specifies the maximum allowable agricultural
land holdings or retentions by geographic regions (12 to 30 hectares
for Worth, 15 to 40 hectares for Central, and 30 to 100 hectares for
South Vietnam, depending upon the nature of the land); provides exemptions
for industrial uses and certain legal entities and classes of persons,
and prohibits the acquisition or retention of amounts in excess of
allowances while authorizing maximum retentions in each of the three
regions by the same owner.

This statute also provides for penalties

or indemnities to be levied against the person or persons concerned.
Wo schedule of penalties or indemnities is specified, but rather it is
recommended that the President order the Minister of Justice to establish
such a schedule.
The fourth statute provides that lands in controlled areas that
have neither been cultivated by the owner nor rented out by him, and
which an occupier has cultivated for at least the three previous years,
may be provisionally allocated to the occupier at his request, and
establishes his priority for the purchase of the land in the event it
is put up for sale by the owner.

The statute further proposes that

a schedule of rental payments for all occupiers be established as follows:
1st
2nd
3rd
4th

year
year
year
year

- no rent but payment of land taxes
notaxes
but12percentof the
notaxes
but19percentof the
notaxes
but25percentof the

grossannual
grossannual
grossannual

product
product
product

It is stipulated further that the owner or proprietor, unless he chooses
to take back his land after the third year for his own or his adult
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children’s cultivation, would be required to continue to adhere to the
25 percent rental arrangement commencing with the fourth year of
occupancy.

(There is included in APPENDIX "A” an English translation

of both the first and second statutes referred to above as well as
translations of each of the three types of Farm Lease Contracts.)
Adequacy: Despite the fact that the new statutes represent a
definite improvement over those passed by the previous government,
they are not believed to be administratively feasible or popularly
acceptable.

Not only do the statutes fail to clarify ambiguous and

undefined terms and phrases, but rather they do in many instances add
to the already large areas of confusion and uncontrolled administrative
discretion.

Instead of simplifying the task of administrative intea>-

pretation, they contain additional qualifications and sources of potential
inequities.

There is the additional lack of enforcement requirements

except such enforcement that could be obtained through the various
committees appointed to implement the program.

It is not believed that

these committees would prove adequate or appropriate for the large task
of control, enforcement and policing.
The conclusion is that there is little likelihood of achieving any
degree of success in the field of landlord-tenant relationships without
substantial revisions of the basic law designed to make it applicable
to a wider range of cases that are certain to present themselves at the
beginning of the program.

Such revisions would require the elimination

of some of the desirable theoretical features, concentrating more on
the basic essentials.

It would mean the adoption of definite, clearly

defined and understandable provisions in the interest of popular acceptance,
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effective administration and rapid implementation.

Experience in other

countries in Asia where agrarian reforms have been adopted has demon
strated that such sound and practical measures are an absolute necessity.
Usually it is only after social and economic systems have become so
crystallized as to make it very difficult for any government to effectuate
changes that the need for drastic agrarian reform becomes evident.
Four requisites are usually deemed necessary for effective imple
mentation of land reform.

These are:

(l) official acceptance with

the determination to carry it through; (2) technical knowledge and
administrative ability; (3) sufficient funds for at least administrative
expenditures; and (4) sufficient time.

It is doubtful if any one of

these essentials are in existence in Vietnam to a sufficient extent.
Land reform experts usually consider certain principles as basic
for a successful program among which are:
1.

Close contact with rural people to insure that the reforms will
meet "felt needs" and fit actual conditions

2.

Within the scope of objectives there should be maximum practical
equity as among landlords, tenants and government

3.

Close observance of the self-help rule that government should
do only those things that are clearly beyond the ability of
the individual to do for himself

4.

Limited practical objectives with special emphasis on the
step-by-step progress rather than sweeping generalities

5. Simplicity, clarity and exactness in order to promote wide
understanding and facilitate effective administration
6. Use, wherever possible, of existing organizations rather than
the establishment of new agencies
7. Straight-line administration based upon clearly assigned and
defined responsibilities and commensurate authority
8. Close supervision, frequent inspection and firm enforcement
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9.

Landlord-tenant-owner and farmer-government participation
through local, intermediate and top level education-implementation-arbitration-enforcement committees.83

To present "land reform", a term which relates to improvements in
the conditions of land tenure and patterns of land ownership, as a
positive cure for all the ills of the rural peasants of Indochina is
indeed over-simplifying the problems to be overcome.

Especially in

Central and North Vietnam the small size of holdings and the relatively
low yields of the land should lead one to caution against the idea
that all benefits can be derived from land ownership and rent reduction
alone.

Such measures cannot result in materially increasing the amount

of land available nor in improving the productivity of the soil— two
conditions that are fundamental to improved living conditions of farmers.
What is needed to overcome these primary obstacles is for "land reform"
to be substituted with "agrarian reform", a term which is used to desig
nate improvements of all economic and social institutions connected with
the living of farm families.
Examples of land reform programs giving way to agrarian reform may
be found in both Japan and Formosa, where land redistribution programs
have been quite successful not merely because the tenant peasants have
become owners of the land, but more important, because such ownership
has been accompanied by strong farm cooperative movements, sound credit
systems, and highly-developed agricultural policies designed to protect
the agricultural economy.

The incentive for increased efforts on the

land offered by ownership, accompanied by the means of increasing and

®^The above are basically the principles outlined by V/. L. Fippin,
U. S, Commissioner with the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction on
the Island of Taiwan, while acting as temporary consultant to the United
States Operations Missions to Indochina on agrarian reform problems.
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maintaining the productivity of the land at high levels, have resulted
in making the land reform more meaningful economically, socially, and
politically.
Under the present conditions in Central and North Vietnam the
average farmer is unable to increase materially the economic size of
his holding through increased agricultural production alone.

In those

areas, even if land reform is implemented, there needs to be initiated
along with it the means for bringing about more efficient utilization
of the land and human resources.

The demands of the marginal farmers

for more liberal credit, and marketing and irrigation facilities are
furbher proof that independent, self-reliant farm producers are not
created simply by shifting the pattern of ownership of the land.
Unless such improvements in land ownership and the land rent situation
are supplemented by all the other necessary improvements, the peasant
farm families may not be much better off than they were before the
implementation of land reform.
Possibilities for Success and Recommendations
Positive reforms leading to improved living conditions for the
masses of rural people in Indochina is an urgent matter.

Farmers are

demanding a larger share of the produce of the land and a better standard
of living.

Programs of improvement may be instituted under peaceful

conditions or through a general revolution.

It is imperative that firm

action by the government be taken soon lest armed rebellion again involve
the country in another destructive civil revolution.

However, under the

democratic form of government presently governing Free Vietnam it appears
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inappropriate to suggest that a broad, all-inclusive agrarian reform
program be embarked upon immediately.

The present government does not

have the statue, experience, financial resources, stability, or the
human resources available to launch and administer such an overall
program at the very beginning.

Possibilities for success would appear

rather to be more certain if the authorities proceeded with a program
embodying different steps or stages.

For these reasons it is suggested

that the problem be approached in the manner described below.
For Relatively Immediate Implementation:
The first step in land reform should be a practical and effective
program of rent reduction and firm regulation of landlord-tenant relations.
This would call for some revisions of the ordinances with closer adherence
to the basic principles.

A more realistic and enforceable rental payment

ceiling should be specified and made to cover not only bare land and
local improvements but all accessories and establishments furnished.
From a technical standpoint, an adequate staff should be well
trained to carry out the program at all the levels of government and be
given complete orientation before being called upon to function actively.
In addition, detailed regulations should be prepared.

Furthermore, very

wide publicity in simple, readily understandable form should be a con
tinuing activity.

This first phase of rent reduction and landlord-tenant

relations could and should be started immediately after suitable regulations
are drafted, implementation committees are formed and sufficient personnel
are trained.
For Adoption Following Limited Preparation:
To provide the greatest possible opportunity for displaced farmers
to re-establish themselves on the land with reasonable expectations of
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becoming owners, all unutilized portions of arable lands owned by the
government, and all unrented portions of arable lands owned by persons
absent from Vietnam should be taken over by the government and sold to
occupiers or selected applicants under suitable long-term payment
arrangements.

Only those families who have a farming background and

wish to continue in agriculture should be selected.

The size of the

operating unit should be fixed on the basis of type of land, location,
condition, etc., and should not exceed an amount which can be cultivated
by the farm family's own labor plus very limited amounts of temporary
hired labor.

The deliberate intent should be to establish a pattern of

family-size farms, owned or to be owned by the operators.
To encourage the incentive for self-interest, families should be
placed or confirmed on the land under arrangements that will lead to
ownership within a definite period of time.
possible should be the aim.

Full ownership as soon as

In establishing fair purchase prices for

the land special appraisers should be appointed to actually appraise
each tract of land with the appraisal subject to review and adjustment
by the local land reform committees.

In addition to the price of the

land, the final price should cover all necessary improvements, accessories,
etc., that may be attached to or a part of the land.
Provision should be made for deferring the first payment for a
stated period of time— perhaps one year— on land which is in need of
reclamation and other improvement before cultivation can be undertaken.
Payments in specified commodities that can be readily stored or sold or
the current cash market value equivalent of basic production items should
be provided for.

All payments should be made to designated government

offices on the one hand, and by government to absentee owners on the other.

212

The original owners should be given the option of receiving installments
either in the specified commodities or in their current market cash
equivalent.

Purchase payments should be scheduled with the generally

anticipated ability to pay in keeping with quickest possible attainment
of full ownership.

Provisions for suspension of any installment should

be made in order to safeguard against disasters or incidents which would
produce crop failures.
It is realized that a certain amount of preparatory work is needed
before such a program can be put underway, but since there is a great
urgency in this reform measure every effort should be made to start
this program as soon as possible following the initiation of the rent
reduction and the landlord-tenant relation program.
For Adoption Following More Extensive Preparations:
As a measure to extend the popularly desired security of ownership
of family-size farms, reduce the area of possible landlord-tenant conflict
and bring the land reform program closer to realization, it is recommended
that all lands in excess of prescribed maximum holdings be used to estab
lish tenants, sharecroppers, and farm laborers on the land under conditions
that will definitely lead to full and unencumbered ownership within a
specified period.

Exceptions should be made for specified categories of

land uses which do not lend themselves to family operations (such as
rubber plantings).
The basic features of the program would closely resemble those
already contained in the existing ordinance.
problems would need solution.

However, three additional

Careful distinction should be made be

tween excepted and all other uses.

Present ownership should not be a

determining factor, but only the economics and practicalities of family

farm versus large-scale or industrial operations.

The matter of

establishing maximum land retention limits and the various sizes of
family farm owner-operator units would require careful consideration.
The processes for accurately locating and calculating individual
owners* holdings and the determining of which portion should be retained
and which would be purchased by the government for resale would be
expensive, complex and time consuming.

However, that such a program

can be accomplished is clearly demonstrated by similar reforms firmly
established in the neighboring Far East countries of Japan and Formosa.
Complimentary Measures;
In addition to land ownership and tenure reform, effective agrarian
reform would call for possibly four supporting measures.

These are:

(l) a system of rural credit designed to meet the needs of those rural
families who are working toward the ownership of their land.

Such

credit should be in the form of subsistence, short-term production and
long-term investment funds at reasonable rates of interest and extended
through government agencies or cooperative service organizations on the
basis of government guarantee against loss.

Formalities in granting

loans and in making repayments should be kept to a minimum and include
the elements of relatively simple use supervision.

(2)

A system of

federated or multi-service farmers cooperatives should be developed to
include wide-spread farmer membership on a democratic basis and essential
farmer service features.

Sale to members of basic farm supplies such as

fertilizer, improved seed and pesticides] sale of daily living necessi
ties such as piece goods, and salt and ricej rice storage and milling]
savings deposits and small loansj and some agricultural advisory service
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are some of the features that would be helpful.

(3)

Some simple foim

of agricultural production advisory services should be developed to
provide help and guidance to farmers.
should be given greater emphasis.

(4)

Guidance in production matters
In order to meet the require

ments brought about by war, political readjustments and land reform,
a more realistic and equitable system of land taxation and schedule
of land tax rates is desired.

The present system of rural taxation is

in need of careful review and adjustment in order to better meet current
conditions.
The Refugee Farm Families
Under the terms of the Geneva Convention civilians were given the
choice of unrestricted movement into the area north or south of the 17th
parallel— the dividing line between the Communist dominated and the free
sections of Vietnam.

Up until the time that this frontier was closed to

unrestricted population movement in 1955, a total of about one million
people crossed over from the Communist area in the North into Central
and South Vietnam.

It is estimated that approximately &5 percent of

these people are farmers, and the refugee farm families evacuated from
the North present an additional and grave problem in South and Central
Vietnam.

The government of Free Vietnam finds itself in a peculiar

situation with reference to those people.

At the time they were evacuated

the government was then not in control over a large part of South and
Central Vietnam, and immediate resettlement in the interior on abandoned
lands was impossible.

Instead, temporary shelter was provided to them

in groups and by villages— each one in charge of a village priest— along
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the main roads leading from Saigon to the north, east and southeast.
The areas surrounding these refugee camps are mostly wooded with no
open land available for cultivation except a few yards along both
sides of the roads previously cleared by the French Army to improve
security conditions.
Lacking possibilities to earn, a living in those wooded areas which
soon became overcrowded, the refugees became destitute and the govern
ment had no alternative but to provide relief food and clothing obtained
mostly with American aid funds.

In fact, compared with the average

rural peasants, some groups of refugees were so well cared for that
they soon lost any inclination they might previously have had to move
away from the concentration areas into the interior rice lands and go
to work producing a rice crop.

Also, since most of the relief supplies

and gifts of money passed through the hands of the local priests, they
were reluctant to persuade refugees to move farther out where farm land
is available for cultivation.
Some movement of refugee farm families out of the crowded reception
and concentration areas into vacant rice land has occurred.

But the

majority still remain where they were originally placed, are making no
great effort to become self-sufficient, and the government, possibly for
fear of antagonizing them, does not seem in a hurry to force them to
begin farming.

That was the situation as of late July, 1955.

Those

who do move off to farm land and begin farming are eligible for all
the benefits promised under the agrarian reform laws— should the time
ever come when these laws are applied and the program implemented.

216
Present United States Interest

Realizing the social, economic and propaganda benefits to be
obtained through affording refugee farm families a chance to earn a
livelihood, the Vietnamese government, at the suggestion of United
States authorities, embarked in Januaxy, 1956 upon a very grandoise
resettlement program designed to place people on abandoned rice lands
in South Vietnam,

In addition to funds already allocated, the two

governments agreed to utilize a total of over $2,5 million of American
aid funds to provide the following:

(l) one million dollars for agri

cultural hand tools; (2) one million dollars for mechanical land
preparation equipment (primarily wheel-type tractors with attachments);
(3) 450*000 dollars for commercial fertilizer; (4) 60,000 dollars for
vegetable seeds; and (5) 50,000 dollars for insecticides and fungicides.
It is anticipated that about 77*000 hectares (over 177,000 acres) of
abandoned rice land will be prepared for rice cultivation and allocated
to 100,000 refugees on a provisional basis.
Extent of Implementation and Difficulties Encountered

A National Commission, composed of the various interested ministers*
was appointed to administer a reform program and special legislation was
enacted directing this government body to take all measures necessary to
implement the agrarian reform and the "emergency” credit programs.
According to the law, this National Commission is to exercise its
functions through special provincial and village commissions and the
regularly appointed province and village chiefs.

However, implementa

tion of this program has been slow in materializing.

Up to July 1, 1955*
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the National Commission existed in name only*

Very few communal com

missions (in which both peasants and landowners are supposed to be
represented) were organized, and the majority of province and district
chiefs were paying but lip-service to the program*

Very little publicity

and information was forwarded from the main cities to the rural areas and
a large percentage of the rural population remained ignorant of existing
legislation.

As of August 1, 1955? no census had been taken of idle

land and landless peasants, no landlord-tenant or government— peasant
leases or contracts had been signed and the whole program in general
was operating only within a few office buildings in the City of Saigon.
As was to be expected in those few cases where landlords and
peasants were brought.together to agree on tenant contracts under the
new law the landlords invariably requested the highest (25 percent)
rent allowed, whereas the tenant would agree only to the lowest (15
percent) rent payment.

Government authorities are supposed to arbitrate

on the rate of rent but in too many cases government agents themselves
cannot agree on what rate should apply on a given plot of land— since
they have little conception of its productivity.

Also, over much of

the rural area— especially those regions formerly occupied by the
Communists and recently evacuated— the Saigon government has not been
able to establish firm governmental authority and control.

In some

areas the Communist military authorities had divided up large estates
and parceled the land among peasant farmers in return for 40 percent
of the harvest to feed and support the guerrilla army.

When the

Communists left for North Vietnam they left orders to the population
under their control to continue farming those plots of land, not to pay
any rent to anyone, and promised that upon the Communists1 return to

the area, clarification of legal ownership and repayment for the land
would be established.

In addition, Communist Cadres were left behind

to make sure the local population would not comply with any new, con
tradicting decrees origination from the Saigon Government.

To make

matters more complicated and the law more difficult to enforce, many
of the provincial and district chiefs are themselves among the larger
landowners in those very areas where they are supposed to enforce this
rent reduction and contractual tenure agreements.

In fact, the newly

appointed- Minister of Agrarian Reform is himself one of the largest
Vietnamese landowners in South Vietnam.

Under those conditions one

can hardly expect progress in the field of needed land and agrarian
reform in Vietnam.

The statutes are on the books and supposedly the

law of the land, but unless they are applied and enforced they will
serve only the very limited purpose of face-saving and propaganda for
the present government but restricted to the city of Saigon and its
suburbs.

CHAPTER VIII

AGRICULTURAL MARKETING AND PROCESSING

Traditionally, the major agricultural products of Indochina are
marketed chiefly through Chinese middlemen who normally take substantial
margins for their services.

These traders and middlemen are often

usurers as well, who usually take in a large portion of the crop as
payment for their advances, thus cutting off the producer from most
free markets in agricultural products.
Generally speaking, there is no organized system of internal
marketing for any of the agricultural commodities produced in Indochina.^
Rice is the only farm product the marketing of which can be said to
follow established patterns.

With the exception of the efforts of

farmers' organizations in introducing some system of marketing coffee,
tea, tobacco, and other minor crops, very little has been done by
either the government or private individuals or institutions towards
effectuating some systematic marketing arrangement for farm commodities.
As a consequence, the majority of the less-important agricultural pro
ducts are traded by producers on a barter basis in local village market
places.

^ A n exception, of course, is the marketing of rubber. Since both
the production and marketing of this product are controlled by relatively
few individuals or syndicates there is a well-established system of mar
keting. Unfortunately, however, the economies and efficiencies resulting
from the systematic marketing of rubber benefit only relatively few indi
viduals, most of whom are foreigners, and the native population, therefore,
does not share in the advantages afforded by the efficient marketing
organization.
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The Present Marketing System

Since rice is by far the most important agricultural commodity
produced, major emphasis is placed on the marketing of rice because
much greater benefits to more people are possible through improvements
in the marketing of that product.

Rice also is the only farm product

that is marketed in large volume in consuming centers at long distances
from the areas of production, as well as being the product which attracts
the largest number of outside trader-merchant-moneylenders who engage in
rice trading as a basis for practicing usury.
Paddv Assembly and Local Processingt
In general a large portion of the paddy produced in the surplus
rice-producing areas of Cochinchina and Cambodia move in relatively
well-established trade channels from threshing floors to the mills
and to consumers or rice exporting organizations.

The main harvest in

the rice surplus areas begins during late October, with the heaviest
harvesting occurring during the first week of January.

Since the

average rice farmer usually is forced to dispose of most of his crop
immediately after harvest, the movement of paddy from the interior
areas of production is at its peak during the months of December,
January and February.

During this period the rice merchants and rice

millers’ agents, usually working on a commission basis, are quite
active throughout the area traveling from farm to farm, and meeting
groups of rice farmers whenever possible, in order to collect the rice
owed them by farmers for credit advances and to acquire as large a
portion of the available paddy as possible.
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Rice for local consumption within a producing district (Circum
scription or Delegation) usually is transported by the producer’s
family from the farm to the local huller-type mill.

Custom rice

milling is usually done on a toll basis, the charge amounting to about
one-fifth of the quantity of paddy processed, with the mill owner
retaining the rice bran, flour, very small broken kernels and the
hulls in addition.

Rice hulls are utilized for fuel for the mill

power plant, while the rice bran is fed to hogs, and the rice flour
and small shattered kernels sold locally for human consumption.

In

certain cases where millers have a backlog of rice milling orders and
the farmer is in a hurry to get his rice for family consumption, some
sort of bartering process takes place.

In such instances the miller

will inspect the farmer’s paddy, determine its milling qualities and
agree to return to the farmer a specified quantity of the milled rice
of a certain grade and quality for each unit of paddy brought to be
milled.

Under this system the farmer is assured of a certain return

in milled rice for his paddy and the local miller usually is able to
secure a fair return for his services, if he is a good rough rice
grader.

Usually only the larger of the country millers enter actively

into the clean rice markets of Saigon-Cholon and other large rice
consuming centers.

The majority of the small huller mills dispose

of their rice in the larger towns, cities and market places within
the province where they are located.

Thus their output of clean rice

(usually undermilled and of inferior quality) seldom enters the large,
commercial domestic or export markets for milled rice.
In addition to custom milling of paddy, a very large quantity of
the rice for home consumption is either hulled by hand in simple
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homemade rice hullers or pounded by hand (Figure XXV).
method most prevalent in North and Central Vietnam.

This is the

Moreover, since

rebel activities resulted in the destruction of a very large percentage
of the small country huller mills, a large proportion of rice farmers
have been forced in recent years to resort to the hand pounding process
of hulling their paddy for family consumption.
Practically all the paddy going into commercial channels for
milling and consumption within the country and for export is purchased
by paddy merchants or millers’ agents.

Only a very insignificant

quantity of paddy is delivered by producers directly to the larger
commercial rice mills and warehouses located in Saigon-Cholon, Pnom
Penh, and other large cities.
The local paddy merchant also may be the owner of a local rice
mill and may deal in production items which he advances to his paddysupplying farmers in lieu of cash loans during the crop production
season.

However, the majority are simply rice merchants operating

simultaneously as moneylenders at usurious rates of interest, and
making large profits on both deals.
An exception to the system described above is the paddy produced
on the larger rice plantations located mostly in South Vietnam.

Planta

tion owners usually supplant the paddy merchants and millers’ agents
with their own managers and native supervisors.

Normally most plantation

owners are able financially (with borrowed capital) to grant loans to
their tenants against pledged paddy deliveries, thus usually are able
to control the whole output from their land holdings and sell directly
to the large commercial mills.

In some cases plantation owners have

financial interest and hold positions through interlocking directorships
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Figure XIV.

Rural Rice Mills in Vietnam.
Rebel activities resulted in almost complete destruction of
country rice mills in South Vietnam. Before the war, a
rather large part of the rice produced in Vietnam was milled
in the interior provinces by small country mills. At the
present time many farm families resort to hand-pounding or
home-made rice mills for hulling their daily rice ration.
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in large rice mills and rice export concerns in Saigon-Cholon.

In

other instances, small and medium rice mills are located at the
plantation headquarters to mill the plantations own paddy as well
as paddy produced by local farmers.

However, recent rebel activities

have resulted in almost complete destruction of facilities on most
plantations in South Vietnam.
A substantial quantity of paddy usually is purchased by owners of
country mills.

In most cases these country millers have financial ties

•with the owners of larger commercial mills in Saigon-Cholon and Pnom
Penh.

Therefore, many of these small rice mill owners also act as

millers' agents for the larger mills.

In addition, the miller repre

sentative may be a middleman engaged almost exclusively in purchasing
paddy, or a local village commodity.retailer and business man, who, in
addition to his regular business enterprise, buys paddy for the large
mills on a commission basis.

The miller representative may lend his

own funds to the local farmers or receive monetary advances from the
large millers which he in turn advances to id.ce farmers during the
growing season.
Whatever may be the business connection of the paddy buyers,
it is the common practice of most to make advances to rice farmers.
Usually the credit advance to the farmer is made at the beginning of
the rice-growing season, either in cash or merchandise, in return for
which the farmer agrees to repay the loan at harvest time by delivering
a certain quantity of paddy of a designated grade and quality, and for a
certain price.

Under such a system of credit advances, rates of interest

are unduly high and also are partially concealed.

Under such a system of paddy assembly it is obvious that the paddy
speculators and the commission buyers are rather essential elements in
the system, and that the larger commercial millers would be unable to
obtain their rough rice supplies without them.

This is the reason that

all the larger mills make use of them almost exclusively.

Until some

improvements are forthcoming in paddy assembly, tied as it is with
production credit, disorganized rice marketing at the farm level will
continue to encourage usurious interest rates on loans by paddy merchants
to farmers.

In fact, when one considers the amount of risks involved

in granting loans to insolvent farmers and the risks involved in buying,
moving, storing, and holding rough rice, the middlemen^ profits may
not be so large as they appear to be.

In addition to the large risk

involved in the borrowing farmer failing to deliver his crop at harvest
time, the merchant must assume the following risks:

(l) loss of weight

of the paddy due to drying after delivery; (2) loss in storage which
may be as high as 10 percent due to rodents and insects; and (3) loss
in transit from the interior to the terminal mill warehouse.

Some

effort need be made in reducing the possibility of those losses.
Weights and Measures:

Paddy usually is purchased by the large

Saigon-Cholon mills on a weight basis, utilizing the metric system.
However, throughout the farming areas paddy is purchased from the
farmers in measures of volume.

The standard measure used is known

as the "gia" which may be either a metal bucket or a bamboo basket
containing 40 liters or from 20 to 22 kilograms of paddy.

The weight

of paddy contained in a "gia" varies with the quality and condition
(moisture content, weeds, rice straw, etc.) of the grain being measured.

In the retail trade, milled rice is sold by weight using the metric
system.

In the wholesale trade rice is sold in burlap bags containing

approximately 67 kilograms.

Burlap bags used in the milled rice trade

are supposed to contain a standard measure known as the ’'picul”.

In

the export trade the metric system of weight is used exclusively and
rice is exported mostly in burlap bags containing 100 kilograms.

All

rice sold in the retail markets of the larger cities is contained in
metal buckets or baskets, with the purchaser furnishing his own con
tainer, consisting of either a paper bag, basket, bucket, or banana
leaves.

There is no pre-packaging of rice in Indochina as in American

markets.
Transportation:
The importance of water in the rivers, smaller streams and canals
as a means of transporting commodities to and from the interior parts of
the country cannot be overemphasized.

Normally, about 90 percent of

the paddy and milled rice from the producing areas of South Vietnam
is transported to the Saigon-Cholon mills in small boats and junks
through the inland waterways that crisscross the area.

The remainder

of the paddy is transported to the mills in trucks and only an insignif
icant quantity is transported by the one railroad line from Saigon to
the city of Mytho on the northern side of the Mekong River.

During

recent years, however, transportation of all commodities by road has
increased in importance while the proportion of produce moving by
water has decreased.

Rebel activities have made inland waterways inse

cure for commodity transportation except when accompanied by armed
naval escorts.

Although some of the main highways in the area were also
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insecure, security conditions for land travel were better than for
river traffic.
Most of the paddy and other farm products move from the point of
production to the primary assembly point along either the roads or
canals on human backs or in small canoes.

Sometimes a small quantity

is carried in water buffalo carts.
River junks are of various capacities —
pounds to 30 or more tons of paddy.

ranging from a few hundred

In South Vietnam, almost every

small village located along a stream or canal is a rice concentration
point with river junks and small boats lining the banks during harvest
time (Figure XV).

A large percentage of the junks were destroyed during

the war, but several thousands are still in use.

These junks usually

are owned by individuals or small companies engaged only in the inland
transportation business.

However, many of the paddy merchants and

Chinese rice speculators own and operate river crafts and derive a
portion of their income from the transportation of paddy and other
products from the interior assembly points to the central warehouses
in Cholon.
The trucks in use for transporting farm products from the interior
to the cities and supplies from the cities to the farming areas are
owned mostly by Chinese rice dealers, some of whom own fleets of trucks,
mostly of United States manufacture.
It is impossible to ascertain the transportation charges for
either truck or junk carriers, and, therefore, no comparison of the
relative costs can be made.

On the average, however, transportation

charges from the country assembly points to the terminal warehouses
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Figure XV*

Junks Used in Transporting Rice and Other Commodities in
Indochina*
Waterways transportation is very important in Indochina*
A very large percentage of all interior traffic is carried
on junks and barges, which are the life-line of many country
villages and cities*

amounts to from 12 to 25 percent of the assembly point price, depending
upon the distance traveled.

Transportation charges for other commodities

varies with the bulkiness of the product as well as with the distance.
In recent years of war activities transportation charges are reported
to have more than doubled, figured on a percentage value of the com
modities transported.

This increase is due to two factors:

(l) in

many cases owners of river junks had to furnish their own armed convoys
or employ armed personnel to accompany the cargo to the terminal point,
or were requested to reimburse the army and navy personnel performing
that service; and (2) both the national army (French Foreign Legion
naires and Vietnamese), the religious sects, and the Viet Minh
Communists all imposed what was termed "protection taxes" on practically
all vehicles transporting produce in or out of the interior.

During

the years 1950-54, almost every army guard post along the inland water
ways and every bridge along the highways was considered a "check point"
by whichever side was in control.

Since a large part of the food

needs of the armed forces was obtained from the immediate vicinity,
the most simple way to procure this was to extract a "tax" in kind
rtc

from transporters of farm commodities.

Naturally, this system had

the effect of greatly increasing the "costs" of transporting the farm
products to markets.
Storage Facilities:
Host of the rice crop is stored in the form of paddy; stocks of

^While following a truck load of bananas, coconuts and vegetables
in 1952 from Hytho to Cholon, a distance of 40 miles, the writer noticed
that after the sixth "check-point stop" the truck operator had paid about
one-half of his truck load of bananas and coconuts and about one-fourth
of the vegetables in "protection taxes".

230
milled rice are relatively small at any given time, usually only about
15 percent of the stocks of paddy in the Saigon-Cholon area.
Before the war a considerable amount of paddy storage facilities
existed in the heavy rice-producing areas.
by rice merchants and small rice millers.

Most of these were owned
However, most of those

facilities have been destroyed and there is now a serious shortage of
country storage facilities and an urgent need to rebuild local storage
warehouses.

Storage facilities in the Saigon-Cholon area before the

war were considered sufficient for the volume of activities, and have
suffered only about 10 percent war destruction.

In Pnom Penh, on

the contrary, both rice storage and rice milling facilities have about
doubled since 1950 as a result of special efforts by the Cambodian
Government.
It probably is fortunate that the harvest extends over a relatively
long season, the movement of the paddy from the farm to the local
assembly point and to the central mills in the larger cities is slow
and dry weather invariably prevails during harvesting and the three
or four months period following.

The combined result of these con

ditions reduces the seriousness of the paddy storage problem in Indochina.
Hand harvesting methods are vised exclusively by Indochinese farmers, and
the rice harvest is spread over a long period of time.

The average

farmer plants his crop by small patches at a time, starts planting as
early as the supply of water will permit, and continues his planting

^ B e s t estimates indicate that before the war adequate paddy
storage facilities existed in the interior provinces in South Vietnam
sufficient for about 90,000 metric tons, while the 75 warehouses in
Saigon-Cholon had a capacity of 300,000 tons. Storage facilities
utilized in conjunction with rice mills are not included in these data.
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to the latest practical date.

In addition, both late and early maturing

varieties are planted, and variations in climatic conditions and water
supply by localities also tend to lengthen the harvesting season for
the country as a whole.
The pattern of paddy movement from the farm to the assembly point,
to the junks and into the mills is about as follows:

the farmer requires

considerable time to harvest and dry his paddy and at all stages the
paddy is moved in small lots to the assembly point.

Heavy deliveries of

paddy in payment of loans to the merchants are usually stored in local
warehouses or in junks owned by the rice merchants and millers* agents.
Deliveries of paddy in payment of loans are anticipated in advance and
storage space usually is provided accordingly.

Very often during dry

seasons paddy is stored in the open until loaded into junks or trucks
for transporting to the mills.

During periods of heavy deliveries

there is usually a large quantity of paddy aboard junks, and when
consideration is given to the large number of such junks in use, it is
apparent that paddy in transit at any given time represents a sizeable
portion of the crop.
On-the-farm storage facilities are of the crudest type.

Although

most farm families have some paddy storage space, this consists mostly
of large bamboo bins placed either inside the family grass house or
outside in the open.

This type of storage is grossly inadequate even

during periods of diy weather.

Losses due to rodents and insects while

paddy is stored in this type of facilities sometime reach as high as 20
percent.

The Governments of both Vietnam and Cambodia are extending

some efforts toward remedying this situation and are taking definite
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steps to furnish the credits and materials needed to erect small countiy
rice storage facilities for the benefit of rice farmers utilizing them
on a cooperative basis.
Financial Arrangements and Prices at Various Points in the Rice Trade;
As previously stated, the farmer receives money (most of it in
form of credit advances) for his salable paddy from local rice merchants
or millers’ agents.

The latter are frequently local retailers who

collect paddy stocks for large rice millers on a commission basis.
These countiy rice merchants and commission agents receive payment
for the paddy upon delivery to the miller.

Generally the two classes

of paddy buyers bear the cost of transportation from the assembly
point to the mill.

Millers recover their capital outlay through the

sale of milled rice to the rice wholesalers and rice peddlers, or through
bulk sales in rather large volumes to exporting firms.

Since rice can

be exported only after obtaining an export permit issued by the govern
ment, it is not unusual for financial arrangements to be of the following
order:

the government banks furnish the credit to the exporting firm,

the exporter grants credit advances to

the miller who supplies the

exporter with..rice, the miller in turn

utilizes the funds to grant

loans to the rice merchant who make use of the borrowed capital to
conduct his operations and pay the farmer for the paddy purchased from
him.

In the case of seasonal capital,

the miller often will grantloans

to his agents in the interior who will

utilize these creditsto lend to

rice farmers against pledged delivery of the rice crop at harvest time.
The large banks operating in Indochina enter actively in the
commercial credit activities required in the rice marketing system.
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They furnish a large portion of the credit utilized by warehouse owners
in financing the storage of paddy in the large rice concentration
centers.

They also are very active in furnishing credit to rice millers

who need loans to finance the rice-milling operation, and to the rice
exporters.

Stocks of paddy in storage usually serve as security for

storage loans which usually amount to about 75 percent of the current
value of the commodity.

Although warehouse receipts are not in common

use, unless the banks are dealing with an old customer of good repute,
they usually keep a first lien on the paddy and order the storage
warehouse locked.
Prices; Theoretically at least, there are two sets of prices
prevailing in the milled rice market - the free (black) market price
and the controlled or official price.

Both of these prices reportedly

approach equality with the free (black) market price only slightly
higher than the official price.

However, in practice, there has been

very little of any degree of stability in rice prices at all levels of
marketing during recent years.

It is impossible to delineate all the

various movements in rice price levels in any one market —
less for the whole country.

and much

About the best examples of instability

in rice prices that can be offered is the price situation and price
movements that occurred at the time the French government devalued the
Indochinese Piaster during Hay, 1953 as compared with the situation as
of July 1st of that year.
Immediately following the devaluating action in Paris, the Vietnamese
government introduced simultaneously four governmental decrees in an
attempt to put brakes on the anticipated increase in prices of consumer
goods.

These four decrees were:

(l) an order suspending provisionally
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exports of all commodities, but designed primarily to block exports of
rice and rubber; (2) an order blocking provisionally all salaries and
renumeration at the level of May 9, 1953; (3) an order blocking the
price of all products, food stuff, and services at the May 9 level;
and (4) an order obliging all establishments at all levels of marketing
and trade to declare the exact quantity of rice and paddy stocks on
hand.

This fourth order also called for the declaration of the nature,

quality, and quantity of merchandise, as well as the place where the
stocks were located and the purchase and resale price in effect as of
May 9.

The third order also called for public exhibition in front

of every establishment of business of the actual resale price of all
commodities, and stipulated that the government would forcefully close
and seize all stocks in all cases where there were infractions of this
order.
Rice prices stood at 390 piasters per hundred kilograms wholesale
and 500 piasters per hundred kilograms at retail on May 11, but increased
to 450 piasters wholesale and 600 piasters per hundred kilograms retail
within 24 hours after the government orders became law.

Paddy and milled

rice marketing at the wholesale level almost came to a standstill within
a week.

The official controlled price of rice (No. 1, 25 percent broken)

in the Saigon-Cholon market was fixed at 3*7 piasters per kilogram at the
wholesale level and at 4.4 piasters retail.

However, actual retail

prices in the "grey-market" stood at 4*6 piasters per kilogram for No. 1,
25 percent broken and 4.4 piasters for No. 2, with no rice of No. 1
quality available in the market at the official price of 4.4 piasters
per kilogram.

Movements of paddy from the interior to the central

markets came to an end within two weeks.

Furthermore, the retail
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prices of imported commodities increased by 60 to 80 percent during
this same period.
On July 1, 1953 the government of Vietnam set a new official
ceiling price for rice at 390 piasters per hundred kilograms at the
wholesale level (EX-magazine) and 475 piasters at the retail level
for No. 1, 25 percent broken.

While rice prices on the free market

behaved in a fairly stable manner in the Saigon-Cholon market area
following this action, they acted quite differently in other parts of
the country, especially in North and Central Vietnam.
government officials give two reasons for this:

Vietnamese

(l) Viet Minh activities

in restricting normal flow of available supplies; and (2) the almost
complete breakdown of the government’s rice rationing system.

An

additional reason of course is the "traffic" that takes place in rice
marketing channels in those areas, where rice prices at the wholesale
and retail levels vary considerably from weelc-to-week, day-to-day, and
even from hour-to-hour each day.

One example of the relationship between

rebel activities and rice prices in any given area during that period
is given by the situation at Hue, the capital of Central Vietnam, when
rice stocks were plentiful both there and at Tourane, the port city.
However, the rebels demolished a railroad bridge between the two cities
and within 12 hours rice prices at Hue more than doubled.
In North and Central Vietnam the government attempted to stabilize
rice prices through a rationing system and by granting rice purchase
permits to the local population.

However, it is apparent that such

permits had the direct effect of themselves finding their way into
the hands of black-market operators and of causing increases in rice
prices, because it is now well-known that anyone willing to pay 100
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to 150 piasters to a government "functionnaire" could obtain a permit
to purchase up to one metric ton from government-controlled "security"
stocks of rice.
On July 1, 1953 the c.i.f. prices for No. 1, 25 percent brokens
were 513 piasters per 100 kilograms at Haiphong and 543 piasters at
Tourane (higher prices at Tourane reflect the higher port costs).
This same rice was advertised for 650 to 700 piasters per 100 kilograms
at retail.

However, after all the under-counter manipulations, permit

deals, transportation charges, extra taxes, etc., that this rice was
subject to before it reached the hands of consumers in centers like
Hue and Hanoi, the actual retail price was anywhere from 40 to 60
percent above this figure, and no one in official governmental circles
could actually determine the exact price of rice to consumers on any
particular day.
Functions of Supplies and the Whole sale Price of Rice:
Legitimate rice dealers and millers normally are forced, through
competition, to operate on a more or less restricted profit margin and,
in a free market, their prices depend primarily upon the purchase price
of paddy and their costs of milling and/or conducting business.

However,

when a rice merchant is primarily a speculator in either paddy or milled
rice his demand or sales price may reflect only to a very small extent
his purchase price and actual costs.

Thus, it is mostly in restraining

the activities of pure speculators in paddy and milled rice that stocks
on hand and available for consumption can be expected to have direct
effects upon prices —

i.e., the supplies on hand can control inflation

of rice prices only if the movement of those supplies can be effectively

237
moved and channeled in the distribution system in an orderly manner.
Evidently, this is not done in those areas of wide and sudden price
fluctuations and the consumer pays dearly for the breakdown in the
system mentioned above.
With respect to the cost of paddy delivered to the Saigon-Cholon
warehouses and the milled rice delivered- to the retail trade there is
also the taxation system that plays a predominant role in addition to
the high speculative profits of traders.

There are far too many taxes

(hidden and otherwise) levied on paddy and milled rice in the movement
from the provinces to the mills, and from the mills to the consumers
and the point of export, to allow retail rice prices to bear a direct
relationship to the farm price of paddy and costs of transportation,
storage and milling.

The problem of keeping rice prices to consumers

relatively low is complex and many-sided and calls for positive govern
ment control measures in certain sections of the country.

However,

legitimate rice dealers feel that in fiscal policy matters the simple
act of lowering the surtax on low-quality broken rice, which is exported
mainly to Dakar, would afford exporters the possibility of obtaining a
higher price (i.e., greater profits) for this low-quality rice and thus
contribute to lower internal prices for the better quality rice consumed
within Indochina.

This of course assumes that raw materials and pro

cessing costs remain uniform over long periods of time, which has not
been the case in recent years.
Among other possibilities of affording more freedom of movement
of paddy and milled rice would be a government banking policy of
restricting credit to speculators for the purpose of stocking and
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holding rice supplies in expectation of higher prices.

Such action

may have the effect of forcing them to release some of the supplies
to the trade, thus easing up on the tendency of prices to rise.
Except for the temporary and "provisional" measures mentioned
above, there are no government-controlled export prices for rice in
Indochina.

There are, however, government controls on the quality of

milled rice that is allowed to move into the export market.

No export

license is granted for rice containing less than 25 percent broken
grains.

The reason for this rule, as explained by high officials in

the Vietnamese and Cambodian Ministries of Agriculture, is that an
influential rice milling syndicate operating in both states owns very
old milling machinery of Japanese manufacture and is unable to produce
rice with a smaller percentage of broken grains.

It appears, therefore,

that this restriction is designed primarily to make it possible for
that syndicate to compete in the export market for milled rice.
All foreign exchange earned through the export of rice is retained
by the government.

The exporter receives Indochinese piasters at the

official rate of exchange.

Although there are no official controls in

the true meaning of the term, the price in foreign currency negotiated
between the buyer and seller must be approved by government authorities
for each transaction.

This action does not, however, constitute price

controls or setting of prices per se by the government, but is more of
a check to insure that the government actually gets the entire amount
of foreign currency involved in the transaction.
Prices are published by trade journals periodically, and the
newspapers usually publish daily price quotations.

The Government

Customs Office also publishes a price list weekly which is made available
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to the trade as a guide to the prices that will be approved by the
government.

During periods of rising prices exporters usually are

able to sell at prices considerably above the minimum price acceptable
to the government.

However, according to government regulations all

foreign currency earned must be turned in regardless of whether the
amount received exceeds the current world market price or the price
of comparable grade and standard in the published list of minimum
prices.
There is no organised commodity exchange in Indochina and, there
fore, no organised trading in futures in rice or other commodities*
However, there is a large amount of trading by individuals and syndicates
utilising the practice of making current committments for delivery on
a certain future date.

The wholesale price of rice normally is con

trolled to a large extent by Chinese millers and wholesale rice dealers,
who also are very influential in controlling the price of paddy.

The

exceedingly strong position of the Chinese in rice marketing is
explained by the very close adherence and unity among members of the
Chinese "syndicate" to which practically all belong.
men traditionally help one another in time of need.

The Chinese rice
It is permissable

for a member of the group to be dishonest with an outsider, but if he
is dishonest with another Chinese he usually is squeezed out of business
by the other members.

It is customary for all Chinese merchants to pay

the same price for paddy and also to agree on a uniform price for milled
rice offered for sale.

In their paddy purchasing activities in the

rice-producing areas it is common practice for Chinese merchants to
divide the territory among themselves and to refrain from engaging in
paddy buying in an area in which another Chinese is operating.

Thus,
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mutual support and cooperation is carried to such an extent that the
"syndicate" often is able to obtain a virtual monopoly at both ends
of the marketing system - the paddy buying at the country assembly
points and in the wholesale market for milled rice.
Taxes in Rice Marketing Operations:
In addition to the special wartime taxes referred to above and
the other taxes such as property taxes on rice mills, storage facilities,
trucks and junks, business taxes, sales taxes, etc., there are three
different taxes levied on the export of rice from Indochina.

A special

duty tax was first introduced in 1933 and modified by the Governor
General in 1937 and 1939, and again in 1941 and 1946.

This special

tax is a simple revenue earning tax and benefits received therefrom
accrue to the Federal budget.
(1)

These export taxes are as follows:

The export duty tax rates are:
Paddy and cargo ricecontaining over 35% paddy
Cargo rice not over 35$ paddy
White rice
Broken rice
Low grade rice flour
Corn

12$ ad
10$ ad
10$ ad
8$ ad
6$ ad
5$ ad

valorem
valorem
valorem
valorem
valorem
valorem

The values to which the rates apply are not the invoiced values but a
valuation determined by the Director of Customs who takes an average of
the f.a.s. prices for the preceeding three months; thus the values are
subject to change every month.
(2)

The exceptional tax (Taxe exceptionne a la sortie des paddys et

derives) was established by the Governor General in January, 1941 and
modified in 1946.

The purpose of this tax is to gain for the Federal

budget half the profits which the government considers to be above
those reasonably to be expected by the exporter.

The amount of this
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tax is established as follows:

a base price is established from time

to time for each category of rice by order of the government.

This

tax amounts to one half the difference between this base price and the
actual f.o.b. price received in units of 100 kilograms gross weight by
the exporter.
(3)

The handling tax (tax d ’antillage) is a simple tax levied to pay

charges involved in handling rice and accrues to the benefit of the
budget of the Saigon-Cholon Port of Commerce.

It is determined by a

formula which averages the ex-mill prices for the preceeding three
months and which weighs this average so that it does not respond to
minor price changes.

New charges are levied each month.

Milling and Processing:
The rice milling industry of Indochina is concentrated in the
Saigon-Cholon area and in the city of Pnom Penh.

Before World War II

the total rice milling capacity of the 75 commercial rice mills in
Saigon-Cholon amounted to 8,400 metric tons of paddy per 24-hour day.
The daily capacity per mill ranged from 540 metric tons of paddy to
16 tons.

In the interior provinces of South Vietnam there were a

total of 321 rice mills vdth a combined capacity of 6,000 metric tons
of paddy per day.

Most of the mills in the country-side had a very

small milling capacity compared with those located in Saigon-Cholon.
The milling capacity of the country mills ranged from 230 to 5 metric
tons per 24-hour day.

The majority of the rice mills in the city of

Saigon-Cholon had a capacity of over 100 metric tons per day while
most of the mills located in the country had a capacity of less than
12 tons.
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Before the war the total milling capacity in Cambodia amounted
to about 600 metric tons of paddy per day.

Most of the rice mills are

located in the cities of Pnom Penh and Battambang.

The effort made by

the Cambodians in recent years to expand the rice-milling industry in
that State is evidenced by the fact that in 1951 there were a total of
47 rice mills with a combined capacity of 700 metric tons per day, but
by the end of 1953 the industry had increased to 103 mills and a capacity
of nearly 1,400 tons.
The rice milling industry never did develop to any large extent in
Worth and Central Vietnam.
mills in these two areas.

Before the war there were not more than 100
Most of the plants were small huller-mills

with a capacity under 20 tons per day per mill.
It has previously been mentioned that a large number of the countiy
mills were destroyed during rebel activities while most of those in
the larger cities escaped war damage.

In South Vietnam only 96 of the

321 rice mills in existence before the war were in operating condition
during the fall of 1952.

The daily rice-milling capacity of the country

mills decreased to 2,000 metric tons of paddy, while the capacity of the
mills located in Saigon-Cholon decreased to 5*000 tons.

37

The consumption of rice in the Saigon-Cholon cosmopolitan area
is between 20,000 and 25,000 metric tons per month.

This indicates

that the capacity of the mills in the twin cities was about five times
the amount consumed by the local population even during the period of

87
'Data concerning the number of rice mills and milling capacities
were obtained from the following sources: (l) Bulletin Economique du
Vietnam, October, 1952, p. 512j (2) Syndicat des Exportateurs Francais
d ’Indochine.
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lowest milling capacity.

On the contrary, the daily rice consumption

in the rural areas of South Vietnam amounts to about twice the capacity
of country mills as reported during the fall of 1952.

Rural people,

therefore, had to resort to home grinding or pounding of their daily
rice requirements.
The larger mills generally are operated by steam power utilizing
rice hulls as fuel.

The quantity of hulls obtained from the milling

operations usually is insufficient to furnish all the steam required
and wood is used as a supplement.

Most of the smaller huller-mills

are powered by internal combustion engines.
The destruction of a large number of small rice mills resulted
in an increased demand for mills of this type immediately following
the end of hostilities to replace those destroyed.

Commercial import

establishments in Indochina responded immediately to this demand, and
since 1954 a considerable number of small rice mills have been imported
from Japan, England, Germany and other countries.

Indications are that

the milling capacity in the interior rice-producing provinces of South
Vietnam will soon return to pre-war level.
Grade and Qnal-i tv;

No one knows all the many different varieties

and strains of rice grown in the various rice-producing regions of
Indochina.

After centuries of rice cultivation under different con

ditions of soil, climate and water supply in the various localities,
rice growers have become 'fairly well adept at selecting rice varieties
best suited to the area.

In many cases those selected may not necessarily

be the highest-yielding variety (see page 91 )•

In some areas many

different varieties may be grown by one farm family— such as 5th month

rice, 6th month, 7th month, etc., all maturing at different times and
having different nailing qualities.

The obvious result is that a very

large portion of the paddy stock is composed of a mixture of several
varieties of rice before it reaches the primary assembly point.

Lack

of adequate storage facilities and indifference on the part of paddy
handlers result in additional mixing before the rice reaches the mill.
It is not surprising, therefore, that a large proportion of the milled
rice in Indochina contains a mixture of several varieties of rice.
Since most rice mills are not equipped with the proper grain separating
and selecting machinery (Carter disc-separator, or other brands) to
sort the grains according to length, a large amount of grain breakage
occurs during the milling process.

Furthermore, lacking proper equip

ment, rice farmers are not able to properly clean their paddy and the
product usually contains a large quantity of weed seeds, straw, dirt,
animal manure and other foreign matter.

Most of the smaller rice mills

do not contain the equipment necessary to remove all the foreign matter
in paddy before it enters the hullers and thus the quality of the milled
product is decreased yet further.

Improper storage and damage to the

grain due to excessive moisture and rodents and insects also combine to
lower the quality of rice in Indochina.
Under such conditions it is difficult to produce a high-quality,
homogeneous product.

The economic consequences are relatively low

milling yields, poor quality rice, and a decrease in the value of the
total crop.

Table 24 shows a comparison of the proportion of the

various products outturned from rough rice in the milling process
between rice mills in the United States and the large mills in Indochina.
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Table 24.

Comparison of the Proportion of the Various Products Outturned from Rough Rice between Rice M i l s in the United
States and in Indochina
Item

U. S. Mills
Percent of total
weight

Indochina Mills
Percent of total
weight

Rice product
Whole head

59.5

1/
57.CK

Second head

3.5

Screenings

5.5

8.0

Brewers

2.0

3.0

70.5

68.0

Polish

1.5

6.0

Bran

8.0

3.5

20.0

22.5

29.5

32.0

100.0

100.0

Total rice products
Rice by-products

Hulls and debris
Total by-products
Total

Whole head rice is not turned out by mills in Indochina but is
mixed with the second head to form No. 1, 25 percent broken quality
rice.
—'

A substantial proportion of the rice polish produced by mills in
Indochina also contains a large amount of rice bran.

Sources:

Randall Stelly, An Economic Study of the Rice Industry in
the United States. M. S. Thesis, Texas A. & M. College,
College Station, Texas, 1947, p. 6l.
Syndicate of Rice Millers of Indochina.
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Most of the rice milled for export in Indochina is subject to
grading under supervision of the Syndicate of French Exporters of
Indochina.

This is an association of exporting firms, most of whom

are also rice millers.

Contrary to the implication in the name of the

association, membership is not limited to French-owned firms.

The

members of the association account for about 95 percent of all rice
exports from Indochina.

The association was formed in 1939 to control

the quality of rice, corn and other products from Indochina in order
to obtain uniformity of products desired by foreign importers and to
establish and maintain grades and standards.

Member firms cannot

export rice or other commodities that have not been inspected and
approved by representatives of the association.
Rice millers and merchants interested in exporting rice or other
commodities usually arrange to have a representative of the association
call at their mill or warehouse to inspect the product and advise if it
meets requirements of the association.
representatives in each port of exit.

The association maintains
The expenses of the association

are supported by a small fee charged on the commodity being exported.
The association has rather strict inspection rules and supervises its
members closely, so that products exported by the members generally
are of the quality and standard they are represented to be.
All clean rice sales for export are bought on sample.

A very

large portion of the rice milled in Indochina is 40 percent broken,
but the bulk of rice exports is No. 1, 25 percent broken— the lowest
percentage broken that the government allows to be exported.

The grades and qualities of rice and rice products, as established
by the Syndicate of French Exporters of Indochina (Syndicat des Exportateur
Francais d ’Indochine), include a total of 40 classifications.

SB

To ascertain the percentage of broken grains contained in a sample of
rice the following procedure is employed:

A certain quantity of rice

from a sample submitted for analysis is weighed, for instance 100 grams,
and the whole grains are carefully separated from the brokens.
grain must be over half the size of the original grain.

A whole

If doubt exists

as to whether half grains should be classified as whole grains or
brokens, the half grains must be divided into two equal portions, one
half being included in the lot of grains and the other half in the
brokens.

In order to determine the percentage, the whole grains and

the brokens are weighed separately.

Example:

A quantity of 100 grams

of rice is found to contain 17 grams of brokens, 75 grams of whole
grains, and B grams of doubtful half grains.

This indicates that the

sample of rice comprises 21 percent of brokens and 79 percent of whole
grains•
Defects in the Marketing System:
At the Farm Level: The primaiy defect in the marketing system at
the farm level arises from the fact that the average fanner in Indochina
is financially unable to retain control of his products after harvest
time.

Invariably, he is forced to sell immediately in order to repay

financial obligations contracted during the growing season.

Too often

88Syndicat des Exportateurs Francais d'Indochine, Le Riz
d ^ndochine des Rizieres a la Consommation, Saigon, Undated.
The more important definitions of qualities of rice are
contained in Appendix "B".
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he is at the mercy of the produce dealer, primary the rice merchant,
who seldom shows any leniency.

The result is very poor bargaining

power on the part of the farmer and he suffers the consequences in the
low prices he is paid for his crops.
There is also the lack of effective competition among buyers at
the farm level.

The practice of rice merchants of dividing up the

territory with tacit agreement and understanding of no interference
greatly reduces the degree of competition among rice buyers that .might
prevail otherwise, and further reduces the average farmer’s bargaining
power in the sale of his products.

Inadequate storage space on the

farms and at the priinaiy assembly points is another major defect.
Even though a rice farmer may be able financially to retain his paddy
for a certain period following harvest, lack of adequate storage space
imposes additional handicaps upon the farm family wishing to hold onto
their products in anticipation of higher prices at a later date.
Transportation Problems: Even during normal years the transporta
tion vehicles available were inadequate to move all the paddy from the
interior to the rice nailing and storage centers during the peak of the
harvesting season.

Unless more storage space is provided in the interior

which would tend to remove the urgency of shipping paddy out to the
central warehouses and mills, better transportation facilities are
needed, both in water transportation and highways.

The problem of

transportation from the interior to the central milling centers is
aggravated by the fact that at least 26 percent of the weight of the
product consists of hulls and bran.

This adds to the cost of trans

porting the rice but adds very little value.

The excessive taxation
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on the movement of paddy from the interior to the mil ling and consumption
centers, begun during \\rartime, has been continued.

These additional

transportation costs all go into the final price of the milled rice
to the consumer and serve to widen the gap between the farm price and
the price paid by the consumer for his daily ration of milled rice.
Rice Mills: It is quite evident from Table 24 that the rice
mills operating in Indochina are relatively inefficient.

For the

most part they are old mills using out-dated milling equipment.

With

such equipment they are not able to do a proper paddy-cleaning and
separating job and the result is a very high percentage of breakage
of the kernels.

This reduces further the value of the milled rice

obtained from the paddy and has a depressing effect on the price paid
farmers for paddy.
Storage:

Storage facilities at both ends of the marketing system

are inadequate both in capacity and efficiency.

The excessive losses

that occur in all types of storage due to humidity, rodent and insect
damage is another factor reflecting in relatively low prices paid
farmers by buyers and millers1 agents who inevitably pass such losses
backward to the raw material suppliers.
Pricing Mechanism on the Domestic Market: There is little opportu
nity for rice prices to be set under competitive conditions in the
domestic wholesale market in Indochina.

With x’ice marketing at the

wholesale level almost completely in the hands of Chinese rice millers
and traders, there usually is a uniform price at which rice sales are
made.

Dealers form one great selling combine, and there usually is

tacit agreement that no one will undercut the selling price arrived
at or overbid the purchase price agreed to.
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Too Many Middlemen:

There are far too many middlemen between the

farmer and the consumer consistent with the amount of services performed
on rice, the major product of the country.

There are very few functions

and very little processing in the rice marketing system in Indochina.
There is no packaging, no store display, no advertising, nor is paddy
or milled rice transported great distances between the farmer and the
final consumer.

Yet the farmer is at least eight middlemen removed

from the consumer.

Invariably the following are engaged in the rice

marketing system:

(l) the millers1 agents and paddy dealers; (2) the

primary assembler and local store keeper; (3) the transporter, truck
owner or junk contractor or owner; (4) the warehouseman; (5) the
miller; (6) the milled rice broker; (7) the wholesaler (or exporter
in export sales); (3) the retailer (storekeeper or rice peddler); and
finally (9) the consumer.
excluded from this list.

The financing agents or moneylenders are
All but the consumer make relatively handsome

profits, each probably as much as what the farmer could theoretically
term net profits.
Need for Improvements to Increase Efficiency:
There are possibilities for improvements in many sectors of the
marketing system.

Left to itself, however, it is very doubtful if such

improvements can be expected in the system.

Since the farmers, if they

have to rely upon their own resources, are powerless to bring about
material remedies it will be necessary for the government to intercede
in the interest of the farmers and the general economy.

Among the

activities that the government could and should engage in are the
following:

(l) make greater efforts toward organizing farmers on a

cooperative basis and furnish those organizations with basic paddy

storage facilities and short-term credit at reasonable rates of interest,
and, through an improved agricultural extension service, furnish infor
mation to farmers and farmer groups designed to improve the quality of
the products, and improve the handling and cleaning of paddy at the
farm level; (2) encourage private initiative in the installation of
more and better country storage and milling facilities through a system
of extending equipment and facilities credit, special taxation and
fiscal policies regarding private capital improvements in the interior
provinces; (3) promote improvements in private and public warehouses
and storage facilities in the main cities through some government
certification system whereby minimum standards would be required before
paddy and rice storage operations can be undertaken and thus lead to
reducing waste and spoilage of the commodity while in storage; (4)
extend the quality and grade classification system as established by
the French Exporters Syndicate to include rice destined for local,
domestic consumption and thus reduce the practices of mixing varieties,
adding water, etc., by internal wholesalers and retailers so that
consumers can buy more according to grade standards and thus have
consumer prices reflect back, through the trade channel, to the farmers;
and (5) bring the farmer closer to the consumer by encouraging farmers
to perform more of the basic marketing services such as assembly, local
storage, transportation, etc., on a cooperative basis if necessary,
and thus reduce the number of middlemen engaged in marketing the com
modities.

CHAPTER IX

AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
*

In the past farmer cooperatives in Indochina have been very closely
associated with the agricultural credit movement and most of them were
financed by the government-sponsored rural credit organizations.

Member

ship contributions never comprised a significant part of the capital.
For the most part, funds for long-term loairs for equipment, medium-term
operating loans and short-term crop financing were obtained from the
government which, at the same time, practiced close supervision of both'
the lending operations and the use of the capital furnished.

Short

term credit to members has been one of the primary purposes of a large
percentage of the cooperatives formed in Indochina during the relatively
short history of farmer cooperatives.

In fact, the first Mutual Loans

Association organized in 1913 had as its primary purpose the provision
of credit to its membership, and this organization is usually referred
to as the first "modern" agricultural cooperative in Indochina.
History of Cooperatives
The development of agricultural cooperatives, exclusive of credit
associations, in Indochina is of very recent origin.

The first agri

cultural producers’ cooperative was organized in 1936 in the Province
of Bac Giang in North Vietnam for the purpose of processing, common
storage, and sale of members’ paddy, abrasin, and castor oil.
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Prior to this first attempt, the agricultural cooperative movement
in Indochina consisted only of the ancient programs of "The Rice Gran
aries" of the Annam emperors which were designed to (l) build a reserve
of rice for use in combatting starvation of the population during bad
crop years, and (2) to facilitate the collection of the "agricultural
tax"— to the extent that this tax was collected in kind and, in fact,
it was these collections that contributed to filling the imperial
granaries.
During the five-year period of 1937-41 the French Administration
undertook a very active program of organizing and financing farmer
cooperatives in almost every major agricultural region of the country.
During this time a number of agricultural producers’ cooperatives were
formed with the financial assistance and under the direction of the
former Office de Credit Populaire.

These cooperatives were organized

among producers of a wide variety of "specialized" agricultural com
modities. ■In addition to the Bac Giang abrasin and castor oil producers’
cooperative mentioned above, the following are some of the more important
cooperatives organized during that period:
(1)

The two tea producers’ cooperatives of Phuto in North Vietnam
and Tourane in Central Vietnam whose activities consisted
primarily of processing and packaging member-produced green
tea for export to metropolitan France and French colonial
possessions.

(2)

The Agricultural Cooperative Society of Than Hoa (North
Vietnam) which processed paddy, com, ramie and abrasin and
sold processed commodities for the account of its members.

(3)

The Agricultural Cooperative of Quang Ngai (Central Vietnam)
whose main purposes were to process members’ sugar cane into
sugar by the traditional, or local method (open-pan process),
furnish short-term crop production loans to members and
common sale of the processed sugar.
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(4)

A group of five tobacco cooperatives located at Qui Nhon,
Pleiku-Kontum, Tuy Hoa, Khanh Hoa and Tourcham. The main
functions of these cooperatives were to grade and select,
condition (diy and ferment), pack and sell their members1
black leaf tobacco to the Saigon-Cholon cigarette factories.

(5)

The Agricultural Cooperative of the Bolovens (in Laos).
This cooperative engaged in the handling, storage, and
packaging of members’ green Arabaca coffee beans and in the
common sale of this product.

(6)

The Anhoa Cooperative in South Vietnam, an organization of
cocoa producers, which hulled and extracted the fiber from
coconuts produced locally and manufactured the fiber into
mats and rope.

(7)

The Palm Sugar Producers’ Cooperative in Kandal (Canibodia)
established to sell on a cooperative basis the sugar pro
duced by local Cambodian farmers.
(The marketing of palm
sugar in Cambodia has traditionally been a monopoly of
Chinese commercial interests.)

(S)

The Farmers Cooperative of Kompong-Cham in Cambodia which
was originally organized for the cooperative sale of corn
produced by local farmers but after World War II engaged
primarily in drying and conditioning locally-produced black
tobacco for sale on a cooperative basis to the cigarette
manufacturers in Saigon-Cholon.

In addition, mention must be made of the Syndicate of Irrigation
Associations of Central Vietnam.

This was an association of fourteen

small irrigation and water control (sea dike construction and mainte
nance) cooperatives under the technical control of the Public Works
Service.

In this association, membership was obligatory for all land

owners benefitting from the water control and irrigation improvements.
The initiative in organizing those cooperatives was taken by the
Office de Credit Populaire.

The primary objectives of this credit

institution in organizing farmers into cooperatives were to be able to
better supervise the loans made to farmers in the area, make the col
lection of those loans easier by establishing centralized delivery
points for the products and to effectuate some degree of control in the
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storage, primary processing and marketing of the farm commodities
produced by farmer-debtors.
The management of the government agricultural credit institution
took notice of the fact that every year small and medium-size farmers,
being always short of money, are obliged to sell their produce as soon
as possible after harvest and very often before maturity, while the
crop is still standing.

Prices are at their lowest level at that time.

It v/as realised by the directors of the credit agency that usually it
is impossible for small farmers to perform any storage and primary
processing themselves, and by leaving these functions to traders, do
not benefit from the higher prices at later sales.

Therefore,

establishing small purchase, sale and primary storage and processing
cooperatives appeared to be a feasible solution to the situation.

At

the same time these organizations would make it possible to ascertain
that the funds loaned to farmers would be utilized for productive
purposes, in addition to increasing the market value of the products
harvested through proper storage, preparation and packaging.
It was realized also that agricultural cooperatives could serve
as a medium through which the agricultural technical services, such
as the Hies Office of Indochina and the Institute of Agronomic Research,
could transmit information on better production practices to farmers.
Cambodia:
There is very little to be stated about the history of cooperatives
in Cambodia.

In fact, the only farmer cooperatives that ever existed in

the history of agriculture in that state were a pepper-growers ’ coopera
tive at Kampot, a palm sugar cooperative at Kandal, and a tobacco—
growers’ cooperative in Kompong Cham.

These two cooperatives were
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organized by the French a few years prior to World War II and were
under the direct supervision and management of the General Director
of the Office de Credit Populaire.

This credit agency took an active

part in organizing these two groups of farmers, primarily as an attempt
to consolidate and safeguard its lending operations among tobacco and
pepper growers.

These two organizations obtained most of their capital

from the Office de Credit Populaire and their basic functions consisted
of granting short-term loans to member-growers, common storage, basic
processing and sale of members’ products.

These organizations were just

getting started when World War II disrupted activities.

With the

decrease in production of pepper and tobacco during the war period,
conditions of insecurity in the areas where they were located, reduced
trade, and war damage to their facilities, their operations had
virtually ceased by 1950.

The tobacco growers’ cooperative resumed

operations in 1951, however on a greatly reduced scale.
A forest products cooperative (S0C0F0R) and a fisheries cooperative
also existed in Cambodia before the war.

However, most members were

Europeans and most of the capital was obtained from the Office de
Credit Populaire in the form of short-term operating and long-term
facility loans.

These two cooperatives are now defunct and remain

as heavy debtors to the former government lending agency.

The fisheries

cooperative was re-organized in 1953 by Cambodian interests but is not
yet of importance.

Reasons for Failure
All the cooperatives mentioned above were short-lived as originally
established.

The reason for their failure, as explained by high officials
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of the former Office of Popular Credit, was that their facilities were
destroyed and records and capital lost during World War II and the
accompanying Japanese occupation.

However, it is common knowledge

that the record of agricultural cooperatives and, in fact, all types
of cooperatives in Indochina, has been discouraging.

Not one of the

agricultural cooperatives proved successful according to usual
standards of performance.

The members were invariably suspicious

and uncooperative with the management.

Farmers were seldom disposed

to bring their produce to the cooperative warehouses or mills, except
against full payment in cash at current market price.

More often the

cooperatives soon became ordinary storage, milling or processing, and
merchandising centers, without close relationship to their members or
raw product suppliers.

What undoubtedly tended to further impede

success was the fact that a certain portion of the well-to-do members
made use of the cooperatives to exploit other members.

It was the

common practice of these persons to unload their surplus rice or other
commodities during period of high prices (at the peak of the seasonal
price cycle) to the cooperative against money loans, then re-lend the
proceeds at usurious rates of interest during the periods of low prices
to other members and specify repayment in produce at harvest time.
These repayments in kind were then sold to the cooperative during high
price periods.
In addition, the administration of the cooperatives was expensive,
operational and other costs were very high and all too often total
costs exceeded total income.

All of the organizations became heavily

indebted to the Office de Credit Populaire and most were disbanded,
thus fully justifying the misgivings of the members.

By 1944 only
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tv.ro agricultural cooperatives were functioning in North Vietnam and
only three in Central Vietnam.

The scale of operation of these re

maining were, of course, greatly reduced.
When a family in Indochina is able to obtain funds in excess of
the amount necessary to meet the basic household requirements for
daily living it is common practice to make loans to less fortunate
families at high rates of interest rather than to expand production
capacity.

This custom increases the difficulties to be overcome in

establishing farmers cooperative institutions on an effective and
permanent basis.
The efforts of the French Administration in establishing an
institution of farmers cooperatives met with two main types of obsta
cles.

One of these was the moral obstacle constituted mainly by the

skepticism and abstentionism of the Indochinese "milieux" who go under
the fatalistic assumption that usury practices are too well fixed in
the habits of the rural economy to be discarded; some people attempt
to justify usury by citing the importance of the risks encountered
by creditors.

They maintain that it is a question of loans granted

to farmers of very doubtful solvency who are most often unable to
offer the least amount of real security and guarantee and who are,
moreover, usually unaware of a loan maturity date.

Under such con

ditions it is obvious that no well-informed banker would negotiate a
loan with such debtors because he would soon be driven into bankruptcy
due to the absolute impossibility of relying on regular repayments.
It appears, therefore, that the usury practices are actually "insurance
premiums" paid for covering the very abnormal risks involved.

However,

arguments presented by former officials of the national agency for
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continued efforts in this field are:

(l) the importance of the real

risks assumed in Indochina by the usurer-creditors is generalized and
greatly overly emphasized, (2) had world conditions not disrupted
internal activities, French efforts in organizing farmers cooperatives
'would have been successful in both the. lending and storage, and sales
types, and (3) the practice of usury is not an Indochinese monopoly or
specialty but one that has ruled for centuries throughout Southeast
Asia.

In fact, usury was common in central and western Europe until

the iniddle of the nineteenth century and was largely abolished through
the farmers cooperative movement.
The other major set of obstacles encountered in Indochina were
the ignorance and disinterest of the j/iass of the rural population in
the problems and activities of the management of the organizations,
and the insufficiency of qualified personnel to fill positions of
management.

These continue to be the fundamental obstructions to

wide acceptance of the democratic principles of cooperation.

There

fore, both the agricultural credit agency and the agricultural
cooperative organizations affiliated with it have always been con
sidered by the rural population as state institutions administered
by civil servants with the conception prevailing that the cooperatives
were simply other trade organizations in which membership was obtained
for the primary purpose of reaping the greatest profits possible.

Very

little consideration was given to allegiance to the associations or
the concept of mutuality on the part of the membership.
education can be cited as one reason for this.

lack of proper

The results were that

most cooperative boards of directors were composed of big landowners
working in harmony with government-appointed French directors or
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managers most of whom were graduates of agricultural colleges in France.
Very little efforts were made by the French to train native personnel
in business management to a degree sufficient to enable them to assume
positions of directors of farmers cooperatives.
Extent and Adequacy Under the French
The farmers' cooperatives established under the French were in
adequate to meet the needs of Indochina *s agricultural economy.

In

general, the radius of action was very limited and existed only in a
few localized centers of concentrated agricultural production of
"special crops" (coffee, tea, tobacco, etc.).

Undoubtedly some of

the cooperatives were responsible for some improvement in the quality
of the products they handled.

However, the quantity marketed through

cooperatives amounted to only a very small percentage of the total
output, and the number of farmers marketing their produce through
these organizations represented an insignificant portion of all farmerproducers.
It should be remembered that short-term production loans to members
constituted a very important and necessary phase of the cooperative
program.

However, the amount of capital available for this operation

was grossly inadequate to meet the needs.

According to the records of

the Office de Credit Populaire, the financing agency, the amount of
capital out on short-term loans to members of cooperatives as of
December 31, 1944 was only slightly more than 3.0 million piasters.
This explains why the amount of money advanced to members against
"pledged" crop deliveries never exceeded 25 percent of the estimated
value of the produce.
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Recent Activities and Government Interest

The governments of Vietnam and Cambodia decided to renew their
efforts at organizing farmers cooperatives, and in 1950 great emphasis
was placed on the part farmers organizations could and should play in
bringing material improvements and well-being to the rural sector of
the economy.

It is on the basis of experience gained from past errors

noted above that it was decided to embark upon a new and different
method of approach in organizing farmers into cooperatives.
More specifically, this decision was based upon the difficulties
encountered by the French Administration, and especially the fact that:
(l) the agricultural credit system was insufficient and the funds
loaned to farmers were often misused and misdirected, resulting in
credit being a "two-edged sword", which, is used unproductively,
inevitably led to perpetual indebtedness; (2) individual loans,
calling for real property as security, were beyond the reach of the
great majority of farmers; and (3) individual loans in themselves
did not protect the recipients from the disastrous results of specu
lation in crop trading by middlemen.

Complementing the activities of

the agricultural credit agency with farmers cooperative organizations
performing the additional functions of crop purchase, grading, storage
and sale would result in farmers being helped in both the essential
fields of loans and storage and sale.

On the one hand, farmers could

borrow production capital from their cooperatives at reasonable rates
of interest and, on the other hand, they could enjoy the benefits
of marketing their produce through their cooperatives under advan
tageous conditions for maximum returns.

However, in practice,

coordinated action between the agricultural credit agency and the
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cooperatives proved difficult to establish and confusion was the result.
Moreover, the existing cooperatives were too few in number to adequately
complement the functions necessary of a centr-al agricultural credit
agency.
The experience gained from these difficulties, and those previously
noted, led to the recommendation of creating a new, decentralized agri
cultural cooperative institution called the "Centre Rural" which was to
act simultaneously as a credit organism by granting short-term crop
production loans to members, and as an instrument for the purchase,
grading, storage, and cooperative sale of members* produce.
The New Program
In scope, a "Centre Rural" would not encompass more than a large
village or a group of small neighboring villages.

This would promote

better application of the fundamental principle of collective responsi
bility, which is, in Indochina, much superior to individual responsibility
for financial guarantees.
Rural" would include:

Under the new program the typical "Centre

(l) as a basic clement, a commodity storage

warehouse, and a primary processing plant or simple rice milling
facilities; (2) for complimentary functions, facilities for sale of
basic essentials needed for crop production and home use, such as
seeds, fertilizers, various kinds of hand agricultural tools, cloth
goods, salt, etc.; and (3 ) a credit section designed to grant short
term production loans to members.
The new program, ’which was started in 1952, brought to light many
problems to be solved.

In the first place, while it is possible in a

practical sense to conceive of groups of farmers delivering their crops
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for common storage, processing and sale as well as common use of pro
duction equipment which they individually possess, it is practically
impossible to foresee grouping these same individuals to combine their
personal capital for redistribution among the members because most
farmers arc seldom in possession of liquid assets.

In order to obtain

capital, farmer groups must, therefore, obtain most of the capital
needed from an outside source.

This outside source of capital can only

come from the state either directly in the form of loans from the state
budget or indirectly in the form of guarantees given to loans granted
by public credit institutions.
It follows, therefore, that while storage and sales organizations
could possibly resort to private initiative and benefit from private
legal control, organisations receiving state funds must be subject to
lacre rigid control by the state which furnishes the capital needed.
It is for this reason that the new program of farmers cooperatives,
calling for almost 100 percent government financing, made it necessary
to revise substantially the basic cooperative statutes requiring closer
government control and supervision of those receiving government credits.
Furthermore, in view of the important part cooperative organizations
could and should play in the rural economy of the country, and the
special privileges, such as certain exemptions from taxation, etc., it
was deemed necessary to protect the rural population against possible
abuses resulting from the new organizations reverting to simple trading
firms or "false

cooperatives".

It was necessary, therefore, to be

very explicit in incorporating definite and precise regulations con
cerning cooperative membership requirements, administrative procedures
and controls, dividend payments, etc.
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A substantial amount of time and effort vias expended in official
circles, first revising the old agricultural cooperative statutes, then
redrafting new ones in attempts to incorporate in the basic legislation
and interior regulations as many of the democratic principles of cooperation as possible.
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Additional time was needed in which to locate

farming areas meeting the basic conditions (local production.and market
conditions, tenure relations, communication and transportation, security,
farmer receptiveness, etc.) deemed desirable and necessary for success.
Present Cooperative Statutes:
In addition to defining the composition, objectives, radius of
action, duration, powers and activities permitted, etc., of the organ
isation, the statutes contain the following basic provisions:
Admission: Membership in the associations is opened to all agri
culturalists who are actively engaged in cultivating the land themselves,
but acceptance is effective only upon favorable decision of the Council
of Administration.

Thus, this section of the law renders all absentee

landowners ineligible for membership.
Capital Stock and Shares:

To be admitted as a member of the

organizations each person must subscribe to at least one share of
capital stock of 100 piasters.
to organize.

A minimum of 200 shares are required

No dividend is paid on capital stock, but provisions are

made for payment of interest up to a maximum of six percent annually,
as determined by the General Assembly.

Sale of stock certificates to

translations of the standard cooperative statutes and interior
regulations pertaining to rice farmers organizations are presented in
APPENDIX "C".
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a third party are to be approved by the Council of Administration which
also approves the new purchaser as a member of the association.

The

Council of Administration reserves the right to refuse admission of a
new member resulting from the sale of shares, in which case the new
owner is to be reimbursed the face value of his share.
Administration;

The associations are administered by Councils of

Administration each composed of five members elected by and among the
membership assembled in a General Assembly.

Members are elected for

two years and each must subscribe to at least ten shares of stock—
to serve as a guarantee for their actions.

Rule is by majority vote

of the members present at meetings with the president’s vote used to
break a tie.

Members of the Council of Administration do not receive

a salary but only per diem for their services while on duty.
General Director and Board of Controllers: The General Director
of the organization is named by the General Director of the Agricultural
Service but only upon the proposal and with the consent of the Council
of Administration.

The association is subject to the permanent control

of the Director of Agriculture.

However, a Board of Controllers is

appointed, presided over by the Chief of Province and assisted by two
commissioners, which may or may not be members of the association.

This

Board acts in an advisory capacity, and as a checking body.
General Assembly and Voting:
assembled constitutes a quorum.
those present and by proxy votes.

One fourth of the membership duly
Decisions are made by the majority of
Each member is entitled to only one

vote regardless of the number of shares he owns or the amount of business
conducted with the organizations.

The amount of partonage dividends
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to be paid is determined by the General Assembly upon the recommenda
tions of the Council of the Administration.
Division of Annual Surpluses: If in the annual inventory, after
deductions have been made for general operational expenses, amortisation
of all material and equipment, provision for equipment and material
replacement, there exists a surplus, this surplus shall be divided as
follows:

(l) the first three percent of this surplus is retained to

constitute a reserve fund} (2) a sun sufficient to pay owners of shares
of capital stock interest on their stock in amounts not to exceed six
percent of the face value; and (3) the division of the remainder shall
be fixed by the General Assembly wliich, upon the proposition of the
Council of Administration, can decide to divide it among the members.
This return to members shall, be made only under the title of dividends
and shall be proportional to the amount of business done with the
association by each member.
Adequacy:

The statutes were recommended for adoption as the law

governing farmers organizations with full realization of their short
comings.

However, two factors mainly were responsible for failure to

insist upon a more complete set of regulations.

In the first place,

the governing statutes and interior regulations had to be kept as simple
as possible in order to be easily explainable to and readily understood
by illiterate farmers.

Secondly, the element of time was very pressing

and only a limited amount was available in which to begin organizing
farmers under the new program.
Specifically, it would have been desirable to give the organiza
tions greater autonomy and more opportunity Cor internal and external
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control by their own membership., such as excluding outsiders from the
Boards of Controllers and giving the membership greater powers in
selecting and appointing the General Directors.
governmental officials argued that:

However, Indochinese

(1) this way of doing business

and type of organization was new to most farmers, (2) prospective
members would be totally ignorant of the basic provisions of the law
and would require much time to understand them sufficiently, (3) at
this stage it was not possible to find many candidates qualified for
the position of General Director from among the farming population,
and (4) since the government was to provide most of the capital, the
control and supervision of the organization would have to be entrusted
to government functionaires.

The validity of these arguments was not

contested very vigorously.
It would also have been desirable to be more specific in the
enforcement provisions relative to Marketing contracts between members
and the associations.

The question of product ownership following

delivery is another possible source of conflict.

As the law is written

there is no provision forbidding farmers from withdrawing their paddy
from the cooperative storage for private sale to a third person.
As a means of safeguarding the organizations from the destructive
activities of rice merchants, millers* agents and moneylenders, efforts
were made to include in the law special provisions forbidding any person
to induce any member of an association to breach his marketing contract
with the association, or who spread false reports about the finances
or management of the association.^

However, government authorities

^ T h e Non-Profit Corporation Law of Louisiana contains such a
provision in Section 145, Title 3, Chapter 2, Part II.
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would not agree to include these provisions.

The reason for their

reluctance was never quite clear.
Accomplishments:
VJhen attempts are made to organise cooperatives among illiterate
farmers with very little conception of the basic principles of a demo
cratic organization, a large amount of preparation needs to be done
before satisfactory results can be expected.

The limited number of

competent local government personnel and the destitute condition of
the fanning population are additional impediments to rapid progress.
In this new program much time and effort was spent in group
meetings between government personnel and groups of farmers in both
Vietnam and Cambodia to explain the purposes and principles of
cooperatives, the conditions necessary for their success, and the
responsibilities of members and obligations of the government.
The first organization formed under the new program was a ri.ce
growers cooperative organized in August, 1952, in the province of
ICompong Cham in Cambodia.

By April 1, 1954* this cooperative had

a membership of more than 9,000 farmers who cultivated over 73?000
acres of rice*

A second rice farmers cooperative was organized in

May, 1953, in the province of Prey Veng with a membership of more than
7,000.

These two cooperatives were each granted a loan amounting to

5.3 million piasters by the Cambodian Office de Credit Populaire.
About 3.2 million piasters of these credits are used to advance cropproduction capital to members, 1.5 miHlion to erect rice storage and
jialling facilities, and the remaining 600,000 piasters utilized to
defray operational expenses of the associations.

In addition to the

above loans obtained from American Aid counterpart funds granted to
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the Office de Credit Populaire, a further grant of aid in rice mill
machinery, trucks, and quonset storage buildings and burlap bags
amounting to about $133>000 was approved for each of these cooperatives.
They engage in furnishing crop-production capital to members, common
storage of paddy, commodity transportation service and loan of rice
sacks, and in cooperative milling and sale of members’ paddy.
In addition to these two rice farmers’ cooperatives, the Tobacco
Growers' Cooperative at Kompong Cham, having 1,500 members, also was
reorganized in 1954 under the principles contained in the new cooperative
lav; and provided with two small tractors and Land cultivating equipment
on reimbursable basis.

A piaster loan was also granted to this organi

zation with which to make improvements to the cooperative leaf tobacco
drying and curing sheds (Figure XVT).
The fourth group of farmers organized in Cambodia under the new
program consists of corn producers along the Mekong River in the
Province of ICandal.

A small c o m drying plant and small tractors and

row cultivatiiig equipment for use by members on a cooperative basis
also was furnished to this organization of over 2,300 members.
A total of about 20,000 farm families were benefitting from the
new farmers’ cooperative program in Cambodia at the end of its second
year.

These four cooperatives all received piaster and equipment loans

from American Aid funds and are all under the general supervision of
the Cambodian Office de Credit Populaire, through which the funds and
equipment are made available.

They are all organized under the demo

cratic principle of one-member-one—vote, dividends according to
patronage, etc.

Members of the boards of directors are elected from
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Figure XVI.

Two Methods Utilized in Drying Leaf Tobacco in Cambodia.
There are great possibilities of improving -the quality of
tobacco produced along the Mekong River in Cambodia through
cooperative utilization of government-furnished facilities
for drying and curing leaf tobacco.
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among the membership at large ’which is restricted to land cultivators*
The General managers are appointed by the Director of the Office de
Credit Populaire but these appointments must be approved by the majority
of the members in each case.
Money and equipment loans furnished by the Office de Credit
Populaire to the cooperatives carry interest at six percent per year.
Operating and crop-production loans from the central lending agency
mature in 12 months while equipment and facilities loans are for 15
to 20 years.

Crop-production loans granted by the cooperatives to

their members are secured by title mortgage to the land and by pledged
delivery of the crop at harvest time.

Loans are' granted in amounts

up to 70 percent of bhe estimated value of the crop.

The maximum

amount loaned to any one member is 6,000 piasters during one growing
season.

A rate of interest of 12 percent per year is charged by the

cooperatives for these short-term seasonal loans to their members.
The future of farmers cooperatives in Cambodia appears bright.
However, there is a great need for good leadership exercising extreme
caution in moulding and maintaining good membership relations in all
cooperatives.

There must be conducted the proper educational and

cooperative promotion campaigns.

There must also be active government

support and a fuller realization of the masses of farmers of the possible
benefits to them in becoming members of cooperatives.

If carried forward

in the proper manner the small amount of efforts made so far can well
prove to be the initial step needed toward solving the Cambodian farmers *
financial, storage, transportation, and general commodity marketing
problems.
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Vietnam;

The background and history of farmers cooperatives in

Vietnam has been discussed in preceding sections where notice was
made of the primary reasons for the failure of those organizations
formed with the financial assistance and under the direction of the
former Office de Credit Populaire.
Activities in organizing farmers into cooperative associations
under the new program in Vietnam were started simultaneously with
those in Cambodia.

The same motives prompt action in this field in

both states and the same basic difficulties were encountered in both
areas— with one major difference.

In Vietnam there was no established

governmental credit agency during the initial phase of the program.
In Cambodia, on the contrary, an agricultural credit agency did exist,
and the fact that the Director General of the Office de Credit
Populaire was also the Director of the Agriculture Service greatly
simplified the task.

Thus, in Cambodia there was coordination and

cooperation among government officials and a single, straight line of
authority with which to work.

Such a condition, deemed necessary for

immediate action and progress, was not found in Vietnam where every
related service in the national as well as the regional governments
attempted to retain all technical and financial control possible over
activities in their respective fields.
The first efforts were made during the fall of 1952 among a group
of tobacco producers in Central Vietnam, the majority of whom are
small landowner-cultivators.

Traditionally, tobacco farmers in that

area sell their produce to local merchants and moneylenders who are
called "manufacturer*s representatives".

As is the case with the
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rice merchants, those tobacco buyers usually lend production capital
to tobacco growers for a few months each season against a lien on the
growing crop.

Tobacco leaves are dried and bundled at the farmstead

and brought by the grower to the merchant’s storehouse in repayment
for previous advances.

The merchant usually sells directly to a

cigarette manufacturer's representative.

As a rule there is only one

leaf tobacco merchant in each village since all manufacturers belong
to a single syndicate.
The main objectives in organizing tobacco farmers into a coopera
tive were?

(l) to improve the quality of the product presented for

sale through proper cooperative drying, curing, storage, and uniform
packaging and presentation; (2) to furnish production credit to member
growers at reasonable rates of interest; (3) to improve the quality of
the tobacco leaves by producing in the cooperative nursery and distri
buting to members improved tobacco seedlings; (4) to sell the produce
of the members on a cooperative basis; and (5) to furnish transportation
facilities to members in the movement of their tobacco from the farm
to the central sheds and warehouses.
The cooperative vjas organized under democratic principles similar
to those of Cambodia with the management entrusted to a General Manager
appointed by the Governor of Central Vietnam but approved by the Board
of Directors, of which the Chief of Province was designated as an
"honorary", non-voting member, and the Board of Controllers.' Considerable
effort was made to explain the basic principles under which the organi
zation was to function and to enlist the support of local, provincial
and regional government authorities.

However, these efforts were not
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sufficient to prevent the organization to meet with difficulties at
the very beginning.
In the first place, the administrative jnachinery required to
get the funds released and into the hands of farmers was so compli
cated that most members had contracted loans with local merchants by
the time the funds were available to the cooperative management.
Secondly, the person elected as president of the Board of Directors
was an unscrupulous individual who had been a tobacco merchant and
usurer, and a former Viet ilinh sympathizer who used his influence as
a creditor to a number of tobacco growers in the area to get sufficient
votes to be elected to the position.

He immediately used his official

position to consolidate his hold on local tobacco producers.

Further

more, the Governor-appointed manager, who was also Chief of the
Agriculture Service for Central Vietnam, completely disregarded the
established regulations and embarked upon a program of lavish spending
of cooperative f u nd s for personal travel and per diem.

In addition,

the Chief of Province was indifferent to the success of the organization
and did not take an active interest in its affairs.

Dessention between

the management and the membership soon became a major problem and
membership relations were poor.

Operating with complete lack of

direction from the manager and no active support and interest from
the Chief of Province, members of the Council of Administration lost
little time in disregarding regulations, with confusion and corruption
as the inevitable result'.
this governing board were:

Among the discrepancies in the operation of
(l) each member procured for himself a

rubber stamp (which in Indochina is used very widely in signing official
documents) which he used in the name of the cooperative.

These were

utilised to verily each other*s expense vouchers, loan applications,
receipts for expenditures, etc; (2) members requesting and approving
for each other advances in money for what they expected to receive as
per diem in the future; (3) prices paid for tobacco deliveries to the
cooperative warehouses that were much higher than the prices local
merchants were paying for the same quality; (4) the wife of the
President of the board, though not a tobacco producer, was admitted
as a member of the association and purchased tobacco in the local
Jiiarket for resale to the cooperative at a profit; and (5) members
delivered their poorest quality tobacco bo the cooperative for storage
and drying while selling the better grades to the tobacco merchant.
Under such conditions it is not surprisingthat the first

year of

operation was a failure from the standpoint of finances and goodwill
.among members toward the organization.
Early in the spring of 1954 the government of Vietnam ordered a
complete reorganization of the association.

A new cooperative manager

and a new Chief of Province were appointed, and a new Council of
Administration was elected.

Following this action the cooperative

progressed satisfactorily; membership increased, administrative costs
were reduced, and volume of business was increased.

The result was

that during 1954 over 500,000 piasters above costs were realized,
compared to a net loss of nearly 200,000 piasters during 1953.

In

the 1955 marketing year the association had a volume of business
amounting to about 800 tons of leaf tobacco, affording a net profit
of nearly 1.0 million piasters, and permitted the payment of patronage
dividends to members for the first time.

Another area in which efforts were made to organize farmers into
cooperatives in Vietnam includes rice storage, milling, sales and
production credit.

Two groups of rice farmer’s were organized in the

spring of 1953 in the provinces of Cantho and Eentre in South Vietnam.
Local counterpart currency and dollar equipment from American aid funds
were allocated to these cooperatives in order to make it possible for
the Ministry of Agriculture and local authorities to install rice
storage facilities and milling equipment at the two agreed sites, and
to afford a source of short-term production credit to members of the
cooperatives.

Rice milling machinery, power units, storage facilities,

burlap bags and transportation equipment were furnished as a direct
grant of aid which was capatalized in local currency so as to constitute
a reimbursable advance to the cooperatives.

These "pilot" cooperatives

were intended to fulfill the several purposes of furnishing badly
needed short-term credit to members, providing them with facilities
necessary to store and mill their rice so as to sell at a more favorable
seasonal price, and to give them the advantage of cooperative marketing
through association with other farmer members.

In this manner it was

hoped that farmers could escape the demands of the moneylenders and the
resulting monopoly of the merchants, and thus be able to experience a
higher income and a better living.
Loans are granted to members in prescribed limitations at a rate
of interest of one percent per month reimbursable to the cooperative
at the end of the crop year, and with the growing crop pledged as
security.

Reimbursements of loans made to the cooperative are to serve

as a revolving fund from which similar advances in subsequent years will
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be made.

These loan funds are reimbursable in equal yearly installments

over a 10-year period.

The rice milling and other equipment and supplies

furnished as direct dollar aid will be repaid with interest in 15 years.
Principal and interest payments are to be made to the National Agricul
tural Credit and Cooperative Service (SNCAAC) and are to be utilized in
extending loans to other farmer cooperatives in other areas.
Crop production loans are granted to members up to 70 percent of
the estimated value of the growing crop.

Upon delivery of the member's

paddy to the cooperative storage warehouse the loans are converted to
storage loans.

Two safeguards in particular are taken to guarantee

loans repayment.

First, the Council of Administration takes proper

steps to verify the acreage of rice under cultivation as declared by
the borrower.

Secondly, loan applications are co-signed by two other

members who are, along with the borrower, responsible for repayment.
In order to prevent unwise utilization of the borrowed funds, loans
are made in three installments, at the beginning of the cultivation
season, during the middle of the rice growing season, and at harvest
time.
Notwithstanding all precautions taken during the initial phases
of organizing, special efforts made to enlist favorable membership
response and cooperation, and the large amount of work done to insure
proper management-member relations, the first year of operation was
not successful.

During the sxunmer and fall of 1953 the countryside

in the vicinities of the two cooperative installations was considered
by government authorities as peaceful and secure from the standpoint
of rebel activities.

This was a primary consideration in selecting

those two '’pilot" areas.

Local farmers were very enthusiastic in their

response and by early fall of 1953 the two cooperatives had a combined
membership of about 3>000 farmers,

however, the Communist rebels soon

realized that the Vietnamese government was utilizing those two farmers
organizations as a means of rallying the rural population and they
immediately s.et out to concentrate their activities in these two areas.
They harrassed the local population and the Council of Notables of both
areas had to flee the villages for the safety of the cities.

The

treasurer of one cooperative was kidnapped and leaflets were distributed
in the area threatening the fanners with death if they delivered their
paddy to the cooperative warehouses.

Consequently, only atout 700 tons

of paddy was delivered by cooperators and stored in the organizations'
warehouses after harvest the first year.

Delays in delivery of supplies

and equipment further handicapped immediate progress.

Following the

cessation of hostilities in 1954, activities were resumed and a total
of 1,500 tons of paddy belonging to cooperative members was stored
during the 1954-55 crop season.
A third rice farmers' cooperative was organised during 1954 along
approximately the same pattern as the first two, with the exception
that rice milling facilities were not provided.

Results of the first

year of operation of tlis organization were very satisfactory (Figure
XVII).

There were over 650 members who stored a total of 1,300 metric

tons of paddy in the cooperative warehouse at the end of the first
year's harvest.

The market value of stored rice was approximately

twice the piaster loans granted to members during the crop production
season.

Figure XVII*

Fanners Cooperative Rice Storage Facilities in Indochina.
There is a great need for more and better paddy storage
facilities in Indochina at the village level. Organizing
farmers for cooperative use of government-furnished facilities
for storing both bulk and sacked rice appear the soundest
solution to this problem.
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The Current Program, of Activities: The difficulties encountered
with the first attempts at organizing farmers under the new concept and
trie revised cooperative laws enabled governmental authorities to realize
that the organisations were too large and actually too impersonal for
the average Vietnamese farmer to feel a close attachment to them.
Furthermore, they were endowed v;ith too much capital and equipment,
and therefore were too complex for local and provincial managerial
talent to manage properly without extensive training in cooperative
management.

The Vietnamese rice farmer was not able to understand

the organisation and operations sufficiently well.
For these reasons the current program, begun during the spring
of 1955, calls for providing additional funds to organize small, simple
village farmers1 storage and credit cooperatives in 20 rural localities
in South and Central Vietnam,

By the end of 1955 a total of 19 groups

of farmers were organized under this program.

These cooperatives are

organized at the village level and are provided with simple paddy
storage buildings, burlap bags, platform scales, and other necessary
items on a loan basis reimbursable over a period of years.

Loans in

amounts up to 70 percent of their estimated marketable crop are granted
to members during the crop production season*

The loans are converted

into warehouse loans on paddy placed in storage in the cooperative
warehouse.

Warehouse loans amount to 85 percent of the value of the

paddy placed in storage.

Both types of loans carry interest rates of

one percent per month.
These cooperatives are "demonstrational" in character in the sense
that it is hoped they will serve the added purpose of demonstrating to
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other farmers in neighboring villages the benefits of group action on
a cooperative basis for mutual and community benefit.

The amount

advanced in money and facilities >0.11 be reimbursed to the Service
Rationale de Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif (SNCAAC) or its
successor agency who will carry out the fiscal management for further
development of agricultural cooperatives and credit in Vietnam.

It is

anticipated that the loans to these demonstrational cooperatives will
be repaid in full in 20 years.
Basic Requirements for Success and Recommended Action
Mention already has been made of the fact that apart from the
conditions of security in the rural areas, one of the greatest handicaps
in the administration and operation of these government-sponsored and
financed cooperatives has been the frequent and extended delays in
disbursement of funds from the counterpart deposits and in the handling
of funds through the echelon of civil administration on down to the
hands of the farmer borrowers.

In the administrative regulations and

financing procedures established and agreed upon during the organisa
tional stage it was stipulated that the "banking" functions and controls
would be handled by and become the sole responsibility of SNCAAC.

The

role of assuming leadership, furnishing guidance and counsel in orga
nizing, propaganda and information, as well as responsibility for
efficient management was left to Agricultural Service and the Ministry
of Agriculture.

However, SNCAAC has never been able to assume fully

the functions reserved for it.

With either the Minister of Agriculture

or the Director of the Agricultural Service designated as "project
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administrator" in each case, they have been very reluctant to release
the banking functions to SNCAAC, but instead have preferred to assume that
role also and thus be in a position to control both operational and
financing activities.
Disbursement of funds has proven to be a difficult task.

Hcwever,

reimbursements of both the short-term and operational loans, and the
long-term equipment and facilities loans probably will meet with greater
difficulties.

It is imperative, therefore, that the whole banking

functions be entrusted to SNCAAC, or some other superceeding agency as
soon as possible, and that the interested agricultural services restrict
their activities to the organizational, informational, management, and
those other phases of the program in which they are more likely to have
some competence.
A broader program of training local village personnel in management
activities should be started as soon as possible.

The objective should

be to allow local personnel to assume cooperative management functions
rather than having government functionaires from Saigon and other cities
perform them.

This would bring about better response and a sense of

belonging to the' associations on the part of farmers, because it is more
likely that they would cease to look upon the managers as strangers
and upon the organizations as being foreign to their interests.
Greater efforts by the Agriculture Service should be made in
educating l’ural people in the principles of cooperation, and the pro
motion of cooperatives should be given greater emphasis.
Definite and concerted action should be taken to effectuate close
and continued supervision and control of farmer associations organized

and financed with government funds and facilities.

Great caution

must be exercised to prevent repetition of the situation that almost
destroyed the Tobacco Farmei^s Cooperative in Central Vietnam during
1953.
Government authorities concerned should put all emphasis possible
toward creating and maintaining strong and amicable relationships
among cooperative members, and between members and the management and
the Agricultural Service.

CHAPTER X
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT
The continuous need for agricultural credit of all types and the
frequent lack of it have been the major factors responsible for the
slow progress in agricultural development in Indochina.

Inadequate

credit facilities and capital is not restricted to agricultural enter
prises, however, and there is a large place in Indochina*s economy for
all forms of credit.

Robequain, for example, is of the opinion that

healthy credit distribution may be called essential to the country*s
life and a condition of its growth.
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Lacking both foresight and capital the average farmer in Indochina
often borrows both the seeds and the draft animals necessary to produce
his crops.

During bad crop years the farmer must also find the funds

■with which to pay his taxes and fulfill his religious and family duties.
A moneylender will readily advance a loan, but on very harsh terms.
The debt will be repaid with difficulty, most often at the cost of
mortgaging the harvest and even the land.
The rates of interest are usually very high, and credit at usurious
rates of interest for commodities which are used by the majority of the
native population is clear indication of an impoverished population
living on the edge of its means and often a little beyond.

It is not

unusual, for example, for interest rates to run as high as 40 percent

9^Robequain, op. cit., p. 168.
2S4
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per annum; and in the case of small loans, rates may even reach 10 or
12 percent per month or up to 140 percent per year.

Domestic savings

are insufficient for credit needs, and the Chinese and Indian money
lenders provide the funds for a very large part of the loans.
Every year the rice millers and Chinese exporters in the SaigonCholon market make loans in order to finance the rice harvest which is
the cornerstone of their business.

Furthermore, professional bankers

from China and India have long specialized in this type of business.
In every case, the loans agreed upon are personal credits whose repay
ment involves a good deal of risk.

This explains in part the high

rates of interest which seem exhorbitant at first sight.
One cannot escape the conclusion that one of the major elements
of agrarian reforms needed in Indochina is the provision of cheap
credit for the peasant.

Whether or not he owns the land he cultivates,

the Indochinese peasant is generally in debt and, because of usurious
rates of interest charged, he invariably finds it very difficult to
extricate himself from this position.
Traditional Sources

In the case of landless farm families the landlord is the main
source of credit.

He furnishes the needed capital and rice to the tenant

cultivator— who is almost always devoid of cash— at a rate which fre
quently reaches 100 percent per year, and rates of 120 percent are not
unheard of.
In Indochina the landlord-moneylender is the worst influence on
the general agricultural development.

The landlords, in many cases,
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depend more on the interest they receive from the loans they grant to
their tenants than on the output from their rice lands.

This explains

why owners of large estates often prefer to divide their land into
small farms and lease them to landless peasants for traditional,
primitive cultivation.

Gourou emphasizes that usury is the surest and

most economical means of rounding out a domain, that the debtors with
a status similar to servitude often seek escape in flight, and that
indebtedness on this scale destroys stability and reduces the intensity
of land use.
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Certainly a system of land utilization based on money

interest and not on agricultural production must finally reduce the
productivity of the entire economy.
In normal times it appears that in the rural areas of Indochina
everyone borrows and almost everyone is at the same time a lender of
funds.

Enrich Jacoby cites a report from a former French colonial

administrator in South Vietnam in which the situation was stated as
follows s
"There is no one who is neither borrower nor lender.
The tenant (tadien) borrows from his landlord, the latter,
if need arises, from the large capitalist; the coolie will
establish credit with his foreman; the latter with his
employer; the fisherman with the fisheries contractors;
the small trader with the large merchant. Those with an
independent calling, artisans and officials, contract with
the Chinese merchant or with the usurer."93
To relate the conditions in 'Cambodia, Jacoby refers to a statement

9/i
by Gourou7H- who states that even in that state where conditions are
92
Pierre Gourou, Land Utilization in Indochina, pp. 345-347.
Jacoby, op. cit., p. 14S.

9/*Ibid, p. 49I Gourou, pp. cit.« pp. 386-387.
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generally more favorable, the absence of equitable credit institutions
has rendered a tempting opportunity for exploitation of the native
farmers.

The Chinese trader generally takes a rate of interest of

100 percent for a six to eight-months loan.

If the peasant does not

repay on time, the Chinese creditor takes the whole (surplus) of the
harvest himself, pays the taxes, and reduces the peasant to a form of
peonage.
Jacoby is of the opinion that though the French authorities recog
nized very well the oppressed position of the heavily indebted peasants,
they still fought usury mainly by legal measures and, therefore, without
success.

Where they tried to combat it indirectly by providing credit

at moderate rates, they also failed because they did not reach the
qc
level of the most urgent need for money. 77
French Efforts
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As soon as trade relations were established between France and
the Indochinese colonies at the end of the nineteenth century, the
National Bank of France established a branch office in the country,
and soon afterward other large French banks helped organize the Bank
of Indochina which was endowed with the right to issue currency

95
^Gourou, op. cit., p. 149.
96Most of the information pertaining to the history and develop
ment of agricultural credit in Indochina was obtained from the archives
and records of the former Office de Credit Populaire. Those records
are on file in the Vietnamese and Cambodian Ministries of Agriculture
and National Economy. A very concise presentation is contained in an
unpublished report by H. A. C. Moreau, formerly General Director of the
Office de Credit Populaire, entitled Agricultural Credit and Cooperation
in Indochina. This report is on file in the Economic Section of the
Haut Commissariat de France en Indochine in Saigon.
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throughout the three states.

By the beginning of the twentieth century

a portion of the funds created by the issuance of bank notes was ear
marked for agricultural loans.

However, not much progress was made

by the issuing bank in this field.

Agricultural loans never did conform

to the issuing banks’ need for liquid funds.

Moreover, they operated

counter to tradition and aroused the natives' distrust.

As a result,

the distribution of credits from this central bank to the native farmers
has never reached large proportions and credit to peasant farmers con
tinued to be obtained from traditional sources.

In fact, Robequain

reports that it should not be assumed that the introduction of European
credit methods, based on taking real guarantees, such as pledges,
securities and mortgages, and the relative abundance of money resulting
from French capital imports, caused the rapid disappearance of usuxy
in Indochina.
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For a long time there have been two types of credit in Indochina,
one adopted to the natives' mentality and customs, and the other to
European business firms in their relations with each other and with
the home country.

One is extended by traditional usurers and the other

by specialized European organizations, both operating in distinct
spheres.
Mutual Loan Associations:
In 1913 mutual loan associations were organized in South Vietnam
which landholders could join by subscribing a ten piaster share.

Their

purpose was to facilitate the granting of loans on as easy terms as

^Robequain, op. cit., p. 168.

possible by increasing the borrower’s credit.

In practice, these

mutual loan associations were merely a convenient way to extend the
issuing bank’s cheap credit policy to European agricultural interests.
Beginning in 1923* private capital flowing in from France began to turn
toward rice cultivation.

Banks already established in Indochina were

paralleled by land banks.

However, while the mutual loan associations

had specialized in small loans to medium landholders, the new companies
granted much larger sums.

In theory their loans were guaranteed by

first mortgages often endorsed by well-known large and solvent land
owners.

The amount of money loaned by these land banks rose rapidly

and their operations were considered a success from the standpoint of
amount of business transacted until 1930.

But the activities of these

organizations never did extend much beyond South Vietnam primarily
because of the fact that this system of credit required the existence
of rice cultivators owning a few assets, and therefore it was inap
plicable in North and Central Vietnam where the people were almost
without resources and the estates unorganized.
Credit Populaire Agricole:
In 1927 the French authorities in Indochina ordered the creation
of the Credit Populaire Agricole in those regions of the country where
the land banks were not functioning.

The Bank of Indochina was required,

under government guarantee, to respond to requests for loans made by
the Credit Populaire.

Native rice farmers were eligible for loans from

the local banks or offices of the Credit Populaire but first mortgages
on real estate served as the primary guarantee.
With the general depression that followed in 1932 the loans made
by the newly-organized Credit Populaire were repaid under rather
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unfavorable conditions for, in most cases, the rice cultivators had to
settle their debts first with their most exacting creditors.

In most

instances, therefore, the Chinese and Indian bankers and moneylenders
were repaid before the government lending institution.

In 1932, 70

percent of the loans were still outstanding, and it became necessary
for the government to settle the frozen liabilities of the Agricultural
Banks by creating a Central Mutual Credit Bank (Caisse Centrals de
Credit Mutuel) which was further endowed with capital by the government
and which received a portion of the annual dues of the Bank of Indochina.
Even after absorbing some of the disastrous immediate effects of
the depression, there still remained the serious problem of the heavy
debt load of rice farmers.

Agricultural indebtedness is widespread

in most countries during depressions.

Since agricultural prices are

always more affected by depressions than are the prices of manufactured
goods, it is usually difficult for farmers to meet payment of debts
contracted during prosperous years.
situation.

There are two remedies for this

The first one adopted in the United States consists in

inflating the prices of agricultural commodities by devaluating the
currency; the other, preferred by the government of Indochina during
the last depression, consists in attacking the problem more directly
by obtaining a reduction or adjustment in the debt of the agricultural
sector of the population.

Undoubtedly this solution, though probably

more equitable and direct, i3 harder to put into practice because of
the fact that creditors, feeling dispossessed of their capital and
assets, will oppose it vehemently.
In order to avoid the brutal dispossession of the indebted land
owners which could only result in further disruption in the rice

economy, the government of Indochina in 1932 created an office for
long-term land loans.

Its purpose was to build a framework of friendly

adjustments between creditor and debtor, and the main job was to induce
creditors to give up their claim to that portion of the loan that had
been wiped out by the devaluation of the security through falling prices;
in return the government would then repay the balance to the creditors.
The debtors then owed the full amount of their debts to the government
under the new arrangement.

Robequain is of the opinion that Chinese

bankers were not greatly affected by the depression insofar as recovering
their loans was concerned since those specializing in short-term loans
were successful in most instances in recovering their entire loans
without resorting to the land loan office.
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However, the fact still

remains that most of the loans outstanding on the books of the various
government-financed lending organizations were adjusted in the manner
prescribed by the land loan office.

According to Robequain, as a

result devaluation of capital averaged 47 percent, and interest rates
were reduced by 75 percent on the average.
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Parallel with the activities of the land loan office were the
reorganizations initiated by the various Indochinese agricultural
credit groups.

From 1933 on the land banks largely gave up long-term

credit operations, limiting themselves to the management of their
securities and real estate and entrusting the handling of their old
loans to the Mortgage Credit Company of Indochina.

As for agricultural

credit, the Central Bank, created in 1932 in order to liquidate the

98

7 Robequain, op. cit., p. 175*

99ibid.
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liabilities of the Mutual Agricultural Credit Associations, became
responsible for all the bills which the Bank of Indochina had discounted
to these institutions*
Credit Agricole Mutuel:
In 1933 a central supervising body, the Mutual Agricultural Credit
Office (Office Indochinois du Credit Agricole Mutuel), was organized to
coordinate the activities of the credit organizations.

The system

comprised a communal bank, provincial banks, and a central fund.

This

government lending agency received the "right and privilege" of granting
short-term production loans to farmers, and was the first attempt by
the government of Indochina to enter directly into the field of agri
cultural credit.

This government agricultural credit organization was

financed by the government with funds provided through the Tresorerie
Generale de L ’Indochine, and was under the close supervision and control
of the French High Commissioner General for Indochina.
Subsequent decrees established in 1940, 1944, and again in 1950
revised substantially the regulations governing the organization and
gave it more financial autonomy.

The lending activities were administered

through provincial offices (Caisses Provenciales) which were formed
throughout Indochina.

In January, 1944 there were a total of 46 provincial

lending offices in Vietnam alone (16 in Tonkin, 11 in Annam and 19 in
Cochinchina) and 8 in Cambodia.
Internal war activities disrupted both the agricultural economy
of the country and the operations of the provincial loan offices and
as a result the lending operations came to an end.

By the end of 1944

only one provincial office, or bank, remained open in Vietnam (in
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Hadong) but this office had ceased lending operations.

In Camboida

the organization survived in name, and when Cambodia received its
share of the liquidated assets in 1951* lending operations were resumed
in that state through eight provincial banks.
Inadequacy of the System —

Reasons for Failure

The French attempted to improve the debtor position of the Indo
chinese peasant in two ways:

(l) by establishing a reasonable legal

rate of interest for private loans and otherwise restricting the flagrant
practices of the native moneylenders 5 and (2) by promoting semi-official
credit organizations to provide loans at moderate rates of interest.

A

decree of 1926 limited imprisonment for debt to cases where the debtor
had obviously acted in bad faith.

Another decree passed in 1934

restricted the annual legal interest rate to five percent and the
maximum rate, by agreement, to eight percent.

To close the loopholes

in this law, another decree in 1936 stipulated that private loan con
tracts and transactions required official supervision and approval.
Subsequent legislation provided for the recovery of interest charged
at an illegal rate and set penalties for lenders who violated the loan
laws.
Notwithstanding the laws passed by the government setting forth
certain legal limitations on lending practices and the activities of
the European lending groups, the Chinese and Indian lending and banking
business never was greatly hampered, nor their activities materially
diminished.

Legal restrictions on lending operations remained on the

statute books but were never enforced by the authorities nor adhered
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to by the moneylenders.

Far from interfering, the different types of

credit in fact dovetailed with each other.

Frequently, the Chinese

and Indian moneylenders continued to grant loans without any security
whatsoever or only on the margin left between the value of the security
and the amount advanced against it by the European banks.

According to

Robequain, sometimes an Indochinese landowner could turn to the
Agricultural Credit Funds for money which he would subsequently reloan
to his fellow citizens on much more stringent terms.
The various credit institutions in the different parts of Indochina
were all initiated by the government and have all been based more on
government guarantee rather than on their own resources.

The frequent

losses that occurred were generally supported by the bank of issue.
It is true that in those areas of the country where property rights
were cleared by a more efficient surveying system, a sounder agricultural
credit system was in operation for some years, but even there loans
could be granted only on the condition that land be put up as security.
Under such conditions, the credit activities of those institutions
could hardly reach the level of the tenants most in need of credit.
Jacoby is of the opinion that certainly those institutions were
instrumental in financing the extension of rice cultivation on the new
rice lands of South Vietnam, but, at the same time, they also fostered
the process of land concentration.

In addition, these institutions

gave the landlords the opportunity to lend to distressed tenants and
small, farmers, at exhorbitant rates of interest, the money they had

■^Robequain, op. cit.. p. 171.
101Jacoby,

o ]d .

cit. . p. 149.
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borrowed at cheap rates.

Generally speaking, the credit system in

Indochina did not ease the situation, but actually aggravated it by
increasing the tenant farmer*s need for credit.
The excessive dependence on the government of the various insti
tutions, the large discrepancy between the capital available and the
loans made, and especially the inability of the system to reach the
small tenant farmers were the major weaknesses of the French credit
system.

This system, though often called a mutual agricultural credit

system, was actually based not on mutual aid but exclusively on govern
ment funds and guarantees.

It was not a cooperative enterprise as no

joint risk was involved, and consequently no cooperative spirit could
be developed.

Since small farmers were not in a position to refund a

loan because they could not save enough money to do so, the government
had to come to the rescue, and therefore government control, instead
of mutual supervision, dominated the credit system.

Jacoby quotes a

former French Governor-General of Indochina as having illustrated the
defect of the credit system in the following manner.

102

"If only the loans had been granted directly to the
needy nahque (small owner-cultivators) or the povertystricken tadien (sharecroppers). The depressing fact is
that the credit facilities so far granted have had no
psychological or economic effects. It has indeed proved
almost impossible to bring these advances within the reach
of the small farmer, the tadien or the nahque. except through
the large or medium-scale landowners ....... All the efforts
made by my administrative officers to improve the situation
of these poor people are therefore brought to naughtj any
attempt to lower the cost of production of rice by reducing
the interest of loans is doomed to failure in advance. The
large and medium-scale landowners charge a tremendous com
mission, equal to the difference between the interest

102
Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 150-151.
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charged on loans by the rural funds and the rates at which
they lend money directly or which they charge for standing
security. Their malfeasant influence prevents any direct
contact between the authorities and the rural masses."
Thus has been the helpless state of dependency of the rural peasants
of Indochina for agricultural loans of any kind.

For years they have

been forced to approach the landlord or moneylender for advances, and
always they have had to be at the disposal of their masters for laboring
services of any kind; always indebted, they have had little chance
ever to repay the loans, and the accumulated interest did not take very
long to multiply the capital debt.
Inadequacy of the System:
An idea of the inadequacy of the agricultural credit system in
Indochina in meeting the needs of farmers is obtained by analyzing the
operations of the provincial offices of the Office de Credit Populaire
during the peak of activities at the beginning of 1944.

These local

or provincial loan offices were organized for the most part by private
individuals and companies or loan societies who made some token con
tribution to the working capital.

However, the greatest part of the

capital consisted of government loans to those organizations and private
contributions of capital was very small compared with the total amount
of money loaned.

The total amount of subscribed capital in all of the

54 provincial offices in operation in Indochina at the beginning of

1944 was only 652,325 piasters— contributed by 237,382 shareholders.
However, the total capital in short, medium and long-term loans out
standing amounted to 7,220,184 piasters— a capita 1-to-loan ratio of
ten to one.

Also, at the beginning of 1944 there were 94,941 individual

borrowers, of which 94,184 had contracted short-term loans averaging 63
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piasters.

In addition, a total of 789 individuals had contracted

medium-term loans averaging 1,300 piasters each, and four borrowers
had received long-term loans totalling 253*000 piasters, or an average
of 63,222 piasters per loan.

(The official rate of the Indochinese

piaster in 1944 was 20 piasters to the United States dollar.)
When considering the total amount of money in loans outstanding
and the total number of individual loans granted, it is quite evident
that the lending activities of the Office de Credit Populaire. even
at the peak of activities, was woefully small in comparison to the
agricultural credit needs of a country where there are more than three
million farm families, the great majority of which are in perpetual
need of credit.
The original Agricultural Credit Office was established for the
purpose of granting loans only to Europeans.

However, a revision in

the regulations in June, 1940 gave the organization the authority to
grant loans to Indochinese farmers also.

According to the Interior

Regulations, the Office de Credit Populaire was free to grant short
term loans to individual farmers with only the growing crop and the
borrower's integrity as security.

This was in principle, but in

practice all loans— short, medium and long-term— were made on the basis
of mortgage security, i.e., the pledging of land.

In the case of loans

to cooperatives, syndicates or villages, the pledging of physical
assets was required as security.
More than 99 percent of the short-term loans were made in North
and Central Vietnam and in Cambodia, whereas about 85 percent of the
medium-term and all of the long-term loans were made in South Vietnam.

The reason for this, as explained to the writer by a former French
general manager of the national office, was that in South Vietnam,
an area of large landowners, the borrowers for the most part were
owners of large tracts of land who employed large numbers of tenants
to cultivate their lands.

The inference was that these borrowers

utilized this borrowed capital in sub-lending it to their tenants at
higher rates of interest.

The reason that the amount of the average

loan granted by the organization in South Vietnam was very much larger
than the average loan granted in other parts of the country was because
agricultural holdings in South Vietnam were very much more extensive.
It was common knowledge that, especially in South Vietnam, a very large
portion of the medium-term loans were used by landowner borrowers to
grant seasonal loans to their tenant farmers who were ineligible them
selves to obtain loans from the Provincial loan offices.

It is known

also that there usually was a tremendous difference between the six
percent per year interest paid by the landowner for the credit obtained
at the loan office and the rate of interest paid by his tenants for the
use of this same money.
Large landowners in Vietnam entrusted their farming operations to
managers, supervisors and "farmer-generals", and, having no trust in
their tenants, they lent money to these managers who in turn sub-lent
it to the tenants on short-term rates reaching as high as twenty percent
per month.

This was the same money originally obtained by the landowner

at the loan office at rates of one percent per month for short-term
loans and an average of six percent per year for medium-term loans.
The only conclusions to be reached from this sort of financing operation
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is that this practice was as bad or worse than the usurious practices
of the moneylenders and merchants that have been going on in Indochina
for centuries.
Therefore, notwithstanding the efforts of the French Administration
in the field of agricultural credit, the debtor position of the poor
peasant farmer has not improved appreciably, and most of the agricultural
loans are still made by the traditional Chinese and Indian moneylenders
and merchants and large landowners under very unfavorable terms to
borrowers.

Perhaps the major fault with agricultural credit as it has

been organized in Indochina is that it has not been really a mutual
undertaking based on traditional forms of cooperatives.

The banks or

societies administering loans always have been almost exclusively
dependent on the government which guaranteed the loans, with the result
that the amount of credit extended greatly exceeded the capital on hand.
Furthermore, the loans have seldom, if ever, reached the peasant directly,
but passed through one or more intermediares, increasing in interest
rates at every stage, before reaching those greatest in need of the money.
History of the Organization and Activities of
Agricultural Credit Agencies
In order to understand more fully the reasons for the complex
state of affairs of agricultural credit in Indochina, it appears ap
propriate to give a rather detailed examination of the operation of the
various governmental and quasi-govemmental organizations since the
inception of organized credit agencies.

It should be kept in mind

that, along with extending agricultural credit of various types to
individuals, most lending institutions established under French
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administration were also set up to grant loans to associations or groups
of individuals, or cooperatives.

For this reason, it is often difficult

to make the clear distinction between the individual agricultural credit
sector and the cooperative credit operations.
The first semblence of an organized credit association was established
in Cochinchina in 1915 when a French Chief of Province helped organize a
few persons into the Societe Indigene de Credit Agricole Mutuel (Native
Society of Mutual Agricultural Credit), most commonly referred to under
its initials of SICAM.

It was not until 1927, however, that the Banoues

Provinciales de Credit Agricole Populaire (Provincial Agricultural
Credit Banks) were created in the other sections of the country.

The

SICAM in Cochinchina on the other hand continued to operate until 1939
at which time it was absorbed by the federated credit organization
known as the Office de Credit Populaire.
Agricultural Credit to Individuals in Cochinchina:
1.

SICAM: Following the organization of the first native society

of mutual agricultural credit in 1915, other organizations affiliated
with it followed suit and by 1930 there-was an organization in each of
the 20 provinces in Cochinchina.

However, the amount of capital sub

scribed by the membership of these organizations was very small (266,000
piasters by some 14,000 members in 1930) and it was never sufficient to
support the amount of money in loans with the result that the Bank of
Indochina was called upon to guarantee the loans through a system of
discounting the indebtedness of the provincial associations.
Loans granted to the members carried interest at a rate of ten
percent per year; the provincial offices paid eight percent to the Bank
of Indochina and the remaining two percent was utilized to pay
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administration costs and to create a reserve fund (which amounted to
slightly more than one million piasters in 1930).

The Bank of Indochina,

on the other hand returned two percent to the local governments in
compensation for the efforts made toward helping in the operation of
the local or provincial loan offices.
The accounting controls of operations were made by inspectors of
the Bank of Indochina.

Administrative controls were exercised by the

Chief Inspector of Political and Administrative Affairs who also held
the portfolio of Inspector-General of Agricultural Credit.
The lending operations of those provincial organizations appeared
satisfactory until the economic crisis of 1930, when, following a sharp
decline in rice prices, not one of them was able to reimburse the funds
borrowed from the Bank of Indochina, with the result that a total of 12
million piasters was lost by the Central Bank.

Following several govern

mental investigations it was concluded that the provincial associations
had been too liberal with their loans and that numerous abuses had been
committed, such as:

(l) granting of large sums of money loans to members

of the Board of Directors and to large landownersj (2) renewing loans in
arrears for no valid reason (for example, in 1929, the year of highest
rice prices, the value of loans renewed amounted to about six million
piasters compared to only 3.4 million piasters of loans repaid)5 and
(3 ) utilization of borrowed funds to pay for sundry expenses and for
non-agricultural purposes.
However, what was probably worse, it was established by government
investigators that the SICAM had not attained the social goals proposed
by the organizers— such as making it easier for peasant farmers to
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purchase and own land, and improving the living standard of the agri
cultural working class by granting loans to tenant farmers and small
owner-cultivators.

On the contrary, investigators reported that SICAM

had helped the large and medium landowners to improve their privileged
position among the rural masses.
The most that can be said is that the greater portion of the credit
granted made some contribution toward the expansion of rice cultivation
in the Transpassac area and that it had some small influence in reducing
i

the amount of money loaned by the Chinese and Indian moneylenders (out
of a total estimated agricultural debt of 50 million piasters in
Cochinchina in 1930 the Credit Agricole furnished about U
piasters).

million

So far as the spirit of mutuality was concerned, it. was

non-existent.
Table 25 gives an indication of the operation of those organizations
from 1924 to 1930.
Table 25.

i
ii

Lending Operations of the Mutual Agricultural Credit Societies
of Cochinchina from 1924-30

«
4»

Year

New

:

Amount of loans (in niasters)
Reimbursed
:: Renewed loans

:

Loans unpaid

1924

1,129,395

843,525

1,177,556

66,520

1925

1,717,925

1 ,121,530

1,730,103

100,048

1926

2,134,165

1,768,770

--------

113,890

1927

3,121,140

1,758,950

2 ,428,060

277,086

1923

5,325,803

2,352,360

3,499,684

234,401

1929

6,195,342

3,444,912

5,967,167

336,475

1930

3,154,067

3,854,628

7,268,965

852,279
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It has already been noted that in order to avoid complete insolvency
of the organizations, the government decided to take certain definite
measures, such as: administrative pressure, reduction in the interest
charges from ten to eight percent, cancel overdue interest to debtors
who paid their loans, purchase by the local governments of lands
belonging to borrowers, etc.

In 1932 the granting of new loans was

suspended and that same year a new government organization (the Caisse
Centrale de Credit Agiicole de Cochinchine) was established to centralize
and control and activities.

The SICAM* s activities were progressively

taken over by the Office de Credit Populaire of Indochina beginning in
1939, and, in 1944, the central office was dissolved completely.
2.

Provincial Mutual Agricultural Credit Banks of Cochinchina:

The transformation of the SICAMs into Provincial Banks under the control
of the Popular Credit Office was begun in 1939 and continued until 1943,
when a total of 19 such banks had been established.

However, this

transformation process was accomplished only with some difficulties.
To begin with, the former managers of the provincial offices were very
reluctant to see the societies which they had formed and managed without
much outside control and supervision suddenly become affiliated with,
and controlled by, a central office located in the country’s capitol city.
Contrary to the system of operation of the SICAMs, the new banks
directed their efforts toward granting loans to small farmers rather than
large landowners.

Each bank was under close supervision of special

government controllers who were instructed to make sure that:

(l) loans

granted were utilized in conformity with the stated purposes as declared
by the borrowers, (2) the amount and duration of the loans was designed
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to meet these declared purposes, and (3 ) those loans granted to land
owners were not utilized by those borrowers to purchase new estates or
for purposes of usury.
the charter were:

The primary aims of those banks as stated in

(l) to facilitate the granting of loans to landless

farm families, and small and medium owner-cultivators; (2) simplify the
procedures required in granting loans; and (3 ) help guide borrowers
in the choice of loans to contract more in line with their needs (long,
medium, or short-term).

Whatever the good intentions of the government

in creating the new banks, however, the results obtained during their
six-year period of life, was very disappointing as is shown by Table 26.
Table 26.

Year

Number and Amount of Loans Made by the Provincial Mutual
Agricultural Credit Banks of Cochinchina, 1939-45

:
Short-term
: Number : Amount

:
Medium-term
: Number : Amount

•
•

: Number

(piasters)

(piasters)

Total
:
Amount
(piasters)

1939

1

80

1

5,000

2

5,080

1940

80

81,865

69

62,655

149

144,520

1941

82

19,900

201

200,435

283

220,335

1942

42

23,670

137

124,310

179

147,980

1943

28

25,410

364

596,260

393 •

621,670

1944

157

186,355

677

927,585

834

1,113,940

1945

150

231,835

154

210,155

304

441,990

Government reports of the activities and results of these banks
cite the following reasons for the relatively insignificant progress
made by these banks:

(l) the new institution was too young; (2) the

consequences resulting from the bankrupcy of the SICAM created very
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unfavorable conditions in which the new institution was called upon
to progress; (3) lack of available credit from the Popular Credit
Office, especially after 1942; and (4) lack of qualified management
personnel among the natives whose technical competance was very low.
The destruction which followed the Japanese Army defeat in 1945
and the rebel activities immediately afterward threw the operation of
the banks into confusion.

Most of the native staff deserted, the

records were destroyed, safes and vaults opened and plundered and
most of the buildings burned and destroyed.

A few banks attempted to

resume operations after the "coup de grace" but their efforts were
directed mainly toward recovering loans.

However, recovery efforts

were poor because most borrowers played the game of intentional
abstention with the hope that their debts to the banks would either
be postponed or eventually forgotten altogether.
3.

Loans from the Provisory Coordination Commission for Rice

Production— (COMIRIC): In an attempt to help reactivate economic
activity in the Transbassac area and encourage resumption of rice
cultivation the French government of Cochinchina created this special
commission designed to grant short-term loans to French or Indochinese
rice planters at an annual interest rate of 5 percent, and to furnish
rice production items at cost to borrowers.
from two sources:

The loan fund was obtained

(l) from the Popular Credit Office which had bor

rowed six million piasters from the Bank of Indochina for this purpose,
which bank in turn received a guarantee from the French High Commissioner^
General and who, in turn, received a piaster guarantee from the Government
of Cochinchina (a very irregular and roundabout operation indeed and
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contrary to the statutes of the Popular Credit Office); and (2) from a
direct grant of 350,000 piasters by the Government of Cochinchina.

The

only guarantee requested from those receiving loans from this commission
■was a written promise to repay the loan out of the proceeds from the
1946-47 rice crop.
ing.

As was to be expected, results were very disappoint

Corrupt practices in granting and receiving loans were widespread.

Funds received were not applied to the stated purpose of rice cultivation
and, worst of all, most of the commodities purchased at cost from the
commission were resold by the recipients on the black market then
flourishing in the country.

Fortunately such operations were stopped

after one year but not before some 3 »& million piasters had been granted
on loans.
Mutual Agricultural Credit in Cambodia. Annam and Tonkin:
The history of organized agricultural credit in these three states
consists primarily of the activities of the Popular Credit Office and
the following three organizations which were actually affiliated with it,
namely:

Popular Credit Service for Agriculture (1927-1933)j Mutual

Agricultural Credit Office of Indochina(1933-1940); and MutualAgri
cultural and Artisanal Credit Office of Indochina (1940-1942).
These three state organizations were given the responsibility of
managing and distributing certain funds put at their disposal to agri
cultural cultivators1 societies and handicraft groups, as well as
controlling and coordinating the actions of those societies to which
government funds were loaned.
1.

Popular Credit Office (Office de Credit Populaire):

The

financial resources put at the disposal of the Popular Credit Office
during the period of 1927 to 1933 amounted to 4*4 million piasters.

Part of this consisted of a loan granted by the Office of Retired
Government Officials but the majority was obtained from credit granted
by the Bank of Indochina.

In 1931 this credit institution received

further grants of aid from two additional sources:

(l) a share of the

charges paid by the Bank of Indochina to the government for the right
and privilege of issuing bank notes as the government Bank of Issue,
and (2) a special grant from the general government budget.

At the

end of 1949 the convention relative to the transfer of the Popular
Credit Office was signed and each state received its share of the
assets.

The financial resources of the organization were as follows:
piasters

From shares paid by the Bank of I n d o c h i n a ..............

9,813,000

Special grants from the General Budget

12.029.000

Total grants

.................

...................................

21,842,000

Loan from the

Bank of I n d o c h i n a ........................

25,000,000

Loan from the

Federal B u d g e t ..........................

1,029,000

Loan from the

general b u d g e t ..........................

1.100.000

Total loans.....................................

27,129,000

Total financial resources ........

48,971,000

. . . . . .

The above figures are obtained from the archives and records of
the organization, and the 48.97 million figure is underlined in French
financial terminology as total financial resources (total general des
ressources).

The balance sheet on the date of transfer at the end of

1949, however, shows that the assets "owned" by the organization
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(capital, reserves, and deposits) amounted to only 7.3 million piasters.
This serves to point out the extraordinary large percentage of ''outside
financing” in the history of all agricultural credit organizations in
Indochina.
2.
Tonkin:

Provincial Mutual Agricultural Credit Office for Annam and
The first such credit office was established in 1927 in the

Province of Hadong in Tonkin.

In 1933 the name of this credit institu

tion was changed to the Indochinese Agricultural Credit Offices and by
March, 1945* when the Japanese Army made its celebrated attack, a total
of 27 provincial loan offices were in existence.

Within each province

were a few local village loan committees whose radius of lending
activities was limited to the territory surrounding the village.
These village offices were under the management of village notables
and the village mayor whose primary duties consisted of receiving loan
applications from neighboring farmers, verify the information given on
the loan application by the hopeful borrower and make recommendations
for approval to the provincial office.

Provincial offices were under

the management of a Frenchman who himself re-verified the loan applica
tions before submitting the documents to the Board of Directors for
final action.

Decisions to grant or not to grant a loan and the amount

of funds loaned to a farmer were supposedly based upon the value of
the land given as security for the loan.

The funds were remitted from

hand to hand down the echelon of management until they reached the hand
of the borrowing farmer.

This roundabout process of granting loans

resulted in many delays— often taking months before a loan applicant
would receive the funds— and the personnel, time and cost involved
were enormous.
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Special committees were appointed in each province whose main
duties were (l) to register the potential borrowers* property in the
provincial land registiy (at that time no land registry service existed),
and (2) supposedly, to make it possible for cultivators to have some
representation in the distribution of the available loan funds through
their local notables.
This institution was very ineffective in bringing needed credit
into the hands of the masses of the people; in the first place, because
only those who had clear title to property could qualify for a loan
and, secondly, many local committees took advantage of their position
and falsified the documents to get loans for their own benefit or to
grant loans to their friends and relatives.

3.

Mutual Agricultural Credit in Cambodia: The first mutual

agricultural credit office in Cambodia was established in the province
of Svay Reing in 1927, and by 1939, when the mutual credit offices
were absorbed by the Office de Credit Populaire, there were a total of
eight such offices in existence.
In the case of the Cambodian loan offices the French authorities
requested that the formalities required in granting loans in Vietnam
be dispensed with for the following reasons:

(l) the mentality and

peculiar characteristics of the average Cambodian farmer, his lack of
individuality, and his very effective integration into the life of the
local village; (2) the relative insecurity of land ownership and title
to the land under the government land appropriation system; and (3)
the great influence of Cambodian government authorities on the life of
the average farm family.

For these reasons the French authorities
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decided to trust the management of the provincial loan offices to the
provincial governors who were to be assisted by native Cambodian
provincial officials, with the management being only responsible for
correct accounting procedures, loans payment and reimbursement.

Loans

granted were secured by having the village mayor countersign each loan
and thus resulting in obtaining what amounted to a collective guarantee.
Although it is reported that the first year of operation showed
relatively satisfactory results from the standpoint of the amount of
money loaned and the loan repayment rate, successive inspections showed
that native provincial authorities in many cases turned the system for
their own benefit through such tactics as falsifying the entries in the
loan account books, establishing non-existency borrowers and direct
appropriating of funds for their own use.

Such abuses by Cambodian

personnel resulted in the system being discarded in favor of the one
used in Annam and Tonkin.

Table 27 gives an indication of the extent

of operations of the agricultural credit offices in all three states of
Cambodia, Tonkin and Annam.
The effects of the depression and decreased rice prices in 1931
are evident by the reduction in the amount of new loans granted in
1932, and the loan reimbursement figures.

The creation of eleven new

provincial offices in 1933 was possible only through redistribution
of the available capital and reducing the average size of new loans.
In 1935 a program of "loan reclassification" was carried out and interest
payments on a total of 1 ,255,000 piasters of "uncertain" debts was
suspended.

At the same time these loans were refinanced under a two-to

five-year repayment plan.
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Table 27.

Extent of Operations of the Agricultural Credit Offices in
Cambodia, Annam and Tonkin, 1923-40

«
•
No. of
: Amount o f : Amount o f : Value of : Amount o f :
Loans in
reimr:
force at
Y e a r : provincial: paid in : deposits : new loans :
• offices
: caoital : received : granted : bursement: end of vear
-------

1923

6

21

1929

10

54

1930

13

69

1931

13

1932

Thousand piasters ------

350

70

280

2,047

703

1,624

210

3,330

1,890

3,114

116

289

1,553

1,072

3,600

24

143

426

568

1,140

3,607

1933

24

151

625

552

774

3,535

1934

24

162

506

567

815

3,137

1935

26

173

870

864

938

3,063

1936

26

180

1,070

1,133

1,081

3,115

1937

26

194

1,718

1,854

1,286

3,683

1933

27

207

2,072

1,321

1,752

3,252

1939

28

212

3,545

1,211

1,334

2,629

1940

30

251

4,305

2,760

1,888

3,501

Source:

—

Records of the Office de Credit Populaire.

Although all lending activities in Cambodia came to an end after
1932 and further operations consisted primarily of recovering past loans,
operations in Annam and Tonkin were resumed in 1935.

It is interesting

that the total amount of deposits received increased from 370,000
piasters in 1935 to over 4-3 million piasters in 1940.

In 1940 an

additional grant of funds amounting to 5.3 million piasters was made
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by the Central office to the provincial offices.

This sum, in addition

to funds of provincial offices (paid-in capital and reserves) of 1.1
million piasters, more than doubled the "finances" of the provincial
offices, which then consisted of 5.4 million piasters of deposits plus
other resources and the 5.8 million piaster grant from the Central
Office.
During the period 1938-1940, an exceedingly large portion of the
lending activities of the provincial offices in Tonkin and Annam con
sisted of loans to cooperatives— primarily to the rice-land improvement
and water control cooperative of Annam.

Table 28 indicates the amount

of money loaned to cooperatives by the provincial agricultural credit
offices in each of the three states of Annam, Tonkin and Cambodia.
Table 28,

Amount of Money Loaned by the Provincial Agricultural Credit
Offices to Cooperatives in Tonkin, Annam, and Cambodia in
1938, 1939 and 1940
Total

Annam

1938

274

656

1939

258

770

12

1,040

1940

213

836

44

1,094

Cambodia
1
1
1

On

0
cn

Source:

i

Tonkin

1
1
1
1
1
1

Year

Records of the Office de Credit Populaire.

Since all the records of the Office de Credit Populaire headquarters
in Hanoi for the years 1941 to 1944 were lost, it is not possible to give
a "balance sheet" statement for the operation of the provincial office
for those years.

The only records available relate to the balance of

accounts as of December 31, 1944, which were recovered from the general
archives of the Japanese occupation government.

This information is

contained in Table 29.

Table 29.

Balance of Accounts of Provincial Agricultural Credit Offices
as of December 31, 1944
Tonkin

Annam

Cambodia

Total

- Thousand piasters
Paid-in capital

266

152

60

498

Reserves

549

374

74

997

Deposits

5,720

4,040

2,296

12,056

Loans outstanding to individusal

2,768

2,069

669

5,706

696

2,462

424

3,582

9,999

9,097

3,743

22,639

Loans to cooperatives

Total

Source:

Records of the Office de Credit Populaire.

In comparing the year-end statement for 1944 with reliable data for
1940 the following conclusions can be drawn from an accounting standpoint
(l) deposit accounts were increased in important proportions— from 4*3
to 12.1 million piasters; (2) likewise, the amount in loans outstanding
also increased substantially— from 3*5 to 5»7 million during this fouryear period; (3) an improvement in the condition of the treasury of the
central office through a reduction of the amount in ,fbad or doubtful"
loans from 171.4 to 38.6 million piasters; and (4) an appreciable
increase in the amount of money loaned to cooperatives and/or "syndicated
associations" from 1.1 to 2.6 million piasters.

Thus, there was a new
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orientation in utilization of the loan fund, with loans to cooperatives
or syndicated associations comprising about 31 percent of the amount of
all loans granted— 5.7 million to individuals and 2.6 million to coopera
tives out of a total of S.3 million piasters.
Post-War Situation

The Japanese A m y "coup-de-grace" in 1945 and the rebellion by
Communists sympathizers which followed struck a severe blow to the
provincial loan offices in Vietnam.

Most of them were completely

disorganized, the personnel evacuated the rural areas either voluntarily
or by force, the records were destroyed, the safes and vaults were
robbed, and most of the buildings and other physical assets were burned.
As a result, only the office in the province of Hadong in Worth Vietnam
remained open in 1947* but the extent its lending operations was
negligible— amounting to only 400,000 piasters.
In Cambodia, on the contrary, the provincial offices suffered only
slight losses or damages and most of them continued in operation following
the armed activities of 1945.

The amount of money out on loans from the

Cambodian offices stood at 6.4 million piasters on December 31* 1949* the
date of the transfer of the popular credit office to each state, compared
with only 85*900 piasters at the end of 1944.

However, those figures can

be deceiving unless the tremendous amount of inflation that occurred
between 1944 and 1949 is taken into consideration.

Recent Developments

With France granting semi-independence to the three states of
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam in 1949* and the subsequent partitioning of
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the "assets" of the former Office de Credit Populaire to each state
individually, the problem of furnishing needed agricultural credit to
both individual farm families and farmer cooperatives became more
complicated than ever.

In order to continue to provide credit to

farmers, relationships now had to be established with three different
governments as well as with three government agricultural credit services.
It is under these complicated conditions that efforts were made to
encourage governmental authorities concerned to devise ways and means
of making credit available to peasant farmers at reasonable rates of
interest.

Since short-term production credit is most urgently needed

by the masses of farmers, it was felt that primary emphasis should be
placed on furnishing this type of credit.
Cambodia:
In Cambodia, fortunately, the Office de Credit Populaire had
continued to exist, although operating on a reduced scale.

At the

time of the transfer on December 31 * 1949 the original capital of the
national association consisting of contributions by the French Colonial
Government and loans from the Bank of Indochina was as follows:
From the French government

("detted administratives")

-21,304*337piasters

From the Bank of Indochina

("dettes privees") . . . .

-25.155.863piasters

Total capital

................................ - 46,460,200 piasters

Of this capital, the Cambodian

share on the date

of transfer was:

Government contributions - 6,705*424 piasters
Bank of Indochina loan

- 8.019.355 piasters

Total capital . . . - 14,724*779 piasters
Out of these assets transferred to Cambodia* a total of 6,327*93#
piasters represented long outstanding and unrecoverable loans inherited
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from the old Office de Credit Populaire.

Most of this amount represented

loans to the defunct SOCOFOR Cooperative (Societe Cooperative Forestierre).
The available capital "was subsequently increased by a five-million
piaster grant from the Cambodian government in 1951, a ten-million
piaster grant from the American aid fund in 1952 and another ten-million
piaster grant in 1955•
Under the present system, the National Cambodian Agricultural Credit
Service is a government organization administered by a Council of
Administration presided over by the Minister of National Economy.

The

General Director of the National Office is appointed by presidential
order and his authority to perform management functions are delegated to
him by the Council of Administration.

Provincial offices of the national

organization were established in ten of the fourteen provinces of
Cambodia by the end of 1955*
In the past, the Cambodian credit organization made long and mediumterm loans to cooperatives and farmers organizations, but had always
restricted its lending to individual farmers mostly to short-term crop
production loans.

Contrary to the situation in Vietnam, landless peasant

farmers are not a problem in Cambodia where the tillable land available
for cultivation is plentiful, where all land uncultivated for a period of
five years reverts back to the Crown, and where title to a piece of land
can be obtained by simply cultivating it for five consecutive years.
Requiring a mortgage on the borrower’s land does not, therefore, create
a hardship on the rural peasants as is the case in Vietnam.
Under the present regulations, provincial offices are allowed to
grant short-, medium- and long-tem loans to either individual farmers or
fanners cooperatives.

However, up to the present time individual loans
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to farmers have been of the short-term type only, and medium- and long
term loans have been granted only to cooperatives.

Pledging of owner

ship title to the land is a prerequisite to receiving individual loans.
In fact, the most common practice consists of the borrowing farmer
depositing with the organization for "safekeeping" his land title
papers at the time the loan is granted and getting those documents
back upon full repayment of the loan.

Real estate constitutes the

principal security for long-term loans to cooperatives, and fajro products
in storage and equipment usually serve as guarantee for short- and
medium-term loans.

Loans to farmer cooperatives by the national and

provincial loan offices are treated in detail in the previous chapter
on Agricultural Cooperatives.
Under the new system the operations of the credit organization
in the short-term individual credit sector has been fairly satisfactory,
with non-repayment of loans reduced to a minimum.

In 1953 a total of

48,000 Cambodian farm families received short-term loans from the govern
ment.

During the 1954-1955 crop year the additional grant of ten million

piasters from the American aid fund enabled the credit organization to
grant loans to 25,700 additional farmers—

making a total of 73,700

farmers benefitting from government-furnished individual crop production
loans.

These loans are reimbursable one month following the harvest of

the principal crop and carry interest rates of one percent per month.
Although the Cambodian government appears to be making progress in
its efforts to combat the usurious practices of moneylenders and merchants,
the amount of capital available to the National Agricultural Credit
Organization is insufficient to bring material benefits to the majority
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of peasant farmers.

It is estimated by Thoutch Thonni that over 75

percent of the 700,000 Cambodian farm families have an average
indebtedness of 1,000 piasters.
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This would represent an agrarian

indebtedness of over 500 million piasters per year, mostly to money
lenders and merchants.

The total capital available to the National

Credit Organization is only 39»7 million piasters which it has to
divide between short-term loans to individuals and medium- and long
term loans to cooperatives.

Therefore, a government credit program

affording credit benefits to less than 74*000 farmers falls far short
of meeting the credit needs of some 700,000 faim families.

The program

is inadequate not only from the fact that only slightly less than 10
percent of the farmers are able to receive loans but the amount of
capital available for loans is so limited that short-term loans granted
during the 1954-55 crop year averaged only about 400 piasters, or less
than 15 percent of the value of the land mortgaged as security.
The relatively favorable results obtained tinder the new system
is too insignificant to have any large-scale effects on economic well
being of the people.

In order to more effectively combat usury, broader

and more positive governmental action is needed.

Among the recommendations

for a more effective program are:
(1)

Increase the capital funds available to the provincial offices
for short and medium loans in order to reach a larger percentage
of the farmers with larger loans more in proportion to their
crop production needs.

103
^Report by Thoutch Thonni, Cambodian delegate to the Inter
national Conference on Agricultural and Cooperative Credit, Berkeley,
California, August 4 to September 12, 1952.
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(2)

Open loan offices in the remaining four provinces without such
offices, and establish sub-offices in each province so as to
reach those farmers living some distance from the provincial
centers where the main provincial offices are located.

(3)

Improve the functions of the Cadastral Service with the
objective of giving the credit organization officials more
accurate information on the land holdings and credit needs of
borrowers•

(4)

Undertake a broad program of farmer education and information
on the democratic principles of cooperation and promote the
expansion of farmers storage, sales and purchase cooperatives.

(5)

Expand, improve and coordinate the activities of the agricul
tural research and extension systems.

(6)

Promote private capital accumulation in the agricultural
sector of the economy by introducing a system of forced
capital savings on the part of individual borrowers and
the cooperative membership, designed to favor long-term
capital and economic improvements with less reliance on
government expenditures.

Vietnam:
During the fall of 1951 the Vietnamese government showed a greater
interest in granting short-term credit at reasonable rates of interest
to small owner-cultivators and landless peasants.

At first, responsible

government officials were insistent upon reorganizing the defunct Office
de Credit Populaire under approximately the same arrangements which
previously prevailed and utilizing the former provincial offices.

In

fact, one of the first propositions made by the Vietnamese was to
utilize whatever credits the American Aid Mission would put at their
disposal to retire the old debts of the Office de Credit Populaire,
This action would, of course, serve only useless purpose of repaying
the Vietnamese Treasury and the Bank of Indochina without resulting in
directly bringing credit into the hands of peasant families.
Finally, it was agreed to create a new, semi-autonomous organi
zation.

As originally established, this new government lending agency
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was to engage in multiple lending operations.

Specifically, it was

organized to utilize government funds placed at its disposal to grant:
(l)

short-term crop production loans to both small landowners and

landless peasants; (2) medium-term farm improvement loans to the same
type of farmers; and (3) medium and long-term loans to artisan shops
and small industries, and farmer cooperatives.'^4'
The urgency of affording a source of short-term production loans
to farmers at reasonable interest rates was realized at an early date,
and a ten-million piaster grant of American aid funds was made to the
new ‘organization during May, 1952 to supplement a five-million piaster
budget granted to it by the Vietnamese Government.

Under the provisions

of the agreement, loans were to be granted to farmers for one year at a
rate of interest of one percent per month, payable at rice harvest time.
Funds established through repayment of these loans were to be utilized
for the same purpose during the 1953-54 crop year.
To be most effective and afford maximum benefits crop production
loans must be at the disposal of borrowing farmers in time to be utilized
by them in obtaining necessary production commodities.

Therefore, some

funds should be granted as soon as possible during the crop production
season, which in Vietnam means not later than July 1st, the beginning
of rice planting time.

The management of the new organization agreed

that loans should be made in three installments:

at the beginning of

the rice planting season in early July, a second part in late August or

^ S c h e new institution was given the name of "Service National
du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif" (SNCAAC). The statutes and
presidential decrees creating the organization, the conditions for
control and operation, and the official interior regulations are con
tained in APPENDIX »D».
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early September, and a third and last part of the loan during late
October, thus safeguarding and insuring the proper utilization of the
borrowed funds on the part of recipient farmers.

However, as with

most endeavors, slowness in organizing the new lending institution,
opening new provincial loan offices, recruiting personnel to operate
the organization, and creating the necessary provincial and village
loan committees, all contributed to retarding the target date.
After many delays and drawbacks, the first loans were finally
granted during early September, 1952.

This was actually too late for

the loans to be of maximum benefit to borrowing farmers.

By that time

many peasant farmers had already contracted debts with and verbally
pledged delivery of their rice harvest to moneylenders and merchants.
However, it was felt that, in view of the urgent need for action and
the large amount of propaganda circulated throughout the villages of
South Vietnam as to what the government was going to do for farmers in
this field, the short-term loans program could not be postponed until
the 1953-54 crop year.
Once begun, this program of activity made very good progress and
by December, 1952 a total of 7*371 individual loans had been granted to
farm families cultivating land in six provinces in South Vietnam.

The

total amount loaned reached 7*9 million piasters against which borrowers
pledged delivery of rice production from 18,300 hectares (42,000 acres)
of land under cultivation.

These loans, though restricted to the South

Vietnam area northeast of the Mekong River, were quite scattered in the
territory affected and included a total of 27 delegations.

105

•^'’A "delegation" refers to a surface area of land with a
separate governmental and administrative unit within a province and
corresponds closely with a country or parish in the United States.
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Although funds sufficient for a much larger program were available,
which would cover a wider area of Vietnam and reaching a larger number
of farmers, it was not realized.

The reasons are threefold and bear

upon conditions of time (late in getting started), a shortage of
personnel, and conditions of security in the interior, more-remote
provinces.

Though shortage of personnel and tardiness in getting the

program started were major obstacles to success in this first venture,
the conditions of security in the interior and remote villages was
certainly the number one drawback.

During 1952 and early 1953 travel

was safe on only the two main highways leading south and southwest of
Saigon, and the principal cities and towns located more than forty
miles from Saigon could be reached only with an armed escort.

None of

the secondary country roads and canals linking the interior villages
to the main cities and highways were safe for travel during that period.
The first phase of this program was implemented under considerable
handicaps and getting funds into the possession of farmers proved a
difficult task.

However, recovery of the loans after harvest proved to

be yet more difficult.

Special efforts were made to instruct the

farmers on the administrative procedures established for granting loans
and also in the process by which loans were to be repaid.

If farm

families needing credit most were to be reached, it was impractical
to embark upon a short-term loan program which called for pledging of
physical assets as collateral.

Requesting such security would have

excluded a very large percentage of the farmers who needed this type of
credit.
basis.

The only alternative v;as to grant loans on a "moral guarantee"
It is for this reason that special loan committees were organized

in every village included in the program.

These village loan committees

323
were given as much responsibility as possible in selecting, certifying
and reviewing the statements of loan applicants and also in controlling
the proper utilization of the borrowed funds.
As a further safeguard in guaranteeing borrower integrity and
moral standing, each loan made was required to be co-signed by two of
the borrower's neighbors— making all three, the borrower and the two
co-signers, mutually responsible for repayment of the loan.

As another

safeguard for repayment of the loan and to prevent larger farmers from
borrowing large sums for the purpose of sub-lending to smaller farmers
at higher rates of interest, the amount of money loaned to any one
farmer was limited to 2,000 piasters.

In order to facilitate repayment

of loans out of the produce at harvest time, loans were made at the
rate of 500 piasters per hectare of rice actually under cultivation—
up to the 2,000 piaster maximum.
In spite of those preliminary precautions, repayments have been
very disappointing.

As of June 1, 1955, only 3 million piasters had

been reimbursed by 2,5&7 borrowers out of a total of 7.9 million piasters
loaned to 7,371 borrowers.

The primary reason given for this failure to

recover loans is lack of security in the villages 'where the loans were
made.

Undoubtedly this is the major cause, although not the only one.
It is true that during the early months of 1953 when the loans

reached maturity, increased Viet Kinh activity in the areas where loans
were granted reduced security conditions and resulted in disrupting
civil administration in most rural villages, and in abandonment of
all governmental and communal authority in others.

In many villages

collection agents of SNCAAC, returning to recover loans could not find
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a single member of the village loan committee, not a single loan co
signer, much less the borrower.
Following the Geneva Convention and the armistice, security
conditions improved and civil administration was re-established in
most villages interested in this program.

However,' for the most part,

local village chiefs and village councils were new and not the same
individuals who constituted the original loan committees.

In many

villages the new civil, or military, administrators were either not
interested in loan recoveiy efforts or refused outright to cooperate
in this endeavor.
Undoubtedly, the fact that the Chiefs of Provinces, provincial
loan committees, loan office directors, and the personnel of SNCAAC
have not shown the same enthusiasm in the work necessary to effectuate
recovery of the loans as they did during the lending period of late
1952 also has contributed substantially to the poor record of loans
recovery.
However, due note must be made of the repayment record achieved
in the province of Giadinh, a province where security was never a very
important element and where civil administration continued to function
with almost no interruption.

In that province slightly more than one

million piasters were loaned to 930 farmers.

At the end of the first

year a total of 737 of these borrowers had repaid their loans of
827,000 piasters in full.

This amount, plus 56,000 piasters paid as

interest, made total receipts equal to about 88 percent of the amount
originally loaned.

It is on the basis of that record that SNCAAC was

authorized to grant loans a second year (1954-35) in that province and
slightly more than 1.5 million piasters were loaned to 933 farmers.
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Many of these are farmers who had repaid their obligations of 1953 and
thus have been granted short-term loans a second time.
In addition to the 10-million piaster American Aid contribution
and the five million from the National Treasury designated for short
term plans, the organisation has at its disposal five million piasters
for medium-term loans to artisans and small industries and 20 million
piasters from the national budget destined for what it chooses to call
"Agrarian Reform", or long-term land purchase loans.

In all, 40 million

piasters are available for lending.
Besides the short-term credit endeavors, however, very few loans
have been made out of the funds available to SNCAAC.

This fact is in

evident when an examination is made of the following financial situation
as of January 1, 1955, showing a total of over 26 million piasters of
its assets, "existing reserve", remaining in the Vietnamese treasury.
By Presidential ordinance in October, 1954 the whole SNCAAC
organization was placed under the direct jurisdiction of the Minister
of Agriculture, without abrogating the previous ordinance placing the
Board of Directors under the jurisdiction of the President of Vietnam.
An ordinance issued by the Minister of Agriculture in November, 1954
placed SNCAAC under the direct management and control of the General
Director of Agrarian Reform, Cooperatives and Credit.

Thus, the former

Board of Directors has ceased to function for all intents and purposes.
As a matter of fact, there is no duly appointed Board of Directors and
the activities are administered by a Managing Director within the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform.

However, besides feeble efforts made

toward recovering loans already granted, the personnel of SNCAAC and
the affiliated provincial offices are engaged in very few activities.

326
The program of agricultural credit assistance may be summarized
as follows:
FUMDAIOLNTALS OF THE PROGRAM
I.

Capital Available:

(Short-Term Loans)

10,000,000 Piasters - American Aid
5,000,000 Piasters - SNCAAC
15,000,000 Total

Area:

Six provinces through two offices — Caisses
Provincials

Amount:

2,000 piasters per family maximum at rate of 500
piasters per hectare

IV.

Interest:

At one percent per month

V.

Duration:

Crop season

VI.

Security:

(1)

Crop season

(2)

Mortgage of any real estate owned, and

(3)

Moral responsibility and guarantee

II.

III.

(Each loan made with security of pledge of crop
or moral guarantee was co-signed by two neighbor
fanners. These groups of three farmers were
known as "mutual groups of co-signers".
VII.
VTII.

Purpose:

To augment rice production and to cope with usury

Administration: (l)

Technical Supervision and Audit - SNAAC
through provincial offices

(2)

Accountability - Provincial accounting
bureau

(3)

Depository - Provincial Treasury, from SNCAAC
regional office

(4)

Commissions:
a.

Provincial - Consider and approve,
collection

b.

Communal - Receive and investigate
requests, recommend, and
assist collections.
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Table 30.

Source and Disposition of Funds for Agricultural and Other
Loans, January 1, 1955
Assets

Liabilities
(in piasters)

Agrarian reform:
(Long-term land purchase loans)

Agrarian Reform

Provincial office
Cantho
2,255,730
Giadinh
23,985
Mytho
770,819
Knanhoa
10,000
Hadong (now closed) 210.000
3,271,296

National Budget
Small Industries

Artisans & small industries
128,200
Giadinh Office
Mr. Tran dinh Lam
500.000
628,200
Agricultural Credit
Giadinh Office
Mytho Office
Thanhquoi Rice
Storage Coop.

National Budget

20,000,000
5,000,000

Agricultural Credit
(short-term)
National budget 5,000,000
10 .000.000
b. A.E.A. (US0M)

15,000,000

2,162,150
4,504,580
500.000
7,166,730

liquidating Capital of old O.C.P.
Advanced amount
2,802,646
Total Cash in V. N. Treasury
Existing reserve 26.151.128
Total

Source:

40 ,000,000

Total

40,000,000

Report of Activities by the General Manager of SNCAAC, January 1,
1955.

328
The Present Program
As related in the previous chapter on Land and Agrarian Reforms,
■with the cessation of hostilities large areas of abandoned rice lands
in South Vietnam became secure and available for settlement and
recultivation while at the same time thousands of farm families in
South and Central Vietnam had been displaced from their lands and
thousands more evacuated from the north to the south.

Throughout

the fall and winter of 1954 the Diem Government labored with the task
of revising the old land reform laws established by the Tam Government
during 1953*

The result of these deliberations was the enactment of

new land reform legislation— the basic provisions of which are con
tained in Presidential Ordinances No. 2 and 7 whereby the government
undertakes to lease idle lands to landless peasants for a period of
four years; and provides for written landlord-tenant contracts with
stipulated rental ceilings.
A four-year government lease or tenant contract will not in itself
solve the problems of landless peasants and displaced refugee farm
families unless some means are available to them to obtain the basic
essentials of food and shelter until the first harvest.

To meet the

immediate need for production items, such as tools, seed, and draft
animals, 225 million piasters and 675*000 U. S. dollars \*ere allocated
as "emergency agricultural credit".

It was the intention that this

allocation would enable displaced farmers and small owner cultivators
to become self-sufficient, economic producers, and at the same time
support the government’s land reform program to which the present plan
of agricultural credit assistance is basically tied.
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The new program of assistance calls for granting short-term
piaster loans to farmers in the category mentioned above for the purpose
of purchasing food and seed paddy and necessary hand cultivating tools,
and medium-term (5 year) piaster loans for the procurement of local
housing material.

The short-term loans carry interest at one percent

per month and medium-term loans six percent i:>er year.

The dollar

credits are destined to purchase work animals, largely in Thailand,
which are to be distributed to beneficiaries in lieu of cash loans.
It was thought that making piaster credits available to farmers for
local procurement of draft animals would create such an increase in
demand as to cause an unduly large increase in local prices.

In

addition to loans in money and work animals, the present program con
templates free distribution of simple hand tools and plows to the
most needy fanners.
As originally established, this program of emergency credit
assistance was to be administered by a Board of Governors composed of
the Ministers of Agriculture, Finance, and of Plan and Reconstruction.
The Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif (SNCAAC)
and its several provincial offices was to handle the details of admin
istration, pending the complete reorganization of a National Agricultural
Credit Agency.
Priority for receiving loans under this "emergency" program is
given to signers of Type "B" or "C" contracts under Ordinance 79 the
basic agrarian reform legislation.

Responsibility for receiving and

processing loan applications is entrusted to the special "village
commissions" established under the terms of Ordinance No. 2.

Responsi

bility for supervision and control is given to a special Inspection
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Service and a Board of Censors who also operate under the general
supervision of the Board of Governors.
Rather than utilize the services of SNCAAC to handle the details
of administration as originally proposed and agreed, government
authorities proceeded to draft new legislation during the spring of
1955 3 creating a completely new organization to manage the new
emergency loan program.

A separate ordinance (No. 29-a) created a

new commission composed of:
a.
b.
c.
d.

The
The
The
The

Minister
Minister
Minister
Minister

of
of
of
of

AgrarianReform - President
Agriculture - Vice President
Plan andReconstruction
Finance

The Ordinance directs this National Commission to take all
necessary measures to implement the emergency loans program, control
the use of the funds and equipment, and to insure the reimbursement of
the loans.

It is also directed to report directly to the President

of Vietnam with a detailed account of the activities of this program
every three months.
Following are the basic provisions of the Ordinance:
1.

At the national level the organization is tinder the direction

of a Director General designated by the National Commission but approved
by the Minister of Agrarian Reform.

However, to make matters yet more

complicated, the appointment to office of this Director General is
made by arrete of the President of Vietnam.

The Interior Regulations

of the organization are to be prepared by the director and approved
by the National Commission, but as of January, 1956 no such interior
regulations had been established.
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2.

At the provincial, delegation and village level, the Director

General is to exercise his function through:
a.

The

Chief of Province assisted by a Provincial Commission

b.

The

Chief of Delegation and the Delegation Commission

c. The
3.

Communal or Village Council and the Village Commission

Control is to be assured by the Inspector General of the

Vietnam Financial and Administrative Services.

A chief controller is to

be appointed by presidential order upon recommendation of the National
Commission
4.

Interest rates are stipulated at one percent per month for

short-term loans and at six percent per year for medium-term loans of
five-years duration.
5.

Penalties are provided for non-repayment as v/ell as for misuse

of the funds on the part of the borrowers - ranging from refusal to
grant loans to six months in jail.

Provisions are also made for

penalties against government functionaires and other persons who receive
or attempt to receive services, money or favoritisms from borrowers.
6.

Communal Commissions composed of three tenant farmers and

three landowners are to be elected from among each group listed in the
village in implementing Ordinance No. 2 of the Land Reform Statutes.
A member of the Village Council constitutes the seventh member of this
Commission.

All members exercise their functions without pay.

The

duties of the Village Commissions include receiving requests for loans
and transmitting those to the Delegation Commission, supervise the
granting of loans and distribution of agricultural tools and equipment,
control the utilization of the funds, and assure recovery of the loans.
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7.

Requests for loans are forwarded by the village commission

to the delegation commissions where they are ‘'verified1' and forwarded
to the provincial commissions.

The Provincial Commission, presided

over by the Chief of Province, establish a numerical list of loan
requests by village, and forward the information to the National
Commission.

Funds are allocated and forwarded to each province

according to the needs as expressed in the loan request lists.
8.

Funds are to be deposited into a special account in the

National Treasury, to be released to the provincial commissions upon
order of the President of the National Commission.

Each Chief of

Province, as president of the respective Provincial Commission, in
turn releases funds destined for each village to the village finance
commissioner who in turn shall transmit to each borrower the sum to
be advanced.
It can be readily deducted that, even with something approaching
perfect timing, coordination, and functioning, considerable time will
elapse between the date of the original application for a loan by the
hopeful borrower and final transmission of the funds by the village
finance commissioner.

This complicated and roundabout procedure for

granting loans of an ’’emergency" nature must result in unnecessary
delays and is indicative of the mistrust and jealousy existing among
the various branches of government.

Because of this, improvements in

the economic and social well-being of the masses of farmers is a slow
and difficult process, and the productivity and standard of living of
individual farm families suffer the consequences.

It is suggested

that decades of colonial administration and subjugation of Vietnamese
officials to intricacies of colonial rule account in part for the

capacity of Vietnamese functionaires to substitute complicated adminis
trative procedures for simple expedient action.

The emergency agricul

tural loans program is a case in point, and all efforts and insistance
that procedures in granting loans be reduced to a minimum and made as
simple as possible brought no concrete results.

Even with the maintenance

of all possible simplicity and straight line of action it would have
been difficult to implement a program of emergency agricultural credit
on time for maximum benefit.

Difficulties were encountered soon after

drafting the basic ordinance creating the organization.

In the first

place,, the National Commission was duly appointed but waited six months
before meeting formally as a body to consider actions called for in the
legislation.

Secondly, a director was appointed by the Minister of

Agrarian Reform but was triable to ftinetion due to lack of personnel
assistance, transportation, and office space.

Finally, the personnel

of SNCAAC (who apparently had few activities) were put at his disposal
to help in administrative duties, but not before four months had elapsed.
Since priority for loans are given to signatures of land tenure
contracts types nB" and "C", the success of this program is basically
dependent upon the application of the existing agrarian reform
legislation.

However, six months after promulgation no official in the

ministry of Agrarian Reform, those delegated with this responsibility,
i

could give information on the number of tenure contracts signed, what
type, nor in what area, village or province such activities had been
in progress.

Furthermore, a census of available and cultivable but

abandoned lands (a prequisite to implementing the program) was begun
only six months later.

It is obvious that, according to the procedures
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formulated., unless there is a list of tenure contracts established, and
thus giving rise to a list of eligible loans recipients by village,
there can be no loans granted and, therefore, no program inqplementation.
This is one case where the availability of funds is not a problem.
Failure to get the program started on time appears to be due to the
following:

(l) Lack of enthusiasm on the part of high government

officials who appear more inclined to actively support and push self
propaganda activities than concrete programs designed to bring emergency
benefits to the massesj (2) Very little response and support from
provincial officials, where most civilian Chiefs of Provinces are
large property owners with some side interest in rice marketing, and
where the military chiefs are more interested in building up their
military forces and consolidating their positions than in engaging in
land reform activities;

(3) The combined activities of the syndicate

of rice millers, merchants and moneylenders in their attempts to sabotage
the program for fear their "system" would be disrupted; and (4) The
hesitancy on the part of government personnel in the cities to go out
in the rural areas and actively engage in efforts necessary for
implementation of the program.
Therefore, unless positive and concerted action is forthcoming
soon the net results are very likely to be:
1.

No program of emergency credit and thus no government loan
funds in the possession of needy rural peasants;

2.

Continued usury practices on the part of merchants and money
lenders who will probably find displaced and destitute farm
families easy prey;

3.

The return of landowners to the pacified areas intent of
re-establishing the traditional pattern of land tenure;
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4.

No implementat ion of the agrarian reform program and no
material benefits to fanners;

5.

Landless farmers remaining at the mercy of the three classes
of people most detrimental to their well being— the landlords,
merchants and moneylenders, and;

6.

Continued agrarian unrest breeding the seeds for another
disastrious revolution.

Conclusions and Recommendations for an Effective Program:
Undoubtedly, for the past decade, conditions of security have been
the major factor responsible for limited activities and relatively
poor results obtained in the field of agricultural credit and other
related activities, such as land reform and farmer cooperatives organi
zation, all of which requires frequent visits by government officials
to remote villages to insure satisfactory progress.
has not been the only factor.
have been:

However, this

Other, but also very disquieting factors,

(l) skepticism on the part of the rural population whenever

government officials, wearing city clothes, visit their village to
discuss agricultural credit or any other program.

(This is not too

surprising when consideration is given to the fact that in many cases
these visits were probably the first ones made to the villages T^y
Saigon officials in eight or ten years, and that in some areas the
conditions and results of previous government ventures in agricultural
credit and related rural activities are still remembered by the local
population); (2) the activities of rice merchants and moneylenders in
doing their utmost to sabotage the program in order to continue their
traditional usurious operations; (3) lack of active support and only
passive action on the part of provincial authorities, shortage of
trained and competently qualified personnel in the respective government
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services; and the reductance of the few that would be qualified to
bring the program to the rural people— where it has to be brought;
(4) dissention, jealousy, and lack of coordination among interested
government services and ministry personnel whose close cooperation is
essential; and (5) the complicated administrative machinery tending to
retard action necessary to bring funds and equipment into the hands of
recipient farm families when needed.
The shortage of technically qualified foreign personnel to work
closely with native government personnel and farmer groups can also be
cited as a reason for past errors and limited activity and success.
Now that peace and security have finally been restored in South
and Central Vietnam, a most wonderful opportunity exists to increase
the program of activity to the point where the credit and related needs
of farmers can be more fully satisfied.

This in itself could well be

the greatest benefit the Vietnamese government— and foreign aid pro
grams— could bring to the 80 percent of the population that are basically
farmers.
But in order to carry out a broad program designed to cover the
needs in this field it is imperative that the conditions noted above,
which have heretofore greatly hampered activities, be inproved.

There

must be wholehearted cooperation among all government personnel and
authorities concerned.

There must be active support and cooperation on

the part of provincial officials in any broad program of developing
agricultural credit and related institutions.

The administrative and

banking machinery must be simplified if funds are to be in the hands of
borrowers when needed.

A program must be established for training
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personnel to carry out the program— personnel who are willing and ready
to mix with the rural population, "narrow the gap" and remove the
skepticism presently existing among village farmers toward city
technicians.

Finally, if it is absolutely necessary to utilize foreign

aid funds in order to have sufficient capital, foreign countries
furnishing this aid also will have to furnish some of the technical
advice needed in this field.

CHAPTER XI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Indochina comprises the three states of Cambodia, Laos and
Vietnam and forms the eastern portion of the Indochinese peninsula*
The total area of Indochina is approximately 285,000 square miles or
about 182 mi].lion acres.

Vietnam, with 126,000 square miles, is the

largest of the three states and is con$>osed of Tonkin, Annam, and
Cochinchina.

About 44,000 square miles is included in Tonkin, 57*000

square miles in Annam and 25,000 square miles in Cochinchina.

The

size of the area ceded to the Communists under the terns of the 1954
Geneva Convention is about 60,000 square miles and includes all of
Vietnam north of the seventeenth parallel.

Cambodia comprises an area

of about 70,000 square miles and Laos about 89,000 square miles.
After seventy-five years of French rule the three states of Indo
china were granted independence within the French Union in 1952, with
the freedom to choose their own form of government.

Cambodia and Laos

are presently constitutional monarchies, while South Vietnam, through
popular referendum, recently chose a democratic republic government
and rejected the former French-imposed Monarchy of Emperor Bao Dai.
Compared to other countries in Southeast Asia, Indochina has not
developed to any great extent economically and industrially under
French rule and administration.

As a result, the economy of the area

is still based almost entirely on agriculture which is conducted under
primitive methods of cultivation for the most part.

In the agricultural

economy of Indochina rice production predominates to such a degree that
it can be referred to as an example of monoculture.
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About ninety
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percent of the inhabitants are engaged in agriculture, and about ninety
percent of the total production of the area comes from agriculture and
forestry.

Most peasant farms are small and the farmers and their

families have a very low standard of living and usually are heavily
in debt.
Nearly all farming is carried on by native farmers, although
rubber and coffee plantations and a number of tea and a few rice
plantations are in French hands.

Except on the European rubber

plantations, yields are low due primarily to the primitive production
practices followed.
As in most Asiatic countries, the diet of the Indochinese consists
mostly of plant foods, primarily rice.

Since production statistics

are unreliable and many fairly important crops are excluded from of
ficial production estimates, it is impossible to prepare a satisfactory
food balance for Indochina.

However, the per capita food consumption

of the average rural peasant is very low.
Besides the French, the Chinese and Indians play an important
role in the internal economy of Indochina.

The Indians have become

well established in the retail trade while the Chinese practically
dominate the internal rice marketing and milling and the forest
industries, and also play a leading role in the fields of agricultural
credit and transportation.
Indochina is a hot country] at sea level there is no cold month.
All of Indochina lies south of the Tropic of Cancer and in the northern
part of the country the coldest month, January, has a mean temperature
of 63 degrees.

Only a few tropical crops are excluded from the extreme
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north, but in all the plains and lower valleys harvests can ripen during
any month of the year.
of rain each year.

In general, Indochina receives a large amount

The amount is conditioned by the monsoons primarily,

and most of the precipitation occurs during the summer and fall months
when it exceeds 120 inches in some parts of the country.

However,

there is considerable variation in total annual rainfall from year
to year, as well as from station to station within the country.

In

most areas there in insufficient moisture during the late winter and
spring months to permit crop production without irrigation.
Although there has never been a really satisfactory census of
the population in Indochina, best estimates place the present total
at about 23 million, with 22*6 million in Vietnam, 1.6 million in
Laos and 3*5 million in Cambodia.

There are approximately 9*3 million

people in North Vietnam, 7« 2 million in Central Vietnam and approximately
5.6 million in South Vietnam.

It is estimated that over SO percent of

the population live on slightly less than 13 percent of the total land
area.

Population data available are sufficient to show the extreme

uneven distribution of the population.

The most heavily populated

areas are the alluvial plains close to the sea.

These areas are:

(l) the Red River delta, 5*790 square miles, with 7.5 million people,
or 1,295 per square mile; (2) the coastal plains of Central Annam,
5,790 square miles, with 4*6 million people, or 795 per square mile;
(3) Central Cochinchina, 6,ISO square miles, with 3»2 million people,
or 520 per square mile; (4) Western Cochinchina, 7*720 square miles,
with one million people, or 130 per square mile; (5) southern Cambodia,
15*350 square miles, 2.4 million people, or 195 per square mile.

The
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reminder of the country also shows significant differences in population
densities.

Large areas of Laos, northern Cambodia, and the hilly and

mountainous areas of Central Vietnam are virtually unpopulated.

On the

other hand, parts of the Red River delta are among the most densely
populated agricultural areas of the world, having a population of over
3,000 people per square mile.
The people of Indochina, the vast majority of whom are peasants,
maintain a high population density in some rural areas only by intensive
use of the land.

Therefore, climate, soil, and agricultural practices

play a great part in the pattern of distribution of the population.
It is commonly agreed that a further important factor determining
population distribution is the prevalence of malaria in most of the
hilly and mountainous areas.

For the country as a whole, population

density, being slightly under 100 per square mile, does not appear to
be a problem of great significance until the pattern of population
distribution is taken into consideration.

The fact that £0 percent

of the total population lives on less than 13 percent of the total
land area, and that between SO and 90 percent of the people are farmers
greatly intensifies the pressure of population upon the land in certain
areas.
According to the best available vital statistics, the annual birth
rate in the principal cities of Indochina is about 40 per thousand,
while the death rate averages approximately 30 per thousand, indicating
a rate of population increase of one percent per year.

While no infor

mation is available which would indicate the average population increase
in the interior, rural areas of the country, it is probable that the
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birth rate is higher than in the cities and the death rate about the
same as in the metropolitan areas, resulting in a rate of population
increase probably higher than one percent in those areas*

However,

this is probably offset somewhat by the higher rate of infant mortality
in the rural areas.
Until 1945 formal classroom education in Indochina was restricted
to the larger towns and cities, and to the children of the privileged.
It is only during the past few years that government-operated schools
have been established in the smaller, rural villages and communitiesj
even these were established only in "secure” areas of the controlled
zones.

There are no official statistics indicating the degree of

literacy in all Indochina.

However, the percentage of illiteracy among

the rural population is without doubt extremely large, running probably
as high as 75 percent of the adult population.
The rivers of Indochina, along with the man-made waterways and
canals, play a dominant role in the economy of the country.

In fact,

from the standpoint of both agricultural production (irrigation and
drainage) and transportation and communication, the rivers and canals
can be called the life-blood of the country.

In some areas, particularly

in the Mekong and Red River deltas, river and canal traffic accounts
for probably more than eighty percent of the total local traffic, with
local roads and highways and water-buffalo trails carrying the remaining
twenty percent.
Broadly speaking, the cultivation of crops in Indochina is carried
on in seven principal agricultural regions or areas.

These are:

the

Red River delta in Tonkinj the numerous small valleys and deltas along
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the Annam coast; the Mekong River delta; the Great Lake region in
Cambodia; the plateau des Bolevens in Laos; the red and grey table
lands north and northeast of Saigon; and the Dalat-Djiring-Ban MeThout
triangle.

Rice is by far the most important crop grown in the Red

River and Mekong River deltas and in the Great Lake region in Cambodia.
C o m , cotton, sweet potatoes, and vegetables are crops of lesser
importance in the Red River delta.

Secondary crops include sugar cane,

peanuts, tropical fruits, coffee, manioc and tea.

Rubber is by far

the most important plantation crop and is produced in the grey and red
tablelands north and northeast of Saigon.
Chiefly because of the wide variation in rainfall from year to
year and the uncertain seasonal distribution, irrigation is necessary
to insure stable production of rice and other crops, in spite of the
generally heavy rainfall.

In Worth Vietnam, protection of crops against

the disastrous floods has taken precedence over irrigation, and an
intricate system of dikes hasbeen constructed for that purpose.

In

the Mekong River delta in the South an important system of canals has
been built primarily to drain the large area of swamp land sufficiently
for growing rice.

In this area it is estimated that over five million

acres of farm land have been made cultivable by means of drainage,
effectuated primarily through a system of over 800 miles of main canals.
As a result, acreage under rice cultivation increased four times from
1880 to the beginning of VIorld ’War II, and rice exports from Saigon
were five times as large before the war as in 1880.

Most of the lifting

of Irrigation water in Indochina is performed by primitive hand methods,
and only an insignificant portion of the total area is irrigated by
mechanical means.
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There are no sufficiently complete soils studies to enable a
detailed description of the various soil types.

But the few general

surveys that have been made indicate that in general the soils of
Indochina are relatively poor from an agricultural point of view.
For the most part, they are acidic, poor in assimilable phosphates,
lime, potassium, magnesium, and in humus.

Generally speaking, only

the recent soils of the low alluvial plains of Indochina are able to
support a crop in the form of wet-field rice year after year.

Most

of these soils are periodically flooded over by the waters of the
Mekong and Red Rivers containing large quantities of silt which help
maintain soil fertility.

A very small amount of fertilizer is utilized

by Indochinese farmers in crop production, and this consists primarily
of human and animal manure, dead fish and mud from rivers and canals.
In many parts of the area commercial fertilizer is virtually unknown.
The fishing industry holds a leading place in the economy of
Indochina, since fish with its various by-products forms an indispensable
item in the diet of the people.

A large percentage of the fish catch

is consumed locally and never enters the market channels.

Although

there are no official statistics on the production of fish for the
country as a whole, all authorities agree that fisheries are second only
to rice in importance to the native economy, and as an export product
ranked fifth in the value of the principal goods exported from the
country before World War II.

The production of salt from sea water

is another important marine resource.
About 74 percent of the total land in Indochina is classified as
forest land.

One third of this constitutes very high-grade timber.

However, uncontrolled timber cutting has denuded large stands in the
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upland areas and the practice of "ray" cultivation in many regions also
has devastated large portions of fine tropical forests.

The forestry

exploitation industry is largely undeveloped.
Goal is the most important mineral resource.

Other mineraljr

found in small quantities include tin, zinc, tungsten, gold and precious
stones.

The largest coal mines in the country are located in North

Vietnam and are now under Communist control.
The largest population center is the Saigon-Cholon metropolitan
area with an estimated two million persons.

Other large cities include

Hanoi with about 300,000 people, Haiphong with a population estimated
at 200,000, and Pnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, which has about
150,000.

Other important centers of population are Nam Dinh and

Haidoung in North Vietnam, Hue, Tourane and Nhatrang in Central Vietnam,
and Mytho, Cantho and Longxuyen in South Vietnam.

In Cambodia, Kompong

Cham and Battambang also are relatively important centers of population.
The relatively few small industrial, enterprises are located in
these cities for the most part.

Besides coal mining, other industrial

activities include cotton spinning and weaving, small ship yards,
rubber processing, the manufacture of paint, shoes, matches, and
cigarettes, and food processing— primarily rice milling and fish products
processing.

Regulations imposed by France and tariff legislation

favoring special French interests probably have contributed many of the
features of Indochina’s present economy, and particularly explains the
slow development of industries as compared with agriculture.
The basic unit of currency is the piaster of 100 centimes.

The

parity of the piaster is tied to the French franc, and since 1953 this

parity has been fixed by mutual agreement by the governments of France
and Indochina at the ratio of 10 francs to one Indochinese piaster.
The exchange rates between the piaster and other currencies are based
on the Paris official franc market rate, presently fixed at 34# francs
to the United States dollar— or 34.# piasters.

The free rate of

exchange, however, is between 70 and SO piasters to one United States
dollar.

The amount of money in circulation has increased at a tremendous

rate since 1940 when 2B0 million piasters were in circulation.
spring of 1954 this had increased to S.5 billion piasters.

By the

The general

level of prices kept pace with the increase in the number of piasters.
Based upon prices in 1939 as 100, the index of wholesale prices in 1951
was 2,450; the index of food items consumed by natives was 4,280; and
the index of food items consumed by Europeans was 4,350.
Indochina is primarily an exporter of raw materials and an inporter
of manufactured goods.

The foreign trade of the country has been

characterised by a substantial excess of imports over exports, by an
increased tendency for imports to rise and for exports to remain stable
or fall slightly in recent years.
to about $117 million.

In 1952 the value of exports amounted

Three agricultural commodities, rubber, rice

and corn accounted for 71 percent of this amount.

Imports during the

same year were valued at about $449 million resulting in an unfavorable
balance of trade amounting to about $332 million.

France is by far

the leading supplier of goods imported into Indochina and the French
Union also is the primary market for Indochina's exports.

Deficits

in trade payments usually have been balanced by new capital imports,
since heavy transfers of profits into France prohibited the accumulation
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of capital in Indochina even during those few years that showed
favorable trade balances.
The most intensive use of hand labor is still the predominant
way of land cultivation; therefore, labor requirements in crop production
are extremely high.

Mechanical agricultural equipment is relatively

unknown and the use of draft animals is very limited in the Tonkin
delta and the Annam coastal areas because they compete with man for
the meager food supply.

Crop cultivation is typically small-scale

with the farm family furnishing most of the labor required.

Due

primarily to lack of improved seed stock, hand cultivation and the
absence of proper equipment, and very restricted use of fertilizer,
the average crop yield is very low by any standard of comparison.
There have been very few efforts made in the past by the government
to bring about improvements in crop production methods.
The intensity of the problems of land ownership and tenure rela
tions varies in the different regions and states of Indochina.

In the

Tonkin delta farming area the problem relates primarily to the large
number of farm families upon the available land supply, the intensive
subdivision and parcelization of land holdings and the extremely small
amount of land available to the average farm family.
improves only slightly in Central Vietnam.

This situation

The problem of absentee

land ownership is not as acute in the North and Central parts of Vietnam
and Cambodia as it is in South Vietnam.

In South Vietnam the problem

revolves around the sharecropper system of crop production, absentee
landlords, insecurity of tenure, and the fact that only a relatively
small percentage of the farmers own the land they cultivate.

In the
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deltas of North and Central Vietnam, the custom of dividing property
equally among all the children has resulted in very small land holdings,
which, in the majority of instances, are divided up into many tiny
parcels.

In general it may be said that South Vietnam is a region of

large land holdings, absentee landlords, sharecroppers and landless
agricultural workers, whereas North and Central Vietnam and Cambodia
are regions of small peasant farmers who cultivate their own lands.
It is estimated that 99 percent of the agricultural holdings in North
Vietnam, 90 percent in Central Vietnam, and 95 percent in Cambodia,
but only 64 percent in South Vietnam are operated by their owners.
In Vietnam there are approximately 4*5 million farm families, but
only 2.0 million farm landowners.

Thus, close to 56 percent of all

farm families in that state do nob own all the land they cultivate.
Legal ownership of land is frequently one of name only; the owner
often is practically a tenant, being obliged to make annual payments to
the moneylender who has allowed him to remain on the land holding.
There is an urgent need for reforms in agriculture in Indochina,
particularly in Vietnam.

This need arises from the following:

(l)

the very unequal distribution of landholdings resulting in a large
percentage of the total cultivated area being owned by a small
percentage of the peoplej (2) the very large number of landless farm
families; (3) the very extensive degree of parcelization of landholdings
in Central and North Vietnam; (4) exhorbitantly high land rental rates
prevailing in most areas; (5) the usurious rates of interest charged
by moneylenders and merchants on short-term money and food loans to
fanners; and (6) the disorganized and unsystematic conditions under
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which agricultural commodities (primarily rice) are marketed at the
farm level.

These conditions of the rural econoiqy all combine to lead

to gross inefficiency in agricultural production in general, grossly
unequal distribution in incomes, perpetual indebtedness and a miserable
standard of living at the bare subsistence level for a large sector of
the rural people.

The result is social and political unrest on the

part of the masses.
There have been only feeble efforts in the past on the part of the
governments toward remedying these conditions.

The few laws and decrees

enacted were inadequate to cope with the situation.

What few benefits

could have been forthcoming never materialized because the laws and
decrees were not enforced and the evil practices of the economic
oligarchy continued to the detriment of the rural proletariat.

At the

present time the government is showing renewed interest in the agrarian
reform needs of the country and, with American aid, a more constructive
program of action is in process of being implemented in that portion of
the country still out of Communist control.
The exodus of about 200,000 refugee farm families from Communist
controlled North Vietnam into the south has reduced somewhat the
pressure of population on the land supply in the Tonkin delta but at
the same time greatly aggravated the agrarian problems in South Vietnam.
The present agrarian reform program includes provisions to rehabilitate
those people on abandoned farm lands.
The greatest handicaps to implementing a broad program of agrarian
reform in Vietnam are:

(l) the opposition from landowners, commodity

merchants and moneylenders) (2) shortage of qualified personnel to
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carry the program to the rural peoplej (3) only passive acceptance in
some quarters and active resistance in others on the part of civil
and military officials in the rural provinces for personal reasons;
and (4) obstructive tactics from Communist cadres left in South and
Central Vietnam by the rebel military forces for that purpose.
Traditionally, the major agricultural products of Indochina are
marketed chiefly through Chinese middlemen who normally take substantial
margins for their services.

These traders and middlemen are often

usurers as well, who usually take in a large portion of the crop as
payment for their advances, thus cutting off the producer from most
free markets in agricultural products.

Generally speaking, there is

no organized system of internal marketing for agricultural commodities.
The only exception is rubber whose production and marketing are entirely
in the hands of relatively few foreign corporations or syndicates.
Besides rubber, rice is the only other farm product the marketing of
which can be said to follow established patterns.

With the exception

of the efforts of farmers' organizations in introducing some system
of marketing coffee, tea, tobacco, and other minor crops, very little
has been done by either government or private individuals or institutions
in effectuating some systematic marketing arrangement for farm commodities.
As a consequence, the majority of the less-important agricultural products
are traded by producers on a barter basis in local village market places.
The commercial rice milling industry is concentrated in the cities
of Saigon-Cholon and Pnom Penh.

Most of the smaller rice mills in the

interior rice-producing areas have been destroyed during the period of
rebel activities.

Practically all the paddy going into commercial

channels for milling and consumption within the country and for export
is purchased by paddy merchants or millers1 agents.

Only a very in

significant quantity of paddy is delivered by producers directly to
the larger commercial rice mills and warehouses located in the large
cities.

It is the common practice of most paddy buyers to make

advances to rice farmers at the beginning of the rice-growing season,
in return for which the farmer agrees to repay the loan at harvest time
by delivering a certain quantity of paddy of a designated grade and
quality, and for a certain price.

Under such a system of credit

advances, rates of interest are unduly high and also are partially
concealed.

Until some improvements are forthcoming in paddy assembly,

tied as it is with production credit, disorganized rice marketing at
the farm level will continue to encourage usurious interest rates on
loans by paddy merchants to farmers.
There is no organized commodities exchange in Indochina and, there
fore, no organized trading in futures in rice or other commodities.
However, there is a large amount of trading by individuals and syndicate
who make current committments for delivery on a certain future date.
The wholesale price of processed rice normally is controlled to a large
extent by Chinese millers and wholesale rice dealers, who also are
very influential in controlling the price of paddy.
In summary, the following are major defects in the system of
marketing agricultural products:

(l) farmers are financially unable

to retain control of their products after harvest but are forced to
sell immediately in order to repay obligations contracted during the
growing season, and because of poor bargaining power they suffer the
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consequences of low prices; (2) lack of effective competition among
buyers at the farm level; (3 ) inadequate and insufficient storage on
the farms and at the primary assembly points; (4) inefficient and
inadequate transportation system; (5) excessive taxes imposed on the
movement of commodities from production to processing and consuming
centers; (6) relatively inefficient rice mills and milling machinery
resulting in low quality product of a lower value which is reflected
back in the form of low prices to farmers; (?) Chinese monopoly in
rice trading resulting in little opportunity for rice prices to be
set under competitive conditions; (&) too many middlemen between the
farmer and consumer consistent with the amount of services performed*
which tends to v/iden the gap between producer and consumer.
In the past farmer cooperatives in Indochina have been closely
associated with the agricultural credit movement and most of them were
financed by government-sponsored rural credit organizations.

Membership

contributions never comprised a significant part of the capital.

For

the most part* funds for short-term crop production loans and aD^jo
long-term loans for equipment were obtained from the government which,
at the same time, practiced close supervision of the lending operations
and the use of the capital furnished.

Beginning in 193&, when the

first cooperative was established, the French administration took an
active part in organizing and financing farmer cooperatives in almost
every major agricultural region of the country.

By 1941 a total of

13 cooperatives had been organized and placed under the supervision
and direction of the former Office de Credit Populaire.

Not one of

these agricultural cooperatives proved successful according to usual

standards of performance.

The members were invariably suspicious and

uncooperative with the management, and farmers were seldom disposed
to bring their produce to the cooperative warehouses or mills, except
against full payment in cash at current market price.

More often the

cooperatives became ordinary storage, milling or processing, and
merchandising centers, without the close relationship to their members
or raw product suppliers.

In addition, the administration of the

organizations was expensive, operational and other costs were very
high, and all too often total costs exceeded total income.

The main

obstacles in establishing an institution of farmer cooperatives in
Indochina have been:

(l) the moral obstacle constituted mainly by the

skepticism and abstentionism of the Indochinese "milieux'* who go under
the fatalistic assumption that usury practices are too well fixed in
the habits of the rural economy to be discarded} and (2) the ignorance
and disinterest of the mass of the rural population in the problems
and activities of the management of the organizations; and (3) the
insufficiency of qualified personnel to fill positions of management.
Farmer cooperatives established under the French were inadequate
to meet the needs of Indochina’s agricultural economy.

In general, the

radius of action was very United and existed only in a few localized
centers of concentrated production of "special crops".

The quantity of

produce marketed through the organizations amounted to only a very
small percentage of the total production, and the membership represented
an insignificant portion of all farmer-producers.

The amount of capital

available was grossly insufficient and the money advanced to members
against pledged crop deliveries never exceeded 25 percent of the
estimated value of the produce.

Present efforts by the Cambodian and Vietnamese governments in
establishing an institution of farmer cooperatives are intended to
avoid past errors.

Emphasis is being placed on organizing a new,

decentralized agricultural cooperative institution called the "Centre
Rural" which is to act simultaneously as a credit organism by granting
short-term crop production loans to members, and as an instrument for
the purchase, grading, storage, and cooperative sale of members’ produce.
Special efforts are made to incorporate as many of the basic democratic
principles of cooperation as possible in the cooperative laws and
regulations, as well as in the operation of the cooperatives, consistent
with proper government control and supervision to safeguard against
misuse of funds.

A special, coordinated program of educating farmers

in cooperative principles has begun which has the objective of
obtaining and maintaining proper menibership-management relations.
The present program also calls for training of personnel who will
become qualified and competent to assume cooperative administrative
duties.

Government financing arrangements are being simplified and

adequate funds are provided through American Aid to grant loans in
both equipment and facilities and short-term production and operating
credit to farmer cooperatives organized under the new system.
The continuous need for agricultural credit of all types and the
frequent lack of it have been major factors responsible for the slow
progress in agricultural development in Indochina.

Rates of interest

on loans to farmers usually are very high, often as much as 40 percent
per annum, and in the case of small loans, even 10 or 12 percent per
month or up to 140 percent per year.

Domestic savings are insufficient
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for credit needs, and the Chinese and Indian moneylenders provide the
funds for a large part of the loans.
One of the major elements of agrarian reform needed in Indochina
is the provision of cheap credit for the peasant.

Whether or not he

owns the land he cultivates, the Indochinese peasant is generally in
debt; and, because of the usurious rates of interest charged, he
invariably finds it very difficult to extricate himself from this
position.
In Indochina, the landlord-moneylender is the worst influence
on general agricultural development.

The landlords, in many cases,

depend more on the interest they receive from the loans they grant to
their tenants than on the output from their rice lands.

This explains

why owners of large estates often prefer to divide their land into
small farms and lease them to landless peasants for traditional,
primitive cultivation.
In the 75 years of French administration of Indochina only relatively
feeble efforts were made in this sector of agricultural credit.

For the

most part, the agricultural credit agencies established by the French
were destined to bring credit assistance only to landowners and large
cultivators since most loans granted under the French system stipulated
mortgage of the land as primary collateral for loans.

A large portion

of the capital advanced to landowners by the government lending agencies
at reasonable rates of interest were used by borrowers for sublending to
their tenants at greatly increased rates of interest.

Most organizations

engaged in rural lending activities under the French administration
therefore were not designed to bring needed assistance to native small
cultivators and tenants.

Briefly, the history of French efforts in this field can be
summarized as follows:

(l) Mutual Loan Associations were organized

in 1915 to facilitate credit advances to agricultural entrepreneurs
against physical assets as security.

These failed to assist the

great majority of the small peasant farmers; (2) the Credit Populaire
Agricole was organized in 1927 to supplant the Mutual Loan Associations
however, the depression of 1932 resulted in over 70 percent loss of its
capital through unpaid loans, and this agency was superceded by the
Credit Agricole Mutuel; (3 ) this institution was organized in 1933 to
coordinate the activities of the credit agencies and to enter more
actively for the first time in short-term loans to small cultivators.
The lending activities of the Credit Agricole Mutuel were conducted
through several provincial agricultural banks and coordinated by a
central agricultural credit bank in charge of control and supervision.
Most of the capital was provided by the Bank of Indochina; (4) the
Office de Credit Agricole Mutuel et Artisanal was organized in 1940 to
furnish credit assistance mostly to cooperatives; however, the manage
ment of this agency was very ineffective in bringing financial and
credit assistance to small cultivators primarily because many members
of local loan commissions took advantage of their positions to falsify
loan application documents to obtain loans for their oxm benefits or to
grant loans to their friends and relatives; (5) the Office de Credit
Populaire functioned from 1939 until 1949 as a centralizing and
coordinating agency; however, very little coordinating was forthcoming
and very few loans to individual farmers were granted up to 1949 when
the assets of this agency were divided among the three states of
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
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None of the above-named, agencies were effective in bringing needed
credit assistance to peasant farmers.

They all lacked financial auton

omy and, although they were all closely controlled and supervised by
the central government banking institution which furnished the capital,
a large portion of the loans made were misused by the recipients who
utilized the funds borrowed to relend at usurious rates to their lessfortunate neighbor farmers.
A Program of Reform
The major problems in Indochina are concerned basically with low
productivity of the average worker and the inability of the worker to
retain a reasonable share of his output for his own uses.

These con

ditions largely are the result of inadequate resources, the improper
use of what resources there are, and the social and economic struct\ire
under which the peasant must exist.
are:

The results of such circumstances

(l) a widening of the economic and social strata with a small

upper-crust of rich aristocracy and a multitude of poor citizens;
(2) loss of interest on the part of the masses in the functions of
government; (3) loss of interest in community improvements and community
life on the part of rural landless people having insecurity of tenure
on the land; (4) very little contribution from the majority of the
population toward the economy and prosperity of the nation, or the
moral and financial support of the government; and (5) further
disruption of the social and economic order occasioned by the
practices and selfish interest of merchants, moneylenders and landlords.
Past errors in colonial rule and administration of Indochina
brought about armed rebellion by a large percentage of the masses and
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resulted in Communism gaining control over a large portion of the
country.

Armed revolution is not the answer, and it should not be

resorted to as a substitute for positive government action designed
to bring about improvements in the living of the people.
A program designed to improve the economic well-being of the
Indochinese peasant and, consequently, the national economy, should
emphasize increasing the productivity of the land and the worker of
the land.

This objective must be accompanied by steps to assure the

equitable distribution of the production.

These aims can be fostered

under a program which will:
1.

Provide short-term crop production and medium-term land
improvement and equipment loans to farmers at reasonable
rates of interest, and thus decrease the reliance of
farmers upon merchants and moneylenders for this type of
credit assistance. The administration of the newlyorganized Agricultural Credit Service should be strengthened
and procedures for granting loans should be simplified.

2.

Inprove the land tenure situation by implementing a sound
and administratively feasible program designed to: (a)
immediately effectuate reduction of land rent, greater
security of tenure and formalizing the rights of squatters
and displaced fairo families on abandoned farm lands in
South Vietnam, and (b) eventually redistribute the lands
on a more equitable basis by setting definite land retention
limits, government purchase of large estates for redistribu
tion on a reimbursable basis to landless peasants and owners
of uneconomically small parcels of land.

3.

Bring forth greater efforts to improve the system under which
most agricultural products are marketed. Emphasis toward
re-establishing local storage and rice milling and other
primary processing facilities in the rural areas is necessary.
Basic revisions in taxation and credit policies are needed
to attract more private investment in such facilities closer
to the points of agricultural production. In addition, the
new government program of furnishing the capital, leadership
and guidance necessary to organize fanner credit, marketing,
and purchase cooperatives at the village level should be
enlarged and given all support possible. There is great
need also for more government activities in the fields of
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market information, crop reporting and statistical informa
tion, and of getting such information to the farmers for
their own benefit. In connection with farmer cooperatives,
rural people should be encouraged to perform more of the
basic marketing services themselves and thus narrow the gap
between them and consumers.
4*

Strengthen the government Agricultural Service to include a
farmer education, information or agricultural extension
section designed to acquaint rural people with benefits
obtainable through improved methods of crop production and
harvesting, such as use of better and proper equipment for
land preparation and crop cultivation, improved seed stock,
proper fertilization and more extensive use of fertilizers.
Government agricultural credit policies should be directed
toward helping farmers incorporate these improvements in
their farming practices and wider cooperative use of small
stationary rice threshers as well as greater care in handling,
drying and home storage of farm products, mainly rice. There
is a great need to make the personnel in the Ministry of
Agriculture and the Agricultural and related services more
conscious of their responsibility toward helping small farmers
improve their living conditions.

5.

Give greater emphasis to the government program of rural
education and health improvement. Increasing the vitality
and decreasing the degree of illiteracy of rural people
would contribute material]y to increasing the interest of
the masses in and their support of local, regional and
nat i ona 1 g ove rninents.

6.

In the interest of greater industralization and economic
development, and moving the excess farming population off
the farms, provide opportunities for more employment outside
of agriculture. Proper government fiscal and Monetary
(credit) policies designed to promote and foster more small
industries in rural provinces would be a step in the right
direction.

7.

Foster improvements in the field of transportation. Special
efforts should be made in repairing war damage to existing
roads, bridges and navigable streams and in building more
rural, farm-to-market roads and thereby facilitate transporta
tion of produce to and from the producing areas.

8.

Place greater emphasis in improving irrigation methods and
water-control facilities. Improved water control and drainage
would bring large areas of land under cultivation and also
decrease the ravaging effects of periodic floods in the deltas.
Better irrigation methods would make it possible to increase
total rice production, reduce the large amount of labor utilized
in lifting irrigation water and also make it possible to increase
substantially the total area planted to crops during the dry
season.
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9.

Before any long-term and permanent improvement in the
general economy and living conditions of the masses in
particular can be forthcoming there must be greater
stability in offices of governmental authority directing
and enforcing action programs leading toward such improve
ments.

Probably the paramount desire of farmers in Indochina is to become
owners of the land they cultivate.

The evils of absentee land ownership

and the exhorbitant land rentals and interest rates of landowners and
moneylenders undoubtedly contribute most of the dissatisfaction expressed
by farmers, and are the major cause of the extreme misery of most rural
families.

Uncertainty of tenure and otherwise unfavorable tenure rela

tions also have been major factors causing unrest.

There is probably

no greater certainty of tenure than there is stability in the provincial
and national governments.

The average peasant farmer is little concerned

about government stability because he does not consider himself closely
associated with it and seldom gets to know the name of the person
appointed chief of his province before a new one is appointed.

However,

he is definitely concerned about the availability of a plot of land to
farm, and in the absence of lease or land rent contracts stipulating
duration and other conditions of tenure, he often finds himself abandoned
by the landowner at harvest time, or as soon as his debts to the land
lord are cleared.

When another piece of land is found it invariably is

obtained only on the new owner's terms.
If the free democratic Vietnamese government had sufficient stability,
power and determination to actually and forcefully administer and imple
ment the present agrarian reform statutes over the whole rural area, the
basic desires of farmers in improved tenure relations and in land owner
ship would be forthcoming.

The present state of agrarian unrest would
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diminish and greater stability and economic well-being of the rural
population would result.
However, improved tenure conditions and land ownership per se
will not solve all the social and economic ills of farmers.

Lack of

adequate credit of any type and the present system of unorganized
marketing facilities or channels also are very effective detriments to
farmer prosperity.

Positive and determined government action is needed

to remedy the prevailing situation of 10 percent per month interest on
short-term production credit and of farmers receiving only 40 percent
of the market value of the crop as their share of the harvest.

Such

usury practices will have to change for the benefit of farmers before
any material economic improvement can be expected.
need to be taken by the government.

All efforts possible

The program of government-sponsored

and financed farmer marketing cooperatives and the National Agricultural
Credit System recently started can go a long way toward remedying the
situation, if they are properly administered and adequately financed.
The presence of foreigners, primarily French, Indian and Chinese,
in agricultural undertakings, and their predominance in the farm credit
and agricultural marketing fields, is viewed with distrust by most
Indochinese farmers.

It is becoming absolutely necessary that the

Indochinese nationals themselves replace foreign interests and assume
a larger role.

It is no longer possible to expect contentment,

stability, and economic and social improvement for the citizenry of a
country when there are in that country 90,000 or 100,000 foreigners
living in luxury but surrounded by 2S-odd million "natives" - 90 percent
of whom live under conditions of extreme poverty.
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These recommendations and suggestions are presented as ideas for
consideration by those in position and charged with the responsibility
of improving the national economy in general and agrarian problems in
particular.

Governmental authorities can present and pursue lines of

action designed to implement needed improvements, but the final solution
can be achieved on a permanent basis only if the people themselves are
properly oriented and given the opportunity to cooperate in the develop
ment of plans and execution of programs, and become closely associated
with all reform movements.

The rural people themselves must come

forward with active support rather than passive resistance.
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191*6.

Domat-MOntchrestien

Paris;

Alcan, 1907*

Lebel, G. Deux Aspects de L ’Evaluation du Protectorat Francais en Annam,
Tonkin. (These Droit) Paris; 19J2.
Le Boulanger, Paul.

Histoire du Laos Francais.

Paris;

Plon, 1930.

373
Le Bourgeois, Jacques. Saigon sana la France, des Japonais au Vietnam.
Paris? Plon, 19U9.
Lien-Vu-Ngoc* Hours et Coutumes du Vietnam.
Hanoi, 19U2T

Hanoi:

Imprimerie de

Levy, Roger, et al. French Interests, and policies in the Far East*
York* Institute of Pacific Relations, l£Ul*
♦

L»Indochine et ses Traites.

Mayban, Charles.
Ory, Pierre*

Paris:

Hartmann, 19U7*

Histoire Moderns du Pays d»Annam.

La Commune Annamite au Tonkin.

New

Paris:

Paris:

Plon, 1919.

Challamel, 1891*.

Quoc-Nguyen-Ai. Le Proces de la;Colonization Francaise.
du Travail,

Paris:

Librairie

Quynh-Pham-Le • Le Pays an Tonkinois a Travers le Parle r Populaire*
Hanoi: Dong Kinh,”1^31>*
*

Essais Franco-Annamite s.

Hue:

Imprimerie Bai Huy Tri, 1937.

• Histoire de la Fondation d*une Commune Annamite au Tonkin.
Hanoi: "Tampin, T9UT7
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GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS
Associated States of Indochina

Annuaire Statistique de 1*Indochine - 19U7-U8*
Chapter I, climabologie* Pages 1-15;
0hapter II, Terretoire et population, Pages 15-2U;
Chapter VI, Agriculture T^vLvage, Forets. Pages 93-107;
Chapter VII,”Industrie* Pages 107-119*
Chapter VIII, Transports et Communications* .Pages 119-155;
Chapter IX, Monnaie et finances Privee* Fages 155-175;
Chapter X, Finances Fublique* Pages 175-197;
Chapter XI, CommerceJ pages 197-253#
Chapter XII, Travail, pages 253-257;
Chapter XIV, Uonsommation. Pages 277-293*
La Culture du Tabac au Cambodge* Report on Cambodian Tobacco production,
"processing, TlncT"marketing presented by Mr* Khoun-Chhup before the
World Tobacco Congress at Amsterdam in 1951* Pnon Penh, Cambodia,
July, 1951Plan d»Equipment de la Cooperation Agricole et Aide Americaine* Ministre
de 1»Economic Nationale, Office du Credit populalre, Saigon,
September, 1951*
L ’Information dtindochine, No* 8U8* La Mechanization de la Culture du
Rjg du Sud-Vietnam* Saigon: November, 1951*
Bulletin Economique du Vietnam, No* 10* Institut de la Statistique et
des fctudes Economiquas. Saigon, October, 1952*
Annaire Statistique du Laos* Ministre de l»Econonri.e Nationale, Direction
de la Statistique, Vol* 2, 1950-51* Vietienne, Laos; 1952*.
Land Tax Law for Central Vietnam*

Governmental Arrete of December 30,
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Indochine, Sud-Est Asiatique, No, 22* Reformes Agraire au Vietnam, by
Edouard”Axelard, Saigon,“October, 1953 •
L 1Annuaire Bleu*

Institut de la Statistique du Vietnam, Saigon, 1953*

Modern Cambodia, Ed* Press Office of the Royal Palace, Pnon Penh,
Cambodia, 1953*

Statute Juridiques des Cooperatives Agricole* Royaume du Cambodge,
Office du Credit' Populalre, pnon Penh, Cambodia, 195U*
Rapport de Qastion de 1»Exercise - 1951* 1952, 1953* 195U* Royaume du
SamEodge, CffTce du Credit Populaire, Pnon Penh, Cambodia, 1955*
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France
Culture, Preparation et Vente du Tabac au Cambodge* Gouvernement General
He 1*indochine. Extra!t'cTu 'Bulletin ^Economique de 1*Indochine,
anne 19hl; Article by C* Badoux, Pnon Penh, Cambodia, 19U2.
Premier Rapport de la Commission de Modernization de 1* Indochine, Plan
He Modernization et d»Equipment. RepubliqueTrancaise, Jbresidence
Hu Consiel, Saigon, November, 19H8.
La Cooperation Agricole en Indochine* Haut Commisariat de France en
indochine, Office Hu Credit Populaire• Article by H*A*C* Moreau,
Director, Saigon, October, 19U9*
Etudes et Documents, No. U* Institut d*Emmission des Etats du Cambodge,
du~iaos, et du VTetnam, Service des Etudes Economique et Financiers,
Saigon, December, 1953*
United States
Department of Agriculture.
“
IV Foreign Agricultural Report No, 15, World Rice Production
and Trade, by Fred J. Rossi ter, T. L* willahan, and W. E.
CummingsV Washington, October, 19U6*
2. Foreign Agriculture Circular FR-3-h8* Reports on the Rice
Situation in the Malayan Federation and Straits^ettleraenb
and in French Indochina, by"j, NormanEfferson, Washington,

Hay,”X95B*
3. Office of Fireign Agricultural Relations* The Agriculture
of French Indochina. (1950)
U* foreign Agriculture Circular, FR 6-51* Rice Situation in
Indochina, by isam Deshatels, Washington, September, 195T.
Department of State*
1* Economic'Cooperation Administration, Division of Statistics
and Reports. Far East Data Book, Indochina Section, Wash
ington, November, 1951. £p • 21-30.
2. Basic Information Summary* Prepared by the American Embassy,
Saigon,“ July, ±953*
3* International Conference on Agricultural and cooperative
Credit, Vols. I and II, Proceedings and Papers; Selected
Readings in Agricultural Credit, international Cooperative
Administration and 'university "of California Cooperating,
Berkeley, October, 1952*
h. International Cooperation Administration. Periodic Reports
to Congress. Washington, 1950-1955*
5* Embassy Dispatches on Vietminh Land Reform; especially
dispatches No. 302, February^, 195U, and No. 133»
October 2, T95U, and enclosures containingThe following
documents pertaining to Vietminh land reform and credits
a. Policy toward the Peasant Class
b* Classification of Peasant Social Groups
c* Forward with the Application of Agrarian Reform
d. Vietminh land Reform Daw
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6* united States Operations Missions to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
Quarterly Reports, Saigon, 19^0-1955*
Eighty-third Congress. First Session. Indochina; Report of the Senator
Kike Mansfield on a Study Mission to the Associates Spates of Indo
china^" Washington,' October 2Y,

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

AGRARIAN REFORM ORDINANCE NO. 20
Complete Text of ORDINANCE No. 20 of June 4, 1953 as it
now reads after incorporating the changes made by ORDI
NANCE No. 2 of January 8, 1955 and including the new
specimen contract Type A appended to Ordinance No. 2 by
Amendment No. 6 of February 5, 1955.

HIS MAJESTY BAO-DAI, CHIEF OF STATE,
In view of Ordinance No. 1 of July 1, 1949, fixing the conditions for
the organization and functioning of public institutions;
In view of Ordinance No. 2 of July 1, 1949, as modified by Ordinance
No. 21 of August 4, 1954, relating to the organization of
public Administrations;
In view of Ordinance No. 19 of June 4, 1953, fixing the procedures for
return to the regional private domain and the redistribution
of uncultivated portions of agricultural concessions;
In view of Ordinance No. 20 of June 4, 1953, establishing the regulations
governing tenant farming;
In view of Ordinance No. 21 of June 4, 1953, stipulating and limiting
the extent of maximum rice-field and agricultural land
holdings.
In view of Ordinance No. 22 June 4, 1953, establishing procedures for
the enjoyment of usufruct of rice-fields and agricultural
land;
In view of Decree No. 15 of June 19, 1954, nominating Mr. NGO DINH
DIEM as President of the State Council and in consideration
of the complete civil and military authority granted to him
by the Chief of State;
In view of Decree No. 94-CP of September 24, 1954, as amended and com
pleted by subsequent Decree, determining the composition of
the Government;
On the proposal of the Minister of Agriculture;
The Council of Ministers being agreed,
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IT IS DECREED THAT :
Section £
Definitions
Article j.. A rural landowner, or proprietor (Chu-dien) is defined
as the individual or legal entity who, possessing the ownership or the
usufruct of rice or agricultural lands, cultivates them himself or rents
them in part or in whole *
-to a tenant farmer (Ta-dien), by a farming lease, in considera
tion of an annual rental in cash or in paddyj
-to a sharecropper (Lam-re), by a lease based on payment of ground
rent, or a sharecropping agreement based on a division between
the two parties of the crop*
The assignees of the said rural landowners are included with them,
for purposes of this Ordinance*
Article 2. A tenant farmer, or Ta-dien, is defined as one who,
having arranged with a rural proprietor a farming lease, based on an
annual rental in cash or in paddy, cultivates, by himself or with the
assistance of others, one or more parcels of rice or farming land be
longing to the proprietor in question.
Article
A sharecropper or Lam-re is defined as one who, having
executed together with a rural proprietor a sharecropping lease based on
a division or sharing of the usufruct between the two contracting
parties, cultivates, himself or with the aid of other persons, one or
more parcels of rice or agricultural land belonging to the proprietor in
question.
Section II
Charter 1.
Concerning the farm leases
Article 4* The farm lease is a contract by which a rural proprietor
rents to a tenant farmer (Ta-dien) a rural landed property, in considera
tion of an annual rental in cash or paddy*
Article
A tenant farmer is prohibited from renting from one or
several proprietors a cultivatable area which, if added to the lands of
which he may himself be the owner, exceeds the allowable limit of land
holding as fixed by Ordinance No. 21 cited above.
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Article 6* The duration of a farm lease may not be less than five
years, renewable by tacit agreement.
Article
The farm lease must be a written instrument in three
copies, of which the original is held by the proprietor, the second
copy by the tenant farmer and third copy kept in the files of the
village where the leased rice field and farm land are located.
Within eight days from the day the lease is signed, it must be
registered at the Communal hall in a special land register maintained
for that purpose.
No charge is made for registering the lease.
No verbal farm lease is valid.
A specimen contract Type-A is appended to this Ordinance.
Article S. The tenant farmer may not sub-let or assign his lease
to a third party without the consent of the rural proprietor.
Article
The rural landlord cannot request the cancellation of
a farm contract or refuse to renew it unless he can offer proof :
lo) that he wishes to take back his holdings in order to cultivate
them himself or have them cultivated by one or several of his lineal
descendents who have completed their eighteenth year and who are capable
of ensuring the efficient exploitation of the farm, providing however,
that the farm contract has been in force for at least three years,
2o)
of any other serious and legitimate reason such as non-payment
of farm rent or excessive and repeated delays in its payment unless due
to causes beyond the farmer*s control, or activity of the farmer which
would be detrimental to proper cultivation of the leased rural property
or refusal by the farmsr to carry out those improvements on the land or
those cultural practices recommended by the Provincial Joint Committee....
Article 10. In case of cancellation or non-renewal of the lease
under the conditions provided for in the foregoing article, the pro
prietor must give at least six months notice to the tenant farmer.
Reciprocally the same period of notice must be given by the tenant
fanner who desires to cancel, or not to renew, his lease contract.
Article UpL. In case of sale of the land by the rural proprietor,
the tenant farmer has, within the limits of allowable landholding as
stipulated by Ordinance No. 21 cited above and subject to the conditions
of Article 5 above, the right of pre-emption with respect to the rural
land which he is cultivating.
If, however, he does not avail himself of this prerogative and the
land is sold to a third party, the latter will be responsible for the

execution of the conditions of the contract, in place and instead of
the former proprietor.
Article 12, The farming lease is not invalidated either by the
death of the lessor or that of the lessee. The heirs of the two parties
partake of the rights and obligations of the (original) principals.
Nevertheless, the lease is (considered as) cancelled without the
necessity of notice if the lessee leaves no heirs, or if the parties
at interest sign a written waiver of their holding rights with respect
to the continuation of the lease.
Chapter 2.
Tenant Farm Rent
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Article 13. The farm rental rate may not, in any case, be less
than fifteen per cent (15%) nor more than twenty five per cent (25%)
of the value of the annual harvest of the principal crop.
This rate is applicable only to the land itself and, where mutually
agreed upon to fixed improvements such as : dwellings, fr-uit trees, fish
ponds, etc.,..
If the proprietor supplies the farmer with seeds or fertilizers,
these products are paid for by the farmer, after the harvest, at the
actual purchase price plus an annual interest not to exceed twelve per
cent (12%)•
When the proprietor leases cattle or farm implements to the farmer,
the rental cannot exceed twelve per cent (12%) of the value of these
animals or equipment. This value is determined by the Cantonal Joint
Committee when the contract is drawn up.
Within the limits set forth in paragraph I of the present article,
the farm rental rate, for each homogeneous crop area, is determined by
a Decree of the Governmental Delegate for the Region based upon the
successive recommendations of the District Joint Committee, of the
Provincial Joint Committee and with the agreement of the Minister of
Agriculture.
In no instance can the farmer be obliged to make any payments or
provide any service either in kind, cash or in labor whatever its
origin or form over and above the payment of the farm rental rate to
the landowner.
Article lit. The farm rent is payable annually, either in cash
or in commercial paddy, at the latest within the month following the
end of the harvest in the province.
Rental payable in paddy must be delivered by the tenant farmer
to a place previously agreed upon by the parties, which may not be
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located outside the limits of the province* When payment is stipu
lated in money, the farmer may always discharge his obligation in
paddy of honest and marketable quality, at the current rate for pay
ment of farm rent.
Artiste te- The tenant fanner is not obligated to pay any rent
if by accident or force majeure the harvest of the leased property
should be at least two thirds destroyed.
Other risks are shared between the proprietor and the tenant
farmer under conditions set forth in the contract.
Chapter 2.
Special rights and obligations of the tenant farmer.
Article 16. The tenant farmer shall have use of the leased lands
under the conditions defined by this Ordinance, and in the manner
specified by the contract agreed to mutually with the. rural proprietor.
He is bound to use the rural rented property in the same manner as a
good and responsible family head would do.
Article 17. The lights of fishing and grazing are'recognized
as belonging to the tenant farmer within the area leased by him, subject
however to conditions of the lease, and especially (subject to) the
possible payment of certain charges or royalties.
Article 16. The tenant farmer is responsible for the upkeep of
small dikes and other hydraulic works relating to the leased parcels
of rice or agricultural lands.
He is also responsible for undertaking his contribution in work
towards agricultural upkeep for the common benefit, and the proper
maintenance of the leased land.
At the expiration of the lease, in case of non-renewal as well
as in the case of cancellation, the departing tenant farmer may request
just reimbursement for his work in improving the land, carried out with
the previous written agreement of the proprietor.
Article 19. In no case has the tenant farmer to bear the costs
of any land taxes, which devolve exclusively and entirely upon the
rural proprietor.
Any contrary provision inserted in the rental contract will not
be legally binding.
SECTION H I
Cantonal, District and Provincial Joint Committees.
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CHAPTER I
Cantonal Joint Committee

Article 20
There is established in each canton a joint committee charged
with carrying out the preliminary study and investigations of cases
submitted to the District Joint Committee,
The Cantonal Joint Committee is an advisory body but its opinion
is in all cases obligatory.

Altlc^e 21
It is composed of *
The Chief of the C a n t o n .......................... Chairman
Two rural landowners, not tenant
farmers, or their alternates .......... .

Members

Two tenant farmers, not rural
landowners, or their alter
nates ....................................... Members
CHAPTER II
District Joint Committee
Article 22
There is established in the principal town of each district, a
Joint Committee whose main responsibilities ares
- to make up a list of the land which for no valid reason has
not been cultivated and to receive the explanations of the proprie
tor or concessionaire prior to proposing either the return of the
land to the regional private domain or the grant of the right of
occupancy.
- to make up a list of the unoccupied State land which could be
allocated as a concession,
- to investigate the applications for concessions of land in the
private domain,
- to estimate annually the average yield of land by homogeneous
crop area,
- to propose the tenant farming rental rate, by homogeneous crop
area, within the limits set forth in the new article 13 cited above,
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- to appraise losses resulting from accident, crop failure and
acts of God,
- to propose the maximum holding, by crop area, that a farmer may
lease,
- to survey and appraise the land and its fixed improvements when
a new contract is drawn up or a contract cancelled, if such survey and
appraisal is indicated.
- to give its opinion on claims for damages in case of eviction
of the tenant farmer,
- to arbitrate, in the first instance, conflicts and disputes
arising out of the application of the terms of rural leases j the dispute
is brought before the Provincial Joint Committee when not settled by
the District Joint Committee.
Article 23
The District Joint Committee is composed of :
The Chief of district ............ ...........

Chairman

Two rural landowners,
not tenant farmers, or
their alternates ........................ Members
Two tenant farmers, not
rural landowners, or
their alternates
..................... Members
CHAPTER III
Provincial Joint Committee
fri&ffle. 2k
There is created, in the principal town of each province, a
Provincial Joint Committee responsible for giving its opinion on the
District Joint Committee proposals particularly with reference to :
- the return to the private domain of the land which for no valid
reason has not been cultivated, or the granting of the right of occu
pancy,
- the survey and appraisal of unoccupied State land which could
be allocated as a concession,
- the applications for concessions of private domain land,
- the annual estimate of the average yield of land, by homogeneous
crop area,

m
- the fixing of the tenant fanning rental rate by homogeneous
crop area, within the limits set forth in the new article 13 cited
above.
- Estimating losses sustained as a result of crop failure,
accident or act of God.
- Determining the maximum holding, by crop area, that a tenant
farmer may lease,
- claims for damages in case of eviction of the tenant farmer,
- the classification of lands by homogeneous crop areas,
In addition, the Provincial Joint Committee makes recommendations
on land improvement measures and cultivation techniques.
It encourages the setting up of agricultural syndicates, associa
tions or co-operative societies as a one way of lowering the cost
price and of increasing the quantity and quality of agricultural pro
duction.
It studies and proposes to the Chief of province measures for
implementing agrarian reform.
The Provincial Joint Committee convenes as an Appeal and Adjust
ment Committee to settle, in the second instance, conflicts and
disputes arising out of the application of the terms of rural leases;
the dispute is brought before the civil court with territorial juris
diction when not settled by the Provincial Joint Conmittee.
The conciliation procedure is compulsory prior to any judicial
process.
Article 25
The Provincial Joint Committee is composed of
The Chief of province or his
delegate .......... .

Chairman

Five rural landowners, not
tenant fanners, or their
alternates

Members

Five tenant farmers, not
rural landowners, or their
alternates....... ......

Members

The Chief of the Provincial Agricultural Office acts as recording
secretary.
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CHAPTER IV
Provisions common to the Provincial. District and Cantonal
Joint Committees
Article 26
The members of the Provincial, District and Cantonal Joint
Committees are nominated as follows s
Every two years, the Communal (village) Councils will prepare a
list of the rural landowners and a list of the tenant farmers on their
villages. Each category of persons listed elects five delegates to
represent them on the joint committees.
The lists of landowners and tenant farmers elected are then
successively pooled
- for each canton,
- for each district,
- for each province.
A committee composed of :
The Chief of Province or his d ep u t y ................. Chairman
The Chief Justice or a judge
of the provincial C o u r t ........................ Member
The Administrative Delegate of the
principal town of the province

............... Member

draws by lot the names of the listed landowners and tenant farmers who
will be members or alternates of the Canton, District or Province
Joint Committees.
The Terra of the joint committee membersand their alternates is
for two years and is not immediately renewable.
No one can be a member of two Joint Committees at one time.
The duly constituted Joint Committee must be convened by the
Chairman and meet at least four times a year, once every quarter.
A Quorum of the Provincial Joint Committee is constituted by at
least seven of its members, including its chairman. A Quorum of the
district or cantonal joint committees is constituted by at least three
of its members, including its chairman.
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The decisions of the Joint Committees are taken by a simple
majority of their members, present ana voting*
The parties to the dispute may challenge one or several members
of the Joint C o m i t tee. The chairman replaces the challenged members
by nominating one or several alternates in the order in which their
names were drawn by lot.
Recourse to the Joint Committee is entirely free of charge.

SECTION IV

Penalties ana miscellaneous provisions
Article 27
For purpose of applying the foregoing provisions, tne following
units of measure are the only one’s recognized:
- For measurement of area:
- For measurement of volume:

- For measurement of weight:

(the Hectare (mau tay: 10,000m2
(tne Are (cong) l,000m2
(the Centiare:.
100m2
(the Gia of ij.0 litres
(the Thung or Tsao of 20 litres
(the Ton: 1,000 kilograms
(the Quintal: 100 kilograms
(the Kilogram: 1,000 grams

Article 28
Effective as of the date of its promulgation, the provisions of
the present Ordinance legally apply to all outstanding verbal and
written tenant faim contracts and cannot, in any case, constitute
a basis for cancellation or nonrenewal of the said contracts.
Within six months from the date of promulgation of the present
Ordinance all outstanding verbal tenant farm contracts must be reduced'
to written contracts.
At the end of this six months period, any verbal tenant farm
contract will be null and void without prejudice to the application
of the provisions set forth in paragraphs £, 6 , 7 and 8 of the present
article.
Effective as of the date of the promulgation of the present
Ordinance, all provisions of current tenant faim contracts must be
made to conform with this Ordinance and must be therefore amended
by an additional contract.
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Any rural landowner who enters into a verbal tenant farm con
tract or who demands or receives from the tenant farmer, over and
above the yearly tenant farm rental ana such payments as may be pro
vided for under paragraphs 3 ana U of article 13 (new) above; any
payment or any service whether in kind, in money or in labor for any
reason or in any form whatsoever, or who without valid reason forbids
or prevents, the exploiting of any leased rural property is liable
to a fine of from One hundred piasters (100$00) to twenty thousand
piasters (20,000$00) independentJy of any damages to the injured party.
In addition he is liable to a sentence of eleven (11) days to
three (3 ) months imprisonment.
Moreover, in case of second offence, a sentence of three (3)
months to a year imprisonment is mandatory.
These penalties are without prejudice to the application of the
heavier penalties which may be provided for under criminal law.
Any tenant farmer who enters into a verbal tenant farm contract
with a rural landowner or who, over and above the yearly tenant farm
rental rate and such payments as may be provided for under paragraphs
3 and h of article 13 (new) above; proposes to provide to the latter
any payment or any service, whether in kind, in money or in labor, for
any reason or in any form whatsoever or who without a legitimate reason
abandons or stops the exploitation of any leased rural property, is
liable to fine, imprisonment and damages as provided for in paragraphs
5, 6, 7 and 8 of the present article*
Any member of the Communal Council who, at the time the tenant
farm contract is registered demands or receives from the landowner or
the tenant farmer, any payment or any service whether in kind, in monqy
or in labor, for whatever reason or in any form whatsoever is liable
to the penalties provided for extortion.
Extenuating circumstances and the suspension of penalties may
be invoked for infringements of the law set forth in paragraph £, 9
and 10 of the present article.
Article 29
All previous provisions in conflict with the present Ordinance,
are superceded.
Article 33
The President of the Government, the Minister of the Interior,
the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Agriculture and the Delegates
of the Government (Regional Governors) in each Region are charged,

each as he may be concerned, with the responsibility for carrying out
the present Ordinance*

Signed in Saigon on January 8,
On the Authority of HIS MAJESTX
CHIEF OF STATE,.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT

ORDINANCE No. 7 of February 5* 1955

HIS MAJESTY BAO-DAI, CHIEF OF STATE,
DECREES;
ARTICLE _I.- Witnin tne framework of the Government policy of
national recovery, the purpose of tne present ordinance is to encourage
an immediate large scale recultivation of unexploited agricultural land
and rice-fields belonging to both private individuals and to juridical
persons.
For the purposes of the present ordinance, unexploited land or
rice-fields are defined as land or rice-fields not having been cultivated
during the past crop year.
ARTICLE II.- Until the joint committees, provided for under
Ordinance No. 2 of January 8j 1955* are in a position to discharge their
functions, the communal councils are charged with the responsibility,
within a month from the date of promulgation of this ordinance, of pre
paring as indicated on the attached form, a list of the agricultural
land or rice-fields which were not cultivated during the last agri
cultural season. This provision applies both to land belonging to
private individuals or to juridical persons and to public land belonging
to the Regional, Provincial or Communal private domain.
Four copies of the lists of uncultivated land or rice-fields will
be forwarded not later than March 15, 1955* to the District Chief who
will keep one. The other three copies will be sent through the usual
administrative channels respectively to the Chief of province, the Mini
ster of Agriculture and the Commissioner General for Refugees.
PROCEDURE FOR LAND

OR RICE-FIELDS BELONGING

TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS OR JURIDICAL PERSONS
ARTICLE III.- Within thirty (30) days from the date of promul
gation of this ordinance, all rural landowners must make known to the
communal council of the place where their holdings are located, their
present address and their intention to cultivate their agricultural land
or rice-fields for the next agricultural season. If these formalities
have not been complied within this time limit, the landowner will be
considered as absent.
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lo - Concerning the landowner who is present:
ARTICLE IV,- When the landowner is present, that is to say, when
he or his legal heirs have complied with tne formalities set forth in
article III cited above, he may agree to cultivate with his own labor
his land and/or rice-fielas during the next crop season or to have them
cultivated by a farmer of his choice.
If he chooses to lease his rice-fields and lands, both parties to
the contract may choose between the model contract Type A appended to
Ordinance No, 2 of January 8, 19E>5 or the contract Type B appended to
this Ordinance, In the first instance, the landowner must pay all the
land taxes 5 in the second instance he is exempted from them under the
conditions outlined in this ordinance.
2o - Concerning the absent landowner:
ARTICLE V.- When the landowner is absent or is unwilling to bind
himself to cultivate his land or rice-field during the next crop year,
these land or rice-fields can be allocated for a period of three (3 )
years to the following persons:

1 ) tenant farmers who have previously cultivated this land,
2) refugees,
3) legal heirs of soldiers and civilians who died on the field
of honor,
if.) war veterans,
S>) anyone who desires to cultivate a rice-field or a plot of
agricultural land with his own family labor
ARTICLE VI,- Anyone in categories 1, 3, H and 5> enumerated in
article V above, who desires to benefit by tne provisions of this
Ordinance should register at tne communal hall of the place where the
lands or rice-fields are located not later than March 1£, 19J?5,
The communal council will study these requests for land and will
make up the list of persons to whom the landis to be allocated. This
list must be publicly posted in the communal hall for ten (10 ) days,
and at the end of this period, if no objection has been registered, it
becomes final.
Any objections raised within this period oftime are brought be
fore the District Joint Committee which wili.
makethefinal decision.
The District Joint Committee wiji also render the final decision
on all other disputes arising out of the application of this Ordi
nance,

ARTICLE VII.- A list of land or rice-fields which have not been
allocated pursuant to article VI above will be sent at once to the
Commissioner General for Refugees by the Communal Council through the
usual official channels.
The list of refugees to whom this available land is to be allo
cated, will be sent through the same channels to the village concerned,
by the Commissioner General for Refugees.
ARTICLE VIII.- Notification of the fact that his land is occupied
will be made to the landowner through official channels.

ARTICLE IX.- The area of rice-fields or land to, be allocated to
each occupant is limited to that wnich can be cultivated by a farmer
and his family* This area may vary depending upon local conditions in
the village or in the homogeneous crop area.
ARTICLE X.- The right to occupy the land for three (3) years is
granted under the following conditions:
The President of the Communal Council or his representative, acting
on behalf of the Communal Council, w i n sign a written contract of the
Type C appended to this Ordinance, with the occupant who has been designated
in accordance with the procedures set forth in articles VI or VII above.
For this three year period, the allocated land or rice-field is
exempted from all land taxes.
The first year the tenant pays no farm rental. For the second and
third year he will pay respectively one-half and three-fourths of the
faim rental rate as fixed in accordance with the provisions of article
XIII of Ordinance No. 20 dated June U, 1953 as amended by Ordinance No.
2 dated January 8, 1955.
ARTICLE XI.- The Government is responsible to the absent landowner
or his legal heirs for the rent. This rent will be deposited in the
Provincial Agricultural Credit Bank or if there is none, in a special
account set up for that purpose in the Treasury.
ARTICLE XII.- If the lanaowner is still absent at the end of
the initial"three years period, the contract will be renewed for a period
of five years in accordance with the provisions of Ordinance No. 20 of
June U, 1953, as amended by the Ordinance No. 2 of January 8, 19^5, and
all land taxes will be due under this new contract.
\
The Communal Council is still required to deposit the amount of
the rental in the Provincial Agricultural Credit Bank or in Treasury
after deduction of all land taxes.
ARTICLE XIII.- If the landowner returns and complies with the
provisions of article III above, he is required to carry out the teims
of the current contract in his own behalf.
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ARTICLE XIV.- In case of sale or transfer of the land, the
occupant will have the right of pre-emption as provided for in Ordi
nance No* 20 of June U, 1953* as amended by Ordinance No. 2 of January
8, 19&.
The new l a m owner is required to comply with the provisions of
the current contract in place of the former landowner.
PROCEDURE FOR PUBLIC LAND OR RICE-FIELDS BELONGING TO
THE REGIONAL. PROVINCIAL OR COMMUNAL DOMAIN
ARTICLE XV.- The right of occupancy may also be granted for
unexploited land or rice-fields belonging to the regional, provincial
or communal domain which were once cultivated or which are suitable
for cultivation.
The lists of those to whom land will be allocated are prepared
according to the provisions of Articles VI and VII of this Ordinance.
The right of occupancy on land belonging to the regional or
provincial domain is granted, by the Chief of Procince acting with the
special authority conferred on him by this Ordinance.
The right of occupancy is granted by the Communal Council on
land belonging to the village or to which it has the right of usufruct.
A farm lease contract Type C is drawn up according to the pro
visions in Article X above.
PENALTIES
ARTICLE XVI.- Any landowner who, after agreeing to cultivate
his unexploited land or to have it cultivated, fails to do so without
a good and sufficient reason is liable to a fine as provided for in
Ordinance No. 2 of January 8, 19f>5.
Any landowner who, without a good and sufficient reason, refuses
to permit or tries to prevent the cultivation of the rural property
which has been allocated under the provisions of the present Ordinance,
is liable to fine, imprisonment and damages as provided for in Ordinance
No. 2 of January 8, 195&*
In both the cases cited above, the landowner must then be consid
ered as absent.
ARTICLE XVII.- Any person enjoying the right of occupancy under
this Ordinance and who, after having signed the farm lease contract,
either does not pay the rent when it is due or who does not cultivate
his land or abandons its cultivation without a good and sufficient reason,
forfeits his right of occupancy and is not entitled to claim any further
benefits under the present Ordinance.
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MISCELLANEOUS

PROVISIONS

ARTICLE XVIII,- Any land, which on December 31, 1955 has been
allocated but not occupied, will legally revert to its owner for what
ever disposition he may wish to make*
ARTICLE XIX.- The provisions of this Ordinance may be made appli
cable for the year 1956 by a Presidential decree, setting forth new
procedures for its implementation particularly with reference to time
limits*
In any event, however the rights and obligations resulting from
the application of this Ordinance will not be affected*
ARTICLE XX*- Ordinance No* 22 of June R, 1953# determining the
procedures for the right of usufruct of agricultural land and rice-fields
is annuled.
ARTICLE XXI*- The President of the Government, the Minister of
Agriculture, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Justice, the
Delegates of the Government in each Region (Regional Governors), and
the Commissioner General for Refugees are charged, each as he may be
concerned, with the responsibility for carrying out this Ordinance*

Signed in Saigon on February 5, 1955
On the Authority of HIS MAJESTY
CHIEF OF STATE,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT
NGO DINH DIEM
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TYPE A
SPECIMEN FARM LEASE CONTRACT
(Ordinance No* 2 of January 8, 19$$,
and Amendment No* 6 of February $, 1 95$)
Between the undersigned;
................. rural landowner, domiciled at •••*.••
Mr* X
••*•..............
onthe
one hand;
and Mr* Y*.* . . . . . . farmer, domiciled at
.*.......... •••••*. on the other hand,

...... ***.*•

it has been, by mutual consent, decided and agreed as follows;
PURPOSE OF THE CONTRACT
ARTICLE 1
- Mr*X *
•••*••• lessor, leases toMr* Y ....... *
lessee, who accepts, a lot of *.......... parcels of rice-field or
agricultural land covering a total area of •••»••••••*••• hectares*
LOCATION
ARTICLE 2
- Thisarea ofrice-field or agricultural land
the village of
... *.......... ...
Canton of••.••*.•••••..•••..••••*••
District of*.*............. *.....
Province of...... *...... .
and delineated as follows;
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is located at

Remarks
(Land Survey
Reference)

DURATION OF LEASE
ARTICLE 3 - The duration of the present of lease is
ginning
At the expiration of this period, the lease will be renewable
by tacit agreement for the same length of time*

^At least $ years

*
t
t
t
t
*
t
t
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ARTICLE h - The lessor does not have the right to cancel the farm lease
or refuse" torenew it unless, he can offer proof:
lo) that he wishes to take back the rural property in order to
cultivate it himself or have it cultivated by one or several
of his lineal descendants who have completed their eighteenth
year and who are capable of ensuring the efficient exploitat
ion of the farm, and provided that the farm lease has been
in force for at least three years,
2o) of a serious and legitimate reason such asnon-payment of
excessive and repeated delays in the payment of the farm
rental unless the non-payment and the delays are due to
circumstances beyond the farmer's control,
- or of any action of the lessee which could be detri
mental to the currently efficient exploitation of the
leased property;
- or of the refusal on the part of the lessee to carry
out those improvements on the land and those agri
cultural practices recommended by the provincial
Joint Committee*
The lessee must be notified at least six months in advance of the
lessor's intentions to cancel or not to renew the farm lease*
ARTICLE £ - When the lease is cancelled or not renewed, the lessee may
claim indemnification from the lessor for improvements on the land
(buildings, constructions and fixed installations, perennial planting
and other land and agricultural improvements whose effect would continue
after the expiration of the contract), provided that the lessee has
received the prior approval of the lessor, or if the latter has refused
his approval, that the lessee has been authorized by the Provincial
Joint Committee*
ARTICLE 6 - The annual rental rate has-been fixed by the Joint Committee
at •'•••.7. ..•% of the main annual crop2 valued at •••••• gia (or kilos)
of paddy per hectare*
However, the lessor and the lessee, in consideration of the parti
cular characteristics of the rice-fields or land, have agreed to reduce
this rental rate to • • • • * . of the main annual crop (optional clause)’

2The rental rate is fixed by the Joint Committee at from 1%% to
2 % of the main annual harvest of the principal crop*
^The lessor and the lessee may agree on a rental rate less than
that fixed by the joint Committee but are forbidden to agree upon a
higher price*
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On this basis the annual rental is gias...» (or kilos ) of paddy .

The lessee binds himself to pay this rental during the month
following the end of the main harvest in the districts
- either by delivering to the lessor at the village of
the.*,.,, gias or kilos of dry commercial
paddy due,
- or by paying to the lessor an amount in cash equivalent
to the value of the
gias (or kilos) of paddy
due, based on the price of paddy on the day and at the
place of payment.
RENTING OF AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS AND
LIVESTOCK (optional)
ARTICLE 7 - The lessor places at the disposal of the lessee the follow
ing agricultural implements:
........... ••«•••.. value:
$
and the following animals:
- ...».................. value:
$
The annual rental for these agricultural implements and livestock
is fixed a t ....... piasters (..«..... *•••$) representing.......
of their value. This charge is payable at the same time as the annual
rental either in kind or in currency in accordance with the provisions
set forth in article 6.
SEED AND FERTILIZER LOANS (optional)
ARTICLE 8 - The lessor furnishes to the lessee
- •••• gia (or kilos) of ...... seed, value:
-

........ ••..••$

kg of ••••••••••.•••..fertilizer, value: •••.•••••••••$

The lessee must repay to the lessor, the value of these advances
plus an annual interest fixed at •••••••••«••.. piasters.h
These advances plus interest must be repaid at the same time as
the annual rental, either in kind or in currency in accordance with
the provisions set forth in article 6.

kjf the place of delivery is not the locality where the crops
harvested the transportation charges are the responsibility of the
lessor.
'’Not to exceed 12%,
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DWELLING, FRUIT TREES, FISH PONDS
(optional)
ARTICLE 9 - The lessor grants to the lessee the use of:
-dwelling-houses:
-fruit tree8:
-fish-ponds:
within the area of the leased rural property.
ARTICLE 10 - In no instance can the farmer be obliged to make any payments
to the lessor or to provide any service either in kind, currency or
labor, for any reason or in any form whatsoever, over and above the pay
ment of the farm rental and those liabilities and obligations cited
above or in article lU below*
SHARING OF RISKS
ARTICLE 3.1 - In case at least one third (1/3) of the harvest is destroyed
accidently or .by an act of God, the lessee will pay only two thirds (2/3)
of the annual rental*
In case at least two thirds (2/3) ofthe harvest is destroyed
accidently or by an act of God, the lesseeis not obliged to pay any
annual rental*
ARTICLE 12 - In case of disaster or theft the lessee is onlyresponsible
for the result of serious negligence or fraud on his part*
MISCELLANEOUS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
ARTICLE 13 - The lessee binds himself not to transfer his right under the
present lease, or to sublet in whole or in part the lot of rice-field or
agricultural land which is the object of the present contract*
ARTICLE lU - The lessee is responsible for the upkeep of small dikes,
b6undary“Tines and other installations on the said lot*
ARTICLE 1$ - The lessee has ihe rights of fishing and grazing on the leased
area,
ARTICLE 16 - m case of sale of the leased rice-fields or agricultural
land, thelesaee will have the right of pre-emption*
ARTICLE 17 “ The present contract is drawn up in three(3) copies, the
first due to be held by the lessor, the second by the lessee and the
.....
third deposited in the archives of the village of
after registration*

^Village where the leased rice-fields and lands are located*

m
Done at

The Lessor

on the

The Lessee

Registered at the Communal Council of
the village of ••»••«••••••.
under No «.•••••••• on the •«••••••••<
The PRESIDENT of COMMUNAL COUNCIL
(Signature and seal)

NOTE* The clauses provided for in article 7, 8 and 9 of the present
contract are optional. The lessor is not obliged toj
- rent to the lessee agricultural implements or livestock;
- lend him seed or fertilizer;
- grant him the use of dwellings, fruits-trees, fish-ponds
within the area of the lease lot.
Reciprocally, the lessee is not obliged to rent from the lessor
agricultural implements and livestock, nor to buy from him seed or
fertilizer, nor to accept the usage of dwellings, fruit-trees or fish
ponds.
But provided that the lessor and the lessee have agreed on the
supply of these loans or advances, these must be made in accordance with
.the stipulations set forth in articles 7, 8 and 9 of the model contract.
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TYPE B
FARM LEASE CONTRACT
for the recultivation of unexploited
rice-fields or land
(Ordinance No*

7

of February 5* 1955)

To be used when the landowner is present
Between the undersigned:
Mr* X.........•••••• rural landowner, domiciled at •••••••.•••*••«
•••«*...•«••*••*•«•«•.••«• on the one hand,
and MT. Y *••••••••* farmer, domiciled at
on the other hand,

.....

it has been, by mutual consent, decided and agreed as follows;
PURPOSE OF THE CONTRACT
ARTICLE 1 - Hr* X •••.••.••••.•**•••••. Lessor, leases to Hr* Y
lessee, who accepts a lot of
parcels of rice-fields or agri
cultural land covering a total area of *•*•«•••••••• hectares*
LOCATION
ARTICLE 2 - This area of rice-fields or agricultural land is located at
Sie village of
Canton of*.**..•••••»•*••••••*•
District of*.**.... •••*•••••••
Province of*.»•»•«•***.»•»*..*«
and delineated as follows:
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DURATION OF LEASE
ARTICLE 3 - The duration of the present lease is three (3) years, beginning
••••*•••»•••.•*•.•••«••..and ending «*«******..*.....

koi

At the expiration of this three years period, the lease will be
renewable for a further fire (*>) years period.
The renewed Haase will be drawn up in accordance with the farm
lease contract, type A, appended to Ordinance No* 2 of January 8, 1955*
The lessor does not have the right to refuse to renew the lease,
unless.he can offer proof that he wishes to take back the rural property
in order to cultivate it himself or have it cultivated by one or several
of his lineal descendants who have completed their eighteenth year and
who are capable of ensuring the efficient exploitation of the farm.
The lease must be notified at least six months in advance of the
lessor*s intentions not to renew the farm lease*
ARTICLE U - Hie lessor does not have the right to cancel the farm lease
unless he can offer proof:
- of a serious and legitimate reason such as non-payment or excessive
and repeated delays in the payment of the farm rental unless the
non-payment and the delays are due to circumstances beyond the
fanner1s control;
- or of any action by the lessee which could be detrimental to the
currently efficient exploitation of the leased property;
- or of the refusal on the part of the lessee to carry out those
improvements on the Hand and those agricultural practices recom
mended by the provincial joint Committee.
Hie lessee must be notified at least six months in advance of the
lessorfs intentions to cancel the farm lease*
ARTICLE 5> - When the lease is cancelled or not renewed, the lessee may
claim incTeranification from the lessor for improvements on the land
(buildings, constructions and fixed installations, perrenial plantings
and other land and agricultural improvements whose effect would continue
after the expiration of the contract), provided that the leasee has
received the prior approval of the lessor, or if the latter has refused
his approval, that the lessee has been authorised by the Provincial
Joint Committee*
RENTAL
ARTICLE 6 - The annual rental rate has been fixed by the Joint Committee
gia
at *.,*.7.*.... % of the main annual crop valued at
(or kilos) of paddy per hectare*

■^•The rental rate is fixed by the Joint Committee at from 15% to
25% of the main annual harvest of the principal crop.

t a

However, the lessor arid the lessee, in consideration of the parti
cular characteristics of the rice-fields or land, have agreed to reduce „
this rental rate to «....... % of the main annual crop (optional clause)*
On this basis, the annual rental is ••.*•••• gia (or kilos) of paddy*

©ie lessee binds himself to pay this rental during the month follow
ing the end of the main harvest in the district:
- either by delivering to the lessor at the village of .....
the •••••••* gia (or kilos) of dry commercial paddy due,
- or by paying to the lessor the amount in cash equivalent to the
value of the »•••*.. gia (or kilos) of paddy due, at the price of
paddy on the day and at the place of payment*
However, during the first year of the present lease, the lessee is
exempted from paying the annual rental*
During the second year, he will pay to the lessor only one-half (1/2)
of the total annual rental*
During the third year, he will pay to the lessor only three-fourths
(3/U) of the total annual rental*
RENTING OF AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS AND LIVESTOCK
(optional)
ARTICLE 7 •• The lessor places at the disposal of the lessee the following
agricultural implements:
- *•«•••«•••*.o.......***...* value ••••••••••••«•$
and the following animals:
-

........

*.... value •••••.•••*.•««$

The annual rental for these agricultural implements and livestock is
fixed at ••••••*•••• piasters representing *••«...•••£** of their value*
This charge is payable at the same time as the annual rental either
in kind or in currency in accordance with the provisions set forth in
article 6*

^The lessor and the lessee may agree upon a farm rental rate less
than that, fixed by the Joint Committee but are forbidden to agree upon a
higher rate*

^If the place of delivery is different from the locality where
the crop is harvested, the transportation charges are the responsibility
of the lessor*
^Not to exceed 12^*
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SEED AMD FERTILIZER LOANS (optional)
ARTICLE 8 - The lessor furnishes to the lessee*
- *.••*««•• gia or kilos of ••..... . seed, value* ••••••••••$
- ,..... •• kg of *•••••*••• fertiliser, value*..............$
The lessee must repay to the lessor, the value of these advances
plus ansmual interest fixed at? «•••••••.*•• piasters*
These advances plus interest must be repaid at the same time as
the annual rental, either in kind or in currency in accordance with the
provisions set forth in article 6*
DWELLINGS, FRUIT-TREES, FISH-PONDS
--------- — (op^onal) ---------ARTICLE 9 - The lessor grants to the lessee the use of*
- dwelling-houses
- fruit-trees
- fish-ponds
within the area of the leased rural property*

ARTICLE 10 - In no instance can the farmer be obliged to make any pay
ments to"~£he lessor or to provide any service either in kind, currency
or labor, for any reason or in any form whatsoever, over and above the
payment of the farm rental and those liabilities and obligations cited
above or in article lU below*
SHARING OF RISKS
ARTICLE 11 - In case at least one third (1/3) of the harvest is ruined
accidently or by an act of God, the lessee pays only two thirds (2/3)
of the annual rental*
In case at least two thirds (2/3) of the harvest is ruined accidently
or by an act of God, the lessee 1 b not obliged to pay any annual rental*
ARTICLE 12 - m case of disaster or theft the lessee is only responsible
for the result of serious negligence or fraud on his part,

MISCELLANEOUS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATION
ARTICLE 13 - The lessee binds himself not to transfer his rights under
the present lease, or to sublet in whole or in part the lot of ricefield or agricultural land which is the object of the present contract*

-*Not to exceed 12£*
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ARTICLE IU - The lessee is responsible for the upkeep of small dikes,
boundary~Tines and other installations on the said lot*
ARTICLE 15 - The lessee has the rights of shing and grazing on the leased

area*
ARTICLE 16 - In case of sale of the leased rice-fields or agricultural
land, thinessee will have the right of pre-emption.
ARTICLE 1*7 - The present contract is drawn up in three (3) copies, the
first one to be held by the lessor, the second by the lessee and the ^
...... .........
third deposited on the archives of the village of
after registration*

Done at
The Lessor

on the ••»*...•
The Lessee

Registered at the Communal Council of
the village of
under No*
......... on the ••••••
The PRESIDENT of COMMUNAL COUNCIL
(Signature and seal)

NOTE: The clauses provided for in article 7, 8 and 9 of the present
contract are optional* The lessor is not obliged to:
- rent to the lessee agricultural implements or livestock;

- lend him seed or fertilizer;
- grant him the use of dwellings, fruit-trees, fish-ponds within
the area of the leased lot*
Reciprocally, the lessee is not obliged to rent from the lessor
agricultural implements and livestock, nor to buy from him seed or
fertilizer, nor to accept -Hie usage of dwellings, fruit-trees or fish-ponds.
But provided that the lessor and the lessee have agreed on the
supply of these allowances, these must be made in accordance with the
stipulations set forth in articles 7, 8 and 9 of the model contract*

^Tillage where the leased rice-fields and land are located

FARM LEASE CONTRACT

x

for the recultivation of unexploited
rice-fields or land
(Ordinance No* 7 of February 5, 19$$)
To be used when the landowner is absent
Between the undersigned:
Mr. X
.............. representative of the Communal Council of
the village of *............
province of ......... ....... acting on
behalf of Mr. T
.... .
rural landowner in the said village, absent,
on the one hand,
and Mr. 2
farmer, domiciled at the village of •••••
........... on the other hand,
it has been, by mutual consent, decided and agreed as follows:
PURPOSE OF THE CONTRACT
ARTICLE 1 -Mr. X
Representative of the Communal Council,
leases to Mr. T ••••••••••• lessee who accepts, a lot of ...••••• parcels
of rice-fields or agricultural land covering a total area of
hectares.
LOCATION
ARTICLE 2 - This area of rice-fields or agricultural land is located at
the village of ........... .
Canton of
District of
......... •••••
Province of ...........««.....
and delineated as follows:
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DURATION OF LEASE
ARTICLE 3^ - The duration of the present lease is three years, beginning
.... 7......and ending
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*
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At the expiration of this three year period, the lease will be
renewable for a further five (5>) year period*
- either by the representative of the communal Council if the
landowner is still absent,
- or by the landowner himself, if after having made presence known,
he expresses the desire to take over the lease in his own name.
The lease thus renewed, either by the village representative or by
the landowner himself, will be a farm lease contract drawn up in accordance
with the provisions of Ordinance No* 2 of January 8, 1955*
The returned landowner has no right to refuse to renew the lease
unless he can offer proof that he wishes to take back the rural property
in order to cultivate it himself or have it cultivated by one or several
of his lineal descendants who have completed their eighteenth year and
who are capable of ensuring the efficient exploitation of the farm*
The lessee must be notified at least six months in advance of the
returned landowner*s intentions not to renew the farm lease*
ARTICLE U - The representative of the Communal Council will have the right
to cancel the present lease for a serious and legitimate reason such as
non-payment or excessive and repeated delays in the payment of the farm
rental unless the non-payment and the delays are due to circumstances
beyond the farmer*s control,
- or any action by the lessee which could be detrimental to the
currently efficient exploitation of the leased property;
- or the refusal on the part of the lessee to carry out those
improvements on the land and those agricultural practices re
commended by the provincial Joint Committee*
The representative of the Communal Council must give the lessee at
least six months advance notice of the decision to cancel the lease*
ARTICLE $ - When the lease is cancelled or not renewed, the lessee nay
claim indemnification from the representative of the Communal Council
for improvements on the land (buildings, constructions and fixed installa
tions, perennial planting on other land and agricultural improvements)
whose effect would continue after the expiration of the contract, provided
that the lessee has received the prior approval of the representative of
the Communal Council, or if the latter has refused his approval, that
the lessee has been authorized by the Provincial joint Committee*
The amount of indemnification will be deducted from the rental
deposited by the representative of the Communal Council to the account
of the lessor in the Agricultural Credit Bank or in the Treasury*
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RENTAL
ARTICLE 6 - The annual rental rate has been fixed by the Joint Committee
at ♦V."**7*.*••••
of the main annual crop valued at ••••••*.* gia (or
kilob ) of paddy per hectare*
However, the representative of the Communal Council and the leasee,
in consideration of the particular characteristics of the rice-fields or
land, with the approval of the Communal Council, have agreed to reduce this
rental rate to ••••••.«»*^ of the main annual crop (optional clause).
Calculated on this basis, the annual rental rate is ••••••• gia (or
kilos) of paddy*

The lessee binds himself to pay this rental within the month follow
ing the end of the main harvest in the districts
- either !y delivering to the village the •••••»•• gia (or kilos)
of dry commercial paddy,
- or by paying to the lessor an amount in cash equivalent to the
value of the ..*•»• ..*• gia (or kilos) of paddy due, based on price
of paddy on the day and at the place of payment*

However, during the first year of the present lease, the lessee is
exempted from paying any rental*
During the second year, he will pay to the village only one-half (1/2)
of the total annual rental*
During the third year, he will pay to the village only three-fourths
(3/U) of the total annual rental*
DWELLINGS, FRUIT-TREES, FISH-PONDS
ARTICLE 7 - The lessor grants to the lessee the use of:
- dwelling-houses
- fruit-tree 8
- fish-ponds
.

-v.

within the area of the leased rural property

^The rental rate has been fixed at from 1$% to 2$% of the main
annual harvest of the principal*
2
The representative of the Communal Council and the lessee, with
the approval of the Communal Council, have the right to agree upon a lower
rental rate than the one fixed by the Joint Committee, but they are pro
hibited from agreeing on a higher one*
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ARTICLE 8 - Over and above the annual rental and the obligations outlined
in ariicTe 12 below, the lessee is not liable for any payment or any ser
vice either in kind, cash or labor, for any reason or in any form whatso
ever.

SHARING OF RISKS
ARTICLE 9 - In case of at least one third (1/3) of the harvest is destroyed
accidentally or by an act of God, the lessee pays only two thirds (2/3) of
the rental for which he is obligated under article 6 of the present contract.
In case at least two thirds (2/3) of the harvest is destroyed
accidentally or by an act of God, the lessee is not obliged to pay any
annual rental.
ARTICLE 10 - In case of disaster or theft the lessee is only responsible
for the result of serious negligence or fraud on his part.
MISCELLANEOUS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
ARTICLE 11 - The lessee binds himself not to transfer his rights under
the present lease, or to sublet in whole or in part the lot of rice-field
or agricultural land which is the object of this lease.
ARTICLE 12 <• The lessee is responsible for the upkeep of small dikes,
foundaiy’Tines and other installations on the said lot.
ARTICLE 13 - The lessee has the rights of fishing and grazing on the leased
area.
s'

ARTICLE lh - In case of sale of the leased rice-fields or agricultural
land, theses see will have the right of pre-emption.
ARTICLE 1$ - The present contract is drawn up in two copies, the first one
to be heTcT by. the lessee and the second deposited in the archives of the
village after registration.
Done at
The Representative of
the Communal council,

on the
The Lessee,

Registered at the Communal Council of
the village of •••••....... ...... .
under N o . .......
on the •••••••
The CHAIRMAN of COMMUNAL COUNCIL
(Signature and seal)
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DEFINITIONS OF QUALITIES OF RICE ESTABLISHED BY THE SYNDICATE OF
FRENCH EXPORTERS OF INDOCHINA
1*

'White Rice Choice Quality - whole round grains with 10 to 15 percent
brokens*
This rice must be fully milled* It must contain not more than 10
percent long grains, taking into account only the whole kernels. The
rice must present a very homogeneous appearance*

2.

White Rice of Choice Quality - whole long grains with 10 to 15
percent brokens;
This rice must be fully milled. It must not contain more than 10
percent round grains, taking into account only the whole kernels.
The rice must present a homogeneous appearance*

3*

White Rice No* 1 Long Ordinary Quality, 10, 15 or 20 percent brokens*
This rice is not milled as fully as the choice qualities* It is
composed of at least 60 percent of long grains taking into account
only the whole kernels. It represents an appearance definitely
less homogeneous than the choice qualities.

1*. White Rice No. 1 Round Ordinary Quality, 10, 15 or 20 percent brokens*
This rice is not milled as fully as the choice qualities* It is
composed of at least 60 percent round grains taking into account
only the whole kernels* It represents an appearance definitely
less homogeneous than the choice qualities*
5*

White Rice No* 1 Ordinary Quality, 10, 15 or 20 percent brokens*

This rice is not as fully milled as the long or round ordinary
quality. It may contain grains of all shapes and length*
6*

White Rice No. 2 Reunion Quality, 25 to 1*0 percent brokens:
This rice is not as fully milled as that of No. 1 ordinary quality.
It may include an unlimited percentage of yellow and/or tinted
grains, and may contain grains of all shapes.

7*

White Rice No. 2 Japan Quality 1*0 percent brokens*
This rice
Quality*
Quality.
5 percent

is definitely not as white as Rice of No. 1 Ordinary
Its milling is less complete than that of the Reunion
It may include grains of all shapes and contain up to
grains with red streaks*

1*10

ill!
8*

White Rice No. 2 Java Quality, $0 to 55 percent brokens:
This rice, definitely less milled than that of No. 2 Japan Quality,
may include grains of all shapes and contain up to 20 percent grains
with red streaks.

9.

Brokens 1 and 2 mixed.
These brokens must be derived exclusively from the milling of White
Rice No. 1, must not contain paddy husks, dust, or straw, and must
not permit more than 10 percent of fine brokens to pass through
Sieve No. 16. They must contain less than 2 percent of whole grains.

10.

Brokens No. 2 from White Rice:
These brokens must be derived from the milling of White Rice,
excluding Reunion or Java quality rice] must not contain straw,
paddy husks, or dust] and must not permit more than 20 percent of
fine brokens to pass through sieve No. 16. They must contain less
than 2 percent of whole grains.

11.

Brokens No. 2 from Reunion Rice:
These brokens must be derived from the milling of Reunion rice and
must not contain straw, paddy husks, or dust and must not permit
more than 20 percent of fine brokens to pass through Sieve No. 16.
They must contain less than 2 percent of whole grains.

12.

Brokens No. 2 from Java Quality Rice:

These brokens must be derived from the milling of Java Rice and must
not contain straw, paddy husks, or dust and must not permit more
than 20 percent of fine brokens to pass through sieve No. 16. They
must contain less than 2 percent of whole grains.
13«

Brokens No. 3:
These brokens are derived from the milling of all qualities of white
rice with the exception of Java rice* They must contain less than 2
percent of whole grains. They may contain a maximum of 15 percent of
fine brokens that will pass through sieve No. 18 and 5 percent of
foreign matter.
The following special terms are used;

1.

Tinted grains:

The tinted grains are considered as yellow grains.

2.

Yellow grains? In regard to the ordinary quality, the tolerance
observed according to the custom of the market is 3 percent up to
the end of July and k percent thereafter, provided no special mention
has been made of a percentage of yellow grains. The Association
may, however, deem It necessary to modify these percentages according
to climate or seascual conditions.

Rice of Choice Qualities: For rice of choice qualities, the per
centage of yellow grains must be a matter of special agreement*
Glutinous grains: The percentage of glutinous grains must not
exceed a maximum of 3 percent in Rice No* 1 and No* 2* In principle,
there should be no glutinous grains in the choice quality rice*
Brokens from No. 2 rice: The attention of buyers is drawn to the
different tents which may be observed in these brokens according to
the rice from which they were derived, namely Reunion, Japan, or
Java qualities*
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STATUTES
of the Rice Farmers Cooperative Association of ________ •
TITLE I
Composition, Name, Objectives, Duration
Art. 1

Amongst the undersigned farmers directly cultivating the land,
and those who adhere to the present statutes, there is constituted
a cooperative agricultural society of variable capital stock
and regulated according to the rules and regulations of the
State Civil Code and those that follows

Art. 2

This society takes the name of "Societe Cooperative Rizicol"
of
.

Art. 3

The Society has as primary objectives:
1. Receiving, storing, milling, conditioning and sale
of rice for the account of its members.
2. Furnishing of advances in money to members in several
installments over a period of time, through a written
engagement on their part at the beginning of the rice
cultivation season, to deliver to the cooperative a
determined quantity of paddy resulting from their cul
tivation.
The amount of these advances is calculated upon the
basis of the quantity of paddy to be delivered to
the cooperative, the periods during which they will
be made, and the estimated value of the paddy shall
be determined each year by the Council of Admini
stration in agreement with the comparable provincial
commission.
The objectives of the cooperative can be modified by the General
Assemblies of cooperators.

Art.

Its offices are established at _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ aru*
of action extends to
.

Art.

The duration of the association is unlimited*

kin

radius

hiB

TITLE II
Admissions, Retirements, Exclusions
Art. 6

All agriculturists directly cultivating the land themselves are
eligible for membership. Membership in the association carries
with it the engagement to conform not only with the present
statutes but also with all interior regulations (by-laws) which
could be established.
The admission of members can take place only upon favorable
decision by the Council of Administration.

Art. 7

All members have the right to retire from the association upon
presentation of a written request to be registered in a special
register in the office of the association. This declaration
shall be made at least two months before the close of the fiscal
year.

For grave and exceptional reasons the exclusion of a member can
be pronounced by the Council of Administration— especially if
the member in question has been found guilty of a crime before
a court of justice or if he seeks to do harm to the cooperative
and particularly if he is found guilty of delivering fraudulent
products to the cooperative.
All members who cease to be a party to the association remain
responsible for a period of five years for all obligations
existing at time of his withdrawal.
The contents of this article are also applicable to the heirs
and beneficiaries of a deceased member.
TITLE III
Capital Stock, Shares, Payments

Art. 8

The capital stock is composed of shares of 100 piasters each
subscribed to by each member. Each member must purchase at
least one share at the time of admission to the association.
The minimum total number of shares initially subscribed to is
200

.

Should a member become deceased, is dismissed, excluded, or
retires, the association is not dissolved but continues in full
among the remaining members. The widow or heirs of a deceased
member can be admitted to the association replacing the deceased
member.
Art. 9

Shares shall always be nominal. The proprietor of the shares
shall be indicated on a special register in the office of the
cooperative. Each share of capital is indivisable with regard
to the association and can belong to only one member.
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Art* 10

In no case shall the amount of reimbursement of shares of
capital stock to a member leaving the association for whatever
reason exceed their original value*
No dividend shall be paid on capital stock*
Interest to be paid on capital stock shall be determined by the
General Assembly, but in no case shall interest exceed 6%.
Shares belonging to members leaving the association shall be
reimbursed to them within a period of, five years after the date
of departure of the member*
No proprietor of a share of capital stock can sell that share to
a third parly without the approval of the Council of Administration
which shall also approve the purchaser as a new member of the
association*
The Council of Administration shall always have the power to
refuse admission to a new member resulting from sale of shares—
In which case the transferee has the right to be reimbursed at
face value of his shares*
TITLE IV
Administration

Art. 11

The association is administered by a Council of Administration
composed of five members elected by and among the membership
assembled in a General Assembly, The Council of Administration
is also revocable by the General Assembly,
Each Administrator shall own at least 10 shares of stock during
the entire period of his membership on the Council* These
shares shall serve as guarantee for all the actions, even per
sonal acts, of an Administrator*
These shares are inalienable and shall be so stamped and deposited
in the office of the association*

Art, 12

Administrators are elected for two years and shall be renewed by
1/2 each year. The first to leave are determined by drawing
lots. Administrators whose terms expire are reelectable*

Art* 13

In case of death, dismissal, or departure, of one or more Admini
strators, the Council of Administration can proceed to replace
them on a temporary basis. The Council's choice of a replacement
must be submitted to the General Assembly for ratification at
the next meeting* Each member thus ratified serves the period
of time of the one he replaces*

Art* II4. The Council of Administration shall each year name among its
members a president, a viee-president, and a treasurer*

Art* 15

Upon convocation of the President, the Council of Administration
shall meet as often as the interests of the association require*
Deliberations are valid only upon the majority vote of the mem
bers present* In case of tie in voting the vote of the President
is preponderant*
Members of the Board of Controllers, established under Article
21 that follows, shall have the right to attend sessions of the
Council of Administration* No one can vote by proxy.

Art. 16

Decisions of the Council are verified by Mi-nutes of the Meetings
entered in a special register signed by the President and all
the members who took part* Copies or extracts of decisions to
be produced before a court of justice or elsewhere are certified
by the President of the Council and the Treasurer*

Art. 17

The Council of Administration is. charged with the general direction
of the cooperative and is held responsible for its proper
functioning. It has, in particular, the following powers which
are only indicative and not limitative:
1* It represents the cooperative vis-a-vis the govern
ment of all public or private administration and of
all third parties and performs all operations necessary
to effectuate that representation*
2. It establishes the budget of the association.
3* It gives the power to receive payments of debts owed
the organization as well as to pay those that it owes*
!*♦ It also gives power to subscribe, endorse, accept
and discharge all commercial affairBo
5* It consents to and accepts all leases, contracts, and
all sales transactions and manipulates prices under
the conditions of all contracts up to a period of
nine years*

6 . It accepts all bequests and gifts*
7* It may acquire, exchange or sell all land properties,
order the construction of warehouses to store agri
cultural products at any location it deems convenient,
constitute all mortgages and other guarantees on the
cooperatives1 properties* However, all loans by the
cooperative in excess of 100,000 piasters must be
approved by the General Assembly.

8 * It authorizes all withdrawals, transfers and alien
ation of funds, rents and securities belonging to
the association*
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9. It enters into and authorizes all agreements and with
drawals as well as cancellation of notices, seizures,
oppositions, and other rights with or without payment*
10* It decides upon the exercise of all Judiciary actions
both as defender and prosecutor*
11. It can issue all sales resolutions, transactions, and
compromises*
12. It issues financial statements, inventories, and
balance of accounts which must be submitted to the
General Assembly; it decides upon and draws up the
Agenda for all General Assemblies*
13. It manages in a general way all social affairs of
the Association*
lU* The President of the Council of Administration repre
sents the cooperative before courts of justice in
position of defender as well as prosecutor; as a
consequence it is against him or on his request that
all judiciary actions should be entered*
Members of the Council of Administration shall
exercise their services without pay. They have
only the right to be reimbursed for their expenses*
Art. 18

The Council of Administration can delegate all its powers either
to one member of the Council or to any other person it so
chooses*

Art* 19

The direction of the cooperative shall be confided to a ManagingDirector named by the Director General of Agriculture upon pro
position of Council of Administration and renumerated by the
cooperative *s budget*

Art* 20

The powersof the Director are defined as follows:
1* He has the personnel under his orders* The expenses
engaged for paying salaries of the personnel shall
be authorized by the Council of Administration and
the Board of Controllers forseen under Article 21*
2* He exercises the powers vested to him and executes
the decisions of the Council of Administration.
3* He keeps all the accounts and records of the assoc
iation.
ii* He instructs all the affairs of the association*
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Control
Art* 21

The association is held to the permanent control of the Director
General of Agriculture*
A Board of Controllers is instituted, presided over by the Chief
of Province and assisted by two commissioners*
The Chief of Province designates one commissioner each year*
The other commissioner, a member or not a member of the association
but selected outside the Council of Administration, shall be
designated each year by the Council of Administration* He is
reelectable*
The Board of Controllers has at all times and at anytime it
deems convenient in the interest of the cooperative, the rights
to examine the books of the cooperative and its operation.
Members of this board can attend meetings of the Council of
Administration without taking an active part but having a con
sultative voice*
This board can, in case of emergency, call a meeting of the
General Assembly*

Art* 22

The General Assembly is placed under the honorary presidence of
the Chief of Province and under the effective presidency of the
President of the Council of Administration who has the duty of
policing the Assembly and watches that discussions do not stray
away from their principal object*

Art* 23

The Director fulfills the role of Secretary. The role of
scrutineers is fulfilled by two cooperators designated by the
Council of Administration.

Art. 21* The General Assembly regularly assembled represents the entire
membership. Its decisions are obligatory for all members, even
those absent, dissidents or incapacitated*
Each member has the right to only one vote regardless of the
number of shares of stock he owns*
Meetings are called by means of letters addressed to each member
at least 20 days before the date set for the Assembly.
The notice of General Assembly shall contain the proposed Agenda*
Art. 25

The Agenda i» issued by the Council of Administration* It
contains only those propositions originating from the Council
of Administration, and, if need be, the commissioners, or
those propositions which have been communicated to it at least
one month before the meeting with the signature of at least
1/1* of the members.
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The Board of Controllers shall issue the Agenda of the General
Assemblies which it may call for tergent reasons*
Only those items carried on the Agenda may be discussed at the
General Assembly*
Art* 26

No one can be represented at the General Assembly if he himself
is not a member of the association*

Art* 27

The names, addresses and number of shares owned by each member
present at General Assemblies shall be inscribed on the roll
call*
This roll call shall be signed by each member present, certified
by the officers of the assembly, and added to the Minutes of
the Meeting* This information shall be communicated to all
members requesting it*
Deliberations of the General Assembly are certified by the
officers of the Assembly and entered into a special register*
Copies or extracts of these deliberations to be presented before
a court of justice or elsewhere shall be signed by two members
of the Council of Administration*

Art* 28

The General Assembly is called at the place and time designated
by the Council of Administration in the Notice of Assembly*
Assemblies are called at least once a year during the two
months which follow the close of the fiscal year*
Notices must be sent out at least 20 days before the date set
for the meeting*
The General Assembly listens to the commissioners* report on
the general situation of the cooperative, to the balance sheet
and the account presented by the Administrators* After due
discussions it approves the balance sheet and accounting state
ment*
It sets vthe amount of patronage dividends to be returned to
members*
Upon recommendation of the Council of Administration it decides
if the capital stock should be increased*
It deliberates and acts on all propositions presented on the
agenda*
It pronounces itself on all subjects affecting the interest of
the association and confers all necessary powers to the Cpuncil
of Administration.
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Art. 29

The General Assembly can be convened in addition to the annual
assembly, either by the Council of Administration in case of
emergency and every time it is deemed useful to have the opinion
of the cooperators to obtain complimentary powers, or upon pre
sentation of a written request to the Council of Administration
for well-defined reasons determined by at least l/U of the coop
erators, or by the Board of Controllers in case of emergency.
Ten days notice must be given for this assembly.

Art. 30

A General Assembly called to act in cases other than those
stipulated in the following paragraphs must be attended by at
least l/h of the total number of cooperators— including those
present themselves or represented by proxy.
The same holds true for an assembly called to act upon the
question^of modifying the duration or the dissolution of the
association.
If a General Assembly does not have a sufficient number of
members to take valid action, according to distinctions estab
lished as follows, a new assembly is convened in at least 10
days in the form indicated under Article 29 above.
This convocation relates the Agenda and indicates the date and
results of the assembly. This second assembly takes valid
decisions regardless of the number of members present and
represented.

Art. 31

In General Assemblies called to act upon modification of the
statutes or on all points in the preceeding Article the vote
of at least 2/3 of the membership present or represented must
be obtained in order that valid action can be taken.
In all other assemblies valid action is taken upon the majority
of the expressed suffrage.
In case of tie in voting, the vote of the President is prepon
derant.
INVENTORY

Art. 32

The fiscal year begins on
of each year and ends
on
. Except that at the beginning of the organization the fiscal year begins as of the date of ratification of
the statutes and ends on ________________.

Art. 33

A summary statement of the active situation of the association
shall be issued each quarter. This statement is put at the
disposition of the commissioners. (Board of Controllers)
Furthermore, at the end of each fiscal year an inventory shall
be made showing the balance of debits and credits.
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This inventory as well as a statement of profits and loss shall
be put at the disposition of the Board of Controllers at least
1*0 days before the General Assembly and are presented at this
assembly*
Fifteen days before the General Assembly all owners of shares
of stock can review these documents at the office of the coopera
tive as well as the list of cooperators and the report of the
Board of Controllers*
Division of Annual Surpluses
Art* 3U

If in the annual inventory, after deductions have been made for
general expenses, amortization of all material and equipment,
provision for equipment and material replacement, there exists
a surplus.This surplus shall be divided as follows:
First 3% to constitute a reserve* Then a sum sufficient to
pay owners of shares of capital stock an interest fixed in
accordance with Article 10*
The division of the surplus shall be fixed by the General Assembly
which, upon the proposition of the Council of Administration,
can decide to divide it amongst the members. This decision shall
be made only under the title of dividends and shall be proport
ionally to the amount of business done by each with the association.

Art. 35 Payment of interest allocated to owners of shares, and payment
of dividends to members shall be made within the three months
which follows the annual General Assembly during periods fixed
by the Council of Administration and in a manner determined by
that Council*
Art. 36

All interest not claimed within five years and all dividends not
claimed within one year shall return to the cooperative. These
sums shall revert to the association’s reserves fund.
Pis solution— liquidation

Art. 37

In case of loss of 3/k of the capital stock, the Board of Con
trollers are forced to call a General Assembly of all members to
study the question of whether or not to dissolve the association*
The decision of the assembly is, in all cases, made public*

Art. 38

At the expiration of the association, or in case of anticipated
dissolution the General Assembly shall determine the method of
dissolution. It shall name one or more liquidators or shall
confide the liquidation to the Board of Controllers in power
during that fiscal year. During the process of liquidation the
powers of the General Assembly continue as during the existence
of the association*

kn
All the assets of the association are realized by the liquidators
who have, in that matter, extended powers. After paying all
social debts and r eimbursement of capital, the General Assembly
shall, upon the proposition of the Council of Administration,
decide to cede any net surpluses either to another farmers*
cooperative or to apply it to other agricultural interests.
Disputes
Art. 39

All disputes which should arise concerning the affairs of the
Association shall, before any judiciary action is taken, be
submitted to the officials of the cooperative who shall endeavor
to settle them out of court to the satisfaction of- those con
cerned.
In case of failure during the duration of the cooperative, or
during liquidation, the disputes shall be judged by a competent
court of law in the home county where the cooperative’s offices
are located.
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INTERIOR REGULATIONS

(By-lavs)
FARMERS COOPERATIVE RICE MILL
I.

General Dispositions

Art. 1

Conforming to Article 6 of the statutes these by-laws are hereby
established— to which all members shall submit.

Art. 2

The activity of the cooperative shall revolve around three prin
cipal operations: furnishing of credit, reception and storage
of paddy, and milling and sale of rice for the account of members.
II.

Credit

Art. 3

At the beginning of each rice production season members shall
be able, on a date fixed by the Council of Administration and
under conditions that follow, to have a credit opened in their
name on the books of the cooperative so as to afford them the
capital necessary for the ordinary expenses of rice cultivation.

Art. h

In order to benefit from a credit account members shall form
amongst themselves mutual groups of co-signers, of at least
five and at the most ten members,“who shall engage themselves
to cultivate a certain surface area of riceland, to deliver
at the cooperative's storage shed a certain amount of paddy,
and to pledge as security the crop produced on the acreage
which they engaged themselves to cultivate.

Art. 5

The members of each mutual group of co-signers shall address a
collective request for loans, signed by all the members of the
group, at lead; 15 days before the date of the opening of the
rice cultivating season. This request shall indicate:
a. The names, number and address of the membersj
b. The designation of the rice fields which they
engage themselves to cultivate individually—
(area, registration numbers on the tax registers);
c. A quantitative estimate of the production;
d. The amount of loan individually requested*
These requests for loans shall be examined by the Council of
Administration which shall verify them and fix the amount of
loan to be opened for the account of each member.
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Art. 6

The amount of the loan accorded shall not exceed 70% of the
value of the expected harvest.
The base price of paddy to be used in determining the amount
of loans shall be fixed by the Council of Administration in
agreement with the Council of Controllers and the General
Director of Agriculture in accordance with the average price
of paddy for the six preceeding months.

Art.. 7

The members of the groups of co-signers shall be eligible to
draw individually the funds necessary from time to time,
according to their real needs, during periods fixed by the
Council of Administration in agreement with the Board of Con
trollers and the General Director of Agriculture.
However, only 30% of the amount of the credit account opened
shall be withdrawn at the beginning of the rice cultivating
season; a second slice of 30% shall be withdrawn only after
verification on a "certificate of cultivation** and signed by
all the members of the group of co-signers and verified by
the communal authorities thaltThe rice fields in question are
actually in cultivation.
The remaining \\0f% of the amount of credit account shall be
withdrawn upon delivery of the crop with reservations being
made to the possible readjustment of price in accordance with
the provisions of Article 10 below.
III.

Reception of paddy and payment

Art. 9

Each year, before the beginning of the rice planting season,
the Council of Administration shall establish a tabular
classification of varieties of paddy by types, and by quality
depending upon percentage of red rice, yellow rice, green
grains, weed seeds, etc. This classification shall be dis
played in the office of the Association and communicated to
all interested meiribers.

Art. 10

One month before the date foreseen for first paddy deliveries
the Council of Administration, in agreement with the Board
of Controllers and the General Director of Agriculture, shall
fix the base price to be applied to number one quality of each
type of paddy defined under Article 9 above, as well as the
percentage reduction in price that each inferior quality shall
be subjected to. At the same time the Council shall determine
the amount to be paid the meiribers delivering their paddy for
milling— provided that this amount does not exceed 70% of the
value of the paddy as determined by base established above*

Art. 11

At least 8 days before delivery of the paddy to the cooperative»s
storage bins the cooperator shall give to the Council of Admini
stration a »*notice of deposit" indicating:
a. The name, surname, and address and number of the member;
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b. The names of the varieties of paddy which he desires
to deliver and also the quantity or weight of each
variety}
c. The probable date of delivery}
d« The number of sacks and the means of transportation
which he believes he will need.
Art. 12

The paddy shall be received by an Evaluation Commission composed
of three members:
a. The Director— or his delegate}
b. Two cooperators designated by the Council of Admini
stration*

Art. 13

Art.

Paddy delivered by cooperators shall be dry, clean, and of good
marketable quality. Drying and cleaning of the paddy can be
performed by the cooperator himself, and at his own expense, on
the drying platforms and with the material foreseen for that
function at the cooperative *s installations.

lU For each lot of the same type and same quality the member will
be given a weight receipt written in triplicate and signed by
the members of the Commission and by the cooperator. This
delivery weight receipt shall show the following:
a. Name, address and number of the cooperator}
b. The variety of the paddy}
c. The quality of the paddy}
d. The net weight deposited}
e. The dry weight of the paddy.
The triplicate copy shall be left with the warehouseman as a
document to verify the paddy stored. The first and second
copies, signed by the warehouseman, shall be given the member
who delivered the paddy.

Art.

2$ Each member delivering paddy can, immediately after delivery, rere ceive from the cooperative a loan up to 70% of the value of
the paddy delivered. In that case he shall turn in the duplicate
copy of the warehouse receipt and sign a receipt of advance*
Those members who shall have received a previous advance shall
be eligible upon delivery, to receive further advances under the
same conditions— deductions being made of the advances received
prior to delivery of the paddy.
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IV. Milling of Paddy and Sale of Rice

«

Art. 16 Rice and rice derivatives produced by the cooperative rice mill
from paddy delivered by members shall be sold, by the Council
of Administration and for the account of the meiribers, over an
extended period (in principle one sale each month) in order to
obtain the average price of the season, either at the mill or
on the Saigon-Cholon market. Sales shall be effectuated through
the submission of bids to the trade by the Council of Administration and at least one delegate of the Board of Controllers.
Art. 17

limited quantities of milled rice destined solely to feed the
families of cooperators and by-products of the rice mill for
animal feed shall be sold to cooperators at prices determined by
the Council of Administration.

Art. 18

Funds recouped drom sales of rice or rice derivatives shall be
deposited in full by the clients either at the provincial office
of the Agricultural Credit or at the office of the Provincial
Paymaster— such deposits shall be carried in a special and
separate account in the name of the cooperative.
Receipts from direct sales of by-products or rice to meiribers
themselves can be deposited at the office of the cooperative.
V.

Art. 19

Consignment of Sacks and Furnishing
Transportation to lumbers

Members of the Society will be able to take delivery, at the
cooperative warehouses, of the sacks needed to hold their paddy.
These sacks shall be consigned at twice their purchase prices;
the consignee shall verify the quality and quantity of these
Backs in the presence of the warehouseman. The sacks shall be
returned within a specified limit of time and those sacks which
have deteriorated will not be taken back. A rental fee, fixed
by the Council of Administration, shall be retained for the use
of the sacks.

Art. 20

The Association will be able to furnish transportation services
within the limits of its possibilities to those members request
ing this service to transportr.their paddy from their private
storage bins to the cooperative's storage warehouses.
This transportation shall be performed at the risks and perils
of the member and shall carry a charge determined each year
by the Council of Administration. BOwever, the reception of
the paddy can in all cases be made only at the cooperative’s
warehouses and in conformity with the Articles.
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VI*
Art* 21

Bookkeeping and Liquidation of Members1 Accounts
>
.
r
All members of the Association shall have an individual account
where all operations made by him with the cooperative shall be
entered* Such entries shall show:
(a) Operations in Money
1* On the Debit Side
a* Amount of advances made;
b* Value of equipment or services furnished
the member$
c* The quota of the costs of the cooperative
as determined by the monetary accounting
procedure*
2* On the Credit Side
a* The value of the sacks returned}
b* The quota of the value of sales of rice
and derivatives produced from milling
the paddy delivered by the member as
determined by the accounting records*
(b) Operations in Nature
1* On the Debit Side
a* The quota of the quantities milled;
b* The quota of weight losses in storage
as determined by accounting procedure.
2* On the Credit Side
a* The quantity of paddy delivered by the
member*

Art* 22

At the end of the operating season the balance of accounts of
each member, as it is defined in Article 21 above, shall show
the position of each member vis-a-vis the Association*
If the account shows a credit balance, the credit— which con
stitutes the gross profits of the cooperative— shall be returned
to the member after deducting withholdings for building up a
legal reserve, and a reserve provided for eventual losses, as
decided by the General Assembly*
However, without waiting for a General Assembly meeting up to
90 % of the credits can be returned to the members; the remaining
dividends shall be returned to growers only after approval of
the General Assembly*
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If the balance of accounts is on the debit side, the deficit—
which amounts to a debt to the society on the part of the
member— shall, at the discretion of the Council of Administration,
be carried over to the following year or be reimbursed to the
cooperative by the member.
If, however, the total of the accounts is on the debit side—
the quotas of each member taken into consideration— the total
amount of deficits shall be liquidated in accordance with the
statutes of the Association.
VII.
Art. 23

The bookkeeping of the Association and the accounting at the
end of the milling season shall be in accordance with procedures
and instructions established by the General Director of
Agriculture.
VIII.

Art. 2h

Accounting and Bookkeeping

Milling of Paddy Belonging to Non-Members

The Council of Administration,
of Controllers and the General
decide to accept to mill paddy
Conditions to be determined at

in agreement with the Board
Director of Agriculture can
belonging to non-members under
a future date*

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX D

Arrete No, 561+ of July 8, 1952, creating the Service National Du
Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif (SNCAAC),
THE PRESIDENT OF Tffi GOVERNMENT
In view of Ordinance No, 1 of July 1, 191+9, fixing the conditions
for the organization and functioning of public institutions.
In view of Ordinance No, 2 of July 1, 19U9, relating to the
organization of the statutes governing public administrations*
In view of the Decree No, 1+9-CP of June 6, 1952, completed by
Decrees Nos, 51, 52, and 55-CP of June 23 and June 25, 1952, determining
the composition of the Government*
The Council of the Cabinet being agreed:
ARRETE (it is ordered)
Article 1* There is hereby created a Service National du Credit Agri
cole et Artisanal Cooperatif, having for itE objectives:
- to promote in agricultural and artisanal spheres, and the
field of small industry, a system for extending loans and assistance
to producers in these categories, either to approved mutual or cooperative
groups or associations of farmers or artisans, or to individual artisans
and small industries, whose activities are in the national economic
interest,
- to accomplish, within the scope of Agrarian Reform, the
acquisition by cultivators of small landed properties*

This Service is placed under the direct authority and control of
the president of the Government*
Article 2* The Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif ischarged;
1* with organizing, in cooperation with the Ministers concerned
and with the Regional Administrations, a (permanent) Office National
de Credit for Agriculture, artisans and small industry*
2, with undertaking the management and the distribution (of its
assistance) among and between the provincial agricultural Banks, or
Caisses Provinciales de Credit Agricole Mutual, and the Cooperative
Societies of artisans, fishermen or related enterprises, presently
existing or which may be created by means of the capital funds which the
Service National has at its disposal in terms of Article 1* below, and
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with coordinating and supervising the functioning of these Banks, Caisses
or Cooperatives, as well as of the societies or associations which are
affilisited with them*
3* with undertaking, on a provisional basis, on decision of the
President of the Government, the technical control and direction of the
groups mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, in case of inaptitude on
the part of their administrators or serious inadequacy in their manage
ment*
Article 3• The Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal
Cooperatif is administered by a Comite de Direction comprising a Presi
dent and three members, designated by the President of the Government
with approval of the Cabinet*
Article U* The Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif has no capital of its own, and does not derive profits*
It disposes of funds provided by contributions from the National
Budget and from the Regional Budgets, as well as donations of various
origin, specially allotted to the Service National*
Article 5* There is opened on the books of the General Treasury a
special current account for the Service National de Credit Agricole et
Artisanal Cooperatif*
All operations devolving upon the Service will be done to the
credit or to the debit of this account, over the two signatures of the
President of the'Comite de Direction and of the Managing Director*
Transfers of funds between the Service and its affiliated in
stitutions or its clients will be effected through the medium of the
Treasury*
Article 6* The personnel of the SerVice National du Credit Agricole
et Artisanal Cooperatif comprises, aside from the Managing Director,
various government servants (fonctionnaires) in the service ,of the
Ministries or the National or Regional Administrations, specially de
tached for this purpose*
Article 7* The appropriate expenses of the Service National du credit
AgricoleHet Artisanal Cooperatif are temporarily assumed by the
National Budget*
Likewise, the expenses of maintaining the personnel of the
affiliated Banks or Caisses Provinciales de Credit Agricule Mutuel
will also be assumed, provisionnally, by this Budget* They (the
expenses) will be taken over gradually by these establishments as
their development permits*
Article 8* Provisionally, and pending the creation of a National
Statute and Legislation governing agricultural and artisanal mutual
and cooperative organizations, the former legislation relating to
these matters will continue in force*
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Article 9• The Minister of Finance and National Economy, the Ministers
concerned and the Treasurer General are charged, each as he may be
concerned, with the execution of the present Arrete.
Saigon July 28, 19J>2

(Signed)
The President of the Government

(Verified)
The Director of the Cabinet
The Chief of the Administrative Service
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Arrete of July 28, 1952, setting forth the special conditions for
operating and controls of Societies affiliated with the Service National
du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif (SNCAAC)*

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT
In view of Ordinance No. 1 of July 1, 191*9, fixing the conditions
for the organization and functioning of public institutions*
In view of Ordinance No. 2 of July 1, 19l*9, relating to the organ
ization of the statutes governing public administrations.
In view of the Decree No. 1*9-CP of June 6, 1952, completed by Deorte*
Nos. 51, 52, and55-CP of June 23 and June 25, 1952, determining the com
position of the Government.
In view ofArrete No. 561* of July 28, 1952, creating a Service
National du Credit Agricole
et Artisanal Cooperatif.
The Council of Ministers being agreed:
ARRETE (It is ordered)
A - CONCERNING AFFILIATED SOCIETIES AND THE INSPECTION
”
stfeVEiLLANCE) CoMmitTEes .
Article 1. The Scoieties affiliated with the Service National (SNCAAC)
are administered by their own Administrative Councils, except in exceptional
cases when they may be directly administered by The Service National, as
provided in Article 2 of the Arrete of July 28, 1952. All members of the
Administrative Council must reside regularly in the Province where the
Societe carries on its activities, and must be chiefly engaged in an agri
cultural or artisanal activity in that place.
The members of the Administrative Council will be elected by the
General Assembly of Members from a list previously prepared by the Pro
vincial Administration and approved by the Regional Governor, containing
a number of persons at least equal to double the number of seats to be
filled.
Article 2. The President of the Administrative Council represents the
Societe 5Tn all its civil activities and relations. He is assisted by a
Director of the Service National, who is acceptable to or is proposed by
the Inspection or Surveillance Committee defined in Article 1* below.
Article 3. The Administrative Council may delegate to the Director or
Manager of the Societe such powers as they deem fitting to confide to
him, but xinder responsibility of the Council.

'
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Regardless of the extent to which these powers are delegated, the
Director shall be responsible in each case for the followingfunctions,
subject to the control of the Administrative Council:
a) - the direction of personnel
b) c) -

the maintenance of

accounts

the preparation of loan dossiers,
the Administrative Council

and theirpresentationto

d) - the disbursement (paying out of the funds) of loans which have
been approved by the Administrative Council
e) - the collection of loans at maturity dates.

The Director will be present at meetings of the Administrative
Council, but with no deliberative voice. He will fullfil the duties of
Secretary,
Article U* The Inspection and Surveillance Committee of the affiliated
Societies, provided for in Article 8 of the Arrete of July 28, 1952, will
be composed as follows:
a) - The Chief of the Province

...............President

b) - A Representative of the members of the Societe,
designated by the General Assembly, who shall
not be a member of the Administrative Council
of the Societe, • , • • • • • • • • • • • • • Member

c) - The Registrar of Landed Property,

Member

d) - The Representative of the Chief of Agricultural
Service, or of the Artisanal Service, or of the
Small Industry Service, as the case may be
, , • • , Member
e) ~ One or two provincial personages, selected by
the Chief of the Province, chosen on the basis
of their competence and their authority • • . Member

Article 3>, The Inspection and Surveillance Committee of the Affiliated
3bcletes“controls the activities of these Societes* In particular it
gives or withholds its consent to all applications involving the expendi
ture of more than five thousand piasters (5,000$00),
The Members of the Inspection and Surveillance Committee may attend
the meetings of the Administrative Council and of the General Assembly
of the Societe, but they shall have no deliberative voice.
They may, however, be privileged to speak and to have their comments
heard.
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In caae of need the President of the Inspection and Surveillance
Committee, with the agreement of its Members, may exercise his veto
against any deliberation which might compromise the interests of the
Societe, or the safety and security of loans or advances granted to
the Societe by the Service National, and also against any decisions
which might be contrary to the provisions of the regulations governing
the Societe, Such difference of opinion will be immediately referred
to the Comite de Direction of the Service National, who will rule thereon.
The Minutes of Meetings must make mention of any interventions or
differences on the part of Members or of the President of the Inspection
and Surveillance Committee#
The Inspection and Surveillance Committee shall also address to
the Regional Governor and to the Comite de Direction of the Service National
all suggestions and recommendations which they consider to be in the
interests of general policy, in respect of Agricultural Credit in the Pro
vince,
Article 6# All operations carried on
subject to the control of the Service
create Inspection Sectors, comprising
head of which it may place one of its
Provincial Inspector,

by the affiliated Societes are
National which may, to this end,
at least four Provinces, at the
agents having the title of Inter-

Article 7, Loans granted by the affiliated Societes shall be subject
to the following conditions*
a) - Individual short-term loans may be granted up to a limit of
twenty thousand piasters (20,000$00) by simple decision of the Admini
strative Council, on condition that a prompt report thereof be rendered
to the Inspection and Surveillance Committeeo
b) - Individual medium-term loans may be granted up to a limit of
forty thousand piasters (U0,000$00) by simple decision of the Inspection
and surveillance Committee and the Administrative Council.
However, in view of the much smaller areas of landed properties in
North and Central Vietnam, the limits specified above will be reduced by
one half for the Societes in those regions.
A H loans exceeding the limits stipulated above must be approved
by the Service National, which may delegate a part of its powers to its
Regional or Inter-Provincial Inspectors.
Article 8. Only the Comite de Direction of the Service National may
grant- long-term loans. Applications for such loans must be referred to
the Service National by the Administrative Council of the Societe in
question, with due justification and under its responsibility#
Article 9. The amount of loans to be granted by the affiliated Societes
to their individual members will be determined on the basis of the
gross revenue of their cultivating operations* In no case may the
amount of short-term loans exceed 2$% of the gross revenue, and for

137medium-term loans the limit shall be an amount of which the annual
amortization payments do not exceed 15% of this groos revenue* However,
the amount of short-term loans may be increased from 25% to 30$ of the
gross revenue on condition that the proceeds of the loans shall be used
for the purchase of selected seeds or fertilizers*
In case of acquisition by "the same borrower of both a short-term
and a mediumt-term loan, the total of payments and annual amortizations
may not exceed 33% or 38$ of the gross revenue, according to the circum
stances*
B - CONCERNING PERSONNEL
Article 10* (a) The salaries and allowances of personnel in the Service
of the aTTiliated Societes (officers, agents under contract (annual basis)
and day workers) are calculated on the same basis and are subject to the
same withholdings and deductions as those of personnel in their same
categories belonging to the various Administrative Services of the Govern
ment*
(b) The Directors or Managers of the affiliated Services may not
claim any reimbursement for their services, nor incidental payment of any
kind, except when, connected with another Government Service, they under
take the management of the Societe in addition to their normal duties, with
due regard for any applicable regulations* However, at the end of the
operating period they may be allowed a percentage of the net profits
realized. This percentage is fixed at*

3% on the first 10,000 piasters;
2% on the second 10,000 piasters, or any part thereof;
1% on amounts exceeding 20,000 piasters, (but the total so realized
may not exceed 10,000 piasters),
(c) The Directors or Managers of the affiliated Societes shall be
entitled (in any case) to some payment in view of their responsibilities,
the amount of which, varying according to the turnover of funds, will be
determined each year by the Service National,
(d) The Directors or Managers of the affiliated Societes will
travel from post to post as directed by the Chief of the Province*
They are entitled, in case of these transfers, to the same travel
and lodging allowances allowed to officers in permanent status of their
same category, and to reimbursement of their transportation expenses*
Article 11* The personnel of the Societes which may be paid out of the
jfetxonai”!?udget, in accordance with the Arrete of July 28, 195>2, shall
be the following, (not including the Director):
one Accountant, or bookkeeper
one Secretary - Typist

1^8
one Messenger - Orderly (planton)
This personnel may not claim any extra indemnity or payment of
any kind. When they are transferred in the interests of the service
they are entitled to the lodging allowances provided for regular govern
ment employees of their same category.

Article 12. No person may be appointed to the management of a Societe
affiliated with the Service National;
(a) if he is engaged, whether personally or through an intermediary,
directly or indirectly, as a principal or associate or guarantor, in any
commercial or industrial activity whatsoever in the same or adjacent pro
vinces as the Seat, or Main Office, of the Societe.
(b) if he has ever been the object of a legal judgment or sentence
implying the prohibition or forfeiture of the right to manage or admini
ster a Societe.

C - CONCERNING REGIONAL COMMITTEES

Article 13. There is established with the Governors of North, Central
arid SoutlTYietnam a Regional Committee of the Credit Agricole et Artisanal,
presided over by an appointee of the Governor and composed of;
- The Regional Director of Economic Service s?
- A representative of the Regional Social Service;
- The chief of the Regional Services for Agriculture, cattleraising and Forestry;
- A regional representative of the Service for Artisans and Small
Industry;
- Three representatives of the Provincial or Regional Croupments
(Associations) of the Credit Agricole et Artisanal; affiliated
with the Service National;
- A delegate of the Service National.
These committees, which will receive the reports end balance-sheets
of the operations of the Regional or provincial Croupments of the Credit
Agricole et Artisanal affiliated with the Service National will offer use
ful comments and recommendations. They may intervene with the Comite de
Direction (Management) of the Service National in order to elicit and stimu
late control measures for the Regional or Provincial Croupements of the
Credit Agricole et Artisanal.
Article m < The Minister of Finance and of the National Economy, the
ffi.nlster of the Interior, the Minister of Agriculture and the Regional
Governors are charged, each as he may concerned, with carrying out this Arrets

(Signed)
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Arrete of 1st August, 1952, governing the organization and operating
of the Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif* (SNCAAC)

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT
In view of Ordinance No* 1 of July 1, 19U9, governing the organi
zation and operating of Public Institutions*
In view of Ordinance No* 2 of July 1, 19U9, concerning the regu
lation of Public Administrations.
In view of Decree No* U9-CP of June 6, 1952, completed by Decrees
Nos* 51, 52 and 55 of the 23rd and 25th of June, 1952, governing the
composition of the Government*
In view of Arrete No* 56U of July 28, 1952, concerning the creation
of a Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif* (SNCAAC)
The Council of the Cabinet has agreed:
ARRETE
Article 1* The organisation and operation of the Service National du
Credit'Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif (SNCAAC), established by Arrete
No* $6h of July 28, 1952, are regulated by the conditions of the present
Arrete*
A - MANAGEMENT AND GENERAL MANAGEMENT
Article 2* The Comite de Direction shall manage and administer the capi
tal fund? placed at the disposal of the SNCAAC* The Comite shall have
the following specific functions:
1.
It shall decide and rule on application for affiliation pre
sented by the Societe1s de Credit Agricole and the Societes Cooperatives
de Credit Mutuel Artisanal et de Vente*
2* It shall decide and rule upon requests for the opening of
credits or for loans and advances presented by the above mentioned societes,
and upon requests for long-term loans on the part of members of the affiliated
Societes, and also upon applications for loans of short or medium term
which may be made by Small Industry*
3* It shall confer and deliberate regarding the SNCAAC and the
accounts of the Managing Director*
il* It shall deliberate regarding recommendations for employing and
discharging personnel of the SNCAAC, as made by the Managing Director.
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*>* It shall study and consider recommendations to be transmitted
to the President of The Government regarding:
(a) The allocation of funds between the different Sections of
the SNCAAC, as defined in Article 7, below*
(b) The proportion of credit to be allotted to short, medium,
and long-term loans, as well as the rates of interest of
the different categories of loans or advances*
(c) The allocation of various appropriations and donations of
funds specially earmarked for the Credit Agricole et Arti
sanal, as set forth in Article I* of the Arrete (of July18, 195>2) creating the SNCAAC*
6, It makes, to the President of the Government, all recommendations
or suggestions regarding the general organisation, the capital requirements
of the institution, and all other questions of a social and economic nature
concerning the agricultural and artisanal production of the country*
No resolution may be validly deliberated upon by the Comite without
the presence of at least one half of its members*
The Comite shall permanently delegate to itB President the powers
to exercise permanent control over the functions of the SNCAAC, and gen
erally to supervise the due and proper execution of the decisions of the
Comite and of the President of the Government.*
Article 3* The Managing Director shall carry out the decisions of the
Comite do Direction, and shall furthermore have the following duties*
1* He shall organize and exercise the permanent control of the
affiliated Societes and Associations.

2.
He shall make all decisions concerning the internal administrati
and shall be responsible for the direction of personnel*
3*

He shall engage temporary personnel, within budgetary limits*

U* He shall exercise such powers as are specially delegated to him
ty the Comite de Direction*
B - ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION
Article U* The members of the Comite de Direction shall exercise their
functions free of charge* However, members residing outside the city
where the Comite meets shall be entitled to travel expenses at a rate
to be fixed by decision of the President of the Government*
Article £*

The offices or departments of the SNCAAC shall comprise:

- The Secretariat
- The General Account in Office
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- The Inspection Department (for agricultural and artisanal
credit operations)
- The Office (Bureau) of Artisans and Small Industry
- The Office for Cooperative b and Agrarian Reform,
C - FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION
Article 6, The Accounting of the Budget of the SNCAAC shall be conducted
according to the administrative regulations in force.
The Managing Director of the SNCAAC shall be the administrator of
the budget of the said SNCAAC*
Article 7* Financial operations relative to the capital which will accrue
to the several affiliated Societes, will be conducted within the scope of
the Account provided for in Article $ of the Arrete of July 28, 1952,
creating the SNCAAC*
This account is divided into three sections:
Agricultural Credit
Credit for Artisans and Small Industry
Agrarian Reform*
The capital allotted to one or another of these Sections may only
be used by the Section in question, all transfers from one to another
Section being prohibited, unless otherwise decided by the President of
the Government on recommendation of the Comite de Direction of the SNCAAC*
Article 8, The SNCAAC is authorized to conduct the following operation,
over the"*Account described in Article 7 above:
1*

To grant to its affiliated Societes;
(a) credit in current account, with which to extend short
term loans,
(b) Advances for loans to individuals or collectives, at
medium term,

2* To grant long-term loans to individual members of its affiliated
Societes*
3* To grant long-term loans a collective basis to approved Societes
and Associations of farmers or artisans,
U* To transmit, through the intermediary of the Societes Provinciales de Credit Agricole Mutuel, to approved Societes Cooperatives
Agricole, advances specially designated for community agricultural works
or projects, or for the repair of damages caused by catastrophes of nature*
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$• To grant individual loans at short- and medium-terms to Artisans
and Small Industries#
6* To receive for credit of the above-mentioned Account the balance
of assets resulting from the liquidation of the former Office du Credit
Populaire*
Article 9* The loans and advances granted by the SNCAAC in terms of the
Foregoing Article, shall draw interest at a rate to be fixed by the decision
of the President of the Government, on recommendation of the Comite de
Direction*
Amounts derived in interest shall be apportioned one half to a
reserve account against eventual losses, Individually for each one of the
Sections, (see Article 7 above), and one half to an account to be used
for amortizing the costs of maintaining the personnel of the Banks or
Caisses Provinciales operating in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article
7 of the Arrete of July 28, 1952, creating the SNCAAC*
Article 10* The Minister of Finance and National Economy* the Minister
.of the Interior, the Minister of Agriculture, the regional Governors,
are charged, each one as he may be concerned, with the execution of the
present Arrete.
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Letter No* 81h of July £, 1953, by the Minister of Agriculture
(as President of the Comite de Direction of the Service National) to
the Governor of South Vietnam, with instructions for setting up a system
to administer an agricultural small loans program*
PROM:

The Minister of Agriculture (President ofthe
Comite de
Direction of the Service National duCreditAgricule
et
Artisanal Cooperatif (SNCAAC).

TO:

The Governor of South Vietnam.

SUBJECT:

Short-term rural production loans*

Monsieur le Gouvernaur,
I have the honor to advise you that I have just received from the
American Economic Aid a credit of ten million piasters for the financing
of short term loans, for the development of agricultural production.
On its part, the Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal
Cooperatif will contribute to the extent of five million piasters, which
will bring the total credit to fifteen millions*
OBJECTIVES AND BENEFITS OF THE PROJECT
This financial aid to rice cultivation is of great assistance to
our peasants, small landowners and tenant farmers in the work of cul
tivating their lands*
In fact, as a result of events, our cultivators are in great
financial difficulties, and find themselves quite at a loss*
In order to meet the needs of theiF Families and especially to cope
with urgent expenses (the purchase of seeds, costs of cultivation, replace
ment of used agricultural equipment) they are obliged to place themselves
at the mercy of certain usurers, and sometimes to sell their crop before
harvesting it*
Such is the actual situation in which these toiling masses struggle,
who now claim our aid both moral and financial*
In helping our farmers to emerge this morass in which they are
sinking in despair, we contribute our part, not only to the development
of agricultural production but also to a rapid recovery of the economic
activity of the country*
Our material assistance will take the form of rural short-term
loans which will be accomplished through the medium of the' 'Caisse Pro
vincials de Credit Agricole (Rural Provincial Banks), recently created*
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DISTRIBUTION OF THE CREDIT
The distribution of this credit will be done in the following
manner:
1*,000,000 piasters - will be placed at the disposal of the
Caisse Provincial of Giadinh, for the
Provinces of Giadinh and Cholon.
11.000.000 piasters - will be placed at the disposal of the
Caisse Provincial of K&rfcho, for the
Provinces of Mytho, Tanan, Goeong, and
Bentre*
15.000.000 piasters
TENOR OF LOANS
mmmm

In view of their purpose, these loans should not exceed a duration
of eight months, representing approximately the time of the operations for
which they are intended, or as an outside limit, ten months only, which
allows our cultivators to hold their paddy and dispose of it at the best
price* This (latter) duration is inoperative and must not be exceeded in
any case*
AMOUNT OF LOANS
In principle each cultivator will be able to borrow *>00 piasters
per hectare of land, but the maximum amount of the loan is set at 2,000
piasters per individual, whatever may be the area cultivated*

INTEREST
The rate of interest is fixed at one percent (1$) per month*
SECURITY AND PRECAUTION TO BE TAKEN
There is not, properly speaking, any tangible security for this
kind of loan. On the other hand, the moral guarantee of the borrower
is strictly required, the loan being extended with full knowledge of the
qualities of the borrower, and especially of the use to which the borrowed
funds will be put.
Nevertheless it would be prudent to take certain precautions to
secure the sums released*
For the security of amounts loaned, the borrower will pledge him
self to hold all or part of his harvest, in sufficient quantity to serve
as security for the loan which is granted to him.

It is understood, however, that if the borrower offers to secure
his land by depositing land title deeds, we would not refuse such security*

PROVINCIAL LOAN COMMISSION
The rural loan operations necessitate the formation in each province
of a Committee to be scried "Commission de Pret"# This Commission, whose
members will be appointed by the Minister of Agriculture on the recommen
dation of the Chiefs of the Provinces, will be composed as follows:
- The Chief of the Province * • * * • • • • • • • • • •

President

- Two MLnicipal Councillors * • • • • • • • • • • • * < »

Members

- Two Rice Cultivators......... * • • • • • • • • • • •

Members

COMMUNAL (OR VILLAGE) COMMITTEES
The Commission de Pret is charged with studying the loan dossiers
which will be submitted to it by a'Comite Communal", which will be chosen
by the Chiefs of the Provinces on recommendation of their Administrative
Delegates or Representatives*
This Comite which is also composed of five members, will be com
prised as follows*
The "Chu Tich" or President of the Communal Council • • • President
Two Communal Councillors* • • • •

* • • • • • « « • • • •

Members

One Tenant Farmer (Ta-Dien) • • • • • 0 * * * * * * * o «

Member

One small landowner * o * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Member

Ifre function of the Communal Committee will be to assemble all loan
applications emanating from the cultivators* They will examine these
requests, summon the applicants, and certify as to the accuracy of the
statements made by the borrowers regarding their identity, the proposed
use of the borrowed funds, the location of their lands, and particularly
as to the moral standing of the beneficiaries*
The Committee then gives their opinion as to these loan applications,
which they therexxpon transfer to the Commission de Pret, which finally
decides whether to grant the loan*
I emphasize once more that the Communal Committee, additionally to
its other functions, will exercise control over the utilization of the
borrowed .funds, to the end that our financial aid shall not be diverted
from the objectives for which it was granted*
Noxf, therefore, I shall be very grateful, Monsieur le Gouverneur,
if you will be so kind as to give the necessary instructions to the

Chiefs of the Provinces, to set up, each in his Province, a Commission
de Pret and Communal Committees,
The formation of a Commission de Pret appeal's to me unnecessary in
those Provinces already provided with a Caisse Provinciale de Credit
Agricole, whose Administrative Council may, in cooperation with the
Communal Committee, adequately fill the role of the Commission de Pret*
On the other hand the presence of a Commission de Pret appears
indispensable where there exists no agricultural credit organisation*
LOAN PROCEDURE
A*

Provinces having a Caisse Provinciale de credit Agricole.

The Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif
will be responsible for giving the necessary instructions to its affiliates
(Rural Banks), as to the Procedure to be followed in extending these
loans,
B*

Provinces not having a caisse Provinciale de Credit Agricole*
The procedure will be the following:

1st Step: The Communal Committees will assemble the loan appli
cations which have been addressed to them by the cultivators* They
will study these applications, will make, if necessary, an investigation
on the spot, and will draw up a certified report* They will then trans
mit all the loan dossiers, together with their opinion thereon, to the
Commission de Pret*
2nd step? The Commissions de Pret, after studying the dossiers,
will give the final decision and will return the loan dossiers, duly
approved, to the Communal Committees, for the drawing up of the loan contract
3rd Step: payment of the loans (disbursement to the borrowers)
will be done by Administrative Deputies (Delegates)*
Upon request of the Chiefs of Province the funds destined for pay
ment of the loans will be furnished (sent) by the Caisses Provinciales.
All these formalities should be accomplished within a period of
l£ days at the latest*
ACCOUNTING
A*

Provinces having a Caisse Provinciale de Credit Agricole*

Accounts are kept by the Caisses Provinciales in accordance with
instructions which will be given to them by the Service National du
Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif*

B * 'Provinces not having a Caisse Provinciale de Credit Agricole#
For convenience, the Commissions de Pret will simply send to the
Caisses Provinciales once a month or at the end of each week, depending
on the volume of loans, an abstract statement of the status of the loans,
on the attached form, A register of the same form must be kept up-todate by the Commissions de Pret.
REPAYMENT OF LOANS
The collection
Deputies (delegates)
Commissions de Pret,
Caisses Provinciales

of loans on dates due will be. done by the administrative
which will pay the amounts so collected to the
which in their turn will transmit the money to the
by Treasury.

As for the operation of completed (repaid) loans, the repayments
must be recorded in an abstract statement, on the attached farm, which
will be addressed to the Caisses Provinciales.
A register in the same form must be kept up-to-date by the Commission
de Pret.
I would ask you to be so good as to take steps with the Chiefs of
the Provinces for a propaganda campaign to be carried out in rural areas,
in order to give a wide circulation of information among our cultivators
regarding this new type of loan*

(Signed)
President of the Comite de Direction
(also Minister of Agriculture)

Forma on which the Commissions de Pret shall report the status of agricultural loans to the
appropriate Caisse Provinciale (branch rural Bank) of the Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal
Cooperatif (SNCAAC), who in turn will maintain accounting records.
RURAL SHORT TERM LOANS

PROVINCE OF
STATUS OF LOANS
(outstanding on

Names of
Borrowers
(addresses)

(1) Nos. of
Loans.

Date
Granted.

Loans.
Nos.

Amounts

Due
Dates

Remarks

(Signed)
(Province)
(Date)
The President
of the Commission de Pret

PROVINCE OF

RURAL SHORT TERM LOANS
STATUS OF LOANS
(outstanding o n

(2)Nos. of
Loans

Names of
Borrowers
(addresses)

Date
Granted

Amount of Loans
Face Amount
Interest

)

Repayments_______
capital ' interest
Dates

Remarks

Ul*9
Loan Contract, covering short-term agricultural production loans, to be
granted by the service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif
(SNCAAC)
I, the undersigned,
(name and address of
the borrower), tenant farmer (Ta-dien) or small land owner cultivation
hectares of rice lands situated at
,
Province or
, acknowledge by these presents having
received from the caisse Provinciale de Credit Agricole (Rural Provincial
Bank) of
f or from the Chief of the Province of
(President of the Loan Committee), representing
the Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif, the sum
of
which is necessaiy for me in order to cultivate
the above mentioned land•
I promise to repay the stun of
, plus interest
thereon at one percent (1;£) per month on
________
the tin©
of the sale of my harvest, of which I solemnly promise to store in my
possession a quantity sufficient to serve as security for this loan.

Done in duplicate at _______________ on

, 195

•

(Signed)
The Borrower
(Signed)
The Director of the Caisse
Provinciale de Credit Agricole

'

of _________________________
Or
The Chief of the Province
Pf
.
President of the Loan Committee
CERTIFICATION OF THE COMMUNAL (VILLAGE) COMMITTEE
Ws the undersigned, communal Committee of the village of __________
certify that Mr*
is in fact a farmer, of smalllandowner,
who has cultivates
hectares of ricelands. We certify,
moreover, that this party, who up till now has enjoyed a good moral
reputation, is deserving of the benefit of the loan which he has requested.
(Or it may be certified that the moral standing of the applicant
is doubtful, and the application should not be considered#)

VITA

VITA
Randall Stelly was born July 11, 1917* on a rice, cotton, and
corn farm near Kaplan, Louisiana.

After attending several public schools

in Vermilion Parish, he graduated from the Kaplan High School in June,
1936.
He attended Southwestern Louisiana Institute from September, 1936,
until June, 19U0, and received the degree of Bachelor of Science in Agri
culture from that institution in June, 19l*0*
He served on active duty with the United States Marine Air Corps
and the u® S* Army Air Force from 191*0 until September, 19U5, with the
rank of Captain, and experienced action in England, North Africa and
continental Europe*
Following honorable discharge from the armed services in the fall
of 191*5 he taught vocational agriculture at the Gueydan High School,
Gueydan, Louisiana, until January, 191*6*

In January, 191*6, he entered

the Graduate School at Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College and
received the degree of Master of Science from that institution in
January, 19l*7*
He was employed as Market Analyst and Statistical Supervisor by
Converted Rico, Inc*, Houston, Texas, from January, 191*7, until January,
19l*8 • From February, 191*8, until September of that year he was Editor
and Advertising Manager of the Abbeville Meridional, Kaplan Times and
Gueydan News —

three weekly newspapers.

From September, 191*8, until

June, 19l*9, he was Assistant Principal, Science Teacher and Coach of
Athletics at the Maurice High School, Maurice, Louisiana*
In June, 19l*9, he accepted employment as Research Associate in
Agricultural Economics and entered the Graduate School at Louisiana State

U52
University pursuing graduate studies leading to the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy.

In September, 1

he accepted a position as Agricultural

Economist with the United States International Cooperation Administration
for employment in the far east.

In this capacity his functions consisted

primarily of helping the governments of Cambodia and Vietnam to establish
an agricultural credit agency, develop and implement a program of farmers
cooperatives, initiate a program of agrarian reform designed to bring
about improvements in the level of living of farm families in Indochina,
and to supervise commercial imports of agricultural raw products from the
United States into Indochina under the American foreign aid program.
In September, 195>£, he returned to Louisiana State University to
complete the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

He

now presents himself as a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Agricultural Economics,
!

EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT

Candidate:

Randall Stelly

Major Field:

Agricultural Economics

Title of Thesis: An Economic Study of Agrarian Problems in Indochina

Approved:

/
Major Professor and Chairman

Dean of tJic Graduate School

E X A M I N I N G COMMITTEE:

(P.

Date of Examination:

May 5, 1956

—

»

